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Preface 
This study describes and analyses the housing and urban development 
policies and schemes that have been implemented during 1980-94 in the 
state of Karnataka, India. While many studies have pointed out that such 
policies and schemes only partly succeeded in fulfilling their intended 
objectives, this study aimed to unravel the factors that have played a role 
in the 'translation' of such policies through the implementation of housing 
and urban development schemes. 
The meaning, premises and rationale of housing and urban 
development policies in India and in Karnataka have been analysed. The 
study has been illustrated with seven case-studies where schemes have 
been implemented. Where were the projects implemented, why were they 
selected, what has actually been implemented, to what extent have thé 
objectives been achieved and what are the benefits to the targeted 
beneficiaries, are the main questions of this elaborate study that are 
addressed in this book. I was able to seek answers to these questions and 
do fieldwork during my posting in an Indo-Dutch development 
collaboration project in Karnataka between 1992-96. The views and 
conclusions of this book are strictly personal and do in no way reflect 
those of any other party or individuals who may have provided information 
and lent support to this research. 
I am grateful for the encouragement and supervision of my promoter 
Prof. Dr. J.M.G. Kleinpenning, who guided me through the 
conceptualisation process of this work and provided me with direction at 
crucial moments and detailed comments where it mattered. I am also 
grateful to Dr. Jan Brouwer, Director Centre for Advanced Research of 
Indigenous Knowledge Systems in Mysore for introducing me to the 
intricacies of Indian communities and Hinduism and Professor N. 
Narayana Sastry, Institute for Development Studies at the University of 
Mysore for concretising this research and introducing me to the 
possibilities and limitations of urban research in Karnataka. I want to thank 
my employer, the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies in 
Rotterdam who provided me with this opportunity and indirectly supported 
me in this research, and my colleagues at IHS for their inquisitive minds 
which prevented me from falling into the various pitfalls. I am also 
grateful to my colleagues at the Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation Ltd. in Bangalore who took keen interest in my endeavour and 
provided me with innumerable ideas, assistance and invaluable 
VI 
information that I would otherwise not have been able to obtain. I am 
particularly indebted to S. Viswanath for his friendship, encouragement, 
impartiality and integrity. For the fieldwork, translation work and his 
unrelenting search for government documents and publications, I am 
grateful to my research assistant B.K. Yagnendra who I had employed 
between 1995-96. I also like to thank Hamsila Samuel-Rajan for her 
painstaking effort to edit this work to the very last page. 
There are hundreds of people in Kamataka who have shared their 
views and shared information with me, of whom a few dozen I came to 
know personally. Although the realities they painted were at times hard to 
swallow, I came to understand that many of them are going through 
difficult times and are not able to speak out as they did to me. I hope that 
this book may speak on their behalf. 
I am also deeply indebted to Monica Windt, my wife, for her love, 
patience and encouragement during these years and for taking the unfair 
share of so many things that had to be done. 
I dedicate this book to my father. 
Utrecht, November 1997 
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1 
Introduction to the Main Themes 
This first chapter introduces the main themes related to the subject of 
study: urban development policies, the actors and the outcome in state of 
Karnataka, India, The scope and various aspects of these themes are 
elaborated and serve as a reference for introducing the conceptual 
framework for urban development in chapter two. 
1.1 The urbanisation pattern in India 
In India, the declaration of Independence on 15th August 1947, was the 
onset of urbanisation. Table 1-1 illustrates that the total growth in 
population has been massive and the urbanisation steady but definite since 
the 1940s. The urban growth in the 1940s and 1970s has been above 40 per 
cent. The growth in the 1940s can be attributed to the massive migration 
which was the result of the partition of Pakistan. It has been estimated that 
about 10 million'refugees entered India from Pakistan (Mohanty, 1993). 
Most of them had no rural base and could move nowhere else than to the 
cities. In the 1950s and 1960s, the urbanisation has been constant and 
witnessed a shift in the distribution from smaller towns to larger cities, a 
pattern that has characterised each successive decade. The urbanisation in 
the 1970s is partly attributed to the constitution of Bangladesh and the 
migration of Hindus to West Bengal and, secondly, to the emphasis on 
industrial development in urban centres which attracted migrants. In rural 
areas, the impoverishment of the small land holders and the landless 
proliferated; natural growth, repeated subdivision of agricultural land 
among inheritors and debts led to a situation in which many land-owning 
families could no longer subsist only on farming. The situation of the 
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landless became worse as their labour was less wanted. Hence, there was 
no other choice left than to search for some other income and to move to 
the cities. With the development focus on larger cities, the growth of 
smaller towns stagnated and many such towns even declined in population. 
These factors contributed to a strong rural-urban migration, attracted by 
the better prospects of urban employment, amenities and services. Whereas 
there is a clear relationship between the level of urbanisation and the per 
capita Gross Domestic Product (World Development Report, 1992), there 
is no clear relationship between the pace of urbanisation over the last two 
decades and the per capita Gross Domestic Product or the growth of per 
capita GDP. Urbanisation seems to be the result of both good and bad 
national economic performance, but was triggered off by different 
mechanisms as the case of India illustrates. 
Table 1-1: Trend of urbanisation in India, 1901-91 
Census No. of Total pop. Urban pop. Urban pop. Growth 
urban aggi, (in millions) (in millions) (in %) between 
census (in %) 
1901 
1911 
1921 
1931 
1941 
1951 
1961 
1971 
1981 
1991 
1827 
1815 
1949 
2072 
2250 
2843 
2365 
2590 
3378 
3768 
238.4 
252.1 
251.3 
279.0 
318.7 
361.1 
439.2 
548.2 
683.3 
844.3 
25.9 
25.9 
28.1 
33.5 
44.2 
62.4 
78.9 
109.1 
159.5 
217.2 
10.81 
10.29 
11.18 
11.99 
13.86 
17.29 
17.97 
19.91 
23.34 
25.72 
-
0.35 
8.27 
19.12 
31.97 
41.42 
26.41 
38.23 
46.14 
36.19 
Notes: 1. In 1981, the census was not conducted in Assam due to political unrest and 
the figures are the result of interpolation. 
2. In 1991, the census was not conducted in Jammu and Kashmir due to the 
political unrest in this state and figures have been projected by the Standing 
Committee of Population Projection. 
3. The definition of urban agglomeration has been changed several times in 
this century. 
Source: Census of India (1991). 
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In 1991, the urban population of India was more than 217 million, spread 
over 3768 urban agglomerations/towns. India's urban agglomerations are 
divided into six classes . The larger Class I cities have sheltered more than 
50 per cent of the total urban population since 1961. Within this class, 82.4 
per cent of the population live in cities of a size between 100,000-500,000 
(Routray, 1993). The highest growth during the 1980s has also been in 
Class I cities (46.9 per cent). On the other end, Class V and VI towns 
suffered a negative growth in the same period. In the states of Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal, however, the Class II towns 
grew more rapidly between 1981-91 than the Class I cities (Mehta, 1993). 
1.2 The history of India's urbanisation 
The history of urbanisation on the Indian subcontinent signified an 
evolution of growing and declining urban settlements (Ramachandran, 
1989). The first phase of urbanisation is associated with the Harappan 
civilisation in the Indus valley, dating back to 2350 ВС. The earliest urban 
developments were confined to the Indus valley and the adjoining parts of 
Rajasthan, Punjab and to some extent Western Uttar Pradesh. In the 
southern part of the continent, Hindu kings established their thrones in 
fortified urban settlements. Of these Madurai, Kancheepuram, Varanasi 
and Delhi have remained urban centres. When the British came, India was 
perhaps the most urbanised nation in the world. 
As far as the urbanisation in South India is concerned, the Harappan 
civilisation had resulted in the establishment of urban centres at the 
mouths of the rivers Narmada and Tapti and in the Malwa plateau. In 
contrast to the northern history of urbanisation, there was no evidence of 
continuity when the Harappan civilisation declined around 1700 ВС until 
the rise of the Dravidian civilisation around 500 ВС. What is evident from 
excavations is that the Dravidian culture used Tamil as the written 
language. Other southern languages, Kannada (spoken in Karnataka), 
Telegu (in Andhra Pradesh) and Malayalam (in Kerala), developed from 
1
 Class I cities have a population of more than 100,000 and include the metropolitan and 
one-million-plus cities. Class II cities have a population between 50,000-100,000, Class 
III between 20,000-50,000, Class IV between 10,000-20,000, Class V between 5,000-
10,000 and Class VI a population with less than 5,000 inhabitants. 
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the 1 Oth century AD as a result of Aryan influences in the South. The 
Dravidian civilisation attained a very high level, with urbanisation as a 
concomitant process. The classical Tamil literature provides ample 
evidence of an independent urban civilisation in the South. 
While urbanisation in the South set in from 500 ВС, northern India 
faced a decline of urban settlements caused by political disintegration of 
the larger empires. It was only with the invasion of Muslims from 
Afghanistan (AD 1000 to 1526) that urbanisation took a turn. New urban 
artefacts were erected: mosques, forts and palaces, reflecting Islamic art 
and values and the traditions of Central Asia. It is argued that the 
absorption of different foreign cultures in the indigenous culture of the 
South did not take place with the Muslim invasion. The southern styles of 
urban planning, infrastructure and architecture remained different from the 
North. 
The Mughal period succeeded (1526-1800 AD) the period of 
Muslim invasions. They established 16 large cities all over northern India 
and their urban planning and architecture is still visible today - though 
partly in ruins. The emergence and morphology of smaller towns was 
determined by a class of feudal chiefs to whom the Mughal emperors gave 
large tracts of land and sizeable grants. Some southern Hindu kingdoms 
managed to resist the powerful military Muslim invasions and stayed 
outside influence of the mighty Mughal Empire. As a result, the urban 
character of the cities on the Deccan Plateau region presents a mixture of 
Hindu and Muslim dominance. The major cities of Golconda (now in rains 
near Hyderabad), Bijapur, Ahmadnagar, Gulbarga, Badami, Kolhapur, 
Pune, Hampi (in ruins near Hospet), Srirangapatnam (near Mysore) and 
Hyderabad provide notable examples. These cities had planned street 
layouts and large market centres. Some of these were walled cities, 
reflecting the sense of insecurity felt by the smaller kingdoms. 
The colonisation of India by European countries started in a period 
during which the Mughal Empire was at its peak. In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries a sequence of Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British 
colonisers established themselves in the coastal ports and some inland 
cities but without having any marked impact on urbanisation. It was only 
in the early nineteenth century that the British established a firm territorial 
hold and India was brought under the rule of the British Crown in 1858. 
Until Independence in 1947, the British exercised unquestioned 
sway over the entire subcontinent including some 500-odd princely states. 
A stagnation and decline of urban centres in India set in, which lasted for 
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well over a century. The main reasons for this decline is contributed to the 
lack of interest of the British in the prosperity and economic development 
of India. Moreover, the emergence of the Industrial Revolution in England 
in the latter half of the eighteenth century needed the creation of markets 
for British goods taking out the source of existence for many smaller and 
buzzing towns, manufacturing and trading in textiles and other regional 
produce. The marketing of the British industrial goods led to the decline of 
traditional urban export and manufacturing centres. The creation of an 
extensive rail network triggered the rise of many smaller trade centres at 
the cost of established trade centres (e.g. Mirzapur in Uttar Pradesh). 
When the first census was undertaken in 1872, the urban population 
had declined from 11 per cent in 1800 to 8.7 per cent. The number of cities 
with a population of more than 100,000 had remained 16 for most of the 
nineteenth century and only 43 cities had a population of 50,000 or more. 
Later, the established rail network and creation of industries in the second 
half of the nineteenth century turned around the urbanisation process and a 
slow but steady increase in urban population was set in motion. In 1901, 
urban India started to recover with 25 cities with a population of over 
100,000 and 69 cities with a population of more than 50,000. 
When the British left in 1947, they had helped in the creation of 
three metropolitan ports, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, that emerged as 
the leading colonial cities of the world. They had established a chain of hill 
stations in the Himalayan foothills and in South India where tea and coffee 
plantations were introduced which produced a number of small settlements 
with distinct urban characteristics in Assam, Darjeeling and in the southern 
hill ranges. They also had introduced functional separation between the 
Civil Lines and the Cantonments, the administrative and military enclaves 
adjunct to the 'native' city to accommodate the British civilian and 
military personnel and their families. In these cities distinct improvements 
were made in urban amenities and in the urban administration. These 
amenities included piped water supply, sewerage, street lighting, domestic 
electricity, modern shopping areas, parks and playgrounds. However, most 
of these benefits were created in the Civil Lines and Cantonment areas and 
not in the 'native' city. The urban administration constituted urban local 
governments vested with responsibilities of providing basic amenities, 
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collection of domestic waste and night soil2, maintenance of roads, 
primary education, public health and collection of local taxes. 
It should be noted that a substantial part of India was outside the 
direct jurisdiction of the British government in India. In 1947, there were 
as many as 548 princely states, some of which were as large as the British 
provinces, for example Hyderabad and Mysore. In the princely capitals a 
similar establishment of the Residency and Cantonment enclaves did 
occur. A difference with British ruled provinces was that the smaller towns 
continued to stagnate and the level of overall economic development 
remained backward. 
The cities became the focal points of westernisation. Schools, 
colleges and universities trained men and women in western thought and 
languages. A new western-oriented urban, often upper-caste, elite 
emerged. The adoption of western values, dress, language, tastes and 
attitudes, their absorption in the British bureaucratic machinery and their 
emulation of the British in all walks of life, rooted deeply. Remnants of 
these values and life styles were maintained among the urban elite, even 
after more than four decades of independence. 
1.3 The urban environment and the urban poor 
Despite the efforts of local and state governments, the present urban 
environment in which many of its residents live is appalling. There is a 
widespread lack of proper sanitation systems resulting in pathogenic 
sewage that is the cause of diarrhoea, dysentery, typhoid, intestinal 
parasites and food poisoning. There is a lack of sufficient and safe water 
which is detrimental to the upkeep of cleanliness, hygiene and good health, 
forcing people to use unsafe water sources. Particularly the poor are 
affected by inadequate water supply systems, while the rich have the 
benefits of being connected to the city network or having an alternative 
water source, water storage and domestic treatment equipment. The partial 
and selective collection of solid waste results in the accumulation of waste 
in congested and poorer areas, attracting insects, rodents and stray animals, 
besides causing nuisance and smell. Inadequate drainage, often in 
combination with a lack of sanitation systems, leads to stagnation of 
The Indian term for faecal matter. 
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polluted water and sewage. Air pollution has become a major health hazard 
in the metropolises: domestic use of wood and coal stoves, uncontrolled 
emission of vehicles, small and large factories in and near the cities 
contribute to high levels of hazardous and toxic substances, resulting in 
eye and respiratory problems, and disabilities and deformation of the new-
born. Another more recent problem is the severe pollution of surface 
water, caused by untreated industrial effluent and untreated city sewage. 
This leads to direct health risks for urban residents who use this water as a 
source for drinking, cleaning, washing, bathing and irrigation. 
Furthermore, infiltration of polluted surface water into the underground 
steadily pollutes groundwater sources. 
These environmental problems culminate in urban slums. Slums are 
not only the answer to the lack of adequate land supply and housing, but 
also are a significant social entity where the urban poor cast their daily 
survival strategy, make a living, raise their families and become part of all 
aspects of urban life, including politics and government. Driven by 
poverty, slums are a cheap form of shelter. To survive, the poor take the 
risk of eviction, accept environmentally hazardous locations and endure 
lack of basic infrastructure and services. Although the social fabric of 
values, norms, communal ties and obligations, may be inherited from rural 
roots or communities and may continue for many years, this dilutes and is 
replaced by more individualistic, materialistic and consumptive values and 
norms. Social control and economic interdependence deteriorate and 
particularly women are more exposed to violence, assault and economic 
insecurity. In an Indian context, slums are also an important political 
factor. As 20-50 per cent of the urban population lives in slums, they 
constitute a major part of the electorate. It is no wonder that politicians aim 
to co-opt local leaders, to give favours, money, food and alcohol, or even 
muscle power to win their favour. 
1.4 Factors of urban development 
To understand the causes of these urban maladies, urban development and 
urban governance need to be further unravelled into a number of 
explaining factors. These are: 
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- Urban development policies 
- Urban administration and politics 
- Urban land and development planning 
- Housing 
- Infrastructure development 
Urban development policies 
Urban development policies are articulated in various policy papers, 
legislative acts, bylaws, government guidelines and orders, and are laid 
down in annual and five-year plans. In India, there are indeed annual and 
five-year plans at both the national and state government level. Various 
policy documents of housing and urban planning also exist. 
Such plans and policy documents constitute a public statement (to 
the electorate) to show what the government plans to do over a period of 
time and include general objectives, main activities and details of the 
proposed budgets. One can expect a certain consistency and 
comprehensiveness and a justification for the planned activities and 
subsequent expenditures. Secondly, it is a political document that 
expresses the outcome of political debate and compromises in the Cabinet, 
between ministers, and is a result of intra- and inter-departmental 
discussions. Thirdly, it is an administrative document that will guide the 
departments in their activities over the coming years. The targets and 
outlays which have been agreed upon are the framework within which the 
departments have to operate and accordingly set their detailed programmes 
and budgets. The plans and policy statements are also an instrument to 
monitor, i.e. to assess the performance of the-government and forms a 
reference for regular progress reporting. This is particularly true for the 
obligatory annual and five-year plans of both the state and national 
government. 
Housing and urban development has been a distinct chapter in these 
plans since the 1960s and any analysis of urban development has to start 
with an analysis of the perception and plans of the government. Have the 
objectives been justified against the existing needs, are priorities and 
outlays commensurate with the stated objectives, has the state government 
been able to achieve its own objectives, and has there been sufficient 
support and commitment to the plans by the implementing departments 
and agencies, are pertinent questions that need to be answered. 
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Whereas annual and five-plans are prepared regularly, there are only 
a few accepted housing or urban development policy statements that would 
provide the broad framework for such plans. The national government 
passed a National Housing Policy only in 1994. Besides a Report on the 
National Commission of Urbanisation (1988), there has been no National 
Urbanisation Policy. At the state level, the situation is even worse. In 
Karnataka, for example, there has never been an accepted housing or 
urbanisation policy. Several papers and drafts have been prepared, 
however, they were never passed by the Cabinet, let alone the state 
Assembly. What do these policy statements contain and what does it 
signify that these statements are not converted into acts, are additional 
questions that need to be addressed. 
It is also remarkable that the annual plans, five-year plans and policy 
statements arouse little or no academic and professional interest. Literature 
on reviews of these documents is rare. Is it that such documents have 
anyway raised little interest among scribes or do these documents carry 
little relevance with regard to what actually happens? These questions will 
also have to be addressed. 
Urban governance: administration and politics 
During the gradual and massive urbanisation during the first half of this 
century, the city administration consisted of a few day-to-day functions, 
such as the delivery of essential public services (health care, water supply, 
sanitation primary education, and so on), the provision and upkeep of 
related public works, and the regulation of certain private activities (trades, 
professions, house building, land uses, traffic, markets, and places of 
entertainment). To finance these functions, the city levied a limited range 
of local taxes and the administration was organised on traditional British 
departmental and hierarchical lines: health, engineering and 
administration. 
In the 1950s, urban growth led to a deterioration of urban life with 
slums occupying inner-city vacant spaces disallowing regulated 
development, and leading to the uncontrolled outward expansion of cities. 
The physical and environmental problems grew in scale and complexity as 
the existing civic infrastructure was heavily used and overstressed. The 
initial reaction to these problems was to provide water supply, drainage 
and housing. These solutions were technocratic, capital intensive, and 
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based on conventional technologies. Little attention was given to the 
social, legal and economic dimensions of these problems. 
As local governments were considered increasingly unfit for such 
tasks, para-statal corporations, statutory bodies, and boards were 
established to finance and to implement these projects. The responsibility 
of local governments was confined to distributing services, maintaining the 
projects and collecting taxes and service charges. Many states established 
strong, command-type urban development authorities in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s with large geographical jurisdictions. They were mainly 
involved in planning and development of new urban areas, embarking on 
the mandates of sectoral departments or encapsulating them within their 
purview. The sectoral agencies and urban development agencies also 
contributed to the further stripping of responsibilities and revenue 
resources of the local governments, undermining their status and financial 
position. Moreover, the gap between revenues and expenditures has been 
increasing and the abolition of the octroi (a heavily utilised tax on the 
movement of goods) in many states has worsened their financial position. 
Although the financial position of the local governments is at the 
root of urban problems, urban development is determined by other factors 
as well. One major factor is the existence of an elected body. The Indian 
Constitution provides for an elected municipal body that determines to a 
large extent the effectiveness of the municipal administration. Its 
functioning has, however, been troublesome. Limited understanding of 
urban development and administration, party-politics and pursuance of 
short-term interests have frustrated the enhancement of local revenues and 
the development of urban services. Therefore, local politics constitute 
another factor to urban development. 
Urban administrators (commissioners, chief officers, engineers and 
revenue offices) are important stake-holders in urban governance and 
development. All financial and operational decisions need their co-
operation and signature by act. It is no surprise that politicians like to 
encroach onto such areas of decision making and it has been observed that 
some administrators have not objected to this as it may provide them with 
additional benefits, better career prospects and personal prestige. 
Favouritism and corruption have become a regular practise in those cases 
where civil servants and politicians collude. Any professional or scholar of 
the urban development sector will admit that, for example, certain schemes 
obtain larger outlays of money than others, that certain towns and cities get 
selected for projects over others that is not driven by need. The existence 
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of 'politics of urban governance' is not disputed, but has remained to a 
large extent unclear and there is, thus, a need for better documentation and 
analysis of the role of these stake-holders. 
Urban land and development planning 
Land and urban infrastructure development, is seen as an essential element 
for developing local economies (World Bank, 1994, Kingsley, 1991). Even 
before any urban development can take place, one has to have the land. 
Land is a scarce commodity and for a city government it can signify either 
an obstruction or a facilitator of urban development, depending on in 
whose hands the land is and with what intentions it is used. The rate of 
land conversion to urban use in the Asian region is enormous. In 
Bangalore, for example, the estimated conversion of agricultural land to 
urban land is about 13 square kilometre per year. Strong population 
growth, urban migration, and the limited deployment of infrastructure have 
sent land prices spiralling in India. In Bangalore, for example, residential 
land prices have increased by approximately 12 per cent per year 
(Acharya, 1989). This figure is a fraction of what is observed today. The 
liberalisation policy and improved investment environment in Bangalore 
and the declining investment opportunities in Bombay, Madras and Delhi 
have added to the attraction of investors. 
There are, however, many problems relating to urban land 
regulation. Unlike consumer goods markets, land markets are not driven 
by perfectly competitive forces. Demand and supply are far removed from 
the optimal; it is not possible to obtain enough land at the right price and in 
the right location. The cost of acquiring and developing land is very high 
when compared to the levels of income of the majority of urban residents. 
Government programmes prove ineffective and - at times -
counterproductive, while the private sector is more successful in 
overcoming the restrictions of government's urban land regulation. A 
major pillar under the government's land regulation is the Urban Land 
Ceiling (and Land Regulation) Act of 1976. The Act has been introduced 
with the laudable aim to avoid land speculation, the holding of large areas 
of land by one owner, to redistribute land, and to give the poor a greater 
access to land for housing. Unfortunately, the Act proved 
counterproductive and resulted thousands of hectares of land being in 
litigations and lengthy judicial procedures. 
12 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Did planned development and regulation of the land market not 
exist? Were there no comprehensive development plans? Of course, there 
were and India did build its urban planning regulation on Anglo-Saxon 
concepts of physical planning from the 1950s onwards. During most of the 
1950s and 1960s, the land-use planning method was well established. It 
has been argued that medium to long-term land use planning, is inflexible 
in the face of rapidly changing development needs. Moreover, the 
preparation of so-called Comprehensive Development Plans is time-
consuming, costly, requires well-trained town planners who are few in 
number, and is not sufficiently oriented towards implementation. The 
conventional physical planning approach has been unsatisfying but 
remains to be practised. 
Housing 
Housing is a highly visible dimension of both affluence and poverty in 
India. For long the housing problems of particularly the urban poor have 
been ignored and many national plans of developing countries failed to 
mention housing until the 1960s. Housing was also seen as an 
unproductive economic activity that would only drain national resources 
with no returns. The initial reaction in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
governments started to realise the emerging problems of slum and squatter 
colonies, was one of removal and reconstruction. In both cases, it meant 
demolition of the 'unfit' huts and construction of 'proper' houses 
elsewhere. It has been widely documented that the displaced dwellers find 
it difficult to establish an adequate livelihood in the new areas and are 
unable to afford the increased cost of living in their new houses (rent, loan 
repayment, transport, service charges). The outcome of such policies is 
often the occupation of these houses by middle and high income groups 
and the re-emergence of slums on nearby open land. With urban land 
becoming scarcer, densities of such informal settlements increases while 
the infrastructure is stretched to its limits. 
Other approaches have since been followed to counter some of the 
problems that faced the initial housing policies. The concepts of supplying 
completed housing units was replaced by sites-and-services and 
upgradation of existing shelters. With the massive support of the World 
Bank, site-and-service and squatter-upgrading programmes arrived on the 
international scene in the 1970s and they represent one of the most 
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important reforms in the housing sector. Though many successes have 
been reported the overall experience, however, has not been very 
satisfactory (Wegelin, 1977). Most of the failures have been attributed to 
poor administration, the low commitment level of executing agencies to 
these non-conventional and less 'profitable' approaches, non-conducive 
building and settlement planning bylaws, problems of acquiring land, and 
the poor response from urban dwellers to settle in often distant, under-
serviced (lacking basic infrastructure, like shops, health and education 
facilities) and in effect more expensive settlements. 
With regard to the present status of providing shelter and housing to 
the urban poor, the picture that emerges from different studies is not rosy 
at all. Few government housing agencies have been able to make a 
noticeable contribution to the low-income housing production as compared 
to the need. Lee (1989) estimated that public housing constitutes only 15 
per cent of the national urban housing formation. 
The production of housing and infrastructure has also proved to be 
more expensive compared to private production, requiring large subsidies 
to ascertain access for low-income groups. Government housing and 
development agencies have shown serious management deficiencies, 
resulting in unduly long development periods and high cost overruns. 
Rigid site planning standards have raised the cost of land development to 
unrealistic levels in relation to incomes. The World Bank (1989) observed 
that about 25 per cent of the land developed for residential purposes is 
wasted due to excessive road areas, arbitrary setback regulations and, to a 
lesser extent, redundant community facilities. Due to such wastage, only 
25 to 50 per cent of the land area developed is saleable as compared to 65 
per cent typically, achieved in other countries. 
Infrastructure development 
The present situation in India is that 18 per cent of the urban population, 
mainly slum dwellers, do not have access to piped water supply and 56 per 
cent do not have access to sanitation (Mohanty, 1993). Though 
infrastructure is heavily subsidised, the subsidies are not well targeted. 
Cost recovery rates are insufficient and the systems are ineffective. The 
actual production costs are also high as conventional technologies and 
unrealistic high standards are applied. 
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While the economic and social importance of basic infrastructure is 
undisputed, the provision of these services is often badly affected by 
inadequate operation and maintenance, obsolete equipment and postponed 
replacement. Poor functioning urban infrastructure has had a detrimental 
effect, particularly, on the urban poor who get less and pay more for basic 
amenities. The benefits of public infrastructure, on the other hand, mostly 
go to the middle and high income groups. Secondly, the urban 
environment is affected by stagnant sewage and storm water, 
contamination of drinking water by the intrusion of polluted ground water, 
poor sanitary conditions, open drains and unprotected power installation, 
being a health hazard to the public. 
1.5 Structure of this book 
A comprehensive research like this would not be possible without a 
methodological and theoretical framework. In chapter two, a conceptual 
model for urban development has been developed. It aims to illustrate the 
relation between policies, politics at various levels, urban development 
institutions, administrators and the actual manifestations of urban 
development: housing, land development, infrastructure development and 
other indicators. In chapter three, a number of urban theories are 
elaborated that are relevant to this research and which provide the 
necessary tools for analysis and explanation. 
The major part of this book has been structured in a converging 
manner, starting with an analysis of India's and Karnataka's social, 
political and economic development, illustrating the inherent and changing 
premises which have been adopted by all spheres of government 
intervention, including housing and urban development (Chapters four and 
five). The sixth chapter deals with the functioning of the government, the 
centre-state relationship, its government institutions at various levels and 
the meaning of these institutions, the perception of the government on 
housing and urban development and the way in which it prefers to 
intervene in these sectors. Chapters seven and eight analyse the existing 
policies, five- and annual plans in India and Karnataka which prove to be 
the framework for any government intervention in the housing and urban 
development sector. They illustrate also the agendas, priorities, successes 
and failures of 'lobbies' that have tried to secure shares of the government 
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budgets. From chapter nine onward, the book focuses on Karnataka with 
an analysis of investments for all housing and urban development in the 
state between 1980-94 and this chapter seeks to unravel the state priorities 
and agendas by their acts (i.e. the actual investments) as compared to their 
words (in policy documents). Chapters ten to fifteen, analyse a number of 
eminent housing and urban development schemes implemented by state 
government agencies between 1980-94: housing schemes, water supply 
schemes, the scheme for the Integrated Development of Small and Medium 
Towns (IDSMT), the Nehru Rozgar Yojana scheme (NRY, an employment 
generation scheme for urban poor), the scheme for Urban Basic Services 
for the Poor (UBSP) and schemes for low-cost sanitation. These chapters 
highlight what these schemes had intended, how they have been 
implemented by the concerned agencies, what they have achieved and how 
these schemes have been appreciated by the targeted beneficiaries, 
citizens, involved officials and politicians. 
Returning to the conceptual model, chapter sixteen focuses on the 
role of the (state) administration and politicians in these schemes, and in 
the formulation of policies and points out what other processes have been 
at work that caused the particular 'translation' of policies into the 
programmes and projects as they are. The last chapter, finally, returns to 
the basic questions of this thesis posed in chapter two, and seeks an answer 
based on the findings of preceding chapters. 
2 
Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology 
2.1 Background 
The background of this thesis is the interest which I took into the various 
urban policies designed by central government in Delhi, the 'translation' of 
these policies by the mandated state government departments into policies, 
plans, project guidelines, instructions and government orders; and the role 
of the state administrators, and politicians in implementing these policies, 
programmes and projects. This interest was fanned during my posting in 
Karnataka between 1992-96 as project leader in a training programme for 
the housing and urban development sector. As may be expected, many 
such policies, programmes and projects - as an 'input' to urban 
development - with their undoubtedly good intentions are diluted, distorted 
and bypassed amidst the 'ground realities' of the political, administrative 
and physical environment in which they have to take shape. The Output', 
i.e. in quantitative terms, and particularly the Outcome', i.e. in qualitative 
terms, may be quite different from the 'input'. A number of scholars and 
researchers have observed this trend, but little effort has been made to 
understand how this 'translation' takes place, to explain the decision 
making processes and mechanisms behind it and to analyse political and 
administrative forces that have contributed to this. 
The three basic questions that have guided this research when it was 
launched in 1994 were: 
- What has been the output (in quantitative terms) and outcome (with 
regard to the stated objectives) of the housing and urban development 
policies in Karnataka? 
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- What were the significant factors that contributed to the output and 
outcome? 
- What was the contribution of the output and outcome to the overall 
development in urban areas in Karnataka? 
The objective of this research is to make an in-depth study of this 'input-
output/outcome' relationship by analysing the factors and forces that have 
contributed to this relationship for the Indian state of Karnataka on the 
basis of a number of carefully selected and comparative schemes and case-
studies. To support the research, a conceptual framework was developed 
(Figure 2-1) that reflects the ¡nput-output/outcome relationship of urban 
development. The framework serves two purposes: 
- as a model, representing a simplified picture of reality based on 
knowledge gained from existing literature and my personal 
experience. The model aims to include the most important factors and 
to promulgate the expected relationship between each component. 
- as a conceptual framework, that reflects the method of deriving at the 
object of study. It is hoped to provide a language and logical frame of 
reference through which reality can be examined and lead to 
questions that otherwise would not have been asked. 
The object of study is defined as the 'translation' of urban development 
policies (input) into schemes that contributed to the actual urban 
development (output). It is realised that 'actual urban development' is a 
vast subject of study and it may be over-ambitious to tackle it entirely. 
There are many activities that shape the city: industrial and commercial 
activities, transport, communication, housing, land development and 
planning, infrastructure development (from power and harbours to 
handpumps and street lights), education, welfare and urban poverty 
amenities and services, etc. These are initiated and executed by a myriad of 
government agencies, by businesses and individuals and result in what we 
see as 'actual urban development'. It is not the intention to analyse all 
these areas. This study is confined to those policies and interventions that 
are initiated, designed and implemented by the state government 
institutions responsible for housing and urban development in Karnataka. 
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2.2 The components and their inter-relation 
In this section the components of the conceptual framework are explained 
from left to right (See figure 2-1). In order to make a proper analysis of 
urban development in one of the Indian states, it is necessary to analyse the 
pre- and post Independence political and economic history. It is postulated 
that policies are not sent from heaven but reflect the contemporary 
thinking on national development. The liberation movement, the Gandhian 
non-violence movement, the strong role of the Congress party and the 
personalities of the Nehru dynasty, Dr. Ambedkar as the apostle of the 
Hindu low-caste communities, and the parallel Independence struggle of 
Indian Muslims provide a background to the political course that India 
took after its Independence in 1947. Self-reliance, a strife for international 
independence, import substitution, a focus on industrial development, a 
strong administration and an indigenous form of socialism and federalism, 
determined the nation's course in constituting national policies and 
government institutions, i.e. a government that should and had to play a 
strong role in all spheres of life and development. 
The political commitment and perception of a dominant government 
has had its bearing on steering urban development as well. The study aims 
to explain how the government's intervention in urban development 
evolved over the various five-year plan periods. This commitment is 
reflected in three inter-related factors: 
1. Urban policies at national level. Policies aim to express a 
government commitment to guide or intervene in development. Policy 
documents also give an insight into how urban areas and their 
development are perceived as factors in economic and social 
development, how urban problems and potentials are analysed, how 
urban development relates to other development sectors, what areas 
are seen as crucial for government involvement through programmes 
and projects and - most importantly - how much priority is given to 
this particular sector in financial terms. 
2. Urban policies are not implemented in the air but need to be 
supported by a legal framework and an institutional set-up which has 
to control development, implement government schemes, and further 
the development of policies. Articulated policies become toothless 
within a weak legal framework or with weak institutions. A major 
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area of study is to see whether these two elements are conducive for 
effective urban development. Does the legal framework allow 
steering urban development in the desired direction, enable 
institutions to intervene in the development process and stop 
undesirable development, and to implement government programmes 
and projects properly, are key-questions to be addressed. On the other 
hand, do the established institutions have enough administrative, 
personnel and financial means to be effective? It is also presumed that 
urban development policies are the result of a force-field in which the 
institutions themselves are an important factor. What role have they 
played in the formulation of policies and what role do they play in 
their implementation? This brings us to the third component. 
3. The role of bureaucrats, administrators and technocrats. Although it 
should be said that bureaucrats, administrators and technocrats would 
not wield more influence and power than they have been assigned in 
development policies and constitutions, no one will deny that they 
constitute a force in themselves. One area of their influence is on the 
formulation of the policies itself, secondly, on the political arena 
where policies are to be endorsed and, thirdly, on the implementation 
of urban development schemes. To what extent this factor does play a 
role is a subject of study. 
India has a rich and vivid political culture and it pervades all spheres of 
life. Hence, the role oí politics at national, state and local level is expected 
to be another explanatory factor. Electioneering, vote-banking, party-
politics, fund-raising, patronage, nepotism, power-play and other tactics 
are common ingredients of Indian politics and is an area of research for as 
far as urban development is concerned. The key-question here is 'To what 
extent have politics at various levels contributed to the implementation of 
policies and what is their contribution to the actual urban development?' It 
is expected that politics plays a role in the formulation of policies at 
national and state level and, influences the role of bureaucrats and 
administrators at state and local level when they implement government 
policies, programmes and projects. 
In the Indian context, the state level urban development policies, are 
expected to be the resultant of the above components. 'Policies' may not 
be seen in a strict sense of regularly prepared and updated documents that 
are further elaborated in plans and annual budgets. It is expected that such 
'policies' are laid down in various other forms as well: strategy papers, 
Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology 21 
discussion notes, programme/project guidelines, government orders, 
ordinances, departmental circulars, correspondence, memoranda, and the 
like. One may even have to accept that 'policies' exist that are not even 
articulated or written down, for example by codes of conducts, 
gentlemen's agreements, deliberate discrimination and practised 
favouritism. It is more important, to reflect on their meaning, what they 
signify, what perceptions they reveal on urban development, whether there 
is a compliance with national urban development policies, or a bearing 
with other sectoral policies in the state, and what commitment transpires 
from both the bureaucratic as well as political spheres in terms of allocated 
finance and human resources. 
'Actual urban development' is understood as not to be determined 
by urban development policies alone, nor by their mandated institutions or 
by politics alone. Other economic and social forces are at work outside the 
sphere of urban development policies that determine the urban landscape, 
maybe even to a large extent. These could be other sectoral policies and 
their respective institutions, in particular, those of industry, education, 
agriculture, mining, irrigation, public works and commerce. They also 
prepare their policies, make investments, establish their own infrastructure 
and public- or semi-public undertakings, generate money, goods and 
services. Hence, their impact on employment, on the generation of a 
service sector and on the overall economic and social development of a 
city can be considerable. 
It has been argued that urban development takes to a large extent 
shape through non-governmental forces, or constitute an autonomous 
development. These forces are, in the first place, determined by the 
business and commercial communities. Responding to the agriculture, 
industrial or locational potential of a city, entrepreneurs enter the urban 
areas and establish their businesses or commercial activity through 
investments and trade. Again, employment, economic and social 
development are affected. In the second place there are individual 
households who are the main consumers of economic produce and also the 
suppliers of required skills and labour. Their productive power, social and 
economic status will, to a large extent, determine the shape of a city. 
Economically strong and wealthy cities will see many middle and high 
income families build and expand their houses. This will stimulate the 
generation of a construction and service sector, provides the local 
administration with revenue, and is instrumental in the emergence of 
education and health services, and a differentiated, specialised and higher 
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quality business sector. The effect of both the business community and 
wealthy individuals on the land market can be considerable. On the other 
hand, economically weaker cities that mainly rely on lowly skilled 
labourers, will face poor housing conditions, a poor financial position, a 
lack of all kind of services and will not have a thriving business 
community. 
The recipient social, physical and institutional environment is 
considered a separate research component. Urban development policies 
and programmes define certain target groups, components, modalities for 
project formulation, finance, participation and implementation, and define 
certain responsibilities during and after implementation. It is a question 
whether the recipient environment complies with and accepts the many 
assumptions and premises. The focus of the research in on: 
a) The role of local government and other public institutions (officials 
and elected representatives) who are expected to co-operate, to co-
ordinate or to implement some of the policies, plans and projects. Has 
adequate priority been given to the local needs, have enough staff 
been mobilised, have expected local contributions been made, have 
any assets become part of daily (municipal) maintenance routines, 
etc.? 
b) The communities, their leaders and households are often expected to 
have another particular role in project formulation, needs assessment, 
implementation and maintenance tasks. Has the programme been 
implemented in such a way that their involvement has been adequate? 
Who has been involved from local communities; what benefits have 
been gained from the programmes and, most important, who has 
finally benefited? 
c) The appropriateness of programme and project guidelines. These 
often presume more or less homogenous conditions, for which 
standard solutions are designed, particularly in a technical sense. 
These standards may prove inadequate for the large variety of 
physical conditions that exist in a state. What has been the experience 
of this premise in Karnataka? 
As outlined above, the focus is on policies and interventions that are 
initiated, designed and implemented by the government institutions 
responsible for (housing and) urban development policies in India. These 
policies and interventions are translated into schemes. The interventions of 
the state government in this sector can be differentiated into schemes for 
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housing, water supply, employment generation, development of local 
economies, sanitation and provision of basic services to the urban poor. 
The output and outcome of these scheme have to be assessed with the help 
of a number of indicators. In the first place, the output and the outcome 
have to assessed against the objectives of each scheme: the recorded 
physical achievements, the number and characteristics of the beneficiaries, 
efficiency and efficacy of the means that have been used, the institutional 
set-up, etc. Secondly, the objectives of the schemes and the outcome and 
the output of the schemes have to be assessed against the overall 
development objectives as laid down in five-year plans and other policy 
documents of the government. 
2.3 Research methodology and selection of case studies 
The research design has been developed within the conceptual framework 
and shows a converging nature: from the history of social, political and 
economic development in India, and the policies and plans at the national 
and state level, to the study of specific schemes in selected case-studies. 
The research methods which have been adopted are: 
1. Collection of relevant literature and documents at the level of the 
central government, the Karnataka state government and the local 
bodies on urban development policies in whatever form (policy 
documents, programme/project guidelines, government orders, 
enactments, ordinances, departmental instructions, correspondence, 
memoranda,, etc.) with a focus on the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Five-
Year Plan period (roughly 1980-94); 
2. Collection of secondary data on selected towns/cities from 
town/district and urban development agencies. This included 
registered industries, commercial activities, population, agriculture 
produce/trade, employment, income distribution, municipal 
income/expenditures, education facilities, etc. which are kept with 
census and statistics bureaux in the state; 
3. Interviews with involved officers, administrators, local politicians and 
citizens. The interviews aimed to understand the various linkages 
between bureaucracies and politicians and to reconstruct and 
understand how the schemes were perceived, conceptualised, 
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designed, pursued, implemented and distributed, how allocations to 
beneficiaries have been done and how achievements have been 
sustained; and 
4. Technical field surveys and significant samples of household 
interviews. 
In order to verify the output and outcome of housing and urban 
development schemes in Karnataka between 1980 and 1994, seven case 
studies had been selected. Seven case-studies is not a significant sample 
from a total of 234 urban local bodies which fall under the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development. The findings in these case-study serve 
to illustrate and support rather than to prove other findings from the study. 
The sample has been selected so as to be representative for those urban 
local bodies where the state government had implemented schemes 
between 1980 and 1994. The following selection criteria have been applied 
in the selection of seven urban local bodies in Karnataka: 
1. Population size 
2. Annual growth between 1981-91 
3. Geographic location 
4. Development status 
5. Political affiliation 
6. Financial status 
7. Type, per capita investment, age and progress of the schemes 
8. Implementing agency 
The eight criteria had been selected with a number of considerations. The 
population size indicates the capacity of the municipality to absorb the 
scheme, both managerially and financially, and the possible size of the 
target group. The annual growth reflects the increased need for basic 
services and housing, an important criterion for project selection. The 
geographic location indicates not only the climatic conditions but also the 
proximity to other municipalities, small and large. The analysis of the 
location in combination with their size will allow to discuss pull-push 
forces and equations of rural-urban migration. The development status 
indicates the potential of the local economy and the range of basic 
facilities and economic infrastructure it will support. This is further 
explained in chapter 9. The development status would be significant in 
discussing project selection. With reference to the conceptual framework, 
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the strength of the political affiliation of the municipalities during the 
period of study may be significant in the discussion on project selection. 
The financial status indicates the ability of the municipalities to service 
debts which result from acquired projects. The seventh criterion aims to 
select a range of towns where projects had a variation in outlay, selected 
components, age and progress. The possible differences in findings may 
reflect on the role and performance of the implementing agencies and the 
outcome of the schemes. The last criterion, the implementing agency, 
reflects on their role and performance and it is aimed to establish a variety 
among the sample as well. The selection process has, thus, not been 
random but selective to ensure a variety for each of the eight criteria. 
Towns and cities where there were two or less schemes, have been ignored 
in the selection. Among the seven corporations, Gulbarga has been 
selected. Including more corporations in the sample would have required a 
substantial larger research effort, including the generation of basic 
statistics from these cities which were not available at the state level. It 
has, therefore, been decided to confine the sample to one corporation and 
six small and medium towns. To facilitate the analysis of all urban local 
bodies, three indices have been developed for this research: a development 
status index, a political affiliation index and a financial status index. In 
chapter nine an explanation of these indices is provided. The seven towns 
and cities in Karnataka that have been selected are: Kunigal, 
Chamarajanagara, Chickmagalur, Sirsi, Hospet, Gulbarga and Bidar. Their 
location is shown in figure 2-2. In table 2-1 and 2-2 the general 
characteristics and details of the implemented projects are presented. 
The field work of this research comprised of 155 interviews with 
officials, politicians, contractors, citizens and journalists knowledgeable 
about housing and infrastructure policies and projects, and 545 pre-
structured household interviews. A research assistant was employed in 
1995-96 to assist in the collecting of relevant policy and project 
documents, and conducting the households interviews. 
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Figure 2-2: Location map of seven case studies selected in Karnataka 
A N D H R A P R A D E S H 
'Chfcmaga/ur ^
 Tumkur 
Chikmagalur у ^ ^ ^ л г а а г 
. . . » χ Щ*** \ Bangalore Rurali 
Arabian \DBks¡ti\jHassan^-*- ^ u n l f l a l 
Kannada 
Mysore " — \ TAMIL NADU 
Chamarajanagara 
3 
Theories and Approaches to the Role of Actors in 
Urban Development 
3.1 The theoretical context of this research 
When embarking on a research that aims to unravel the intricacy of the 
urban development processes, the contribution of (housing and) urban 
development policies and the role of the urban actors, there is a need for 
analytical tools which help to place findings in perspective, to compare 
with other findings elsewhere, and to create a semantic platform for 
scientists and professionals who want to discuss such findings. 
The research was not conceived within a pre-determined theoretical 
framework or a school of thought. It also did not aim to falsify an existing 
theory or argument in the tradition of Popper, or adopt pre-set research 
instruments. As mentioned in chapter two, the research is guided by a 
number of key-questions. As far as the existing theories are concerned, the 
research has explored, analysed and utilised these in a rather eclectic 
manner. A major reason for this approach is that the current body of 
theories relating to urban studies are confined to countries and to specific 
contexts of urban development processes. I found that there is no 
satisfying set of theories or concepts for the urban reality in India. This is 
not surprising as this reality is determined by a complex range of forces 
that have been analysed by multiple disciplines; economics, sociology, 
geography and public administration, to name just four. 
Urban studies face the 'normality of rapid changes of social context' 
(Savage and Warde, 1993, p. 193). Individuals, groups and governments 
respond often in an inventive and adaptive manner to emerging issues and 
urban problems, utilising their constellation of powers and networks over 
time in a variety of ways. Savage and Warde (1993) admit that urban 
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sociology is a fragmented and somewhat unstable discipline, precisely 
because many of the key practices of everyday life are contextual and 
configurai. It does not offer a clear theoretical object. Judge, Stoker and 
Wolman in their Theories of Urban Politics (1995) are elated when they 
observe that '..it is the sheer eclecticism of theories and the variety of 
approaches to theoretical issues which makes the study of urban politics so 
vibrant in the 1990s..' (1995, p. 1). They continue with 'There are now so 
many theories that it is increasingly difficult for scholar and student alike 
to keep pace with them, let alone comprehend or evaluate their respective 
merits' (ibid., p. 1). Although one has to appreciate this positive view, it 
does not make urban studies easier. The anaemia of urban theories, as I 
would phrase the current state of affairs, is the outcome of the academic 
tradition to analyse objects of study in disciplinary isolation. It is 
unfortunate that the academic world has little to offer to city managers in 
developing countries who have to deal with so many constantly changing 
factors. There is a changing world in which people migrate easier and 
farther, in which economies are more exposed to and influenced by a 
global economy, where communication and exposure to western culture 
makes urban population change rapidly in their aspirations and consumer 
needs, and where it proves to be more and more difficult to predict a future 
and to steer development toward any desired future. And India is not an 
exception. A word by a Wall Street tycoon has more of an impact on an 
Indian village these days than the word of the local pandit. 
Another set-back in the search for theoretical concepts and tools is 
that, as has been argued by Jürgen Rüland (1988), theories on urban 
governance in developing countries 'are virtually non-existent' (ibid., p. 
12). In absence of a good stock of comparative studies and a substantial 
contribution to theory development, eclectical case studies remain the 
predominant species of particularly south-east Asian urban research. 
Nevertheless, Rüland has attempted to organise the various approaches 
toward urban studies. He distinguishes six different approaches of which 
three approaches bear particular relevance for this research: the legal-
institutional approach, the normative approach and the 'penetrated system' 
approach. One of the excluded approaches deals with the model of circular 
causation which focuses on the role of local governments in economic 
development. The work of Riggs has been categorised under this approach. 
The second approach excluded here is the community power approach and 
includes the work of Hunter and Hollnsteiner. The third so-called 
comparative approach is a branch of research studies which aim to 
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compare the functioning of local governments across countries and across 
different political and social systems. The work of Walsh has been listed 
under this approach. Though these three approaches may be relevant, they 
have been excluded as their focus of study (i.e. local economies, 
communities and international comparison of research) is considered 
different from this study. 
The legal-institutional approach include studies which analyse the 
role and performance of local governments with a focus on the legal-
constitutional foundations of the institutions. Deficient performance is 
attributed to overlapping functions and responsibilities between 
proliferating government agencies and the concomitant of intra-
bureaucratic rivalries, lack of local autonomy, co-ordination problems, 
lack of professional and technical expertise and financial constraints. The 
reputed urban institutes around the world, whether they are the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank, consultancy or educational institutes 
follow this approach. Improvements in the performance of local 
government would have to concentrate on these areas and many scholars 
and institutes have dedicated their resources to study these problems and to 
propose such legal-institutional improvements. The decentralisation to 
local government is an exponent of this approach, in which - based on 
western experiences of economic development - local government is 
viewed as the foundation of a pluralistic, participatory and democratic 
system, and considered a prerogative for socio-economic development. 
Evidence from several countries showed that deficient performance was 
the result of unwarranted interventions by state governments. These state 
governments would aim to reduce local powers and political participation, 
not so much to provide a remedy for the alleged maladministration, 
inefficiency and the malpractices of local governments, but rather to 
centralise powers for their own benefit and to reduce local and urban 
political opposition. The weakness of these studies are that they are aimed 
at the legal framework and are rather descriptive in nature. 
The second approach is the normative approach. Two major schools 
of thought are distinguished by Riiland under this approach: 
(i) the representative-democracy school and 
(ii) the grass roots school of thought. 
The representative-democracy school in the zest for a fully democratic 
system, regarded local government as an ideal training ground for 
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democracy that could inculcate democratic procedures and values in a 
population hitherto adhering to traditional attitudes and belief systems. 
Leadership recruitment, local elections, popular participation and 
articulation of people's needs were the focal points in these studies. 
However, the assumptions were based on idealised Western democratic 
systems. These ignored many indigenous values, the general level of 
education, social and economic sub-ordination, and persisting oppressive 
feudal systems which stood in the way of achieving the ideal. While 
researchers may have been disillusioned and withered in numbers, western 
countries still - from time to time - like to use this approach in their foreign 
policies. The grass roots school of thought leaned on the social movement 
phenomenon in Europe and the US in the 1960s and 1970s and on the 
experiences in Latin America. The main concern is for the upliftment of 
the urban poor. Self-organisation, démocratisation from below, active 
participation in political and economic processes, mobilisation of pressure 
groups and empowerment are important elements in this approach. Manuel 
Castells can be considered as one of the major proponents of this school. 
Critics of this approach, e.g. by Pickvance, argued that the premises 
resemble rather a political statement than the reality. Particularly in 
developing countries, the urban poor may prove to adhere to a rather 
conservative and middle-class political value, may not be interested in 
politically conflicting approaches and would only be interested in short-
term and individual material gains. 
The third is the 'penetrated system' approach. This approach 
analyses the influence of supra-local forces and the downward political 
interactions on local institutions. The community (or electorate) is seen as 
a focal point of political and bureaucratic influences. Supra-local forces 
may be the central government, the bureaucracy, the military, business 
companies or powerful interest groups. Because of their assumed superior 
legal and financial powers, the community and even local government are 
at the receiving end. Rüland distinguishes in this broad approach two 
streams: 
(i) the authoritarian approach and 
(ii) the clientelist approach. 
The authoritarian approach owes its school of thought from the persistence 
of authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s in particularly South-
American countries. Out of fear for an uprise of urban and poor 
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communities in politically sensitive and active areas, these regimes 
ensured a minimum level of service provision and infrastructure. The 
ultimate aim would be 'regime stabilisation'. On the same line certain 
forms of participation in the political system were not based on voluntary 
consent but essentially on structural coercion. Examples from the 
Philippines during the Marcos era and from Malaysia are quoted to 
substantiate this particular form. 
The clientelist approach has its roots in a feudal system in which a 
traditional patron-client or landlord-tenant relationship exist. The patron 
receives almost unconditional services and cheap labour which is bonded 
by providing (false) security of income, certain ad hoc favours, a prospect 
of social or economic improvement and access to housing, services or 
finance. The client has little choice than to accept and make use of this 
dependency as against the far more insecure situation as a daily labourer 
with no future prospect or access to the fringe benefits. In an urban context 
this situation does not exist in this form. However, the client-patron 
concept can be effectively applied to networks of politicians and their 
electorate (vote banks) in a number of democracies. These 'political 
machines' (Scott, 1972) are run by full-time professional politicians 
aiming to establish vote banks and to gain votes at the time of election. 
The relationship between politicians and their straw-men, field-workers 
and the communities is also reciprocal. However, the inequality of 
relationship increases down the line. The straw-men and local leaders 
would offer a package, sometimes at their own expense, through 
campaigning, giving petty favours, material gifts and other means to gain 
support for the politician in, for example, a neighbourhood or slum. This 
he would do in return for getting financial compensation, material benefits 
(a house or plot), a post in the local council or government, finance for 
infrastructure facilities in the area, which in the end will help him to 
consolidate his position as local leader. At the community level, the 
residents receive 'favours' in the form of a community centre, paved roads, 
handpumps, electrification, street lights, etc. Recent urban studies by 
De Wit (1996) and Baken (1996) have illustrated these mechanism for the 
slums of Madras, Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam and may, thus, belong 
to a clientelist approach. 
Both the legal-institutional approach and the clientelist approach 
assume particular relevance in this research. The analysis of government 
policies and their government institutions would benefit from an 
institutional-legal approach. However, the analysis of the realities of 
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project implementation and the interactions between government, 
politicians and the public is expected to benefit more from a clientelisi 
approach. The legal-institutional approach is also more normative while 
the latter is fore-most empirical. 
3.2 Selected theories about urban society, the state and 
bureaucracy 
As the object of this study, in my view, constitutes an interface between 
urban sociology and public administration, a selection of theories and 
concepts from these two disciplines have been explored in the proceeding 
sections. It has not been not the intention to be comprehensive and only a 
limited number of theories and concepts have been discussed. Based on 
Saunders' (1983) division, the views on the urban soceity, the state and 
bureaucracy have been grouped as follows: 
1. Normative views; 
2. Structuralist views; 
3. Instrumentalist views; 
4. Pluralist views; and 
5. Urban machine politics. 
Normative views on the state and bureaucracy 
Views on (urban) societies and the role of the state have been developed 
ever since societies reached a certain level of complexity and organisation. 
The Greek, Roman and other cultures have produced philosophers who 
gave thought to the role of citizens and to the organisations that govern 
them. One can go back to Aristotle's Politics, in which he observes and 
expresses his concern about the apparent apathy of urban residents. He 
proposed a 'democracy' in which every citizen should participate in the 
affairs of the city, instead of the prevalent 'aristocracy'. 
The revolutionary developments that took place in France in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century have had a tremendous impact on the 
norms by which nations had to be built in the twentieth century, for 
example, the principle of Trias Politica. These principles, introduced by 
Urban Development Theories 35 
Montesquieu, were not so much a reflection of reality but rather a 
normative view of how the state should be organised vis-à-vis societal 
forces. The role of the state in France has a long tradition of legitimate 
monopoly in providing public service and the derived powers to do so in 
the name of a 'general interest'. These ideas were also developed by Hegel 
in his Philosophy of Law (written in 1843) in which the state represented 
the general interest as against civil society, which is a collection of groups, 
corporations and estates, which represented particular and often 
irreconcilable interests. The role of bureaucracy was to mediate between 
these interests. It is also the 'raison d'être' and gave the state a self-
imposed superiority over other societal and individual interests. This order 
or étatism is reflected in the existence of administrative law separated from 
civil law. 
The civil servant, the ultimate executive of the state, was to 
renounce any private interests and abide to his 'fonction publique'. He is 
considered an amorphous and anonymous servant of a public organisation 
who cannot claim any rights unlike his counterpart in the private sector. 
This brings us to the work of Max Weber, who was important for the 
development of the concept of bureaucracy. The development of Western 
industrialism, a money economy, a society based on democratic principles 
and modem forms of communication evolved a new organisation that was 
slowly replacing older types of organisation based on inheritance, royalty, 
feudalism, landlordism, despotism and the like. In Weber's view, the new 
organisation form would become common place and would be based on 
the so-called 'legal rational authority', i.e.: 
the bureaucracy is based on rules accepted by the members of the 
organisation; 
the bureaucracy is a continuous operation as against the temporary 
form of political organisations; 
the spheres of competence of bureaucratic organisations are specified; 
there is an established hierarchy based on designation, 
responsibilities, sub-ordination and super-ordination; 
officials are trained in legal rational authority; 
- officials are not themselves the owners of the means of production; 
- the jobs belong to the organisation and not to the officials concerned; 
and 
the successful and continuing operation of bureaucracy depends to a 
large extent upon written records. 
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The bureaucrats have an important role to play in a modern organisation. It 
is also understood that private life is strictly separated from official life 
{fonction publiqué), that they are selected on basis of their qualification 
and experience, that they are aware of their position in the hierarchy, and 
are paid according to standard rates and obey the rules of the organisation. 
This model of a government organisation has had an impact on the 
institution building in the twentieth century, including in India. For 
example, the Indian Administrative Service is well versed with Weberian 
thinking and aims to upkeep this 'fonction publiqué'. 
Structuralist views on the state and bureaucracy 
Hegel's train of thought and the French 'raison d'être' for the state met 
severe opposition by Karl Marx (1818-1883) who studied the French 
Revolution and the evolution of the state. Marx refutes the concept of the 
state standing above and being impartial to societal interests. The state, he 
regarded as 'nothing more than the form of organisation which the 
bourgeoisie necessarily adopt... for the mutual guarantee of their property 
and interests' (in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983, p. 10). Marx was also convinced 
that the bourgeoisie would not allow to let any democracy prevail in the 
long run, as it will threaten their interests. They would not hesitate to 
repudiate universal suffrage and engineer a 'coup d'état'. For this reason, 
Marx was rather sceptical about the possibility of achieving socialism by 
democratic means. In most cases, he argued, socialism could only come 
about through a revolution. While Marx had elaborated his idea on the 
state, Etzioni-Halevy observed (1983, p. 24) that he failed to develop a 
full-fledged theory of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was rather seen as 
incidental and an agent in safeguarding the interests of the ruling class. 
However, he held a positivist view on a bureaucracy under socialism who 
would not pursue any individual or material interest and only keep the 
proletariat's interests in mind. 
The Marxist view was kept alive and received new proponents 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Ralf Milliband can be mentioned as one 
important theorist of this so-called structuralist perspective on 
bureaucracies in modern times (Saunders, 1983). The main body of 
thought remained intact, i.e. of a bureaucracy which safeguards the interest 
of the ruling class. However, the exponents and mechanisms of historical 
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materialism needed redefining to suit the changing realities of the late 
twentieth century. The furtherance of elitist interests by the bureaucracy 
would now be explained as follows: 
- those who are in commanding posts in the state belong either to the 
dominant classes or share their views as the result of their education, 
their social connections and their preferred way of life. This results in 
common attitudes and common perspectives on what is desirable and 
good for society; 
- the capitalist class, by virtue of its decisive economic power, has 
become the dominant pressure group in a capitalist society, and the 
government has no choice but to give in to its pressures; and 
- because the state acts in a capitalist system of production, it is 
structurally compelled to serve the interests of capitalism. And by 
serving the capitalist economy, the state necessarily serves the class 
in charge of that economy. Failing this, it would undermine the 
economy and thereby, the basis of its own power. 
Despite the fact that countries may have parliamentary democracies and 
pluralist societies, the Marxist theory stipulates that the ruling class still 
dominates while an illusionary political participation is maintained and 
electoral freedom is filled with meaningless generalities. The ascendancy 
of bureaucracy in the twentieth century has only strengthened the grip of 
the ruling class on government through bureaucracy. 
The latter has been further elaborated by M. Castells in The Urban 
Question; A Marxist Approach (1977). The local state as provider of 
welfare, serves to produce services and commodities which will keep the 
urban poor healthy and educated so that they reproduce the labour force 
and provide them with housing, water supply, sanitation facilitates, roads, 
street lights and such like. The local state is, thus, supporting 
contemporary capitalism in which the spatial unit of a city provides 
additional advantages through existing economies of scale in the 
generation of the so-called 'collective consumption' commodities. Urban 
'problems' do not arise by chance or through mis-management; they arise 
from the unequal distribution of public means and clash with a 
government, which has been favouring one group and depriving another. 
'Urban disorder was not in fact a disorder at all; it represents the spatial 
organisation created by the market, and derives from the absence of social 
control of the industrial activity' (Castells, 1977, p. 45). This paradigm 
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found many contemporary followers among urban sociologists, urban 
planners and other social scientists. 
The structuralist approach is rather pessimistic about change 
(without a revolutionary processes) and is contrasted to a normative view 
which is more optimistic about the ability to craft society. 
Instrumentalist views on the state and bureaucracy 
Rather close to the structuralist perspective are the views of Gaetano 
Mosca (1939) which could be called the elitist view. He departs from the 
simple argument that in all societies two classes of people exist: a class 
that rules and a class that is ruled. The ruling class is always less numerous 
and could belong to a group of religious functionaries, warriors, 
landholding aristocracy, wealthy and erudite class, or a combination of 
these. They monopolise political power and enjoy the advantages that 
power brings. Ruling classes never rule merely by brute force; they justify 
their rule by political formulae, i.e. abstract principles (such as 'divine 
right' or 'the sovereignty of the people') which frequently are accepted by 
those they rale. With this, Mosca is considered one of the forerunners of 
the instrumentalist perspective on government. When ruling classes are 
vigorous in their capacity to impose their political formulae, to manage 
society and render a service to it, when they are open to the more talented 
and ambitious people among the ruled, gradual rejuvenation of the ruling 
class itself and gradual change and progress in society will take place. But 
when the ruling classes lose their vigour, violent upheavals are likely to 
take place. These frequently result in the total replacement of the ruling 
classes. The whole history of civilisation comes down to the struggle 
between existing ruling classes and their contenders. The ruled remain 
unorganised, are manipulated by political formulae, and receive token 
service in order to be pacified. Mosca comes close to the description of the 
fifteenth century republics by Niccolò Machiavelli in The Discourses. 
Once elected, the people's representatives and assemblies tend to 
concentrate excessive power in their own hands and the government 
machinery falls prey to their irresponsible tyranny' (in Etzioni-Halevy, 
1983, p. 16). The ability of elected representatives to govern well is 
distorted by their tendency to pursue their own interests, by getting 
themselves elected, and by their tendency to pursue the interests of the 
party which backs their election. This leads to improper interference of 
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elected representatives in court procedures, in public administration and 
generally in the distribution of wealth that accrues to the state through 
taxes and levies. In its more extreme form, it can lead to the transformation 
of administrative departments into electioneering agencies and, thus, to the 
improper interference of bureaucracies in elections. 
The classical theory of Mosca experienced a revival in the 1970s 
with the technocratic view on bureaucracies (or instrumentalist view by 
Saunders, 1983). The power of the elite have in modern times been 
replaced by the managers of bureaucracies, businesses, financial 
institutions, production companies, etc. In bureaucracies, the 
administrators utilise their expertise to constitute a considerable counter-
force to the political leadership. Political leaders are no longer the masters 
of bureaucrats, but rely on them for their expertise and co-operation to 
meet their political goals. When the political echelons fail to heed 
bureaucratic advice, it can count on passive or active opposition. 
Bureaucrats have to be co-opted to meet the politicians' goals. The reasons 
for the growing power of bureaucrats are explained by the increasing 
government intervention in all spheres of life, by the increasing 
complexity of government tasks and the need for greater technocratic 
expertise to tackle these complex situations. Also the information required 
for decision making is in the hands of bureaucracies which is an additional 
help. The limited time, manpower and resources of politicians and the lack 
of continuity among politicians are in the advantage of bureaucracies. 
Pluralist views on the state and bureaucracy 
Another school of thought which is relevant to this study is the modern 
theory oí pluralism. Undoubtedly this thinking had its roots in the United 
States. Basically, pluralism refutes Mosca's premise of absolute powers (of 
politicians or bureaucracies) and argues that in the twentieth century, 
political power has become increasingly fragmented and diffused. Each 
economic, professional, religious, ethnic or other such group is held to 
exercise a certain influence on the policy-making process, but none of 
them is seen as possessing a monopolistic or decisive share of power since 
they all check and counter-balance each other. For an American city, it 
refers to the various ethnic groups, the developers, the house-owners, 
Christian societies, business groups of particular sectoral or communal 
affiliation, environmentalists, the social rights movement, women's rights 
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groups, etc. The bureaucratic organisation is seen as a system in an open 
relation with its 'environment'. The 'environment' constitutes the various 
interest groups that have mobilised their channels to make demands and to 
express their views. As a result of these politics, the mechanisms of power 
and influence are important themes in this approach. 
The pluralist approach is a reaction to the classical and normative 
approach of M. Weber, Woodrow Wilson and F. Taylor and the work of 
R.A. Dahl (1961) has been an important contribution to this approach. The 
public administration cannot be perceived as a neutral and technical 
machine in which various interests are weighed in a balanced and objective 
manner and in which optimal co-ordination between the various interest 
groups is always possible. 'The ideal of a neatly symmetrical, frictionless 
organisation structure is a dangerous illusion' (Seidman, Politics, position 
and power, 1970, p. 47). In fact, the bureaucratic organisation makes a 
distinct - and at times deliberate - contribution to the political and societal 
dynamics through their experiences and knowledge of operational and 
executive limitations and opportunities of policy implementation. There is, 
thus, a fine balance and reciprocity between the interest groups (including 
politicians) and the bureaucracy. In other words, bureaucrats are unable to 
rale alone, and yet no one else can rule without them; they cannot always 
achieve their goals, but they can prevent others from achieving theirs; they 
are constrained by political elite, are influenced by private interests and are 
constrained by them too; and they, for their part, constrain others. They are 
thus one of several veto groups in a pluralist political system. 
A bureaucratic agency is accepted as a separate entity in a pluralist 
society which - like other entities - also strives for building up and 
maintaining political support for its own goals and expansion (Long, 
1954). In order to survive, any bureaucratic agency must, in the first place, 
mobilise the support of the legislature. The bureaucracy is an entity to 
reckon with but not an unity. The bureaucratic organisation is not a 
monolithic and hierarchical entity, but rather a poly-centric structure with 
more or less autonomous units. It is a highly fragmented set of agencies 
that are partly interdependent and are also in fierce competition within and 
among themselves for survival, primacy and for a growing share of 
government resources. Long is of the view that the multi-faceted structure 
of interests needs to be institutionalised in bureaucratic organisations; the 
'checks and balances' need to be ensured by imparting 'advocatus diaboli' 
and the presence of a 'loyal opposition' within a bureaucratic organisation. 
Public administration is, thereby, the result of negotiations between 
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coalitions of represented interest groups. Whether and how these interest 
groups are represented in the negotiations depends on the networks that 
have been established between bureaucrats, politicians, public interest 
groups and others. Bureaucratic organisations become, thus, 'whirlpools of 
interests' (Milward and Wamsley, 1985 in Korten and Toonen, 1988, p. 
47). 
In the pluralist school of thought, the line between empirical 
deducted theories and normative inducted theories is hardly 
distinguishable. Lindblom, who may be categorised under this school of 
thought, tends to be rather normative. For example, he argues that 
organisational goals have to be interpreted as a result of negotiations 
between the active interest groups (Lindblom, 1959). The importance of 
these goals, the size of allocated resources, the pressures to perform, the 
setting of particular performance criteria are also the result of negotiations. 
This not only applies for the organisation as a whole, but more so for the 
departments. Policies and co-ordination between organisations and 
departments should not only be seen as a functional prerequisite for 
effective goal-achievement, but also as a source of power and the result of 
another negotiation process. Bureaucratic output is the result of an 
incremental process, characterised by a 'political rationale' of 
compromises, persuasion and trading between competing and conflicting 
interests. Lindblom refers to this process of decision making as 'muddling 
through'; staged decision making with - on the face of it - little sense. This 
rationale should not be seen as negative, but as necessary and desirable. It 
is only in this manner that bureaucratic output becomes responsive to 
societal and political needs. Normative overtones are here pervasive. 
Empirical evidence proves that the participation of the various interest 
groups is not equal. Although exerting influence on government policies 
may be 'de jure' equituous, 'de facto' some groups have used their 
opportunities with much greater effectiveness than others while some have 
been unable to seize the opportunity at all. For example, the blacks and 
Puerto Ricans in New York hardly participate in its city's politics. The 
elitist argument has thus crept in a basically, equalitarian and normative 
thesis. 
The imperfection in bureaucratic decision making and the concept of 
'muddling through' has been appealing and accepted by many a 
bureaucrat, but may be attributed to other reasons: the lack of information, 
the whims and fancies of individuals, the lack of rational decision makers 
and mainly time pressures under which decisions have to be made. Such a 
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pessimistic view of the rationale of bureaucratic output and decision 
making has been propagated by J.P. Olsen (with J.G. March, 1976). He 
argues that organisations are ambiguous as far as their intentions, available 
knowledge, the objectives and organisational procedures are concerned. 
Moreover, institutional memory is poor and lessons are hardly learnt from 
its history. This ambiguity gives life to inconsistent preferences, unclear 
operational procedures and a fluid participation in decision making. This 
so-called organised anarchy manifests itself in the decision making that 
takes place with changing participants, without a consistent sequence, 
erratic preferences, confusing and irrational formulation of problems and 
solutions. Decision making he compares with a so-called 'garbage can' in 
which different participants dump various problems and solutions. Olsen 
supported his concepts by analysing the decision making in a number of 
educational institutions and universities (March and Olsen, 1976 in Korten 
andToonen, 1988, p. 189). 
Urban machine politics 
The work of James С Scott (1972) bears particular relevance here as he 
attempted to unravel the mechanisms of corruption in both developed and 
developing countries, including India. Literature on corruption is mostly 
rather descriptive in its analysis, focusing on how and where corruption 
takes place, casting a moral judgement on corruption and calling for more 
prudent institutional and legal changes. S.B. Gupta (1992) and Pavarala 
(1996) belong to this school of thought. Corruption is seen by others 
(Ward, Johnston and Schenk in Ward, 1989) as one of the instruments of 
the ruling elite to expand their influence. Their explanation, however, 
provides little clue for the fact that corruption is practised by almost all 
members of society, including the government. The structuralist approach 
also seemed to have incorporated corruption without a proper 
understanding of the phenomenon. Both elitist and structuralist schools 
agree that corruption strengthens the existing inequalities, subverts 
resources away from the poor and acts against the wider interest. In 
allowing some people to 'jump the queue', others are denied access. 
Moreover, institutional goals and targets are replaced by personal and 
material goals, undermining the organisational and individual 
performances. Corruptive practices also deface the reputation of public 
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institutions and reduce the public confidence in political control and the 
functioning of the political system. 
In contrast, Scott offers a more comprehensive analysis of 
corruption in the context of 'the ecology of machine politics' (Scott, 1972, 
p. 114). The concept of machine politics was developed and applied by 
Steffens (1963) when he analysed the operations of local parties and 
partymen in the United States around the turn of the century. They aimed 
to gain the favours of and control over the electorate by using material 
incentives. The urban political machine flourished and managed to rule 
and became reasonably effective and legitimate in an immigrant-choked 
city and fashioned itself to supply a cacophony of concrete and parochial 
demands. Many of the machine's favours were non-monetary and merely 
involved to showing an immigrant where to apply for a job or housing, 
how to fill out legal forms, and who to go to in case of trouble. 'It was the 
immigrant's newness to the country and his insecurity, quite as much as 
his poverty, that drew him to the machine - and the machine to him' (ibid., 
p. 117). Scott formulates three prerequisites under which machine politics 
can emerge: (a) political power is fragmented and the balance of power is 
determined by the behaviour of the voters during elections, (b) ethnic 
cleavage and/or social disorganisation is widespread making the voters 
vulnerable to manipulation and wanting help for getting access to 
bureaucracies, finance, services and shelter, and (c) most of the population 
is poor and their only tradable asset is their vote. In such circumstances, 
the interest of the poor electorate is short-lived and material. These needs 
must be satisfied and the provision of material favours comes along with 
patronage, mediation through local middle-men, 'locking in of the 
electorate', and expelling others from accessing these vote banks using 
discrediting campaigns, intimidation, threats and - at times - violence. 
In order to satisfy monetary demands, the party funds have to be 
allocated. These funds can be generated from business houses and 
established aristocracy who are interested to continue their control over 
political decision making and so donate to the party lavishly. This practice 
is widely spread in India and most business houses do indeed contribute to 
one or more party coffers in order to ensure their influence when one of 
these parties comes to power. The donations are not always politically 
motivated as business houses donate to Congress, BJP and regional parties 
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alike. An example is the reputed Tata's business house in India . While the 
party may rely on these financial sources for the purpose of getting elected 
to power, individual and lower ranked politicians may have to seek other 
sources for their machine politics. Also, once elected, the struggle to 
remain in power continues and the various interest groups have to be 'co-
ordinated'. In the dynamics of local politics, established coalitions come 
under pressure due to surfacing political conflicts which result from 
unfulfilled rewards promised before election or from coalition partners 
seeking their rightful share of power. As the earlier donors may not be 
interested to continue funding a ruling party 'the only treasury big enough 
to support co-ordination was the public till', argued Flynn (1947, in Scott, 
1972, p. 116) when he analysed the power struggles in New York. 
The machine party is 'rather a non-ideological organisation 
interested less in political principle than in securing and retaining political 
office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work 
for it' (Banfield and Wilson, 1965 in Scott, 1972, p. 116). A populist 
image is promulgated based on a myriad of acts that symbolise its 
accessibility, helpfulness, and desire to work for the 'little man'. While the 
evidence of machine politics is mostly drawn from examples in the United 
States, Scott argues that machine politics 'seem in large degree applicable 
to many underdeveloped nations' (ibid., p. 115) and provides examples 
from Ghana and India. The Indian machine politics of the 1960s 
functioned to a large extent on the personal wealth of the political 
contestants: inherited wealth, landholdings and traditional status gave them 
an independent base of power. The most dominant party of the 1960s, the 
Congress, had to spend a great deal in keeping together the various 
factions of its semi-independent partymen. At the level of the electorate 
the local politicians used a host of local middlemen, expediters or brokers. 
They extended the necessary help and exchanged material gains with 
electoral bondage. Scott, however, argues that India 'has not been 
characterised by the growth of urban machines' (ibid., p. 136). Local 
politicians bank on their established economic wealth and social status. 
The Congress then incorporates these local leaders in their ranks. India has 
'machine-style politics without a cohesive machine' which Scott attributes 
to the limited control of the Congress over its politicians and their control 
of material inducements at the local level (ibid., p. 140). The analysis of 
The Tata's family has extended its business in electronics, telecommunication, car and 
truck manufacturing, infrastructure development, aviation and estate development. 
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the machine-like politics of the 1960s can be seen as different from the 
politics of the 1980s and 1990s, the period of study. Therefore, in chapter 
16, a reflection of the contemporary Indian urban politics has been 
presented. 
3.3 Final remarks 
A final remark has to be made. The theories and concepts presented are 
diverse in terms of theoretical object and interpretation of reality. 
However, they are expected to provide the necessary tools for discussing 
the findings in the following chapters. The normative views help to explain 
the government's perception and expectations of their bureaucracy. The 
concepts of structuralist, instrumentalist and pluralist views will help in 
discussing the role of societal interests groups, urban elite, politicians and 
the public vis-à-vis the government at particularly the state level. The 
theory of urban machine politics is expected to add useful concepts to the 
discussion of the findings at the local level. As mentioned earlier, the 
conceptual framework adopted for this research follows a political view of 
the state and local bureaucracies. I, therefore, support and follow from the 
outset Rüland's view that the prevalence of authoritarian and centralist 
governments in most developing countries, and in India particularly, calls 
for an approach that seeks to uncover power structures and the patterns of 
decision-making. He recommends that the 'penetrated system' approach 
may be the best analytical instrument and I have, in fact, adopted this 
approach as research methodology in chapter two. 
4 
A Profile of India's Economic, Social and Political 
Development 
4.1 India's route to a welfare state and democratic socialism 
The first step in analysing urban development processes and the policies of 
the government is a reflection on the pre- and post Independence social, 
political and economic history. It is postulated that policies are not sent 
from heaven but reflect the contemporary thinking and premises on 
national development. India's modern history provides the background to 
the political course that India took after its Independence in 1947 and the 
strong role that the Indian government had to play in all spheres of life and 
development. 
India's Independence struggle and the foundations of a new nation 
One cannot look at India today without looking at its colonial past when 
the British Crown ruled over the whole of India between 1818 and 1947. In 
the early years of the British dominion and with the experience of East-
India Company trading in Bengal in the eighteenth century, it was thought 
possible to leave things as they were. A basic infrastructure and a 
administrative framework would be sufficient to gain the benefits that the 
Crown wished to see. In this scenario, the remnants of the Mughal 
landholding system and administration, the princely states and rural Hindu 
society were to be left intact and accommodated where necessary within 
the British system. However, this conservative stand was replaced by that 
of the so-called Radicals and Evangelicals and Britain took the line of 
offering the West to the East without compelling acceptance. Lord William 
A Profile of India's Development 47 
Bentinck, governor-general from 1825-35 was the pilot for this change. 
The major changes in this new policy were to establish a new 
administrative system to collect land revenues based on surveys and a 
western system of administrative control. He disregarded the use of local 
chiefs and the land control system inherited from the Mughals, particularly 
in the North. Another change was the establishment of schools and 
colleges imparting western knowledge in the English language and using 
western technology, medicine and science. 
The prominent and pervading influence of a foreign power led to 
tensions over a period of time which resulted in the Mutiny, the first open 
revolt, in Meerut in 1857. It spread to various parts of the country, lasted 
for four months, and was the beginning of broad resistance against the 
colonial power. The British saw in these developments that India would 
remain backward-looking and self-centred for a long time, that 
westernisation would take more time and that the contemplated self-
government on western concepts would remain a distant future. It led to an 
underrating and neglect of the newly emerging westernised middle class, 
who were partly the product of their own rule, and the growing aspirations 
for self-governance. 'The fissure between the British and the new India 
began at this point' (Spear, 1990, p. 153). Secondly, Indians have a 
tradition of and pride in Hinduism, 'that there was no country like theirs, 
no kings like theirs, no religion like theirs, no science like theirs' as the 
Arab philosopher Albiruni noted in the eleventh century (in Spear, 1990, p. 
159). Various religious movements with nationalist agenda started in this 
period. None of these, however, triggered a mass movement as Hinduism 
was not able to organise the divisive, pluriform and inward looking castes 
and communities into any cohesive form. Meanwhile, the British created 
outstanding public works: an extensive rail network, roads, irrigation. 
Industries developed led by land-owning families. The famous steel mills 
of the Tatas may be mentioned in this regard, who continue to be one of 
the largest business houses in India today. 
The Independence struggle did not start until the traumatic 
experience of the First World War changed the balance in world powers 
with emerging newly independent powers such as the United States of 
America, Australia and Canada. Facing up to the reality, the British passed 
a bill in 1919 that introduced three principles which provided the 
foundation of later independent India: 
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1. the realisation of self-governance by stages with the ultimate goal of 
parliamentary self-government, but full independence was ruled out; 
2. the devolution in the financial and legislative spheres to provinces; 
and 
3. the introduction of the concept of federalism. 
There was the ascendancy of Mahatma Gandhi, who played a catalytic role 
and introduced several public protest tactics that appealed to a large public 
and unsettled the rulers. 
India had also a large community of Muslims, who lived in towns, 
descended from merchants, soldiers and officials of bygone courts of Arab 
traders, Muslim invaders and Mughal emperors. The heyday of the Muslim 
community was during the Mughal empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, but which collapsed in the eighteenth century. In the middle of 
the nineteenth century a Muslim revival was the response to the 
westernisation of society. Sayyid Ahmad Khan of Delhi (1817-97), a 
lawyer and writer, was an important leader in this revival. Though the 
large Muslim community supported the independence movement through 
the established Congress Party, they were apprehensive about the party's 
commitment to sufficiently protect their interest in the struggle for a new 
nation. The freedom struggle was to them perhaps too much based on 
Hindu themes and methods as applied by Mahatma Gandhi. It was after 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah defected from the Congress Party that new life was 
given to the Muslim aspirations through the founding of the Muslim 
League. In 1935, the Government of India Act was introduced which 
proved to be a landmark in the development of India. Although the Act is 
seen as far-sighted, the outbreak of the Second World War slowed things 
down as far as the British were concerned. This had an irreversible effect 
on the Indian urge to become fully independent (puma swaraj) and the 
strife of the Muslim League to establish a separate Muslim homeland: 
Pakistan. The latter with unimaginable consequences. In 1947, India begot 
in the wake of its Independence, a communal bloodbath with 
approximately 500,000 lives lost, a separated West and isolated East 
Pakistan, and about 13 million people uprooted from their homes and 
forced to migrate to a homeland that was grossly unprepared to receive 
such numbers (Spear, 1990). 
The movement for political independence has always been linked to 
ideas of social and economic development. The widespread poverty and 
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recurrent famines could not be reduced by a policy of laissez-faire, which 
the British found most appropriate for India. It required a strong national 
government which actively promotes development in a planned way. It 
was this socialist outlook that Jawaharlal Nehru and his Congress party 
adopted. The Constitution was drafted by Dr. Ambedkar shortly after 
Independence in 1947, and contained many articles that aimed at the 
establishment of fundamental human rights, equality and fraternity and 
'the state's duty, within the limits of its capacity to make effective 
provision for securing the right to work, education and to public assistance 
in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other 
cases of undeserved want' (Indian Constitution, Article 39). Hence, the 
independent Indian nation sought to achieve the pattern of a welfare state. 
It had also adopted the objective of achieving a 'socialist pattern of 
society'. This would embody the values of socialism, democracy and the 
approach of planned development. 
Religion, caste system and secularism 
The result of India's history is that many religions have found a home on 
this subcontinent. The Hindus form by large the majority with 84 per cent, 
followed by Muslims with 11 per cent and the rest other religions, among 
them Christians and Sikhs. To understand Indian society and the processes 
of urban governance, one has to unravel various layers of 'reality'. These 
layers to many westerners often appear puzzling, incomprehensible, 
irrational and contradictory and at the same time so intriguing to travellers 
and scholars. 
One such layer is the Hindu religion and the caste system in India. It 
is surprising to see that most literature on public administration, economic 
development and urban development policies hardly touch upon these. It is 
generally accepted that caste system came into existence with the invasion 
of Aryans about 1500 ВС. There existed three classes: priests, warriors and 
commoners. During that period there was no caste consciousness, 
professions were not hereditary, and marriages were not confined within 
the three classes. The first step in the direction of casteism was taken when 
the Aryans treated the dark-skinned and 'alien' looking Dasas (literally 
slaves) as socially lower, fearful of loosing their Aryan identity when 
assimilated with them (Thapar, 1990). Initially, the division was between 
Aryans and non-Aryans, which later developed into a four-layered system. 
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The basic unit of this caste system is the varna, which is the Sanskrit word 
for colour. The fourfold hierarchy has on top the Brahmin (scholar-priest) 
caste, then the Kshatriya (warriors and aristocracy), Vaishya (landowners 
and merchants) and at the bottom the Sudra caste (cultivators and 
labourers). The Dasas and mixed Aryan-Dasas belonged to the lowest 
caste. Other ethnic groups were integrated in this system, depending on 
their profession and colour. The Brahmin by then was in a supreme 
position and decided about matters of religion, custom and caste. Below 
this solid house exist the outcastes, the untouchables or Harijans ('children 
of God') as they were renamed by Mahatma Gandhi. 
However, most Hindus follow the classification of jati (or birth). 
The jati is articulated in one person's dharma, i.e. his or her hereditary 
position, profession, ethnicity, marriage and lineage, language, region, 
religious customs and interpretation, values and adopted tradition, 
historical background and social determination towards other castes. It is 
the dharma of the Brahmin to be respected, and that of a sweeper to be 
despised. The inequality is based on the inheritance of good and bad deeds 
of previous lives, which materialises for each Hindu to be reborn into a 
certain jati. This reward or punishment in next life is called karma. There 
is an inescapable complacency, that is imperative for any chance to end up 
better in a next life: '...he must accept without ambition to change, he must 
regard his misfortune or otherwise with detachment and without 
complaint, since whatever melancholy or happiness he has, was 
irrevocably ordained by the deeds of a previous life, and his complicity in 
that situation will doubtless help next time', writes James Cameron (1994, 
p. 45), a known scholar of India, writer and journalist. The Hindu society 
is, thus, based on this fundamental notion of moral and religious 
inequality. 
The Constitution of India of 1950 aimed to do away with the caste 
system and outlawed discrimination on the grounds of caste. The 
Constitution also included clauses allowing the state to implement 
'affirmative action'. These would entail policies of positive discrimination 
and quotas of seats in Parliament, state legislative assemblies, public sector 
jobs and educational institutions, and a certain fixed percentage of public 
funds for targeted groups to improve their welfare. For the purpose of 
registration and eligibility of benefits, these backward classes were 
categorised as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST) and Other 
Backward Castes (OBC). Thus, the former lower castes would now be 
renamed into SC, ST or OBC. This formalisation was required as the 
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government initiated policies to improve their living conditions and had to 
find a way to identify them. While on the one hand, the government 
wanted to do away with the caste system, they introduced an identification 
system that would continue their social stigma. In spite of these policies, 
the Mandai Commission report of 1979 concluded that although the 
backward castes comprised 52 per cent of the population, they held only 
12.5 per cent of central government jobs, and only 4.7 per cent of jobs at 
officer level. The Commission had recommended massive discrimination 
in their favour. When the government wanted to implement their 
recommendations ten years later, it resulted in severe protests from the 
established upper-caste communities and the political chaos that followed 
was instrumental in causing the downfall of the V.P. Singh government. 
Constituting a large segment of the population, it may be obvious that 
caste and reservation policies is a major drum in party politics. 
4.2 Economic development planning 
India's adoption of central development planning 
The first pre-Independence economic policy was the Industrial Policy of 
1945. The major concern of this policy was to secure balanced investments 
in industries, to ensure steady employment and regular wages, to prevent 
excessive profits to private capital, to avoid unhealthy concentration of 
assets in the hands of few persons and to ensure production quality. This 
policy reflected the main principles for development planning that the 
Government of India adopted at the time of Independence: 
1. There should be central planning and the state should play an active 
role, for social and economic development to bring about a rapid rise 
in standards for living; 
2. There should be controls and licensing in order to direct (private) 
investment into the desired channels and ensure equitable 
distribution; and 
3. While there should be balanced development in all sectors of the 
economy, the establishment of basic industries was important. In this, 
state-owned and state-managed enterprises have an important role. 
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In 1938, India had established the first National Planning Committee with 
Jawaharlal Nehru as its chairman. The planning machinery that evolved 
during this period was inspired by the national planning set up in the 
Soviet Union. The Gosplan (Soviet Planning Commission), established in 
1928, and its functions, responsibilities and procedures for national social 
and economic planning provided an important reference for India's nation 
builders (Chandran, 1986, Avasthi & Avasthi, 1993). 
In 1950, the National Planning Commission of independent India 
was established which resembled to a large extent the corresponding 
institutions in Soviet Russia at that time. The process of planning that took 
root within the constitutional framework and the federal structure of India 
postulates that: 
1. Industries, railways, national highways, major ports, shipping, civil 
aviation and communications, as well as overall fiscal and monetary 
policies and the principal financial institutions are central government 
tasks and detailed plans are prepared for these sectors by the central 
government; 
2. There are, however, many other sectors that are state government 
tasb: agriculture, irrigation, power, education, health and social 
services, housing and urban development, small industries, roads and 
roads transport, and minor ports. These areas are elaborated in state 
plans for which the central government prepares a global policy and 
programme outlines and provides general outlays in the five-year 
plans; 
3. The process of planning is done by the Planning Commission which 
has to be necessarily responsive to public needs and opinions, and to 
central and state government institutions, including the state planning 
departments and ensure their participation, when preparing the 
documents; and 
4. The main planning document is a five-year plan, this is to concur with 
the election cycle of national Parliament and state Assemblies. 
However, an increasing number of projects have long gestation periods, 
which has made it necessary to place increasing emphasis on long-term 
plans of development in different sectors of the economy, more specially, 
in industries, transport, power, large irrigation works and the training of 
manpower. The five-year plans are followed by annual plans, mid-term 
appraisal reports and other documents that are forwarded to the National 
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Development Council, who take care of endorsement and presentation to 
the Parliament. The policies as outlined in the five-year plans are 
elaborated in chapter seven and eight. 
Employment, income disparities and poverty 
There has been a long shadow between economic planning objectives and 
performance. The major shortcoming in the balanced economic planning 
of a developing nation like India is that it was believed that economic 
growth alone would bring about the achievement of the other objectives: 
full employment and equal income distribution and wealth. Although the 
Indian economy has achieved economic growth, it has fallen short in terms 
of reducing unemployment, reducing income disparities and eradicating 
poverty. The subject of poverty has been accompanied by the discussion of 
who are the poor and of the definition of the poverty line. There are several 
interpretations and different figures have been quoted. For example, the 
Report of the Expert Group on Estimation of Proportion and Number of 
Poor, prepared by the Planning Commission in July 1993 quotes the 
estimates as shown in table 4-1. 
Table 4-1: Percentage of urban and rural population below the poverty 
line according Expert Group Estimates in India, 1973-88 
Area 
Rural 
Urban 
Combined 
1973-74 
56.4 
49.2 
54.9 
1977-78 
53.1 
47.4 
51.8 
1983-84 
45.6 
42.2 
44.8 
1987-88 
39.1 
40.1 
39.3 
Source: Planning Commission, Report on the Expert Group Meeting on Estimation of 
Proportion and Number of Poor (1993). 
Urban poverty is unevenly spread and the poor are particularly numerous 
in Bihar, Urtar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Orissa and Madhya 
Pradesh. As compared to data available from 1972-73 (National Planning 
Commission), the incidence of urban poverty has reduced in relative terms. 
However, the absolute number of urban poor increased in the state of Bihar 
by 39 per cent, in Orissa by 28 per cent, in Uttar Pradesh by 13 per cent, 
and in Andhra Pradesh by 11 per cent. In other states the absolute number 
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of urban poor declined. Among the urban poor, women and children, 
scheduled castes are over-represented (Amis et al, 1992). 
Elimination of poverty has been and remains the primary objective 
of India's development policies. The goal of reducing poverty has loomed 
large in development plans, strategies and projects. However, Amis et al 
(1992) argue that 'a glaring deficiency concerning urban poverty 
intervention is the consistency with which it has been side-stepped 
throughout the history of central planning in the country. Successive Five-
Year Plans have avoided formulating any direct and substantive policies 
and programmes aimed at solving the problem' (ibid., p. 48). According to 
the World Bank's Country Study (1989), 'the success of these efforts has 
been seen in a rise in real agricultural wages and in consumption levels of 
people at the lower end of the income distribution in the 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s. As a result of this, the prevalent rate of poverty and the 
number of people in absolute poverty in India have been diminishing' 
(1989, p. xxviii). Indeed, most programmes in the first Five-Year Plan 
were aimed at rural poor. The belief was held that urban poverty was an 
offshoot of rural poverty and therefore, taking care of the latter would 
automatically solve the former. In the 1970s, the awareness grew that 
urban poverty is a problem that needs to be dealt with as well. Since then 
several programmes and institutions have been established that are dealt 
with in the later chapters. 
4.3 India's political landscape 
To understand India's development, it is important to get acquainted with 
India's political landscape as well. 
The institutions of India's democracy 
At the centre, there is the Lower House of Parliament (or Lok Sabha) with 
543 seats in 1991. The system of voting is the single-member 
constituency; each constituency is represented by only one member of 
Parliament (MP). The state of Karnataka is represented by 28 MPs. The 
peculiarity of this system is that it has produced governments that failed to 
have a majority of votes but captured a clear majority of seats both at the 
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centre and the state . The party that has captured the majority of seats, 
establishes the government In case there is no clear majority, a coalition 
government can be formed. The prime minister heads the Cabinet of 
Ministers. Besides the prime minister and the Cabinet ministers, there are 
also ministers of state, who together constitute the government. The 
second constitutional body at the Centre is the Council of States (or Rajya 
Sabha). It has 250 members of whom 238 represent the 25 states and 7 
union territories. The distribution of seats among the states is roughly in 
proportion to their population strength. The third constitutional body at the 
centre is the president. An electoral college consisting of members of the 
Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha and state legislative assemblies elects the 
president for a five-year term. Under normal circumstances, the powers of 
the president of India are merely ornamental, comprising appointive, 
dismissive, legislative and symbolic functions. 
At the state level, the state legislative Assembly is similar to the 
Parliament (Lok Sabha) of India. The voting system is similar and the 
formation of state government follows the same rationale with a chief 
minister presiding over Cabinet ministers and ministers of state. The 
Karnataka's State Legislative Assembly has 224 seats (in 1994). Five 
states have two chambers, among them Karnataka. In Karnataka, it is 
called the State Legislative Council. The role of the legislative council is 
merely advisory, while it can hold up the passage of a bill. The governor at 
the state level defends the national interests and has the power to dissolve 
the state legislative Assembly under article 356 of the Constitution. A 
governor is appointed by and holds office at the pleasure of the president. 
The fact that the governor is appointed whereas the president is elected, 
has raised many controversies. Central government dominance, lack of 
sensitivity for state matters, centre-state party politics, etc. have been 
issues raised since India's Independence. These issues have been 
particularly strong in states where the government is ruled by a party 
opposing the national government. 
In 1984, the Congress secured only 48 per cent of the votes but captured 77 per cent of 
the seats in the Lok Sabha. 
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India's political parties 
Beside to the constitutional bodies at the centre and the state, there are 
political parties that colour the Indian political landscape. The Indian 
National Congress Party is one of the oldest in the world and was founded 
in 1885 from a number of groups representing the interests of the new 
urban middle class. The party has dominated the scene from its early 
official representation in British-ruled India in 1936 till the post-Nehru 
years that ended in 1967. The Congress policies are characterised by their 
pursuance of a socialist democracy, secularism, establishment of strong 
government, a planned economy based on industrial and agricultural 
development, education, and favourable policies towards 'minorities' such 
as the large communities of Muslims and Hindu scheduled castes and 
tribes. Only recently a policy of liberalisation of the economy has been 
launched to replace the earlier government-led planned economy policies. 
Table 4-2: Government parties and prime ministers in India, 1947-97 
Period 
1947-64 
1964-66 
1966-77 
1977-79 
1979-80 
1980-84 
1984-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-96 
1996-97 
1997-
Party 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Janata 
Janata 
Congress 
Congress 
National Front 
Samajvadi Janata 
Congress 
United Front 
United Front 
Prime minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru 
Lai Bahadur Shastri 
Indira Gandhi 
Morarji Desai 
Charan Singh 
Indira Gandhi 
Rajiv Gandhi 
V.P.Singh 
Chandra Shekhar 
P.V. Narasimha Rao 
H.D. Deve Gowda 
I.K. Gujral 
Source: Thakur(1995). 
The strength of the Congress party is that it was able to keep together the 
continuously competing factions. 'The Congress ... is amorphous, resilient, 
hospitable to diverse strands of dogma and interpretation, non-rejectionist, 
tolerant and accommodating, capable of internalising dissent, and seeking 
to reconcile the irreconcilable', observes R. Khan in a striking manner in 
77je State, Political Processes and Identity (in Hasan, Jha and Khan - eds., 
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1989, p. 64). 'Consensus politics' was therefore a requisite paradigm 
throughout the party's history. Nevertheless, dissidents have left the 
Congress party and established independent parties or have joined other 
opposition parties and some have succeeded such as the BJP and Janata 
Party. But many parties have rejoined the Congress while many others 
have joined independently. The containment of centrifugal forces in any 
party in India relies to a large extent on the presence of a charismatic and 
strong leadership, which the Congress Party has enjoyed for many years 
(Spear, 1990). The Gandhi-Nehru dynasty, as it has been referred to, has 
produced such personalities through whom the party could sustain its 
powerful position for more than 30 years since 1936 and regain power 
several times during the last three decades. Table 4-2 illustrates the long 
and recurrent reign of the Congress party till the present day in national 
politics. 
After a traumatic Emergency period, the Congress was defeated in 
national elections in 1977 and again in 1989, a loose coalition of other 
parties came together to form the government for brief interludes. United 
only in a common opposition to Congress, it was the Janata Coalition in 
1977-79 and the National Front in 1989-90 that came to power in Delhi. 
Both governments were born out of unhappiness with the Congress 
governments, those of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi respectively. 
Neither coalition could produce a strong enough leader to keep the 
different factions together and both governments resulted in the national 
elections being held ahead of time, to give the Congress party victory once 
again. The Janata Party is full of former Congress people, and in many 
ways offered the familiar Congress vision with a slightly more populist 
tinge. While the Janata Party has a much stronger base in a number of 
states, it never succeeded in producing a strong enough leader for a 
national coalition until 1996 when the chief minister of Karnataka, H.D. 
Deve Gowda, became prime minister of the United Front that had a dozen 
parties as their coalition members. 
The third largest party is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Its 
policies were a reaction to the progressive attenuation of secularism 
promoted by the Congress at the cost of Hindu religion interests. The 
origins of the BJP go back to a process of competitive ethnic-linguistic 
nationalism. The Hindu Mahasabha was formed in reaction to the Muslim 
League and the Indian liberals. Neither the Hindu Mahasabha or the later 
Ram Rajya Parishad were able to become a movement with an electoral 
impact as a Hindu revivalist party. In fact, Hinduism lacks both a tradition 
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of exclusivity and an accepted hierarchical religious order in which a papal 
equivalent can pronounce authoritatively on religious dogma (Thakur, 
1995). The closest to a Hindu party in Indian politics was the Bharatiya 
Jan Sangh. Formed in 1951, it drew much of its organisational strength 
from the Rashtriya Swayasevak Sangh (RSS, or National Volunteer 
Group). The RSS was formed in 1925 with a militant commitment to the 
regeneration of India as a Hindu nation, as much as Pakistan was built as 
an Islamic nation. Fighting Western evils, advocating Hindi language and 
Ayurvedic medicine, protecting the sacred cow and taking a hawkish 
stance on defence, including the acquisition of nuclear capability, the RSS 
had a clear identifiable and popular profile. The Jan Sangh was renamed to 
BJP in 1984 and has gained in strength since the late 1980s. The Jan 
Sangh/BJP captured 7.4 per cent of the votes in 1984, 11.4 per cent of the 
votes in 1989 and 19.9 per cent in 1991 national elections. 
As nowhere else in the world, the communist parties in India have 
gained and held on to power at the state level within the framework of 
parliamentary democracy and a non-communist regime at the national 
level. Though they never had any impact on the national elections, they are 
a distinct power in the states of Kerala and West Bengal, where it has the 
broad support among the rural poor and also the urban middle class. The 
two principal communist parties are the Communist Party of India (CPI), 
and the Marxist Communist Party of India or CPI(M). Both parties are 
oriented towards the former Soviet Union Communist Party rather than 
towards the neighbouring China. 
It has been argued that today's political theatre is rather issue-based 
and lacks an overall vision of society or clear goals. These issues seem to 
mobilise temporary political support from the electorate but wears out 
rather quickly and fails to sustain a broad based support. The politicians 
would have alienated from the needs and feelings of the public. The Hindu, 
an important national daily newspaper for many intellectual, conservative 
Indians, had conducted a poll among its readers to identify their political 
priority. Not surprisingly, they had given the highest priority to the 
improvement of the economy and the fighting of black money and, 
secondly, to reduce the population growth. Particularly, fighting black 
money and control of population control are considered politically 
controversial and are, at best, addressed in slogans that do not have any 
further repercussions. The readers gave a very low priority to 
contemporary political issues of 'Mandai and Mandir': the reservation 
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policies and the re-construction of a Hindu temple on the site of former 
mosque in Ayodhya. 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has tried to place urban development today in the light of the 
historical evolution of religion, culture, foreign dominion and politics in 
the country. The pervading and unequal divisions among religious 
communities and between castes determine to a large extent individual 
economic opportunities. The policies of the government aim to undo the 
historical inequalities but at the same time help to continue these divisions 
in castes by its reservation policies. The British dominion and the 
Independence movement inspired by an Indian form of socialism, has to a 
large extent determined the Constitution of an extensive government and 
bureaucracy. Policies were focused on industrial development, agriculture 
and poverty reduction. While poverty seems to be on the decline, the total 
numbers still increase, particularly in the northern states. As the 
performance of the economy has been unconvincing, there is as yet no 
reason to believe that the rural-urban migration will diminish. 
Development has been to a large extent formulated by one party: the 
Congress. After 1967, the party fell prey to instability and, since then, a 
few other parties have successfully challenged the Congress domination. 
Since the 1980s, the BJP and Janata Dal have become serious contenders 
to power. The change in the political balance of powers has brought about 
the increased need for coalition and, in fact, unstable governments which 
find it difficult to serve a full five-year term. 
5 
A Profile of Karnataka 
To understand Karnataka's urban social and economic situation one has to 
study its history, was the advice I received from a senior civil servant in 
the urban development sector. It is certainly true that today's urban 
landscape in Karnataka has been determined by its rich past. The social 
landscape is the outcome of the history of the rise and fall of communities 
under the subsequent rulers. The economic and political landscape is to a 
large extent determined by the traditional land-owning classes who have 
their roots in the rural areas. This chapter presents a historical, political 
and economic profile of the state Karnataka. 
5.1 Karnataka's history 
For at least two millennia, large parts of Karnataka were ruled by 
successive Hindu dynasties, of which the Kadambas, Chalukyas, Hoysalas, 
Vijayanagara and the contemporary Wodeyars of Mysore. They 
acknowledged the importance of dharma, and confirmed greatly to the 
Kautilyan pattern of administration: to respect one's parents and elders, to 
show compassion to animals, to speak the truth and inculcate the virtues of 
practical morality (Basavaraja, 1984). 'In the happiness of the subjects lay 
the happiness of the king' was the prescribed principle for rule. The 
constituted Council of Ministers and lower administrators had an elaborate 
doctrine for rule, for training of heirs, inheritance, religious duties and for 
the treatment of the king's subjects. Cultural and educational institutions 
were also established. Land tax constituted the principal source of revenue 
to these rulers. Up to one-fourth of the produce could be claimed. Besides 
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a revenue administration, a military administration and force, and a 
judicial system were established. Although there were not many towns, 
those that were declared as such by the king had a mayor, a town 
assembly, an administration with an accounts officer, an engineer, a 
customs officer and a guard, and the right to levy taxes and fines. Schools, 
water tanks and temples were the main amenities to be looked after by the 
town assembly. Streets or wards were used to administratively divide the 
town. This system dominated from pre-Vijayanagara times through the 
Vijayanagara period and ended in the early seventeenth century. The 
decline of this form of local administration set in with the advent of the 
centralised Mughal rule and vanished almost completely under the British 
rule (Basavaraj, 1994). 
With the expansion of the Mughal Empire and the dominion of the 
British in the eighteenth century, Karnataka became administratively 
fragmented. The present state of Karnataka (See figure 5-1) was divided 
into five administrations: the districts1 of Dharwad, Belgaum, Bijapur and 
Шага Kannada belonged to the Bombay Presidency in the North-West, 
the districts of Dakshina Kannada and Bellary to the Madras Presidency in 
the East, the districts of Gulbarga, Raichur and Bidar to the Princely State 
of Hyderabad in the North-East, the tiny Coorg in the South and the other 
districts in the Centre and the South belonged to the Princely State of 
Mysore. More than half of Karnataka was ruled by the two princely states 
and a dozen other small princely states, e.g. Sandur. Of these princely 
states, Mysore was the most progressive, the rulers paid much attention to 
the development of culture, literature and education. The Princely State of 
Mysore grew in importance and size during the eighteenth century under 
the rule of Haidar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan. Although they were 
Muslim, they showed a great tolerance towards the Hindu religion and the 
culture of their subjects and integrated many religious festivals as state 
functions. They also established a sophisticated administration for revenue 
collection. These revenues were required for their struggle against rivals -
especially the British. Tipu Sultan was finally defeated by the British and 
the Mysore state was divided and given to their allies, the Nizam of 
Hyderabad and to the Wodeyars who had been a minor Hindu chieftain in 
the area around the present city of Mysore. 
The geographical areas refer to the administrative districts as they exist today. 
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Figure 5-1: Map of Modern Karnataka 
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In 1831, a revolt by the landowning peasants against the revenue system 
resulted in the installation of direct rule by the British. The Wodeyar 
family was placed in control in 1881. Following the administration model 
established by the British, the princely rulers recruited men with talent and 
modern education to constitute the civil administration. Such people were 
bound to be overwhelmingly the privileged Brahmins with their tradition 
of literacy and education (Manor, 1989). In 1916, 79 per cent of the 
students who received college education were Brahmin. Brahmins took 
over more than half of the white-collared jobs in the bureaucracy and were 
to constitute the modern and urban elite (Srinivas, 1964). In higher 
services, where English was the common medium they held 82 per cent of 
the jobs (Government of Karnataka, 1986a). They were instrumental in 
building a first-class government and the Mysore state advanced well 
ahead of the others. Hydro-electric power plants and mining industries 
sprang up in the first part of this century. Education, literature and the 
press developed further and Bangalore became the first city in India 
illuminated by electric street lights. 
Despite the fragmentation of the earlier Mysore state, Karnataka has 
experienced a distinct freedom movement. The freedom movement took 
strong root in the northern part of Karnataka, i.e. the British Indian 
province of the Bombay Presidency and the National Congress gained 
many followers here. The political orientation was more towards 
happenings in Maharashtra and Bombay than towards the southern parts of 
the divided state. Belgaum, Hubli, Dharwad and Gadag were cradles of 
political activism and produced many leaders. In 1937, when India got its 
first provincial legislative assemblies that were ruled by the Congress, 
Karnataka was still divided between the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, 
and the princely states. These assemblies were hardly effective and when 
the Second World War broke out, the British withheld any progress 
towards independence. This led to many strikes by workers and students. 
The British retaliated with arrests and repression, further escalating the 
protests and acts of sabotage against British rule. Again the northern part 
of Karnataka was the main stage of these protests. In the Princely State of 
Mysore similar developments followed much later and were far more 
tempered. All this changed in 1942 when the 'Quit India' movement 
started. Thousands were imprisoned, 156 people died and several hundreds 
wounded as the result of police firing upon strikes and protests. The 
situation in the Princely State of Hyderabad had been different throughout. 
The conservative Nizam refused the establishment of the State Congress 
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Party, nor did he want to become part of a straggle for independence or to 
accede to the Indian Union. Repression of any upheaval for independence 
was the order of the day. Only by police action after Independence was this 
princely state forced into the Union. 
The colonial lines of princely states and presidencies were found 
irrational, haphazard and artificial. As a reaction, the Indian National 
Congress had already organised its branches along linguistic lines from 
i 920 onwards. The work of Kannada writers and poets further awakened 
the unique Kannada identity and several cultural institutions played a 
significant role in the revival of Kannada language and culture 
(Basavaraja, 1984). After Independence, a process of formation of states 
based on linguistic lines was initiated and marked a turning point in the 
history of modern Karnataka. 
5.2 Economic development and urbanisation in the state of 
Karnataka 
Excavations and existing ruins indicate that ancient Karnataka had forms 
of town planning, distinct economic activities and forms of urban 
organisation during the successive Hindu dynasties. The caste-based guilds 
of oilpressers, weavers, perfumers and the religious upper-caste Brahmins 
were well established and had their own streets that were often named after 
them. Besides shops and markets, temples, an assembly hall and 
sometimes a playground-cum-parade ground were built. A main road 
formed the heart of a town. 
Trade centred around the local produce of rice, cotton, areca-nuts, 
textiles, silks, turmeric, camphor and sandal wood brought to the various 
market places by bullock-cart and traded for imported elephants, horses, 
pearls, white clothes and musk. Srirangapatnam (Shah-Ganjam), 
Bangalore, Mangalore, Hanovar, Channapatna, Sira, Kolar, Davangere and 
Bellary were already established trade centres around 1600. During British 
dominion and the Wodeyar rulers in the Mysore princely state, coffee, 
pepper, tamarind, imported cotton, cardamom, sheep bred for their wool, 
sandal and teak wood, sericulture, gold and manganese excavation became 
new fields of merchandise. In the early part of the twentieth century rapid 
industrialisation developed the southern parts of Karnataka, particularly in 
the Mysore princely state under the inspiration of the engineer-
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administrator M. Visveswaraiah. Iron, steel, paper, electrical goods, 
fertilisers and chemicals became the core sectors. The economy 
concentrated on the Mysore-Bangalore axis, while development in other 
parts of Karnataka was rather tardy. The lopsided development was 
amplified by the construction of a railway network in the same region. 
Public sector undertakings were established in the first half of the century 
for iron and steel production, soap and detergents, paper mills, lamps, silk 
weaving, chemicals and fertilisers. In the second half of this century other 
public enterprises were established such as the Hindustan Aeronautics 
Ltd., The Indian Telephone Industries and Bharat Electronics Ltd.. These 
industries are all concentrated in the Bangalore region. 
In the 1940s, Karnataka was the fourth state in terms of industrial 
development, but fell in 1967 to the sixth place and in the 1980s 
Karnataka's position fluctuated between the eighth and the ninth place. 
During the 1980s, the annual industrial growth was more than one per cent 
below the country's average. However, in the 1990s the growth has 
improved and some industrial sectors have grown significantly, notably the 
production of electronics and phosphate fertilisers. The concentration of 
economic activity in the southern part of Karnataka is reflected in the 
disparate development in the districts. Chachadi (1994) composed an 
integrated development index based on eighth indicators that received a 
certain weightage. The index was prepared for the year 1971-72, 1981-82 
and 1991-92. Table 5-1 shows the score and rank of the different districts. 
At a glance, the districts of Bangalore, Mandya, Dakshina Kannada and 
Shimoga are at the top of the table; here the number of industries are large, 
the rainfall is good, there are large areas of irrigated land and there is a 
good transportation network. The districts of Gulbarga, Raichur, Bidar and 
Tumkur are at the bottom for reasons of poor rainfall, fewer areas with 
irrigation or pumpsets and a poor infrastructure. The scores are, however, 
more indicative than the ranks. One overall observation is that there was a 
steep decline in Karnataka's development in the 1970s and to a lesser 
extent in the 1980s. The flourishing districts started to loose their edge. A 
major cause for this negative development may be attributed to the 
population growth and the insufficient investments in industry and 
economic and agricultural infrastructure. 
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Government policies have not been able to attract private capital as, for 
example, the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra and the Punjab were able to 
do. Four districts have shown a considerable decline in development: 
Raichur, Bangalore, Mysore and Dharwad. There are only two districts that 
have done moderately well: Hassan and Mandya. What is surprising, is the 
decline of the economic axis, Bangalore-Mysore. 
In contrast to the overall slack in growth in the state as a whole, the 
city of Bangalore has been an exception and has attracted the investments 
of a large number of companies from the late 1970s onwards. The climate, 
the available skilled labour and well-educated professionals, the low land 
prices and available infrastructure made Bangalore an attractive location 
for investment as compared to Bombay and Delhi. This development 
picked up considerably in the 1990s. The liberalisation policies introduced 
in 1993 under M.V. Moily have been instrumental in this development. An 
investment subsidy, sales tax exemption/deferral, simplification of land 
acquisition procedures and the establishment of a Single Window Agency 
were incentives for investors to come to Karnataka. National and 
international companies for electronic goods, computers, software and 
other high-tech industry came to Bangalore. Bangalore has been booming 
with mushrooming industries, followed in their tracks by banks, suppliers 
and service companies. 
Though Karnataka has taken a progressive stand in attracting 
investments, i.e. to Bangalore, the state remained conservative in 
reorganising the public sector. 'Liberalization does not mean privatisation. 
We will not take the drastic decision of winding up the public sector' 
(M.V. Moily in Frontline, April 8, 1994). Neither could a decision be 
taken to reduce subsidies in the power sector, a reason for the World Bank 
to withdraw aid to several ongoing projects. Nevertheless, there was no 
hesitation to initiate large and prestigious projects, such as the Mysore-
Bangalore Express Highway, the Light-Rail Transport System in 
Bangalore, an international airport against warnings from professionals. 
Short-sighted political gains, rather than financial viability and economic 
benefits have guided the progress of these projects proposals. 
A major cause of Karnataka loosing its advantage over other states 
is the power situation. Though Karnataka was a forerunner in harnessing 
hydro-electric energy in 1902, it is facing a growing shortage of power. 
The populist policies of the 1980s have led to a crisis situation in 1995 
with the daily power requirement of 59.3 million units against a supply of 
50.5 million units (Government of Karnataka, 1995b). New projects have 
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been recently cleared and the private sector has shown interest in 
supplementing the state power generation. As the immediate power 
situation has worsened drastically and the gestation period of power 
generation projects is five to six years, businesses have already start to 
avoid Karnataka and many of the foot-loose companies have started to 
move elsewhere and will lead to further economic decline in the long run. 
It is puzzling to see the casualness with which politicians deal with such an 
essential commodity. The Karnataka Electricity Board in their 'aim to 
render better service', has no other choice than to distribute the available 
power fairly and equitably, and apologetically request the public to 'bear 
with them' in the difficult situation (Deccan Herald, 24 October 1995). 
5.3 Urbanisation in Karnataka 
Today, the Karnataka is one of the more urbanised states in India. With a 
total population of 44.8 million (1991) and an urban population of 13.9 
million (30.9 per cent), the state is well above the national average of 25.7 
per cent (Housing and Urban Development Department, Annual Report 
1993-94). The average urbanisation figure for Karnataka conceals the 
differences between the twenty districts as is shown in table 5-2. Bangalore 
urban district is a synonym for Bangalore city and has drastically skewed 
the average urbanisation figure. If one would exclude Bangalore urban 
district, the average urbanisation would be just 24 per cent. The district-
wise figures also show that Dharwad, Mysore, Bellary, Dakshina Kannada 
and Chitradurga had an urbanisation rate well above the average, while the 
least urbanised districts are Kodagu, Mandya, Tumkur and Chikmagalur. 
The urban growth between 1981-91 has been above average in the districts 
of Chitradurga, Bangalore Urban, Tumkur, Raichur, Bidar and Gulbarga. 
The lowest urban growth was recorded in Chickmagalur, Uttara Kannada 
and Hassan. There is also no relationship between the level of urbanisation 
and the urban growth. All combinations can be detected among the 
districts; rapid urban growth occurred, except for Bangalore Urban, in 
districts with a low development index (see table 5-1), and slow urban 
growth occurred in districts with both high and low development index. 
Rapid urban growth occurred in districts with both high and low per capita 
incomes. These extremes in per capita income hold true for districts with a 
low urban growth. 
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Table 5-2: District wise urban population and urban growth in Karnataka, 
1981-91 
District Population in Percentage urban Decennial urban 
1. Bangalore Urban 
2. Bangalore Rural 
3. Belgaum 
4. Bellary 
5. Bidar 
6. Bijapur 
7. Chikmagalur 
8. Chitradurga 
9. Dakshina Kannada 
10. Dharwad 
11. Gulbarga 
12. Hassan 
13. Kodagu 
14. Kolar 
15. Mandya 
16. Mysore 
17. Raichur 
18. Shimoga 
19. Tumkur 
20. Шага Kannada 
Karnataka: 
Excluding Bangalore: 
1991 
4,823.951 
1,665,468 
3,520,406 
1,892,715 
1,251,060 
2,914,667 
1,016,839 
2,177,638 
2,692,081 
3,498,814 
2,573,900 
1,566.412 
485,229 
2,221,304 
1,643,626 
3,155,995 
2,307,049 
1,900,429 
2,301,448 
1,218,367 
44,817,398 
39,993,447 
population 
1981 
84.14 
17.37 
22.54 
33.05 
17.82 
24.09 
17.54 
23.50 
24.47 
35.25 
22.86 
14.63 
15.52 
22.45 
15.52 
27.41 
19.27 
25.72 
13.77 
25.32 
28.89 
1991 
85.82 
18.21 
23.88 
29.93 
19.49 
23.58 
16.88 
27.02 
28.31 
34.95 
23.48 
17.38 
16.06 
23.34 
16.23 
29.76 
20.82 
26.53 
16.59 
24.17 
30.91 
24.25 
growth rate 1981-91 
(in %) 
Total 
37.52 
14.62 
18.21 
26.69 
25.78 
21.53 
11.54 
22.55 
13.27 
18.80 
23.74 
15.45 
5.05 
16.14 
15.80 
21.57 
29.26 
15.08 
16.35 
13.49 
20.66 
Urban 
40.28 
20.14 
25.23 
14.76 
37.56 
18.96 
7.40 
40.88 
31.03 
17.80 
27.06 
37.19 
8.71 
20.73 
21.15 
31.98 
39.65 
18.67 
40.22 
8.34 
29.09 
Source: Census ( 1991 ). 
This pattern is supported by Kingsley's et al. (1989) who state that the 
urbanisation in Indian states is as much the result of economic growth as of 
its decline. 
Looking into greater detail at the various urban agglomerations in 
Karnataka, table 5-3 shows the distribution of the urban population in six 
classes of urban agglomerations and their growth over the last two 
decades. Bangalore Urban Agglomeration takes a dominant position in 
Class I cities with an urban population of 4.1 million. This comprises of 47 
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per cent of the Class I population in 1991 and 29.5 per cent of all classes. 
The inter-censal figures have also been pushed up by the Bangalore Urban 
Agglomeration as it recorded 75.6 per cent growth between 1971-81 and 
42.14 per cent between 1981-91. Overall, the rapid pace of urbanisation 
experienced in the 1970s slowed down in the 1990s. What is of further 
interest is that Karnataka does not show a balanced urbanisation pattern, 
but a concentration of urban population in the larger Class I cities. In fact, 
the urban imbalance has been increasing over the past two decades with 
Class I cities increasing their share of Karnataka's urban population at the 
cost of the other classes. The strong urban growth in Karnataka during the 
1970s was for 54 per cent due to migration, according to a study conducted 
by the National Institute for Urban Affairs in 1988. The national figure for 
the same period was 40 per cent. Interestingly, more migrants came from 
other urban areas (54 per cent) than from rural areas (46 per cent). Natural 
increase contributed 34 per cent and reclassification of urban areas 
contributed less than 10 per cent. Another study by J. Samual and 
Lingaraju (1989) illustrated that the growth of Bangalore has been mainly 
due to migration (61 per cent). Natural increase and reclassification 
contributed approximately 20 per cent. The main growth of urban 
Karnataka between 1971-1991 is contributed by Class I and Class III cities 
while some districts urbanised quickly and other stagnated. Not shown in 
the table, the number of class I, II and III cities and towns has doubled, 
while the number class IV, V and VI towns has remained constant or 
decreased. The inter-censal growth rates confirm these findings with larger 
cities growing much faster than smaller ones. 
Rural areas are from time to time added to urban agglomerations in order to allow for 
urban growth. The population in these former rural areas is now counted as urban 
population. However, it also happens that smaller urban agglomeration are merged with 
talukas. Annual reports from the Housing and Urban Development Department show a 
decline in number of urban agglomerations between 1980 and 1995. This is partly 
compensated by the population added from rural areas. 
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5.4 Social and political profile of Karnataka 
Social and political development up to 1980 
Rural Karnataka has been dominated throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth century by powerful minorities. They were peasant proprietors 
whose wealth was derived from the cultivation of crops and not so much 
from the rearing of animals (Manor, 1989). Two caste groups are particular 
dominant: the vokkaligas and lingayats. 
In the twelfth century, a devotional movement reacted against the 
Brahmin dominated caste system with its barriers and inequalities. Several 
castes and occupational communities joined the sect and established their 
own religious symbols, vegetarianism, rituals, teaching, priesthood and 
identity. They formed the community of lingayats or worshippers of the 
Unga, the phallus, which is the symbol of god Shiva for fertility. From an 
egalitarian movement in the beginning, it developed into a caste among 
other castes with priesthood castes and sub-castes. They claim equality 
with Brahmins. The lingayats dominate in the northern and western parts 
of Karnataka. Though vokkaligas inhabited mostly rural areas and villages, 
the lingayats had also an urban inhabitation by their trading and mercantile 
occupational groups (Manor, 1989). 
About the vokkaligas (or also known as Gowdas) little is known 
from literature. They belong to a crop-cultivating caste and have a strong 
presence in south-eastern rural Karnataka. Before 1900, the vokkaligas 
consisted of a number of distinct castes of cultivators not structurally 
linked to one another. They paid their respect to Brahmin neighbours who 
officiated as priests in religious functions. As a response to the 
development of polity in the Mysore state in the early twentieth century, 
they slowly bonded together to form a mobilised base (Kaul, 1993). The 
more recent and loose affiliation of several castes without a distinct 
religious identity - as with the lingayats - or a cultural pattern, makes the 
vokkaligas volatile to internal conflicts as the recent political history has 
illustrated. The Venkataswamy Commission Report (1984) assessed the 
lingayats and vokkaligas at, respectively, 16.9 per cent and 11.7 per cent of 
the total population, while the Chinnappa Reddy Report (1988) assessed 
the communities at 15.3 per cent and 10.8 per cent respectively. 
Before Independence, the rural dominance by vokkaligas and, to a 
lesser extent, lingayats was in sharp contrast with the urban dominance by 
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Brahmins who were holding the most important posts of civil servants. It is 
no surprise that in the early twentieth century, the independence straggle 
by vokkaligas and lingayats also meant a revival of an anti-Brahmin 
movement. This did not prevent the Brahmins and non-Brahmins from 
working together in the Indian Congress Party when the freedom struggle 
was at its peak in the late 1930s and 1940s. In contrast, the Dravidian 
movement in Tamil Nadu was far more radical and sought to overturn the 
Brahmin dominated socio-religious order and replace it with a non-
Brahmin one. In Karnataka, the anti-Brahmin movement never aimed for 
this and sought an equal share of cultural, religious and political presence 
in urban Karnataka and its government. In this they succeeded largely after 
Independence. 
Before the Karnataka unification of 1956, every chief minister was a 
vokkaliga and when the lingayats-dominated northern districts joined the 
state after 1956, every chief minister between 1956 and 1972 has been a 
lingayat. The appointment of Cabinet ministers and ministers of states 
under the various governments of Karnataka illustrates the delicate balance 
that has to be maintained between the vokkaligas and lingayats. Along 
with community-biased politics came the benefits derived from the 
distribution of the reservation policies. It was exploited by one community 
when they were politically powerful, and all the others were satisfied with 
the crumbs (Thimmaiah, 1993). These strong bi-polar communal politics 
were reduced during 1972-80 when Devaraj Urs was chief minister of the 
Congress led government. Being a Kshatriya, he started a movement in 
favour of the backward classes, thereby changed the political balance 
between the two groups and increased the presence of other disadvantaged 
groups in the Cabinet as well as in the civil service. Among them were the 
Scheduled Castes and Muslims. He also introduced programmes to benefit 
these groups in the state. In order to co-opt vokkaligas and lingayats, he 
put vokkaligas on the list of Backward Castes, eligible for special 
concessions from the government, and discretely maintained certain 
benefits for the owner-cultivators in northern Karnataka where most of the 
militant lingayats reside. The ideology of the backward castes movement 
did not take root and when Devaraj Urs fell out of grace with Indira 
Gandhi and was forced to resign in 1980, the backward classes movement 
withered and many of his supporters deserted him. What is further 
noteworthy of this period is the introduction of the radical land reform 
legislation (the 1974 Amendment to Land Reforms Act of 1961) when 
land tenancy was abolished and a ceiling was placed on the size of any 
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family holding. According to G. Thimmaiah and Abdul Aziz (1984), the 
lingayats in North Kamataka suffered as they lost large portions of their 
land due to the implementation of the land ceiling legislation. Devaraj Urs' 
land reforms had reduced their economic power. This, however, has been 
refuted by Narendra Pani (1983) and Kaul (1993): 'the same set of 
landlords who controlled a feudal system now controlled a more capitalist 
one' (Kaul, 1993, p. 45). Devaraj Urs has been considered as an intelligent, 
tough, confident and extremely capable politician who could not escape 
the emerging games of money politics. Contributions to Congress 
Headquarters in Delhi and to local MLAs became customary while the 
involvement of politicians in money making activities increased 
drastically. The concern for their constituency decreased in favour of self-
interested endeavours. Mainly as a result of the era of Devaraj Urs, 'it is no 
longer possible for any single set of social forces to exercise dominance in 
state-level and supra-local politics in Kamataka' (Manor, 1989, p. 356). 
The two parties that have dominated politics in Kamataka in the last 15 
years - the Congress and Janata Party - have to seek a broad basis among 
the various interest groups and communities and allow a more prominent 
representation at the highest level. The state politics has evolved into a 
heterogeneous and unstable community that has to keep its balance and 
peace with several communities in order to maintain power. The 
subsequent chief ministers in Kamataka were Brahmin, lingayat, 
Scheduled Caste, Backward Caste and again vokkaliga. For an overview 
see table 5-4. 
In urban areas, however, caste dominance has eroded significantly, 
while economic class has grown in importance. Although caste was and is 
a central element in the dominance of minority communities in rural 
Kamataka, Manor observes that the caste hierarchy and economic 
hierarchy has sufficiently cut across the communities of vokkaligas, 
lingayats and the traditional supreme Brahmins '...that make possible a far 
less exploitative set of social practices and inter-caste relations..' (1989, p. 
358). 
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Table 5-4: Chief ministers of Mysore and Karnataka state, 1952-97 
Year 
1952-56 
1956-73 
1973-80 
1980-83 
1983-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-92 
1992-94 
1994-96 
1996-
Name 
K.C. Reddy 
K. Hanumanthiah 
Kadidal Manjappa 
S. Nijalingappa 
B.D. Jatti 
S.R. Kanthi 
Veerendra Patii 
Devaraj Urs 
R. Gundu Rao 
Ramakrishna Hegde 
S.R. Bommai 
Veerendra Patii 
S. Bangarappa 
M.V. Moily 
H. Deve Gowda 
J.H. Patel 
Party 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Janata 
Janata 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Janata 
Janata 
Community 
Vokkaliga 
Vokkaliga 
Vokkaliga 
Lingayat 
Lingayat 
Lingayat 
Lingayat 
Kshatriya 
Brahmin 
Brahmin 
Lingayat 
Lingayat 
Backward Caste 
Backward Caste 
Vokkaliga 
Lingayat 
Source: Government of Karnataka, State Legislative Assembly Reviews of respective 
periods. 
Political developments in 1980s and 1990s 
Of particular interest to this research are the successes and failures of the 
political parties in Karnataka and their leaders in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Table 5-5 gives an overview of the distribution of votes and the number of 
seats held between 1978 and 1995 in the state legislative Assembly, the 
most important political institution. Gundu Rao, who succeeded Devaraj 
Urs, was of different calibre and more controversial, 'whose government 
was perhaps a little too personalised and somewhat amenable to political 
corruption' (Rao and Rajasekhariah in State Administration in India, 1988, 
p. 230). His rule between 1980 and 1983 has also been called 'civil servant 
ray' when legislators were deprived of any influence and only elementary 
tasks were executed by the government. This set the stage for the 
emergence of the Janata Party and a downfall of the Congress government 
for the first time since the inception of the state. 
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Table 5-5: Distribution of votes and state legislative Assembly seats in 
Karnataka between 1978-97 
Party and 
leadership 
Years of rale, votes and seats 
1978-83 1983-85 1985-89 1989-94 
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
in% Nos. in% Nos. in% Nos. in% Nos. 
1994-97 
Votes Seats 
in % Nos. 
Congress(I) 44.3 149 40.4 82 
Janata Party 38.0 59 33.9 95 
Janata Dal - - - -
BJP - - 7.9 18 
Independents 17.9 16 17.8 29 
& Others 
Total 100.0 224 100.0 224 
Ruling party Congress (1) Janata Party 
Chief Min. Devaraj Urs R.Hegde 
Gundu Rao 
Max. number 
of ministers 
26 34 
41.1 66 43.8 176 29 35 
43.8 139 11.4 2 
27.3 24 30 116 
3.8 2 4.1 4 25 40 
11.3 17 13.4 18 16 33 
100.0 224 100.0 224 100 224 
Janata Party Congress (I) Janata Dal 
RHegde V.Patil H.D.Deve 
Gowda 
S.R.Bommai S.Bangarappa J.H.Patel 
M.V.Moily 
35 47 35 
Notes: (i) On 31st January 1989, the Janata Party split into Janata Dal with 111 
members and Janata Party with 27 members, 
(ii) On 21.4.1989 president's rule was imposed which lasted till 6.12.1989. 
Source: Government of Karnataka, the Karnataka Legislative Assembly Reviews of 
respective periods. 
From 1983, the Ramakrishna Hegde government proved to be more 
accessible and sensitive to the needs of the people and this improved the 
image of the government considerably. A major policy of Hegde was the 
decentralisation of power and establishment of elected decision making 
bodies at the local level; the panchayat raj institutions. In 1983, Hegde 
started with a limited representation of the formerly dominant lingayats 
and vokkaligas (just one-third of the ministerial posts), however, they 
managed to claw back and held nearly half of the ministerial posts in 1987 
(Kaul, 1993). The Janata Party had created a strong rural base and party 
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organisation in the 1980s and it was no wonder that they gave more 
emphasis to rural development and welfare programmes. 
Dissidence grew within the ruling party and against Ramakrishna 
Hegde's rule. Among them was H.D. Deve Gowda, a minister at the time, 
who resigned from the Cabinet. As a result, S.R. Bommai took charge in 
1988 as chief minister. Being a lingayat, he continued to strive to regain 
power for his community and in that year the lingayats held most of the 
state civil service posts with 16.7 per cent, followed by the Brahmins with 
12.1 per cent and vokkaligas with 11.5 per cent. Since British times, the 
representation of Brahmins among the civil servants, was brought down 
from over 50 per cent to 25 per cent. The Janata Party got into serious 
turmoil and it split in that year forming the Janata Dal, led by H.D. Deve 
Gowda (a vokkaliga), and the Samajwadi Janata Party led by M. 
Rajasekhara Murthy (a lingayat). In this political chaos, the Congress-led 
national government stepped in and imposed president's rale for almost 
one year {Aside, 1 December 1993). 
After the president's rule was lifted in 1989, fresh elections resulted 
in a landslide victory for the Congress party. Veerendra Patii became the 
new chief minister and inherited an empty treasury from the Janata Party. 
He suffered a stroke a year later and was removed unceremoniously by the 
Congress (I) president, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. He installed S. Bangarappa who 
had declared that 'I know how to raise money and I know how to spend it'. 
He could hardly be called a die-hard and loyal Congress-man as he had 
been part of various other parties: he was leader of the backward caste 
movement Kanthi Ranga between 1980-84, for some time a coalition 
partner to the Janata Party and now enrolled into the Congress ranks3. He 
held office for just two years between 1990-92 and launched massive anti-
poverty programmes, among them the infamous Ashraya housing scheme, 
and signed Memoranda-of-Understanding with foreign investors to beef up 
the power capacity. Although coming from a backward caste, he had scant 
interest in the upliftment of his own community. 
Most of his policies were populist and aimed to gain political 
mileage and also personal gains. At the end of his two-year tenure, 
Bangarappa was called the 'one-crore a day' chief minister, illustrating his 
greed for kickbacks and lust for corruption. He had also to resolve to a so-
called 'revolving-door' principle by appointing ally ministers in order to 
These defections are not uncommon, particularly for those politicians who bring with 
them a large electorate and who know how to campaign and raise resources. 
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keep his contestants at bay and to remain in power. James Manor 
commented that 'Bangarappa was the anti-thesis of the staid bureaucrat; 
posturing dramatically, taking risks, throwing his weight around and, most 
crucially, engaging in dubious manipulations of the bureaucracy in the 
interest of "fund raising". This occurred on a scale unknown even during 
the Gundu Rao years and, for the first time, it intruded severely into daily 
administrative and developmental activities' (Manor, 1992, p. 127). Known 
are his nepotist licensing practice for granite quarrying and distilling, and 
direct appointment of computer suppliers without tendering. Disgusted 
with his policies, many Congress legislators and ex-ministers staged a 
dissident movement led by M. Veerappa Moily, M. Rajashekara Murthy, 
R. Gundu Rao and Veerendra Patii. Bangarappa could avert many such 
attempts as he had a strong backing from the Congress Headquarters in 
Delhi. 
Finally, his opponents succeeded in overthrowing him. M.V.Moily 
became the next chief minister whose first goal was to eradicate corruption 
and to establish a 'clean government'. The previous call for an inquiry into 
corrupt practices of Bangarappa was not repeated; the verbal threat 
sufficed as a strategy rather than to bring the guilty to book. After months 
of engineering in-party dissidence, S. Bangarappa was expelled from the 
Congress party and established his own Karnataka Congress Party with ten 
MLA followers . Dissidence did, however, not die down but grew again 
with vokkaliga support led by the Deputy Chief Minister S.M. Krishna. Six 
ministers resigned after only ten months. Moily was forced to pacify many 
legislators by making them ministers. The number of ministers increased 
to form an unprecedented 47. In this so-called Jumbo-Cabinet there was 
even a minister for sugar. In the Assembly, it was jokingly suggested to 
have another minister for beedis (the pungent poor man's cigarette). At the 
end of Moily's term, little had been achieved and political commentators 
noted that he had spread the limited resources too thin in order to make his 
well-intended policies effective. 
Both Congress chief ministers between 1990-94 showed poor results 
in terms of economic performance, infrastructure development and 
financial management. Particularly the shortage of power continued to 
increase, casting a dark shadow on Karnataka's economic future. They also 
slowed down the decentralisation process and postponed elections of the 
panchayat raj institutions. Although the Congress government under M.V. 
He joined the Congress party once again in 1997. 
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Moily was rattled by conflicts and invested with dissidents, it was 
expected that it would be a close race between the Congress and Janata 
Party in the 1994 Assembly elections. One party that has not been 
mentioned so far which had become a force to reckon with in Kamataka is 
the Bharata Janata Party (BJP). In the 1991 national Lok Sabha elections, 
the BJP won 28.3 per cent of the votes in Kamataka and they did 
particularly well in the more developed districts: southern Kamataka and 
the coastal districts. In the months leading to the state Assembly election 
of 1994, the BJP with the support of pro-Kannada organisations, instigated 
communal issues and anti-Muslim sentiments. It was expected that they 
would play a pivotal role in establishing a majority government of either 
Congress or Janata after the state Assembly elections of 1994. However, 
the election in December 1994 turned out to be a victory for the Janata Dal 
with a sufficient majority of seats and H.D. Deve Gowda was installed at 
the helm. The outcome has - in retrospect - been ascribed to the stronger 
rural base and better party organisation. The BJP secured 24.5 per cent of 
the votes and 40 seats, more than the decimated Congress, but with too few 
seats to be a serious opposition party in the Assembly. 
It has been observed that electioneering in India today is a money 
devouring business. Lavish meals, drinks and other treats for party 
workers, and all sorts of gifts for the voters, including money, are now part 
of the electioneering machine. This holds tme for Kamataka also and large 
contributions are made by business interest lobbies. There are at least five 
powerful lobbies that fund elections in Kamataka: liquor, sugar, granite, 
real estate and private colleges. These lobbies do not back specific parties, 
but finance - like in a roulette - a cross section of the most prominent 
leaders of all parties which stand a chance of forming the government 
(M.D. Riti in The Week, 30 October 1994). The oldest and most powerful 
lobby is that of liquor controlled by a number of communities and families. 
A close second is the sugar lobby with 33 licensed sugar manufacturers. 
Many politicians from either the Congress, Janata and Kamataka Congress 
party are directors. They have a strong presence in the districts of Bidar, 
Mandya, Mysore, Dharwad and Belgaum. The granite lobby is rather new 
but grew under the chief ministership of S. Bangarappa. They are now over 
250 license holders. The real estate lobby is more powerful in urban areas, 
particularly in Bangalore and Mysore, and is the more recent player in 
politics. Under Ramakrishna Hegde (1983-88), this lobby has developed a 
strong hold among politicians. The last lobby is that of private educational 
institutions. The private colleges make money by demanding outrageous 
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captivation fees of over Rs. 100,000 for admitting any student. The 
Supreme Court has abolished the practice for some time and their power 
has since diminished. Financial support during election is traded after 
election for certain benefits such as providing licences for granite 
quarrying, permits for acquisition, development and building, exemption 
or reduction of sales tax, etc. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illustrated that Karnataka was ruled until Independence 
by kings, princes and the autocratic British with little interest in urban and 
rural development. To run their administration, which was not much more 
than revenue collection and maintaining order, the British selected and 
trained urban, educated middle-class officers belonging to uppercastes and 
denied all others access to development. The importance of other 
communities, like vokkaligas and lingayats, in state politics grew with the 
independence movement and they contributed to the uninterrupted 
dominion of the Congress party until 1980. While they were united in their 
fight against the British, their strife for dominance over the uppercastes 
emerged shortly after 1947 and ever since they have determined the 
politics, defections and establishment of new parties between 1956 and 
1980. From 1980 onwards, the backward castes emerged as more serious 
contenders to power and a few chief ministers came from these 
communities. Today, the balance of political power is fluctuous and feeble. 
An outcome of this political instability is the negligence of the economic 
development of the state which had a prime position in the 1950s and 
1960s. While populist schemes were introduced at regular intervals, major 
infrastructure schemes for power, roads and irrigation suffered, with the 
result that Karnataka has become less interesting for investors. 
6 
Centre-State Relationships and the Actors in Urban 
Development 
After having discussed the social, economic and political context of urban 
development in India and Karnataka, a further analysis of the centre-state 
relationship and the main actors who play a role in urban development 
both at the centre and at the state level should follow. This chapter aims to 
provide an insight and the necessary framework for further analysis of the 
urban development in Karnataka. 
6.1 Centre-state relationships 
The Indian Constitution was adopted in 1950 and was the beginning of a 
form of federalism. In the Constitution, the central government is given 
exclusive authority of the 97-item Union List, which includes currency 
printing, income tax, foreign affairs and defence. The State List, embracing 
66 items, includes health, education, agriculture, housing, urban 
development, land revenue and police. The third and 47-item Concurrent 
List gives shared jurisdiction to the state and central government in such 
areas as civil and criminal law, and social and economic planning. The 
Union Government has been given over-riding powers and Article 256 
ensures that the executive powers of every state shall comply with the laws 
made by the Parliament and the Union law prevails over state law in case 
of conflicts. India has 25 states and seven Union territories. 
With this form of constitutional federalism India hoped to establish 
the concept of unity-in-diversity. It did, however, not follow the system 
established in the USA were a 'dual government' exists with limited 
control from the centre over the states. The reason is that the Indian 
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government aimed to establish a socialist democracy and centrally planned 
economy for which it had to exercise sufficient control over the economy 
and administration of the states; to control the perennial centrifugal forces 
that exist between ethnic and religious groups; and to exercise sufficient 
control over political processes and a representation of central government 
interests in decision making in the states. 
During the prime ministership of Jawaharlal Nehru between 1947-
64, the Indian National Congress dominated at the centre and the states. 
There was little evidence of centre-state tension. However, shortly after 
1964, the balance of political power was less clearly marked and union-
state relations became the domain of party politics. Power and resources at 
the state level became a reward for loyalty to the prime minister (Thakur, 
1995). An ultimate instrument to control state politics is the imposition of 
president's rule under article 356 of the Constitution. Problems of law, 
order and political unrest were sufficient reason for imposing president's 
rule in a state. While president's rule in all states and Union territories was 
imposed only 10 times in 15 years between 1952-66, this increased to 64 
times in the next 15 years between 1967-82. Since 1982, president's rule 
was imposed 25 times. 
Regarding the distribution of revenue, under the Act of 1919 the 
centre was made dependent on provincial grants. The Government of India 
Act of 1935 undid this 'mistake' and provided for a solvent and strong 
financial arrangement in favour of the centre. The present Constitution has 
continued this arrangement. Income tax, stamp duties, excise duties, 
customs duties, corporation tax are solely appropriated by the Union 
government. Some of these revenues are collected by the states and fully 
appropriated by the Union government. Other less elastic revenues are 
collected and appropriated by the states: profession tax, sales tax, land 
revenue, tax on agricultural income, excise on alcohol and narcotics, taxes 
on electricity and vehicles. As a result, the central government income has 
grown much faster than the states' income and has increased the 
dependency of the states on central government funds. While 25 per cent 
of the state total expenditures in 1951-52 were central funds, this increased 
to 46 per cent in the 1980s. Thereafter, the share of central funds started to 
decline. In Karnataka, the central government contribution to the state 
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five-year plans has been declining over the years and stood at 29 per cent 
in the Seventh Five-Year Plan 1985-901. 
The distribution of central taxes between the centre and the states 
and among the states partly follow prescribed rules. The share of central 
taxes distributed to the states has been increasing over the past few five-
year plans. A considerable central contribution to the states comes as 
grant-in-aid or loan (59.5 per cent of the allocation to the states in the 
Eighth Five-Year Plan 1992-96). Grant-in-aid and central government 
loans are determined by various economic and social considerations as laid 
down in the five-year plans and on the recommendation of the sitting 
finance commission. However, there is scope for 'political' considerations 
as well and a certain arbitrariness and bias towards politically favoured 
states has been discerned (Dart and Sundharam, 1995). 
In Karnataka, the relation with the central government has been 
quite cordial up to 1977 when Congress ruled both at the centre and in 
Karnataka. Since then relations have been strained due to opposition rule 
in the state as illustrated in Table 6-1. Only seven out of the seventeen 
years show a favourable combination. A Congress central government and 
a Congress state government is, however, not a guarantee for cordial 
relations. It may be recalled here that tensions had developed between 
Devaraj Urs and Indira Gandhi in the late 1970s which led to the dismissal 
of the Devaraj Urs government in 1980. The most intense confrontation 
took place when the Janata Party came to power in Karnataka in 1983. The 
Janata Party demanded a radical restructuring of centre-state relations, a 
greater devolution of financial powers, an increase in the distribution of 
resources to the states and a weakening of administrative hold of the centre 
over the states. Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde was a committed 
proponent of more state independence and did not fear the confrontation 
with the centre. The state-centre relations remained strained until 1989 
when Congress regained power in Karnataka. They further improved when 
S. Bangarappa took charge as chief minister in 1991. In 1994, the Janata 
Dal once again regained power in Karnataka. H.D. Deve Gowda did not 
follow the confrontational politics of his predecessor. In fact, he 
frequented Delhi where he was received with the necessary courtesy. 
According to the draft Eight Five-Year Plan 1992-97, Planning Department, 
Government of Karnataka, 1992. 
84 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Table 6-1: Ruling parties at the centre and in Karnataka between 1978 
and 1997. 
Period/Year Centre Prime minister Karnataka Chief minister 
1978-80 
1980-83 
1984 
1984-88 
1988-89 
1989 
1989 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-94 
1994-96 
1996-97 
Note: 
Janata 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Morarji Desai 
Charan Singh 
Indira Gandhi 
Indira Gandhi 
Rajiv Gandhi 
Rajiv Gandhi 
President's 
Rajiv Gandhi 
National Front V.P.Singh 
SJ 
Congress 
Congress 
United Front 
Ch. Shekhar 
P.V.N.Rao 
P.V.N.Rao 
H.D.Deve Gowda 
Congress 
Congress 
Janata 
Janata 
Janata 
Devaraj Urs 
Devaraj Urs 
Gundu Rao 
R.Hegde 
R.Hegde 
S.R,Bommai 
rule for 10 months 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Congress 
Janata 
Janata 
V.Patil 
S.Bangarappa 
S.Bangarappa 
S.Bangarappa 
S.Bangarappa 
M.V.Moily 
H.D.Deve Gowda 
J.H.Patel 
Both the National Front (NF) and the Samajvadi Janata (SJ) had a large 
Janata contingent. 
Source: Government of Karnataka, Karnataka Legislative Reviews of respective 
periods. 
6.2 India's administration and bureaucracy 
A major actor in urban development is the top bureaucracy of India's 
government institutions. Like France, a separate elite group of officers 
exist who are trained differently, have a distinguishable identity and have 
developed their own culture of unity and solidarity: the IAS Indian 
Administrative Service. Before dealing with the IAS, it is good to realise 
that urban administration in some form had existed for millennia. 
The history of government is impressive and begins from Vedic 
times and continues up to AD 1000 till the establishment of Mughal rule. 
In this long history, numerous administrative organisations rose and fell, 
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and two aspects have continued till today: the village (grama) as a primary 
unit in administration and revenue collection, and a continuous straggle 
between trends of centralisation and decentralisation (Avasthi & Avasthi, 
1994, Singh & Singh, 1993). In ancient India, the powers of administering 
the states were centralised in the (Hindu) king. The king was considered 
indispensable, in whose absence total anarchy would prevail. The king was 
assisted in his reign by an advisory Council of Ministers, and sometimes 
by a kind of cabinet secretary (amatya), who could become quite 
influential. Ministers and high-ranked officers were directly appointed by 
the king. This information has been drawn from the ancient writing of 
Kautilya2 in his Arthasastra which deals with the theory of state. He was 
the predecessor of Max Weber for the administration on the Indian sub­
continent and described many rules for administration and good 
kingdomship. The kingdom was divided into provinces, regions and local 
urban and rural governments, where the officers were directly appointed 
by the king or by the central administration. Provincial governors were 
often members of the royal family, while others were appointed on the 
basis of elite background, merit and efficiency. A system of recruitment, 
qualification and hierarchy among officials was in place, while salaries, 
leave and pension were provided for (Rangarajan, 1992). 
Another influence that finds its traces in today's Indian 
administration is that of the Mughal period. Though the Muslim invaders 
did not grant any rights or status to the Hindu majority, it was Akbar 
(1542-1605) who established a tolerance that allowed for an amalgam of 
Islamic dogmas and Hindu traditional governance. The institution of the 
Council of Ministers and a cabinet secretary was discontinued under the 
Mughals. The appointed ministers under the Mughal Emperor were merely 
his assistants. He was free to consult them at will and was in no case bound 
to their advice. Mughal administration was essentially military in nature 
and every civil servant had to be enrolled in the army list. The Mughal 
Empire was divided into provinces out of administrative convenience and, 
more so, military control. At the heyday of the Mughal Empire they had 23 
such provinces. The administrative heads of the provinces (subedars) were 
appointed by the emperor and wielded large powers and enjoyed a 
2
 Kautaliya (or Chanakya, as referred to by others) was the prime minister of 
Chandragupta Maurya who became emperor between 320-322 ВС. 
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magnificent life style. Their multifarious duties had three main aspects -
civil, military and judicial. Revenue and financial matters were exercised 
by the diwan, also appointed by the emperor. While the districts were 
divided into clusters of villages, there was no arrangement for local 
government and this was left untouched by the Mughal administration. The 
Mughal rulers established a sophisticated land revenue system. They 
introduced surveys and measurements of land, a classification of 
agricultural land and of agricultural produce, and a registration of 
cultivators (in stead of land owners) who had to pay the revenue in cash or 
kind. This could be one-third of the actual product. 
The British administration of India was in its earliest period not 
more than running a purely commercial corporation in Bengal, Bombay 
and Madras: the East India Company. Initially they did not intend to 
establish a system of countrywide administration. Between 1773-1858, 
however, a process of strong centralisation of authority took place and the 
powers rested with the governor-general of the Council of India. With a 
change in the political orientation in Great Britain, it was decided to 
establish a Government of India by the Act of 1858 and to bring it directly 
under the control of the Crown. Legislative councils and city corporations 
were established in the second half of the nineteenth century supported by 
suitable legislation and an elective principle; a devolution of powers was 
set in motion. The Government of India Act of 1919 sought to associate 
more Indians in every branch of Indian administration which should lead 
to the gradual development of self-governing institutions. Provinces were 
to establish local governments. 
The Indian Civil and Administrative Service (ICS and IAS) 
An important British legacy is the establishment of a cadre of 
administrators. In 1858, the control was taken away from the East India 
Company and the Crown introduced a rank for the new administrators: the 
Indian Civil Service (ICS). They numbered 846 in 1859 which increased to 
1299 in 1939. They administered all the districts and manned the 
secretariats. It was a strenuous service but also the best rewarded in the 
world at the time and unequalled in power, prestige, and money. While it 
was almost entirely British until 1853, they gradually recruited Indians, 
mostly from well educated urban middle class families. The recruits had to 
undergo a stringent training at Haileybury in England to ensure full loyalty 
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to the Crown, and to ensure efficiency and devotion. In 1922, only 6 per 
cent of all ICS officers were Indian. This increased to 52 per cent in 1942. 
After passing the examination in London, the fresh ICS probationer would 
be posted to a district to work under the guidance of a senior ICS officer. 
Upon Independence, there was an elaborate debate about the 
continuation of the ICS. The ICS had not responded to the civil 
disobedience movement in the final years of the independence struggle as 
they continued to serve the British. Many felt that such an exploitative and 
imperialist institution should be done away with. They would be 
unresponsive to the needs of the public and unsuitable agents of change 
and development. After Independence, the new government also realised 
that there would be no alternative administrative cadre with sufficient 
training and experience. The new government so decided to continue with 
this cadre and to create an All-India Civil Service. Many former ICS 
officers enrolled into this service of which the Indian Administrative 
Service (IAS) became the most important. Besides the IAS, other services 
were constituted as well: the Indian Police Service and the Indian Foreign 
Service. 
The new scenario did not suit many former ICS officers and quite a 
number of them resigned. The main reasons for these resignation were the 
leniency of their new political masters to corruption, favouritism, 
nepotism, self-centred politics, arbitrariness of decisions, unmerited 
harassment, humiliation and persecution (Patnaik, 1974). The recruitment, 
training, status and pivotal role in the Indian public administration 
remained, however, intact. To substitute the former ICS training in Britain, 
the National Academy of Administration in Mussourie was established in 
1959 to train the IAS probationers and other All-India Service 
probationers. 
A fresh IAS officer begins his career with a posting as sub-
divisional officer within a district under the guidance of a senior IAS 
officer. An IAS officer is normally assigned to one state cadre for'his 
entire career and 70 per cent of the IAS officers are usually under state 
posting at any given time. The IAS continues to be a highly select group 
with only 2,253 officers in 1963, which grew to only 5,251 in 1990 that is 
only 0.03 per cent of the total of 17 million public sector employees. Each 
year only 150 new recruits join the IAS. Direct recruits, as they are called, 
constitute 70 per cent of the IAS force and 30 per cent of the IAS-officers 
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are promoted from the State Civil Service. In 1993, Kamataka had 258 
IAS officers in service of which 144 (56 per cent) are from states other 
than Kamataka. Of the 114 Kamataka officers, 53 are promotees from the 
Kamataka Administrative Service (KAS). The top positions are dominated 
by non-Kannadigas (71 out of 115) and Kamataka IAS officers are a 
majority in the lower ranks. The direct recruits of today are still from a 
middle-class, well educated, upper caste and urban background and in this 
regard similar to the earlier ICS. (R. Kumar and K. Bhatnagar, 1992). 
Many states have established a state administrative service, that follows 
the same pattern for recruitment, training, posting and promotion as the 
IAS. They are, however, ranked and posted below the IAS. IAS officers 
hold the higher posts in the state administration, from chief secretary, 
commissioners and secretaries to deputy commissioners and directors. 
Politicians consider many bureaucrats conservative, inefficient, 
reactionary, manipulative, elitist and anti-developmental. Bureaucrats also 
do not have a positive image of politicians; they consider them self-
interested, placing their own/party interests first, not representative of the 
interests of the people, lacking the administrative skills, insufficiently 
educated, and having poor moral standards (Taub, 1969). During the reign 
of Indira Gandhi the politicisation of the bureaucracy took a strong leap. 
At a Congress Party meeting in 1969, she called for a committed 
bureaucracy that could possibly bring out the desired change in the 
country. She attacked the administrative machinery for being old, indolent, 
passive and apathetic, and constituting a stumbling block in the path of 
congress. The concept of a 'committed bureaucracy' provided a cover for 
increasingly partisan interference by politicians - whether at the centre or 
at the state level - in the affairs of the administration and a witch hunt after 
those who were not committed (Thakur, 1995 and K. Subrahmanyam in 
Economic Times, 23 March 1994). Civil servants were also expected to do 
party work, for example, prepare party lists for election and to prepare 
intelligence reports on the party candidates (T.V.R. Shenoy in Economic 
Times, 3 December 1994). 
Different means have been used by political leaders to subordinate 
the bureaucracy and make them more 'co-operative', i.e. behaving 
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politically favourable3: a constant interference with delegated authority, 
victimisation of otherwise good officials on political and personal grounds, 
protection for corrupt officials, frequent and irrational transfers and - at 
times - callous and reckless treatment of senior officers in the presence of 
juniors. Several authors report that such mechanisms have been applied in 
other states as well (Thakur, 1995, Singh & Singh, 1993, Patnaik, 1974). 
The politicisation of the bureaucracy took another step when the Janata 
government in 1977-79 organised another witch-hunt and launched a 
massive transfers to weed out those guilty of enforcing the Emergency 
regulations under Indira Gandhi between 1975-77. Upon her return to 
power in 1980, Indira Gandhi had again a reshuffle of administrators. The 
frequent and massive transfers of administrators with political motives has 
ever since been practised both at the centre and the state level (P.S. 
Jayaramu in the Deccan Herald, 15 October 1995 and Nitish Sengupta in 
Inside the Steel Frame, Vikas, New Delhi, 1995). 
The public opinion about the bureaucrats is also poor. Both in 
scientific, political and public fora views are aired that are strongly 
disapproving; 'This unique feature of bureaucratic casteism in India has 
been eating into the vitality of the country and has prevented it from 
making full use of its vast human resources' (R. Singh, 1988), and '..the 
fence has started eating the crop. We have government servants who do 
not serve but oppress the poor and the helpless, ... They have no work 
ethic, no feeling for the public cause, no involvement in the future of the 
nation, no comprehension of national goals, no commitment to values of 
modern India.' (Former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, 1989). 
In conclusion, the bureaucratic functioning in India has become a 
shadow of what it wished to be; a Weberian archetype of government 
bureaucracy. Secondly, the power they wielded before Independence has 
been eroded by the nature and the omnipotent invasion of politics. 
Pederson (1992) argues that Indian society has become more pluralist with 
other forces reducing the erstwhile dominance of bureaucracy, i.e. the 
agricultural bourgeoisie and the industrial sector. This may be true but 
these interests do not operate vis-à-vis the bureaucracy but use accessible 
In Punjab the political processes and interference with administration had led to a 
serious demoralisation of the civil service. This had become so serious that the 
Administrative Reforms Committee conducted an investigation and brought out a report 
in 1966, listing several causes for this situation. 
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and the more effective political channels. Pederson argues that more 
specialised and technically qualified personnel have been eating away the 
powers of the IAS. In my view, this is disputable as most technical 
departments (e.g. Department of Town and Country Planning, Pollution 
Control and Forest and Environment) have not gained much decision 
making authority to challenge the established powers of those departments 
headed by the generalist bureaucrats (Finance, Planning, Home Affairs, 
Personnel and Administrative Reforms among others). 
6.3 State administration 
The chief minister and ministers are the political heads of the state who 
have a group of their own staff, including private secretaries, attendants, 
drivers, etc. The chief minister is advised by the chief secretary who is the 
highest ranking (IAS) civil servant in the state and the head of the state 
administration. The chief minister and ministers are responsible for one or 
more departments. There may be 30-40 departments in each state. The 
administrative head of a department is a (principal) secretary, who belongs 
with a few exceptions to the IAS cadre. The secretary is supported by his 
own staff of deputy secretaries, under-secretaries and other administrative 
and technical staff who constitute the secretariat. In important secretariats, 
a joint-secretary, additional secretary or special secretary may be added. It 
is not uncommon in these cases that the secretary is designated as principal 
secretary. The secretariat's primary responsibility is to assist the Council 
of Ministers and the responsible minister(s) in policy formulation, 
monitoring and evaluation; framing of legislation, rules and regulations; 
sectoral planning and programme formulation; central and state five-year 
and annual plan preparation and budgeting; control of expenditures as per 
agreed annual budgets; supervision and control over execution of policies, 
programmes and projects; co-ordination with departments at state and 
central government; personnel management of executive departments, 
including appointments, postings, promotions, pay, leave, allowances, 
pensions, etc.; and to respond to queries and requests from ministers and 
the Legislative Assembly. 
Each secretariat can be responsible for a number of executive 
directorates, departments and boards. Each of these agencies are headed by 
an executive, usually an IAS officer or a specialist (chief engineer, chief 
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town planner, chief conservator, etc.). Since India's Independence, the 
generalists have had a superior position over the specialists. Their 
dominance is further proliferated by the recent trend in which IAS recruits 
have more often a degree in medicine, engineering, economics or chartered 
accountancy (Avasthi and Avasthi, 1994). Even without an appropriate 
degree, their sense of superiority over specialists takes at times hilarious 
forms. One senior IAS officer when commenting on the importance of 
town planning expertise, said: 'What is there in town planning? I can study 
one or two books and I can tell you perfectly what it takes to create green 
belts, the finger expansion model, segregation of urban functions and 
transport routes. There is nothing more to it'. 
India and the state of Karnataka, in particular, are no exception to 
the global phenomenon of an expanding government. In 1956, Karnataka 
had a chief secretary and only four secretaries to the government heading 
the Revenue Department, Public Works, Education and Military Services. 
In the 1990s, the number of secretariats in Karnataka stands at about 
twenty. Housing and Urban Development is one such secretariat, which 
was further split into a Housing and an Urban Development Department in 
1995, each headed by a principal secretary. Karnataka is further divided 
into four administrative divisions and twenty districts. The division has its 
roots in the colonial revenue divisions for collecting revenues for the 
British Crown. Today, the divisions and districts are the administrative 
platform for almost all delegated developmental work. The division is 
headed by a divisional commissioner who is a senior IAS officer and has a 
rank equal to a secretary to the government. Each district is headed by a 
deputy commissioner (or DC who was earlier called district collector), 
usually a mid-career IAS officer and occasionally a Karnataka 
Administrative Service (KAS) officer. The DC has three functions: 
revenue collection, maintaining law and order and implementing 
development work. These functions are common both for rural and urban 
administrative areas. Both the divisional commissioner and the DC have 
extensive powers under the Criminal Procedure Code, over the police, the 
food distribution, excise, elections, municipal administration, rural 
development programmes and land reforms. With the proliferation of state 
departments, their powers have often been curtailed which sometimes 
leads to unnecessary delays in decision making and transfer of money for 
projects. 
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6.4 Urban local bodies and their role in development 
Apart from the central and state government, the local government is the 
lowest of the three-tier system of government in India. The local 
government forms the most accessible government institution for the 
citizens. The essential characteristics of local government are: a) its 
statutory status and fixed jurisdiction area, b) its power to raise financial 
resources by taxation in the area under its jurisdiction, c) the participation 
of its citizens in decision making in specific areas of administration, d) a 
certain degree of autonomy to act independently and e) an administration 
that can execute works. 
Under the rule of the Hindu kingdoms, local government had existed 
in a form that may have resembled representation of the citizenry and, to 
an extent, local self-government. In Medieval and Mughal India, local 
government continued but was reduced to a mere lower tier of military rule 
and it did not intend to establish citizens' participation. The British did not 
alter this form of local administration. An exception is the Madras 
Municipal Corporation, established in 1687. The corporation had 
appointed representatives from the citizenry and was charged with levying 
taxes, maintaining law and order, exercising justice, controlling court 
proceedings and undertaking works to improve the often appalling sanitary 
situation. In 1882, this situation changed drastically when the governor-
general Lord Ripon issued a resolution that aimed to establish a network of 
local self-government institutions; reduce the official element in local 
government to not more than a third of the total membership of the 
corporation; give more financial powers; and most importantly, adopt 
election as a means of constituting local bodies. In the wake of the 
mounting independence movement, local self-government took further 
shape with the Government of India Resolution of 1918. Communal 
representation was introduced, municipal acts were established and 
amended to articulate such powers. 
The experiences with local government turned sour when 
administration and efficiency deteriorated and corruption emerged, for 
example, in Punjab (Sachdeva, 1993). As a reaction, some local bodies 
were superseded and municipal executive officers were installed with 
greater powers to restore administrative efficiency and to reassert 
government control. Lack of administrative experience among elected 
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members and lack of guidance from the provincial government made the 
first decades of local self-government an unhappy experience. 
State-local government relationship and control 
The Constitution places local government within the legislative control of 
the states. The Constitution failed, however, to constitutionally recognise 
urban local government, to delineate their powers, functions and resources. 
As a result, many states neglected to establish an adequate body of state 
laws for urban local governance. It is observed that '...feeble attempts have 
been made from time to time in tinkering with urban local self-government 
and giving it a face lift but the response from those in power has generally 
been lukewarm and occasionally hostile' (M. Kistaiah, 1985). The 
Planning Commission has been a serious onlooker from the mid-1950s 
when it reported its concerns in the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61) and 
made regular though futile appeals to central and state governments to 
strengthen local government. Thirty years later the Planning Commission 
observed that 'The urban agglomeration, by their very nature, need a 
minimum of basic services for their healthy existence. However, the state 
of urban areas in this respect is far from satisfactory. In fact, in general the 
picture is extremely bad. Many municipalities have undeveloped and/or 
eroded tax systems and suffer from lack of capital funds and there seems 
no sign of reversal.' and '...many of the municipal bodies are moribund or 
have been superseded and are being administered badly' (Seventh Five-
Year Plan 1986-91, par. 12.27, 1986). Under the purview of state 
legislature, the state government has established urban local bodies with 
different classifications, names, functionaries, elected bodies and 
committees, functions and powers. It will suffice to refer here to the 
situation in Karnataka. According to the census of 1991, Karnataka has 
seven types of municipal conglomerations as shown in table 6-2. 
The first Municipalities Act in Karnataka was passed in 1964 and 
the Municipal Corporation Act in 1976 defining the obligatory and 
discretionary functions of the three most important statutory urban local 
bodies: municipal corporations (MCs), city municipal councils (CMCs) 
and town municipal councils (TMCs). In comparison with other states, 
Karnataka has specified its municipal functions reasonably well. Several 
obligatory and discretionary functions have been listed in both acts. 
94 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Table 6-2: Type, number and size of urban local bodies, Karnataka, 1991 
Type: 
Municipal Corporation 
City Municipal Council 
Town Municipal Council 
Cantonment Board 
Notified Area Committee 
Sanitary Board 
Mandai Panchayat 
Total: 
Number: 
7 
19 
135 
1 
12 
2 
56 
232 
Population size: 
2,650,659 - 303,139 
265,971 - 51,011 
66,660 - 12,412 
23,912 
74,865 - 3,130 
81,257 - 72,481 
19,306 - 2,179 
Source: Government of Karnataka, Housing and Urban Development Department, 
Annual Report 1994-95 (1995); Government of India, MUOD (1994). 
The administrative control of the state government over urban local 
bodies is also detailed in the two acts. For example, the state government 
can supersede a corporation up to one year and request for an extension of 
half a year. For municipalities no time limit is given. Moreover, a president 
of a council can be removed for misconduct, neglect or incapacity to 
perform duties. The state government also has the right to call for records, 
to inspect any work, to order an inquiry, to demand performance of certain 
duties under the law, and to appoint another person in case of non-
performance. The state government can revise any decision of the 
corporation or council, and cancel or suspend or rescind resolutions in 
contravention of the act. The same applies for municipal bylaws. For 
municipalities, the deputy commissioner of the district administration is 
the main actor in the latter provisions. He is also entitled to execute work 
on behalf of the municipality and to allocate municipal funds or taxes to 
certain works or duties. On the other hand, the elected corporation and 
council may remove with a two-third majority a commissioner or chief 
officer. 
Furthermore, the Karnataka government has established in 1985 the 
Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) and many of the 
aforementioned powers, excluding those related to municipal corporations, 
are vested with this agency. In addition, the DMA can rescind or modify 
the orders of deputy commissioners, which has proved to be a fertile 
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ground for conflicts between the state and district administration. The 
DMA has a director of IAS rank. The corporations have remained under 
the direct control of the secretary for housing and urban development. 
Financial control by the state government on the expenditures of 
urban local bodies is considerable as local governments have to obtain 
state government approval when they exceed prescribed expenditures 
ceilings. For example, the municipalities in Karnataka have to obtain 
sanction from the Directorate of Municipal Administration to give 
technical sanction to works worth more than a mere Rs. 50,000. Beyond 
Rs. 500,000 the sanction of the state government has to be obtained. The 
annual allocation of the state government development funds and grants-
in-aid is another instrument that exercises state government control. In this 
allocation, outstanding debt service amounts and occurred deficits are 
deducted by the DMA before transfer. Although, the DMA is only allowed 
to recover outstanding debt in part (i.e. 50 per cent) from the grants-in-aid, 
the department effectively deducts the entire amount. 
It is concluded that urban local bodies are vulnerable to state 
government interventions and supersession. In Karnataka, however, the 
state government has shown a certain degree of restraint in doing so. 
Except for a few, most municipalities have had functioning councils and 
corporations for long periods. 
Local leadership 
An important dimension to local government is the existence of an elected 
body. In a democracy, local government is expected to be significant and 
bring forward future statesmen and women. 'Municipal governments have 
produced many leaders of national eminence and status, who were shining 
examples of sober and healthy municipal politics and restored to these 
institutions, the authority and dignity they deserved' writes P.R. Dubhashi 
(Kaushik, 1986, Foreword) about the pre-Independence era. Feroz Shah 
Mehta, Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhash Chandra Bose and Vallabh Bhai Patel 
are often referred to. 'These giants of yore had raised the term 'politics' to 
the high level of municipal statesmanship' (National Academy of 
Administration, 1970). The commentators had - in my view - a rather 
romantic impression of the past and not a realistic presentation of what 
was factually true. One may recall that in the 1930s municipal councils 
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were also dissolved for reasons of mal-administration, inefficiency and 
corruption, the result of unscrupulous, amoral and self-interested 
leadership. The situation of today, nevertheless, is not much better as 
Dubhashi and others observe, where one may find only a few capable 
councillors. Faction-ridden politics, inertia, poor performance and a 
declining image of the councillors among the public are - with a few 
exceptions - common observations (Srinivisan and Sharma, 1965, Ashraf, 
1966 & 1977). Council proceedings are not an example of mannerly 
behaviour with deadlocks, rowdy scenes, ugly protest, shouting and 
screaming, skirmishes, demonstrations and walkouts. Similar observations 
are made about more recent municipal politics by S.L. Kaushik (1986) and 
M.N. Buch: 'The poor quality of the elected representatives has resulted in 
most municipalities being unable to think beyond their respective noses' 
(M.N. Buch in The Independent, 26 March 1993) and 'The better 
politicians eschewed municipal politics and aimed at higher targets' (M.N. 
Buch in The Telegraph, 25 July 1994, Calcutta). The rather poor ¡mage of 
local politics is a result of the decline and lack of able leadership (Buch, 
1993). 'The municipal councillors of today are mediocre - some of them 
illiterate, semi-educated, and devoid of spirit of dedication and service ... 
They do not hesitate to throw their weight around ... are not reticent while 
they exercise their power or claim their privileges' (Sachdeva, 1993, p. 
373). This is partly confirmed by Kaushik's research in which a majority 
stated that their local leaders are insufficiently equipped or trained for their 
function. 
For long political parties have kept away from municipal politics 
and council candidates would campaign as independents. Since the 1970s, 
the dependency on established parties increased. In Rajasthan, these parties 
'not only sponsor their own candidates and actively canvass support for 
them, but spend a lot of party funds on elections '(Bhambri and Verma, 
1973, p. 180). Similarly, behaviour and decision making in the council is 
more determined on the lines of party politics. This party culture does not 
only apply to their own candidates but also to many independent 
candidates who have opted for a party-affiliation after becoming 
councillors. Municipal politics do not carry a high status among the major 
parties and are seen as stepping stones to state politics where the prestige, 
status and rewards are much larger. Talented politicians seldomly dwell for 
long in municipal councils. An important reason for the unattractiveness of 
municipal politics is the limited and declining powers of urban local 
bodies (Avasthi and Avasthi, 1994). 
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The president/mayor, the council/corporation members and the 
commissioner/chief officer embody the main decision making authority. 
The president enjoys considerable authority and for many a 
commissioner/chief officer he is the 'political master'. He or she controls 
the council, whose consent is also required for many decisions. In other 
places, he may just be figurehead and a reflection of dispersed powers 
within the council or corporation. Other council members, ex-presidents, 
local business tycoons and other less illustrious personalities may pull the 
strings in such cities and towns. 
Another observation is that the division of functions between 
officials and councillors as laid down in the state legislation is not 
followed in practice. Councillors encroach upon executive tasks, officials 
do the same with policy matters, councillors claim executive successes as 
solely theirs, while officials keep under wraps executive responsibilities 
where they should be more transparent, consultative and communicative. 
Politicians claim more say and responsibilities on democratic grounds, 
while officials ward off such claims on the basis of existing administrative 
rules and regulations. 
Public participation in local government 
Democracy at any level postulates the interest and active participation of 
the citizenry in public affairs. In urban areas, the participation is expected 
to be more significant because of the proximity of the local government to 
the citizenry. The extent of participation of the citizenry - whether direct or 
indirect - 'will depend on their access to information and opportunity of 
presenting their views to elected representatives' (Darke and Walker, 
1977, p. 89). It is a global phenomenon that active participation and 
interest is only raised among a small group of citizens, while the large 
majority get involved in casting their votes and in matters that affect their 
well-being and livelihood directly. In Kaushik's research among citizens in 
Punjab, almost 30 percent of the group of 200 respondents discuss 
frequently or regularly municipal administration matters. More than half of 
the respondents indicate various degrees of interest in these matters. It is 
no surprise that 40 percent rarely or never discuss and 47 percent are not 
interested in municipal administration matters. 
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This picture is rather rosy in comparison with the comments of 
others who reported indifference, apathy and at times disgust of people in 
local politics and government (Buch, 1993, Sachdeva, 1993, Rosenthal, 
1976). Several reasons have been mentioned by them. One reason is that 
the organisation of the society is still very much along the lines of 
community and caste. Local government constitutes an amorphous and 
heterogeneous institution that hardly bears any resemblance to a caste or 
community identity (Bhattacharya, 1979, p. 9). 'At best people can 
identify themselves with their own representatives' (Rosenthal, 1976, p. 
114). Another reason is the lack of aspirations or sense of belonging to the 
city they are living in (Avasthi and Avasthi, 1994). Their quality of life is 
satisfied by their domestic life and family. Local government is seen as a 
supplier of basic amenities and they would rather be left undisturbed. A 
civic sense or sense of duty for paying taxes is often missing also because 
the level of services has remained rather poor and no benefits are seen in 
the payment of such taxes. Councillors also show little interest in their 
electorate after elections and the citizens have to come to them 
(Kopardekar, 1991b, p. 70). The councillors fail to make local government 
more accessible and understandable or to provide a basis for civic sense. 
Corruption is common at the local level as well, providing 
councillors and officials of benefits while depriving others. Corruption 
constrains the accessibility of the local government and encourages the 
belief that the local government does not exist for the public good but for 
self-interested reasons. Corruption has had a negative impact on the public 
image of local government. It is no surprise that 'when the Bhopal 
Municipal Corporation was superseded in May 1986, the citizens of 
Bhopal held public thanksgiving ceremonies' (NCU Report, 1988). 
The municipal personnel system 
The personnel system of urban local bodies in Karnataka is another factor 
to the implementation of housing and urban development policies. There 
exists a mix of three systems. The first system is the 'separate personnel 
system' in which the local authority appoints and administers its own 
personnel who are not transferable to any other municipality. The system 
is considered in ensuring local self-government better, the personnel in 
having a better knowledge and attachment to local interests. Other benefits 
are the long-term appointment and a higher sense of responsibility and 
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accountability. It is outweighed by the experienced disadvantages of 
nepotism and patronage, superfluous personnel and inflexibility to newly 
introduced changes (Sachdeva, 1993). In Karnataka, the system has been 
adopted for the lower ranks of personnel: sweepers, drivers, clerks and 
typists. 
The second and parallel existing system is the 'unified personnel 
system' in which a staff cadre is created by the state government for 
municipal administrative functions. The cadre can been transferred 
between municipalities. In this way municipal services are provincialised 
and career possibilities are larger. The involvement in local politics will 
reduce because of their protection by the state government apparatus, their 
relative independence of local decision makers and the limited duration of 
tenure. In Karnataka, this system is followed for a small group of officers 
belonging to the Karnataka Municipal Administrative Service (KMAS) 
that was created in 1985. They are mostly revenue officers and chief 
officers and are under the control of the Directorate of Municipal 
Administration. 
The third system is the 'integrated personnel system' in which the 
personnel is employed by the state government departments and posted in 
municipalities. They can be shifted between municipalities and also 
transferred to other state departments where their services and 
qualifications are of equal use. Also the IAS officers fall in this category 
and hold the most senior posts of commissioner of the largest corporations 
in the state. The Karnataka Administrative Service cadre (KAS) are also 
categorised under this system. The KAS officers are under the control of 
the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms. The technically 
qualified personnel also fall in this category. They are under the control of 
the Public Works Department, Revenue Department, Health Department 
and Social Welfare Department, Town Planning Department and others. 
For example, an engineer recruited by the Public Works Department can 
be transferred from a city municipality to the Karnataka Housing Board, 
then to the Mysore Urban Development Department, to the Karnataka 
Slum Clearance Board and finally back to the 'parent department' to await 
retirement. They are also protected and more remote from local politics 
and show at times disinterest when posted in an unfavourable location. 
Postings in smaller municipalities are considered to offer little professional 
challenge, opportunities and 'fringe-benefits'. In any case, working in 
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remote, smaller and medium sized towns is not favoured by any of the 
transferable personnel. The lack of proper housing, recreation, 
entertainment and education for children are common discouraging factors. 
The existence of three parallel personnel systems creates a peculiar 
situation in which the municipal administration consists of officers of 
different cadres with different backgrounds and varying interests and 
ambitions. Those who have a higher administrative status, such as IAS and 
KAS, look for state administration positions and connections in the upper 
administrative hierarchy and in the political network. Those who belong to 
KMAS and state departments have a professional outlook and seek career 
opportunities within their cadre, for example in the larger cities. Both 
groups of officers remain somewhat distanced from local affairs and 
politics in the realisation that their tenure may be rather short. Finally, 
those who are permanent employees of the municipality, have little scope 
for upward promotion, except in the few larger municipalities, and serve 
'aliens' who come and go with the passing of the years and seasons. One 
can well imagine that creating a kind of team spirit, the paradigm of 
modern management, is rather difficult, if not impossible. 
Municipal financial situation 
'All undertakings depend upon finance, hence foremost attention should be 
paid to the treasury' writes Kautilya in his Arthashastra about 3,500 years 
ago when guiding kings in administration (Rangarajan, 1987, p. 254). The 
existing sources of municipal income can be classified into four categories: 
local taxes and revenues; non-tax revenues; grants-in-aid and fiscal 
transfers from the state government; and loans and borrowings. These 
constitute the backbone of necessary housing and urban development 
projects. 
Local taxes and revenues are without doubt the most important 
source of income and secure a healthy financial operation and reduce a 
dependency of other fluctuating and ad-hoc sources. Γη 1987, the National 
Institute of Urban Affairs conducted a survey among 155 municipalities in 
India. The study revealed that the local taxes comprise 54.3 per cent of the 
total municipal income (National Institute of Urban Affairs, 1989). Local 
taxes consist of octroi (tax on entry of goods), property tax, profession tax, 
entertainment tax, advertisement tax, water and lighting tax, health cess, 
education cess, sanitary cess, motor vehicle tax and a few others. Of these, 
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motor vehicle tax, profession tax and entertainment tax are revenues that 
are shared with the state government (Report on Urban Local Bodies in 
Kamataka State, 1986). 
Octroi has been criticised by powerful trade and transport lobbies 
and they demanded abolition. Truckers went on strike for weeks and some 
states came to an economic standstill. In many states these lobbies had 
their way. The Government of Kamataka abolished octroi in March 1979. 
The state government decided to introduce an octroi compensation, 
payable each quarter and equal to the amount received in the year of 
abolition with an annual increase of, initially, 10 percent and later 12.5 
percent4. This, in effect, meant that urban local bodies lost to a 
considerable degree of their financial independence as the state 
government obtained an instrument of control over municipalities by 
releasing or withholding payment of octroi compensation at will. 
Moreover, the quarterly and at times irregular release of state octroi 
compensation has created frequent liquidity problems for the municipality 
as compared with the daily income from octroi. 
Property tax is now the most important own revenue income to 
urban local bodies in Kamataka. In Karnataka's corporations, it comprised 
31 percent and in other municipalities 21-24 percent in 1994-95. There are 
various problems with this tax instrument. Many properties have not been 
entered in the list for valuation and taxation. A survey in Bangalore 
conducted in 1992-93 showed that 35 percent of the properties are not 
registered (State Finance Commission related to Urban Local Bodies, 
1996, p. 174). It is expected that this percentage is much higher in other 
cities. The assessment of the rental value and fixation of the property tax is 
often subject to negotiation between the official and the owner of the 
property - at a certain price -, with the result that most properties are 
under-assessed or not assessed at all. Moreover, the periodic revision of 
property tax has been delayed under pressure of municipal councillors or 
MLAs. Either the municipal authority is withheld to request approval'for 
revision from the state government or the state government delays 
approval. 
The State Government related the increase to the overall inflation and Consumer Price 
Index and not to the increase in volume of goods or income from State Government sale 
tax. 
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The second most important source are the grants-in-aid and fiscal 
transfers from the state government and include development grants for 
sanctioned works, dearness allowance grant5, octroi compensation grant, 
motor vehicle tax grant and other fiscal transfers. It comprises 22.3 percent 
of the income of municipalities at the all-India level (NIUA, 1989). The 
dependency on state funds varies considerably among the states in India. 
One may say that the ability of urban local bodies in India to raise 
revenues is particularly low. In 1991-92, the municipalities were able to 
raise a mere Rs. 205.3 per capita. In comparison, the states raised Rs. 573.9 
and the central government Rs. 986.6 per capita. Considering the fact that 
the urban areas contribute to over 50 per cent of the GDP in India, their 
own revenues are as low as 0.6 per cent of GDP. It is evident, 'that as the 
city economies prosper, the municipalities get impoverished and remain 
peripheral to both the city and the national economy due to their inability 
to establish effective linkages with the spatial and economic activities 
within their jurisdiction' (Sundaram, 1994, p. 2). It is also observed that 
the larger municipalities show a much better per capita revenue position 
than the smaller municipalities. Even among municipalities of comparable 
size, the per capita income may differ considerably. 
Based on the two reports of the Local Finance Commission of 1986 
and 1996, the income situation of urban local bodies in Karnataka emerges 
to be not better than the national picture. The income in real terms 
increased by 30 percent in this period. This has been mainly on the account 
of the corporations and municipal councils. As a matter of fact, the larger 
municipalities, i.e. corporations and city municipal councils, fared 
reasonable well, but the smaller town municipality councils are financially 
in a poor condition. With the steep increase in prices in the 1990s, a result 
of the opening up of the Indian market, the real income of town municipal 
councils has started to decline as is illustrated in table 6-3. The decline in 
income of the town municipal councils is partly due to the decrease of 
grants support by the state government. On the other hand, it also shows 
that the corporations have been improving their own revenues better than 
the municipalities. 
5
 Dearness allowance is a sum of money added to the basic salaries of government 
employees. Dearness allowance is fixed annually and aims to compensate for loss of 
real income as the result of inflation. Over the years, dearness allowances have become 
a substantial portion of the net salary. 
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101 
49 
49 
47 
47 
70 
70 
299 
141 
159 
75 
124 
58 
215 
101 
472 
144 
181 
85 
125 
38 
298 
91 
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Table 6-3: Per capita income situation of urban local bodies in Karnataka 
between 1980-95 
(in Rs. per capita) 
Urban Local Body/Year 1980-81 1990-91 1994-95 
Corporations 
(in real terms ) 
City Municipal Councils7 
(in real terms) 
Town Municipal Councils 
(in real terms) 
Total: 
(in real terms) _ _ _ ^ _ 
Note: Income includes all taxes, non-tax revenues and grants. 
Source: Government of Karnataka, Report on Urban Local Bodies in Karnataka State 
(1986); Government of Karnataka, Report of the State Finance Commission 
related to Urban Local Bodies (1996). 
With regard to the municipal expenditures, most of the municipal income 
is spent on operation and maintenance: Rs. 143 per year per capita 
according to a survey among 157 municipalities in 1986-87 with an 
average per capita municipal income of Rs. 151 (NIUA, 1989). This 
amount is substantially lower than the norms proposed by the Sarkaria 
Committee, which suggested an expenditure - at 1986-87 prices - of Rs. 
205 per year per capita for cities with a population between 100,000-
500,000 and Rs. 239 for those which have a population of over 500,000. 
The figures look rather favourable as compared to the per capita 
expenditures in Karnataka: particularly the small and medium towns have 
annual expenditures that are below the national average (Table 6-4). 
6
 At a discount factor of 1.00, 0.471 and 0.301 respectively based on Consumer Price 
Index for 1980-81,1990-91 and 1994-95 for urban non-manual labour. 
7
 For 1990-91 and 1994-95, the city of Raichur has been excluded as the stated income 
and expenditure figures have been incorrect and would have distorted the average 
figures considerably. 
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Table 6-4: Per capita expenditure situation urban local bodies in 
Karnataka between 1980-95 
(in Rs. per capita) 
Urban Local Body / Year 
Corporations 
(in real terms ) 
City Municipal Councils9 
(in real terms) 
Town Municipal Councils 
(in real terms) 
Total: 
(in real terms) 
1980-81 
121 
121 
68 
68 
28 
28 
74 
74 
1990-91 
286 
135 
138 
65 
103 
49 
198 
93 
1994-95 
453 
139 
181 
55 
140 
43 
293 
90 
Sources: Government of Karnataka, Report on Urban Local Bodies in Karnataka State 
(1986); Government of Karnataka, Report of the State Finance Commission 
related to Urban Local Bodies ( 1996). 
There are a number of reasons which explain the poor performance of 
urban local bodies. While the functions of urban local bodies have been on 
the increase, the state governments have not paid sufficient attention to 
increase their resources proportionately (Jha, 1989). Secondly, states have 
appropriated or abolished conventional sources of revenue without 
providing sufficient compensation or alternative sources of income: octroi 
was abolished and entertainment tax and profession tax have been partly 
appropriated. Compensations for octroi, motor vehicle tax and others have 
not been in line with the increase of traffic and the volume of transported 
goods. Again larger cities located on national and state highways are 
deprived of a substantial source of income. The compensation proved over 
time Obviously ... meaningless' (Government of Karnataka, Report on 
Urban Local Bodies in Karnataka State, 1986, p. 52). Moreover, the state 
grants-in-aid allocation is in real terms on the decline and is often 
inadequate, irregular, unsystematic and prone to political patronage 
(NIUA, 1989, Kapoor and Anand, 1995). Keeping accounts and strict 
financial management are often weak in urban local bodies. Funds and 
See footnote 6. 
See footnote 7. 
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revenues are booked under wrong headings, while financial management 
operates according to the one-purse system, and does not keep to the 
budgeted amounts or plans. Audit reports are prepared at long intervals, if 
prepared at all. Due to staffing deficiencies, assessments, billing and 
collection of local taxes and non-taxes are beset by problems of backlogs, 
delays, inefficiency, maladministration, manipulation, corruption, etc., 
leading to a considerable loss of municipal revenue. An ultimate reason is 
the unwillingness of local politicians to pursue better financial 
management systems and to introduce new taxes or to increase existing 
ones. Thereby, they serve short-term and populist political goals but 
deprive the city from developing its local economy and infrastructure. 
Since 1989, the Government of India and subsequently the 
Government of Karnataka have been making attempts to decentralise the 
powers of the state government in favour of the urban local bodies. The 
74th Constitutional Amendment became an Act in 1992 and the state 
government followed with suitable amendments to their municipal acts. 
Despite the progress on the legal front, the financial and administrative 
empowerment of urban local bodies remains to be improved. In Karnataka, 
the State Finance Commission had recommended a number of steps for the 
enhancement of the financial position of its urban local bodies which still 
have to be implemented (as on November 1997). 
6.5 Central government institutions for urban development 
A number of central and state government institutions play an important 
role in housing and urban development policies at both the centre and the 
state. The following section provides a brief description of selected 
institutions. 
Shortly after Independence, the concern for urban development at 
the central government level was synonymous with improving sanitary 
conditions. It followed the colonial segregation of functions and urban 
development was placed under the Ministry of Health. In 1966, urban 
development was shifted to the Ministry of Works and Housing, which 
was renamed as the Ministry of Works, Housing and Urban Development. 
It was a first acknowledgement of the need for intervention and control in 
other areas than sanitary conditions. A year later, it was shifted back to the 
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new Ministry of Health, Family Planning, Works, Housing and Urban 
Development. In 1973, the Ministry of Works and Housing was created 
and included the portfolio for urban development. In the years that 
followed mounting urban problems created the need for a separate 
Ministry for Urban Development. 
Central Ministry of Urban Development (MOUD) 
In the international arena during the 1970s, ample attention was given to 
housing and urban development issues, particularly those of urban poor. 
The Habitat Conference in Vancouver triggered off many reactions and a 
reorientation of development policies for the sector, for example, slum 
improvement and upgradation. In India, these development sank in much 
slower than in other countries and in 1985 the Ministry of Urban 
Development was created with a number of important agencies under its 
control. These were the Central Public Works Organisation, the Town and 
Country Planning Organisation and the Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation Ltd. 
Though housing and urban development are a state subject, the 
Union ministry is responsible for the formulation of policies for 
programmes and implementation strategies of housing and urban 
development schemes. This is, for example, laid down in the national 
housing policy, ministerial guidelines, circulars and the respective five-
year plans. Besides framing policies and guidelines for the union states and 
territories, it formulates and implements a number of schemes through the 
state governments. The most important schemes are the Integrated 
Development of Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT); the Nehru Rozgar 
Yojana (NRY) with schemes for stimulating urban micro-enterprises 
(SUME), urban wage employment (SUWE) and housing and shelter 
upgradation (SHASU); Urban Basic Service for the Poor (UBSP); the 
Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (EIUS); and the Integrated 
Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation and Liberation of Scavengers 
(IPLCS&LS). We will discuss these schemes in greater details in the 
following chapters. 
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Town and Country Planning Organisation (TCPO) 
The Town and Country Planning Organisation (TCPO), Government of 
India, was established in 1962. Its main functions are to (i) formulate 
national policies for urban and regional planning to form part of the 
national five-year plans; (ii) pursue approved schemes and programmes; 
(iii) undertake detailed development plans for Delhi; and (iv) conduct 
studies, research and extend advisory services for the purpose of urban and 
regional development. The TCPO is the apex technical advisory body to 
the Ministry of Urban Development on matters of urban and regional 
planning, and is also responsible for monitoring and evaluating central 
government schemes and policies. The initial functions and activities 
assumed a wide scope of operations and several central schemes1 were 
placed under their purview. However, the TCPO's role has been reduced 
considerably and is now confined to the formulation, appraisal and 
monitoring of the central scheme for the Integrated Development of Small 
and Medium Towns (IDSMT). 
The Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd. (HUDCO) 
The Housing and Urban Development Corporation Ltd. (HUDCO) is the 
sole financing institution that features in this research. The HUDCO was 
established in 1970 by the central government to finance and undertake 
housing, urban development and to support the building industry. In the 
1960s, access to finance was felt to be the crux of the problem of the poor 
of not being able to obtain proper housing, and the cause for the growing 
housing shortage. When the HUDCO was established their mandate was to 
provide finance for housing to the poorer sections, i.e. those defined as the 
so-called economic weaker section (EWS) and low-income group (LIG). 
The financing modalities are set by the Ministry for Urban Development. 
Fifty-five percent of HUDCO's loan sanctions have to be earmarked'for 
EWS and LIG. The rest to the middle-income group (MIG), high-income 
Such as the scheme for Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns 
(IDSMT), Urban Basic Services Programme (UBS), Prime Minister's Special Grant 
Programme for Bombay and the scheme for Environmental Improvement of Urban 
Slums (EIUS). 
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group (HIG) and for general purposes. Secondly, differential interest rates 
are applied for the various income groups11. The share of finance by the 
HUDCO has also been differentiated according to the stated family 
income1 . This is to the advantage of the poorest sector. Ceilings have been 
set for the cost of houses for each income group. These ceilings have been 
adjusted over the years with the inflation of the currency and the rise in 
construction costs. Table 6-5 provides an overview of the prescribed 
ceilings. 
Table 6-5: Ceilings for different income categories in HUDCO's housing 
schemes 
Period 
1985-91 
1991-
EWS 
15,000 
22,000 
LIG 
20-30,000 
50,000 
MIG 
60-100,000 
175,000 
HIG 
250,000 
no ceiling 
Source: HUDCO (1996). 
The HUDCO does not provide loans to individuals directly, but only lends 
to institutions: state housing banks, housing corporations, development 
boards, co-operative societies, state infrastructure development and finance 
corporations, etc. They design and implement housing schemes and 
distribute such houses to the various income categories on purchase or rent 
basis. The borrowed amount and interest rates applied by the HUDCO 
depend on the definition of the beneficiary (EWS, LIG, MIG or HIG) and 
whether it is a housing or an infrastructure scheme. 
The growth of the organisation has been impressive and it continues 
to grow exponentially. By the end of 1994, HUDCO had sanctioned a total 
loan amount of Rs. 95 billion for 10,649 projects with a total value of Rs. 
155 billion (HUDCO, 1995). In a period of 25 years, the HUDCO has 
financed the construction of 5.6 million houses. In total, 5,448 schemes 
have been completed. In the late 1980s, the HUDCO extended its 
operations to financing infrastructure development: drinking water supply, 
drainage, sewerage and sanitation, bus stations, new township and area 
" In 1993, 8.0 per cent interest was calculated for EWS houses, 11.5 percent for LIG, 
13.0 percent for MIG and 15.0 percent for HIG houses. 
12
 For EWS houses, HUDCO can finance upto 90 percent of the total cost, for LIG upto 
85 percent, for MIG upto 75 percent and for HIG upto 60 percent. 
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development, etc. Up to 294 projects were sanctioned with a total value of 
Rs. 18 billion, most of them being water supply projects. The HUDCO also 
constituted a channel to implement central government schemes. The 
schemes for the Integrated Low-Cost Sanitation and Liberation of 
Scavengers, for the Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns, 
Night Shelter, Earthquake Relief, Cyclone and Flood Affected areas are 
well known. 
In comparison to other public undertakings, the HUDCO appears to 
be a well-organised institution with a serious appraisal and monitoring 
system, progressing with contemporary approaches for housing, slum 
improvement and provision of infrastructure facilities for the urban poor. 
Through its research and training wing it also undertakes relevant research, 
promotes particular technologies and approaches, and supports their clients 
with training. 
6.6 Karnataka state government institutions for urban 
development 
While central government institutions for housing and urban development 
are only a few, the state government in Karnataka has established eleven 
institutions to cater for the housing and urban development requirements in 
the state. 
The Secretariat for Housing and Urban Development 
In Karnataka, the organisation most concerned with urban development 
and urban local bodies is the Secretariat of Housing and Urban 
Development, headed by a secretary. He reports to the minister of 
Housing, the minister for Urban Development and in some functions 
directly to the chief minister. The secretary is further responsible for the 
departments and agencies listed below and their respective functions and 
jurisdiction (See table 6-6). A number of agencies bear particular relevance 
for this study. The Karnataka Housing Board, the Karnataka Slum 
Clearance Board and the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board have been dealt with in the proceeding chapters and it will suffice 
here to discuss the Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) and 
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the Department of Town Planning. They will be dealt with in more detail 
in the following sections. 
Table 6-6: Departments and boards falling under the Secretariat for 
Housing and Urban Development (1995) 
Department or board, year 
of establishment 
Main functions Jurisdiction 
1. Karnataka Housing 
Board, 1965 
2. Karnataka Urban 
Water Supply and 
Drainage Board, 1975 
3. Directorate of 
Municipal 
Administration, 1985 
4. Karnataka Urban 
Infrastructure 
Development and 
Finance Corporation, 
1993 
5. Urban Development 
Authorities and City 
Improvement Boards, 
1976-88 
6. Department of Town 
Planning, 1959 
7. Town Planning 
Authorities, 1961 
Land acquisition and 
(infrastructure) development, 
housing construction and 
distribution of sites and houses 
Construction of water supply 
and drainage works 
Administering urban local 
bodies and implementing and 
monitoring of urban 
development schemes 
Project formulation of 
infrastructure developing 
schemes, obtaining and 
channelling finance, monitoring 
and loan repayment of such 
schemes 
Land acquisition and 
(infrastructure) development, 
housing construction and 
distribution of sites and houses 
Preparing of urban development 
plans for urban areas and 
assisting development 
authorities in their tasks 
Execute statutory planning and 
enforcement of the Town and 
All urban local 
bodies, including 
selected rural areas 
Urban local bodies, 
except Bangalore 
All urban local 
bodies, except the 7 
Corporations 
Urban Karnataka 
22 larger urban local 
bodies where such 
boards have been 
constituted, except 
Bangalore 
All urban local 
bodies 
Four urban local 
bodies 
Country Planning Act 
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Department or board, year Main functions 
of establishment 
Jurisdiction 
8. Karnataka Slum 
Clearance Board, 
1975 
Slum identification and 
declaration, development of 
housing schemes, resettlement, 
clearance or improvement of 
existing slums, distribution of 
sites and houses 
All urban local 
bodies 
9, Bangalore 
Metropolitan Region 
Development 
Authority, 1964 
10. Bangalore 
Development 
Authority, 1976 
11. Bangalore Water 
Supply and Sewerage 
Board, 1964 
Planning, co-ordination and 
supervision of development and 
planned growth 
Land acquisition and 
(infrastructure) development, 
housing construction and 
distribution of sites and houses 
Construction and maintenance 
of water supply and sewerage 
works 
Bangalore 
Metropolitan Region 
Bangalore 
Metropolitan Area 
(which is different 
from the Region) 
Bangalore City 
Corporation area 
Source: Housing and Urban Development Department, Government of Karnataka, 
Annual Report 1994-95 (1995). 
The Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) 
'Every state should have a Directorate of Municipal Committees under the 
charge of a senior officer with considerable knowledge of and experience 
in local administration. The Directorate would exercise close supervision 
over the working of chief Executive Officers and also give necessary 
guidance to the local bodies. It would also function as the Inspectorate of 
Local Bodies and by frequent inspections ensure that the performance of 
the local bodies is up to the mark' writes the Sarkaria Committee (1963, p. 
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44). Other committees recommended the same. Hence, there was a lot of 
pressure on the states to establish such a directorate. 
Kamataka was a late comer in this area when under the Janata Party 
government a Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) was 
established in 1985. The DMA co-ordinates, controls and supervises the 
activities of 168 municipal bodies in Kamataka. This control pertains to 
the financial administration, revenue and expenditure vigilance, posting 
and transfer of government officers, annual budgeting and reporting. The 
municipal bodies consist of all CMCs (19), TMCs (135), Notified Area 
Committees (12) and Sanitary Boards (2) but excludes the seven city 
corporations. The DMA also acts as a nodal agency to implement and 
monitor a number of housing schemes and activities for urban poverty 
alleviation schemes, sponsored by the central and state government. These 
schemes are: the Nehm Rozgar Yojana scheme (NRY), the Scheme for 
Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT), the 
Scheme for Urban Basic Services for the Poor (UBSP), the Integrated 
Programme for the Low-Cost Sanitation and Liberation of Scavengers 
(IPLCS&LS), and the State Action Plan for the Development of the Urban 
Child. 
An IAS officer was appointed as director of the DMA and he 
managed to do this with fervour and has made the DMA a department to 
reckon with. Particularly the Department of Town Planning was deprived 
of handling the IDSMT scheme and the Kamataka Slum Clearance Board 
was ejected from the NRY scheme. The director has also been vested with 
extensive powers (DMA, 1987), for example, to remove councillors and 
presidents, to withdraw, modify or cancel municipal powers, to allocate 
municipal funds for particular purposes, to revise municipal budgets, to 
appoint an administrator to replace the council, to overrule or suspend 
decisions of the council, to conduct an inspection or financial audit, and to 
appoint, suspend or transfer municipal officers. The Directorate has its 
office in Bangalore and has 89 (DMA, 1996) staff members, among them 
one director of IAS rank, one joint-director of KAS rank, two deputy 
directors (administration and engineering), four assistant directors 
(administration, engineering and accounts and health), one accounts officer 
For example the Central Council of Local Self-Government in 1965, the Conferences 
of Mayors of Municipal Corporations, the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee in 1966 
and the Study Team on District Administration of the Administrative Reforms 
Commission in 1967 (Sachdeva, 1993). 
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and other technical and administrative staff. The DMA has only one 
executive engineer and two assistant executive engineers. A separate unit 
has been attached to the DMA to execute the scheme for Urban Basic 
Services for the Poor. Two junior project officers have been appointed for 
this purpose. 
The DMA is a top-heavy organisation with little executive strength 
for the implementation and monitoring of schemes or to provide 
administrative support to municipalities. The role of the Directorate has 
been criticised for its overlapping responsibilities and the competence of 
the director and the deputy commissioners in the districts with regard to 
budgets, appointments, transfers and intervention in council matters 
(Sachdeva, 1993). Rather than being supportive of municipalities, many 
directorates have become authoritarian and acted as a stumbling block, 
causing delays in developmental works. 
Town Planning Department and urban development authorities 
As housing and urban development are considered state subjects, the State 
Town Planning Department is supposed to play a crucial role. The 
Planning Department comes into force after the state government has 
declared a local planning area. There are 38 local planning areas in 
Karnataka. Subsequently, a planning authority has been constituted to 
prepare development plans and town planning schemes. 
The activities of the Department of Town Planning are strongly 
focused upon the preparation of three plan forms . First is the preparation 
of a Outline Development Plan (ODP) within two years after declaration of 
a local planning area. It includes the designation of areas for different land 
uses, such as residential, commercial, industrial, recreational, educational, 
circulation, public purposes, etc. A procedure of notification, public 
hearing and comments follows before the ODP is approved. Second is the 
preparation of a Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) within three 
years after final approval of the ODP. The ODP is further detailed into 
zoning of land uses together with zoning regulation, required set backs, 
maximum plot coverage, height of buildings, maximum floor areas, sub-
division of land, complete street patterns, improvements to existing road 
14
 This in compliance with the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. 
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patterns, reservation of areas for public purposes such as parks, play 
grounds and other recreational uses, housing sites, etc. Again, a procedure 
of notification, public hearing and comments follows before final approval. 
Third is the preparation of town planning schemes; a plan that outlines 
how the CDP can be implemented and the existing situation be adjusted to 
fulfil the requirement of the CDP. As mentioned above some of the funds 
of the department are used for such town planning schemes. An additional 
function of the Town Planning Department is the preparation and updating 
of base maps for all urban areas. This task was taken up in 1961 and is 
now conducted by the district town planning units, free of cost. All urban 
areas have a base map. 
The Town Planning Department was established in 1959. The 
Department has a branch office in all the twenty districts with a core staff. 
The Department has 397 officers and a senior planner as their director. 
There are six joint-directors. At least one for each of the two zonal offices 
(Bangalore and Dharwad). The southern zone is divided in fourteen sub-
zones each with an office. The northern zone has sixteen sub-zones. Also 
here the Department is top-heavy with many senior officers to manage few 
subordinates. As urban planning plays an important role in various 
economic and developmental activities, the director of the Department of 
Town Planning is, for example, a member of the Karnataka Housing Board 
and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board, the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Region Development Authority, the Environment Clearance Committee 
and a permanent invitee of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development 
Board. 
Urban development authorities and city improvement trusts are the 
lowest development agencies. These authorities are constituted after the 
state government has notified and defined an 'urban area' under the 
respective acts15. While the town planning authorities are mandated to do 
just planning, the urban development authorities' mandate is to acquire 
land, to develop the infrastructure, to prepare the layouts, - when requested 
- to construct houses, to sell the developed sites to individual buyers and to 
hand over the assets for maintenance to the local authority, i.e. the 
municipality or corporation. The difference between an urban development 
authority and an improvement trust is that the jurisdiction of an urban 
The City of Mysore Improvement Act of 1903 and the Karnataka Improvements 
Boards Act of 1976, which are superseded - where applicable - by the Karnataka Urban 
Development Authorities Act of 1987. 
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development authority falls mostly outside the limits of a municipality or 
corporation. This is not the case with an improvement trust that is 
replacing the local authority for as far as their development and service 
functions are concerned and, in fact, becomes the local authority. Urban 
development authorities are constituted mainly for larger urban 
agglomerations of more than 100,000 inhabitants. Except four, all other 
corporations and city municipal councils, have an urban development 
authority. Including Bangalore, Karnataka has 21 urban development 
authorities. Bagalkot and Hospet are the only two city municipal councils 
with a city improvement trust. The urban development authorities, with 
senior politicians and officials in their board, constitute a weighty and well 
established decision making body with good links to both state 
administration and the Legislative Assembly. In contrast, the city 
improvement boards are much 'lighter', and constitute of only a chairman, 
a town planning officer, an engineer and appointed citizens and elected 
representatives of the local authority. The income of the authorities is 
generated from selling and letting of sites and houses, and from levying 
betterment charges. While their legal mandate is confined to acquisition, 
preparation of lay-outs, development of all infrastructure facilities and sale 
of sites, they may undertake housing schemes of their own' . Projects of 
urban development authorities are financed from central and state 
government Plan funds'7 and through loans from the HUDCO, insurance 
companies and scheduled commercial banks. 
There has been critique about the role of improvement trusts and 
urban development authorities. The main arguments that are floored are 
that they constitute an authority that is against the philosophy of an elected 
local body and local self-government, that they deprive local bodies of 
necessary local revenues and state development funds and that they exert 
unwanted state government control over local development. Others have 
observed that they do not fulfil the expectation of working towards 
economic and regional development through proper town planning and 
project development. Development takes place, nonetheless, in an 
unplanned, piece-meal and ad hoc manner' . 
For example the Urban Development Authorities of Bangalore, Chikmagalur, 
Mangalore, Gulbarga and Hubli-Dharwad have undertaken housing schemes. 
17
 i.e. Five-Plan and Annual Plan funds for approved projects and schemes. 
18
 Report of the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee, 1966. 
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6.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illustrated that the centre-state relationship is to some 
extent subject to political patronage by the central government. Upto the 
late 1980s Karnataka's relations with the centre was cordial after which it 
became strained due to the emergence of the Janata party. This lasted until 
1991 when again a Congress-led government ruled in Karnataka. It has 
also been argued that this patronage had little financial influence as the 
distribution of national resources is to a large extent fixed by a formula. A 
distinct role in urban development has been held by the bureaucratic elite 
belonging to the Indian Administrative Service. It has been pointed out 
that from an erstwhile Weberian type of cadre, they were transformed into 
a disunited and politicised lot. In fact, there has been a schism between 
those who wanted to maintain the traditional aloofness to the political 
turmoil and those who started to co-operate favourably with the state 
politicians. The institutional set-up for urban development and housing has 
illustrated that both at the centre and state level a number of institutions 
have proliferated and expanded. At the local level, there has been a 
sustained neglect and a deprivation of financial sources and a lack of 
proper administration. Moreover, state government control has been 
increasing in the financial, personnel and administrative areas. Functions 
have also been taken away and given to urban development authorities and 
town planning authorities. This also led to a diminishing resource base. 
Octroi, betterment charges, profession tax and other taxes have been 
abandoned or appropriated by state level agencies. The local political 
environment, the poor local leadership, disinterested citizens and a 
fragmented personnel system were not conducive to resist this increasing 
centralisation or to improve self-government. The financial situation of 
particularly municipalities has been - in real terms - deteriorating in the 
last 15 years. The situation is slightly better in the larger cities and 
corporations in Karnataka. Overall, the increasing dependency on the state 
government for housing and basic amenities disallows local government to 
have any significant or pro-active role in urban development. 
7 
Overview of National Housing and Urban 
Development Policies since Independence 
7.1 Introduction 
The development of urban areas is determined by policies, programmes 
and projects implemented by a myriad of government institutions and it is 
not the intention of this study to deal with them comprehensively. This 
research has been confined to those policies, programmes and projects that 
have been initiated and implemented by the central Ministry of Urban 
Development (now called Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment) and 
the state government Secretariat(s) for Housing and Urban Development. 
These include selected urban employment, urban poverty alleviation 
policies and programmes, and policies and programmes related to the 
development of local economies, urban planning, housing, water supply 
and sanitation. Excluded are policies and programmes that relate to 
industries, power, bridges, national, state and district roads, 
telecommunication, transport, commerce and trade, harbours, import, 
export, and the public sector undertakings (PSUs). These are handled by 
other ministries and departments. The diagram below indicates the policies 
and programmes that national and state housing and urban development 
institutions are involved in (Table 7-1). The grey areas indicate the focus 
of this research. 
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Although urban planning, housing, special schemes for health, 
employment and education, and infrastructure development in urban areas 
are state matters, the central government has had a strong influence in the 
past two decades through directives, legislation, five-year and annual plan 
preparations of both central and state governments. Central government 
also exerts influence on the operation of the states through plan funds, 
centrally sponsored schemes, established institutions for urban 
development and finance, and through policy documents and guidelines. 
This has been particularly true for housing. When state governments 
prepare their five-year and annual plans, they rely on central government 
support through plan funds and centrally sponsored schemes. Secondly, 
their own outlays to the various sectors and programmes have to be 
approved by the national Planning Commission. In this sense, India has a 
true centrally led economy. 
The concurrent five-year plans since the first plan of 1951 , show a 
pattern in development priorities. Strong urban development programmes 
and the adoption of an urban development policy came at a very late stage 
and it seemed that urbanisation did 'not appear as a problem worthy of 
attention' (Ramachandran, 1989, p. 329). The First Five-Year Plan was 
deviant from the Second Five-Year Plan in the sense mat agriculture, 
transport, communication and social services received higher priority as 
compared to power and industry (See table 7-2). In later plans one can 
observe that there have been growers and decliners. Power was the only 
grower as it has been realised that the share of private investment can only 
grow when sufficient power is generated. Industry has had a constant and 
substantial share in the five-year plans until the mid-1980s, indicating the 
importance that was given to develop heavy and basic industry in a 
planned economy. Thereafter, the first steps were made to liberalise the 
market forces in the economy, to deliberately attract private capital and to 
slowly retreat from the dominant role of the public sector in the industrial 
sector. Transport and communication had a high share in the first three 
five-year plans but then came down to around 20 per cent. There has been 
widespread critique on the declining priority for agriculture and social 
services. The agriculture sector has been seen as stagnating and slow in 
picking up new technologies and crops, aggravated by the little support of 
India the planning and financial year starts on 1st April and ends on 31st March of the 
next calendar year. 
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infrastructure, power and irrigation. Education has also been criticised on 
its declining standard and poor infrastructure. However, the figures do not 
support this. As a matter of fact, after the First and Second Five-Year Plans 
the outlays have remained more or less constant. One could argue that the 
emphasis in the five-year plans has been shifted from industry in favour of 
power, while the other sectors have remained - by and large - constant. 
Table 7-2: Pattern of resource allocation in India's five-year plans 
(in per cent) 
Heads of development Five-year plan (years) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 
51-56 56-61 61-66 69-74 74-79 80-85 85-90 92-972 
1. Agriculture and related 
sectors, irrigation & 
flood control 
2. Power 
3. Industry 
4. Transport and 
communications 
5. Social services 
Total (%) 
Total (Billion Rs.) 
31 
13 
6 
27 
22 
100 
20 
20 
10 
24 
28 
18 
100 
46 
21 
14 
23 
25 
17 
100 
86 
24 
15 
23 
20 
18 
100 
159 
22 
19 
26 
18 
15 
100 
393 
25 
20 
24 
16 
15 
100 
975 
21 
30 
17 
16 
16 
100 
2,223 
22 
27 
14 
19 
18 
100 
4,341 
Source: Eighth Five-Year Plan 1992-97, Government of India (1992). 
г
 In the intermittent non-FYP years, the Planning Commission had prepared Annual 
Plans. 
3
 Outlays for Science, Technology &. Environment and General and Economic Services 
have been included in 7th and 8th FYP. 
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7.2 Housing and urban development policies in the national 
five-year plans 
First National Five-Year Plan (1951-56) 
In the First Five-Year Plan (1951-56), the problem of urbanisation was felt 
due to the major population shifts from rural to urban areas and its effect 
on the increasing housing shortages. As an operational measure, the plan 
recommended a model act for controlling land prices, while there was no 
reference to deliberate urban development and planning as such. The initial 
focus was on housing and the problem of poverty of the new urbanités: 
'The private enterprise is not in a position to do the job so far as the low 
income groups are concerned. They cannot afford to pay the economic rent 
for housing accommodation or even the minimum standards' (First Five-
Year Plan, 1951). A number of subsidised rental housing schemes were 
initiated for the urban poor . Secondly, the Ministry of Works and Housing 
and the National Building Organisation were established to support these 
housing efforts with finance, design and planning. The Bombay Rent 
Restriction Act of 1939, provided a headway to prevent profiteering by 
landlords in areas of acute housing shortages and proved the precursor to 
many rent control acts. However, these rent control acts led to a fixation of 
house rents for many years, and to disrepair in the old rental stock, 
inequities to different groups of tenants, reduction in supply of formal 
rental housing and losses to the public exchequer, and the operation of a 
parallel (black) housing market as a result (Mehta and Mehta, 1989). 
Second National Five-Year Plan (1956-61) 
The Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61) recognised the urgent need for 
housing. The central government shifted its policy from giving direct loans 
to individuals to giving assistance to state government and local 
authorities. A statement on housing policy was for the first time made on 
14 August 1957. The statement proposed to establish housing corporations 
in the states and to use more indigenous materials. Besides the two existing 
central government institutions, the Life Insurance Corporation of India 
The Subsidized Housing Scheme for Industrial Workers and Economically Weaker 
Section of the Society (1952) and the Low Income Group Housing Scheme (1954). 
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Ltd. became associated with the government for financing housing 
schemes for middle income groups. Housing in rural areas was added on 
the agenda and the Subsidised Housing Scheme for Plantation Workers 
(1956), the Village Housing Project Scheme (1957) and the Rural Housing 
Scheme for State Government Employees (1959) were initiated. Other 
urban housing schemes were also added to the existing ones . The Second 
Five-Year Plan, however, did not formulate any specific national 
programmes. 
City surveys were conducted in the 1950s for the Planning 
Commission and they were the first set of urban studies in the post-
Independence period. The observation of emerging slums in the 1950s was 
associated with the poor physical and shelter conditions, and the illegal 
occupation of land. Re-housing to (highly) subsidised and conventional 
high-rise and row-housing was adopted as the paradigm after demolishing 
(clearing of) the slums (Mehta and Mehta, 1989). It was soon realised that 
progress was tampered by the lengthy and cumbersome procedures 
involved in land acquisition, non-availability and high cost of alternative 
sites near existing slums, the inability of slum dwellers to pay even the 
subsidised rents and their reluctance to move from the areas selected for 
clearance. 
Third National Five-Year Plan (1961-66) 
The Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) has been quoted as the beginning of 
urban planning and land policies in India. For the first time, emphasis was 
given to the preparation of master plans for the growing cities and towns. 
The master plan is conceived as 'the official statement of a municipal 
legislative body which sets forth its major policies concerning desirable 
future physical development' (Basu, 1996, p. 28). The concept originated 
from the British experience and the invitation to Sir Patrick Geddes in 
1915. The first master plan in India was prepared for Delhi in 1962 . 
Master plans for other cities followed along the same concepts. Almost all 
5
 The Slum Clearance and Improvement Scheme (1956), Middle Income Group 
Housing Scheme (1959) and the Land Acquisition and Development Scheme (1959). 
6
 The Delhi Master Plan parcelled the city into eight self-contained planning divisions 
with their owns residential, service, employment and recreational facility. Further, there 
was to be as a system of linked open spaces planned as green arteries. It also included 
regulations for built-up area per plot, floor-area-ratios, setbacks and heights for various 
types of buildings. 
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the states introduced town planning legislation based on the concepts of 
British town planning laws. It stipulated isolation and segregation, a 
distaste for congestion and crowded cities and had an Obsession with 
order and homogeneity' (Shaw, 1996, p. 226). 
The approach toward urbanisation was of 'balanced development' 
between large, medium-sized and small cities and between urban and rural 
areas. The major ingredients of the new development policy were: 
(i) 'as far as possible, new industries should be established away from 
larger and congested cities' (Third Five-Year Plan, p. 689); 
(ii) the adoption of the concept of the region in the planning of large scale 
industries; 
(iii) the integration of the rural and urban components in the community 
development projects; 
(iv) a diversification of the non-agricultural occupational pattern in the 
rural areas; and 
(v) the preparation of masters plans beginning with the metropolitan 
cities, state capitals, port towns, new industrial centres and other 
growing cities. 
It was realised that urban development could not take place effectively 
without a control on urban land. Legislation and other measures were 
formulated and implemented to achieve the five-year plan's objectives. 
Moreover, the government adopted a more active role in the acquisition, 
development and sale of the land. As a consequence, many states 
established housing boards. 
National Annual Plans (1966-69) 
In the intermittent period of 1966-69, when annual plans replaced the 
regular five-year plan, the concept of economic weaker section (EWS) was 
introduced. The introduction of EWS signified the adoption of a target 
group approach and was applied to the Subsidised Industrial Housing 
Scheme. The definition of EWS was on the basis of monthly family 
income. Though the definition was simple in nature, it proved far more 
difficult to verify in reality. In the case of industrial workers the monthly 
income was rather easier to assess than in case of informal workers and 
daily wagers who do not have any specified salary. The latter was an 
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invitation for middle men with sometimes political motives to intervene 
and exploit the provisions. 
Fourth National Five-Year Plan (1969-74) 
During the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74) some attention was given to 
discourage the growth of big metropolitan cities of Calcutta and Bombay 
by developing smaller centres in the regions. At the same time the 
management of the larger cities received equal attention. The 
establishment of the Delhi Development Authority during the Third Five-
Year Plan was appraised positively and the Planning Commission advised 
establishment of development authorities for other larger cities in India. 
Several large scale urban projects were started, e.g. the creation of the new 
state capitals Chandigarh, Bhopal and Bhubaneshwar. The active 
involvement of government in acquisition, development and sale of land 
was intensified. Besides viewing land acquisition as a prerequisite for 
guided development, it also generated local revenues. These were 
necessary as other revenue instruments proved weak, inflexible and low 
yielding. The government changed its role in the land market from a 
regulator to a developer. It authorised urban development authorities to 
acquire, develop and sell land with a profit. 
The growing problems and appalling living conditions in urban 
slums were addressed and it was stipulated that a minimum level of health 
conditions should be created. The approach of 'slum clearance' was 
reviewed and considered an inadequate solution for the shelter problems. 
The five-year plan urged that the slum clearance policy should be replaced 
by 'slum improvement'. Two important measures were introduced: (a) the 
launch of sites and services as an approach besides regular housing 
construction schemes and (b) the Scheme for Environmental Improvement 
of Slums (EIS). The EIS was initiated in selected cities and aimed at 
providing basic services in existing and legalised slums. 
The Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO) was 
set up in 1970 as the apex organisation to provide financial and technical 
assistance for housing and urban development projects in the country with 
a primary emphasis on the promotion of housing for persons belonging to 
low-income groups and economically weaker sections. It was hoped that 
the HUDCO would contribute to overcome the shortcomings of the urban 
development sector, particularly housing. 
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Fifth National Five-Year Plan (1974-79) 
The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-79) aimed once more to stimulate 
balanced urbanisation. The Task Force on Planning and Development of 
Small and Medium Towns was established to strengthen a more deliberate 
urban development planning process. The Fifth Five-Year Plan admitted 
that housing production cannot be separated from the saving capacity of 
the people and from an economy that can raise such finances. The plan 
tuned down its earlier ambitious goals and a new and massive scheme for 
the poor was announced: the Minimum Needs Programme for both rural 
and urban residents. The support to the HUDCO and housing boards in the 
states would be continued to enable them to provide assistance to such 
housing schemes. The Housing Development Finance Corporation 
(HDFC) was established in October 1977 to extend financial assistance to 
sectors where the HUDCO was not active: individuals, associations of 
individuals, co-operative societies and companies for staff housing. 
During the Fifth Five-Year Plan, the Urban Land (Ceiling and 
Regulation) Bill, 1976 was put forward for approval by the Parliament. 
The bill was introduced to overcome some of the disabilities of the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894. The Land Acquisition Act enabled state 
governments to acquire private land for public purposes. The private 
owner would be compensated with a payment equivalent to the market 
value of the ex-appropriated land7. In prime locations, the compensation to 
be paid under this Act would be stupendous and impede, for example, low-
cost sites, houses and services for the poorer sections. Besides 
compensation, solatium is to be paid over and above the market value of 
the land. It was hoped that the Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act would be 
a way out. The Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 has the following elements: 
(i) an imposition of a ceiling on ownership of vacant land holdings in 
selected urban agglomerations; 
(ii) limitation of the size of plinth area of dwelling units to be built on 
future plots; and 
7
 The Constitution IV Amendment Act, 1955 and the 25th Amendment to the 
Constitution have attempted to lower the 'compensation' to less than the market value. 
However, subsequent court rulings have disabled these Amendments and payments are 
'de jure' not less than market value (Ravindra, 1996). 
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(iii) registration by all persons of their urban land holdings and regulation 
of any transfer of titles of holdings. Where vacant holdings exceeded 
the specified limits, such (part of) holdings were to be surrendered for 
a token payment and thereby bringing more land into the market for 
public purposes. 
Exemptions can be granted if the excess land will be used in the interest of 
the public, or if the surrender of excess land would cause undue hardship 
to the landholder. A third exemption ground is the re-development of the 
land-holding in compliance with the master plan. 
Report of the Task Force on Urbanisation (1977) 
An important document which determined the course of thinking in the 
early 1980s was the report of the Task Force on Urbanisation. The Task 
Force submitted their report in 1977 and they presented elaborate 
guidelines for the preparation of master plans and the improvement of 
efficient management of local governments. Among other things, the Task 
Force suggested a greater degree of attention to the existing towns and 
cities in the range of 50,000 to three million population. The Task Force 
defined the following imperatives for the proper development of these 
towns and cities: 
(a) the formulation of a national urban policy; 
(b) an urban land policy to ensure proper use of land and prevention of 
wastage; 
(c) the development of small and medium towns and cities with organic 
linkages to their immediate areas; 
(d) the identification of growth points in the regions that may be 
delineated; 
(e) the evolution of location policies in the context of regional 
development; 
(f) the provision of inviolable green-belts around settlements of certain 
sizes; 
(g) working out a rational and workable set of norms and standards for 
urban development; and 
(h) the creation of appropriate statutory local government agencies at 
various levels. 
National Housing and Urban Development Policies 127 
As a consequence, the Integrated Development of Small and Medium 
Towns (IDSMT) programme was launched in 1979. 
Sixth National Five-Year Plan (1980-85) 
The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85) placed emphasis on the environmental 
improvement of urban slums for which the existing scheme EIS was scaled 
up to a national scheme for all urban local bodies. Lack of drainage, 
sewerage and sanitation were considered to be the principal causes of an 
area becoming a slum (Routray, 1993). As land became scarce, the Urban 
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 was finally passed and put into 
effect. However, within a few years the many loopholes in the Act proved 
counter-productive and urban land became even scarcer. 
With regard to housing, no extra efforts were made other than to 
continue the existing schemes. It has been argued (Kurana, 1995) that the 
absolute increase in the outlay for the housing sector did not keep pace 
with the increasing land prices and cost of building materials. Secondly, 
the public sector investment in housing as compared to the private sector 
investments decreased from 21.7 per cent during the First Five-Year Plan 
period to 11.5 per cent in the early 1980s . Although the contribution of 
the public sector to the total housing stock has been small in numbers and 
also relatively expensive, their contribution to the urban sector has been 
favourable as compared to the rural sector (11.1 and 2.7 per cent 
respectively between 1981-85). While the central government had defined 
an important role for the state government in housing and urban 
development, it was realised that effective urban development cannot take 
place without the prominent involvement of these bodies. The Sixth Five-
Year Plan, therefore, called for revitalisation of urban local bodies, for 
devolution of funds and for supporting legislation that will strengthen 
urban local bodies. Moreover, the economic crisis of the 1980s compelled 
the government to make urbanisation more self-financing and self-
governing with less dependency on state governments (Shaw, 1996). 
8
 According to the National Building Organization, Government of India, 1985 
(HUDCO, 1995). 
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Seventh National Five-Year Plan (1985-90) 
The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-90) presented the housing and urban 
development related policies for the first time in three separate chapters: 
housing, urban development; and water supply and sanitation. The latter 
was the outcome of the increased attention in the International Decade of 
Water Supply and Sanitation (1980-90) and the extra effort that the 
Government of India chose to take in improving these essential services in 
both urban and rural areas. 
With regard to housing, the plan states that it 'serves to fulfil many 
of the fundamental objectives of the plan: providing shelter, raising the 
quality of life particularly of the poorer sections of the population; creating 
conditions which are conducive to the achievement of crucial objectives in 
terms of health, sanitation and education; creating substantial additional 
employment and dispersed economic activity; improving urban-rural and 
inter-personal equity through the narrowing down of differences in 
standards of living and last but not least, generating additional voluntary 
savings' (Seventh Five-Year Plan 1985-90, 1985, p. 292). One may 
observe that housing per se was seen as an important instrument to solve 
many of the urban poverty related problems. The housing production 
during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85) was 363,1339 units against a 
housing shortage of 24.7 million units. The figures indicated that public 
housing agencies produced a mere 1.5 per cent units as compared to the 
estimated housing shortage. The Seventh Five-Year Plan also mentioned 
that due to the expected increase in population the shortage would increase 
by another 16.2 million over the period 1985-90. Unless there was a steep 
increase in the level of production, the housing shortage would then 
increase to a staggering 40.5 million in 1990. The Planning Commission 
realised that a different approach was required for financing housing on a 
larger scale, for the development of suitable sites and for applying low-
cost technologies. Moreover, they realised that the private sector and the 
individual households had to deliver the lion's share. 'The time has now 
come for the Government to set before itself a clear goal in the field of 
housing and launch a major housing effort; not so much to build but to 
promote housing activity through the supply of fiscal and financial 
infrastructure such that every family will be provided with adequate shelter 
9
 The Seventh FYP also mentions here that 5,430,000 housing sites were submitted in 
rural areas. 
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within a definite time horizon', continued the Seventh Five-Year Plan 
document (p. 293). 
Despite the call for a radical change in approach, there was no 
specification of objectives or targets to be met, or of strategies to be 
followed. The plan, finally and suddenly, presented the outlays for 
different activities without much of a justification. Moreover, most of the 
plan's outlay went into the established schemes and there was little change 
from earlier versions. The written intentions and implicit implications of 
the analysis and recommendations drafted by the Planning Commission in 
this five-year plan document were in no way reflected in the presented 
figures. There seemed to be two disconnected worlds in one document: the 
harsh reality of figures as the outcome of negotiations between the 
ministers, chief ministers and senior civil servants, and the illusionary 
world of good policy intentions prepared by economic planners and other 
civil servants. Those who were to implement the policies, i.e. the financing 
institutions and the state government, would find the plan's allocations in 
no way related to the targets they had to achieve. When the Planning 
Commission made half-hearted policy statements which had no bearing 
with their actions (i.e. the allocation of funds), their sincerity was 
questioned by the financial institutions and the state government. If the 
central government was half-hearted about its intentions, what could one 
expect of lower and state governments? 'The central government can write 
anything, but there is little support as far as the implementation is 
concerned', commented one former secretary to the state government 
aptly. 
In the section on urban development, the Planning Commission gave 
a redressai of the weaknesses of urban local bodies. They emphasised the 
need for a range of measures: better urban and regional planning; the 
creation of an Urban Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation to 
deal with the emerging urban problems; reforms for land acquisition; and 
tax reforms and devolution of state funds to strengthen urban local bodies. 
However, it was noted that 'the State Government have to shoulder the 
major responsibility for putting through these measures' (Seventh Five-
Year Plan 1985-90, p. 298). The Plan also remained silent on what tax 
reforms and devolution of funds to local bodies should be implemented 
and how local bodies were to proceed about land acquisition, to raise 
money for such endeavours and to succeed in profitable development of 
land. 
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There was an increase in the outlay which was to a large extent 
contributed by the steep increase in urban development programmes. In the 
document there was little justification or explanation of this increase. One 
may carefully observe that the capital region (Delhi) had been successful 
in securing urban development funds, both through urban development 
schemes and through separate National Capital Region funds. The smaller 
towns and cities had fared less successfully, as the outlay for the IDSMT 
scheme was brought down from Rs. 960 million in the previous five-year 
plan to Rs. 880 million in the Seventh Five-Year Plan. This is surprising as 
the analysis of the Planning Commission pointed out that these urban areas 
were not able to provide and sustain a basic level of services and also 
suggested to continue and expand the support to the IDSMT scheme. 
Thirdly, the call for tax and financial reforms was not reflected in any 
supportive programme or outlay. Apparently, it was expected that these 
reforms were to be formulated, implemented and the cost borne by the 
state governments. 
During this period, the IDSMT continued to be the most important 
central government sponsored urban development scheme and another 102 
towns and cities were added. Two more centrally sponsored scheme were 
introduced: 
(a) the scheme for Urban Basic Services in 1986, with the primary 
objective of enhancing survival and development of women and 
children of urban low income families, and 
(b) the Nehru Rojgar Yojana scheme (Nehru's people employment 
scheme) in 1989, aiming to improve the income situation through 
petty loans and employment generating projects for urban poor living 
under the poverty line. However, the first funds were released during 
the Annual Plan of 1990-91. 
One could say that the Seventh Plan 'made a new beginning by explicitly 
recognising the problems of urban poor which were seen to be linked with 
creation of employment opportunities' (Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1992, p. 
348). 
Water supply and sanitation received special attention in the Seventh 
Five-Year Plan as well. The Government of India wanted to make an extra 
effort in this area to follow up on the appeal of international agencies to set 
specific targets during this International Drinking Water Supply and 
Sanitation Decade (1980-90). India had indeed been quite successful in 
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increasing the coverage of water supply, particularly in rural areas . The 
coverage of rural water supply increased from 31 per cent in 1981 to 53 
per cent in 1985. In urban areas, the coverage increased slightly from 78 
per cent to 81 per cent. The achievements of increasing the coverage of 
sanitation was less impressive: in urban areas there was an increase from 
27 to 33 per cent and in rural areas from 0.5 to 0.95 per cent between 1981 
and 1985. It was realised that the targets set for the Seventh Five-Year Plan 
would not be achieved unless low-cost options replaced the conventional 
and expensive sewerage systems", unless beneficiary contribution was 
introduced and community involvement in various stages of the projects 
had become part of the programme implementation (Seventh Five-Year 
Plan, p. 301). Again, the Planning Commission pointed at the state 
governments who should identify and establish adequate institutions, such 
as the water supply and sewerage boards, to establish uniform technology 
approaches and designs, establish proper monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms, etc. 
Report of the National Commission on Urbanisation (1988) 
When the Ministry of Urban Development was established in 1985, it was 
probably the right time to review ongoing efforts and to reflect on how to 
proceed with effective urban development policies. The Commission's 
report was confrontational and - at times - blunt in its analysis. In total, 78 
detailed recommendations were made that dealt with a wide range of 
subjects: dimensions of urbanisation, land, water and sanitation, energy, 
transport, urban poverty, housing, urban form, etc. These 
recommendations have carried substantial weight in the years that 
followed and no discussion about urban planning and urbanisation in India 
till today has ignored the recommendations of the Commission. It is, 
therefore relevant to highlight a few points. 
To guide urban development, the Commission had recommended 
that a number of cities be given special status and to make provisions for 
10
 The objective under the Sixth FYP 1980-85, in line with the IDWSSD 1981-91, was 
to provide water supply to the whole population (100 per cent coverage), sanitation to 
80 percent in urban and 25 percent in rural areas. 
11
 Several low-cost water supply and pour-flush sanitation technologies have been 
developed and promoted by the Technical Advisory Group of the United Nations 
Development Programme, in which quite a number of Indian experts had participated. 
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investments for infrastructure development and housing. The Commission 
had identified 329 cities spread all over the country which were called 
Generators of Economic Momentum (GEMs). Apparently, Perroux's 
concept of growth-pole had inspired the Commission. Of these, 77 cities 
were grouped as National Priority Cities and 252 cities as State Priority 
Cities. In Kamataka, eight GEMs were identified by the NCU: Gulbarga, 
Davangere, Shimoga, Raichur, Tumkur, Bidar, Harihar and Karwar (See 
also figure 5-1). 
In addition, 49 Spatial Priority Urbanisation Regions (SPURs) were 
identified which constitute a chain of cities from where urban growth is 
expected to take place in the future and should function as a counter-
magnet to existing metropolises and one-million-plus cities. The Spatial 
Priority Urban Regions aim to create spatial axes between settlements with 
large potential for expanding economies. In Karnataka, three such SPURs 
were identified: 
(a) Belgaum-Hubli-Dharwad-Davangere-Harihar, 
(b) Tumkur-Bangalore-Hosur-Mysore-Mandya and 
(c) Hospet-Bellary-Raichur. 
The Commission realised that spatial planning requires enhanced meaning 
and utility. It proposed to introduce three type of plans: Master Directive 
Plan for the entire city, an Executive Plan and an Action Plan which served 
as programmes for particular zones or wards of the city. The Commission 
also realised that guided urban development cannot take place without 
available land and it noted that 'the supply of such should be given the 
topmost priority'. Land surveys, change of urban land tenure to ensure 
security and a drastic change of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) 
Act of 1976 should take place. With regard to water supply, sanitation, 
energy and transportation the Commission proposed better integration 
between the sectors, the application of low-cost technologies, pursuance of 
cost-saving measures and sensitivity to the needs of the poor and the 
public, rather than the individual. On housing, the traditional housing 
sector agencies should 'be restructured for the fulfilment of their new role 
as facilitators rather than providers of housing', i.e. make available 
serviced land, provide finance, infrastructure development and community 
facilities. Realising the dilapidated state of the rental housing sector and 
the decline in available rental housing stock, the Commission 
recommended that existing rent acts should be liberalised to allow for 
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reasonable annual increases, reflecting the cost of living and the required 
expenditures for maintenance. 
The Commission was very critical about the state of affairs of local 
governments: their weak financial position, the non-functioning of the 
elected councils due to supersession by the state governments, etc. The 
Commission proposed a set of recommendations for strengthening the 
urban local bodies and improving their tax and revenue base. Secondly, the 
roles of executives and elected representatives were to be codified, as well 
as legislation adopted to reduce frequent supersession. One of the 
implications was the introduction of the 63rd Constitutional Amendment 
(or Nagarpalika) Bill of 1989, later converted into the 74th Constitutional 
Amendment, a landmark legislation for the empowerment of local 
governance. The Commission further recommended the establishment, 
both at the centre and in the states, of an Urbanisation Council to formulate 
urbanisation policies. 
While the report is much lauded, it was also criticised. In general, 
the policies and programmes set out in the report were found to be neither 
explicit nor always the 'most relevant'; it lacked prioritisation of issues 
and was found devoid of a clear-cut direction for intervention in the 
process of urban development and planning. 'The entire set of 78 
recommendations sound like oft-repeated platitudes drafted for a political 
platform or election manifesto to be forgotten as soon as the election 
campaign is over' (H.U. Bijlani in The Hindu, 11 April 1989). Another 
point of critique is the lack of in-depth understanding of the intricate 
relationship between the urbanisation process, economic 
(underdevelopment and the increase in urban and rural poverty. 'The 
borrowed concept of growth centres is not supported by any theoretical 
background, empirical evidence or research' argued Shekhar Mukerji (in 
Diddee and Rangaswamy, 1993, p. 93). Most migrants are attracted to the 
larger cities as they offer the largest and most diverse informal sector, 
where employment and income are mostly gained rather than in the formal 
sector. Such cities continue to grow in size but not necessarily with 
prosperity. This so-called 'involution' process was not acknowledged in 
the NCU Report. While the Commission took three years to prepare the 
report, the database on which the findings and recommendations were 
founded was rather weak. H.U. Bijlani writes in The Hindu (11 April 
1989): 'Are three years not enough to generate a more solid date base'. 
The selection of SPURs and GEMs, etc. had been done following a 
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disputable rationale and revealed a rather simplistic and mono-disciplinary 
(i.e. economic) dimension. The emphasis on infrastructure development 
showed a bias towards the formal sector, which can only very partially 
contribute to a more balanced regional development or stem rural-urban 
migration to the larger cities. 
Almost a decade after the submission of the NCU's report the 
following positive observations can, nonetheless, be made: 
- The central government introduced the Nehru Rojgar Yojana (NRY) 
scheme for generating employment through small credits and creation 
of civic amenities; 
- The scheme for Integrated Development of Small and Medium Town 
has been revised to account for the spatial development approach 
recommended by the NCU; 
- The financing and lending in the housing and urban infrastructure 
sector has been increased through the creation of the National 
Housing Bank and through the opening of infrastructure finance wing 
in HUDCO; and 
- The Seventy-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution (Nagar Palika) 
Bill has been introduced and adopted to some extent by some states. 
On the other hand the formulation of the much-talked-about and long 
awaited national urbanisation policy did not materialise, despite the fact 
that the Town and Country Planning Organisation prepared a draft 
National Urban Policy in 1992 on the lines of the recommendations of the 
NCU. Both the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and the state rent 
acts have been issues of debate in national and state assemblies but little 
progress has been made so far. The strategy to develop GEMs has been 
half-heartily followed up by the state governments as we will see later in 
the case of Karnataka. 
Two National Annual Plans (1990-91 and 1991-92) 
The gap of two years between the Seventh and Eighth Five-Year Plan was 
filled by two annual plans. In the urban development sector, there was a 
marked increase in the annual expenditure as compared to the previous 
years, primarily due to the first release of funds for the newly introduced 
NRY scheme. The scheme for the Environmental Improvement of Urban 
National Housing and Urban Development Policies 135 
Slums (EIUS) continued to be the most significant programme in the 
urban development sector. There were few changes in the plan outlays as 
well as in policy directions. For example, the schemes for the Integrated 
Development of Small and Medium Towns and the scheme for Urban 
13 
Basic Services were continued with some modifications. One scheme 
was added in 1990-91: the Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation 
and Rehabilitation of Scavengers. The scheme aims to eradicate the 
collection of human faeces by 'untouchable' Hindu scavengers and to 
replace the use of bucket latrines by self-supporting low-cost latrines. 
Eighth National Five-Year Plan (1992-97) 
In 1991, when P.V. Narasimha Rao started as prime minister of the new 
Congress-government, a new economic policy was launched which opened 
up several sectors to direct foreign investment that were previously solely 
public. These include industry, trade and banking. Deregulation and 
reforms were formulated, aimed at areas of foreign exchange, taxes, public 
distribution systems, agriculture, textile and fertilisers. The Eighth Five-
Year Plan also expressed its concern about the high incidence of marginal 
employment and people living below the poverty line. The existence of the 
informal sector was acknowledged as a major employment generator and it 
was suggested to upgrade and integrate this sector in the economy at large. 
As compared to the Seventh Five-Year Plan the chapter on housing, 
urban development, water supply and sanitation provided a more thorough 
analysis and presented a set of objectives and targets. While the same 
chapter had only fourteen pages in the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the Eighth 
Five-Year Plan accounted for forty-three pages. The Report of the National 
Commission on Urbanisation of 1988, provided the basis for this plan. The 
observations with regard to the widening gap between demand and supply 
of basic infrastructure and housing did not differ from the earlier five-year 
plan, nor did the comments about the weak position of urban local bodies 
and their dependency on state and central government. 
12
 The scheme for the Environmental Improvement of Slums was renamed into the 
scheme for the Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (EIUS). The modalities 
remained, however, more or less the same. 
In 1990-91 the UBS scheme was modified and renamed to Scheme for Urban Basic 
Services for the Poor (UBSP). 
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The Eighth Five-Year Plan did not, however, propose to change the 
strategy followed by the Seventh Five-Year Plan but 'the content and 
manner of implementation of these programmes will be made more 
comprehensive and compatible with the overall strategy at the state level' 
(Eighth Five-Year Plan, p. 352). Resource mobilisation and strengthening 
of institutions were to get a concrete shape, promised the plan, to be 
followed by 'spatial and economic dimension', 'convergence of all related 
programmes', 'legal, financial and organisation measures for enhanced and 
equitable supply of land', 'public and private sectors have to act in 
tandem', and 'programmes to deal with the problem of urban poverty 
should be developed in integrated manner'. A new element was the 
proposed role of the private sector. However, these distinctive features 
remained - unfortunately - as hollow as they were fashionable. 
What was notable was that small and medium towns were to receive 
funds according the concepts of GEMs, earlier introduced by the National 
Commission of Urbanisation. Moreover, other institutions were to be 
roped in to increase the co-ordination of related programmes and to 
dovetail available institutional finance. For example, the HUDCO would 
be directly involved in the channelling of funds and financing of 
remunerative components of the IDSMT and NRY schemes. Integration of 
the UBSP and EIUS schemes was also proposed. 
The plan proposed to remove legal bottlenecks and announced the 
introduction of the famous Nagarpalika Bill (74th Constitutional 
Amendment) as a remedy against the dwindling role of local bodies in 
providing basic services. The plan did, however, not conceive any 
instruments other than the introduction of the Nagarpalika Bill. The central 
government could, for example, have decided to establish a Municipal 
Development Fund to be utilised for borrowings by urban local bodies; a 
subsidy system or tax reduction for the private sector to invest in urban 
development, housing, water supply and sanitation in urban areas; and a 
municipal advisory and technical assistance body that extends help for 
preparing development plans, to improve management and planning. 
Unfortunately, none of these were indicated and it goes without saying that 
this was left to the imagination and initiative of the state governments. 
Apparently, the central government did not dare to touch what is this state 
government's responsibility. 
For example in the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, the Transfer of Property 
Act, the Land Acquisition Act and the Rent Control Act. 
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With regard to housing, the national shortage of housing was 
estimated at 31 million for the year 1991 which would increase to 41 
million in the year 2001. It was also estimated that about 48.8 million 
persons lived in slums in 1990. The Plan failed to present the actual 
achievements in number of houses built or money invested in the previous 
periods. It is a sorry state of affair that the Ministry of Urban Development 
was not able to present more precise data about the outcome of the various 
schemes and the operations of their financial institutions. Apparently, the 
combination of schemes and financing strategies through housing finance 
institutions has suffered from loss of overview and made it impossible to 
evaluate their policies in quantitative terms. 
While housing was a social goal in the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the 
Eighth Five-Year Plan underlined that housing 'is not to be treated as a 
marginal or welfare sector which is a drain on productive resources but to 
be recognised as a major economic sector' (Eighth Five-Year Plan, p. 360). 
This plan also noted that the investment in housing, by either the private or 
public sector, had come down from 15 per cent in the early part of the 
1980s to 9 per cent in the second half of the 1980s. The plan urged the 
state governments to intervene in the housing market and to create an 
enabling environment for a spurt in housing production by the private 
sector and individual households. 
The plan's outlays showed a decline in the budgetary support by 10 
per cent in real terms as compared to the Seventh Plan. It is a mystery how 
the Planning Commission wanted to triple the target of the Eighth Five-
Year Plan as compared to the achievements of the Seventh Five-Year Plan 
with no increase in real terms. Moreover, the applied discount factor based 
on the Consumer Price Index only partly accounted for the increase in the 
cost of construction materials in the urban sector. In fact, the increase in 
the cost of construction material was higher than that of the average 
consumer prices15. Did the Planning Commission believe that the private 
sector would take care of this target? Then, what were the incentives to 
attract private capital into the housing sector that had shown a declining 
interest? Had particular subsidies or tax exemptions been introduced to 
stimulate such activities? Unfortunately, the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
For example, the Consumer Price Index for Urban Non-Manual Employees, applied 
in mis study increased from 100 in 1970 to 390 in 1987. The construction cost index 
during the same period followed the same trend, but increased from 100 to 498. 
13 8 Urban Development in Kamataka 
remained silent on this subject. The central government had placed high 
confidence in the HUDCO who was the main budgetary winner. They had 
been identified as the prime institution that operated successfully at the 
lower end of the housing market and proved better equipped than other 
housing finance institutions to provide housing stock to the lower income 
households. 
During the Seventh Five-Year Plan and subsequent two annual plans 
considerable progress had been made in the areas of urban and rural water 
supply and also urban sanitation. The targets which were set for the end of 
the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1990) have, however, not been achieved at 
all, particularly in the area of urban and rural sanitation. At the same time, 
the planned outlays in central and state plans had been spent almost 100 
per cent. Apparently, the cost of implementation of the schemes had been 
seriously underestimated and the appeal to build with low-cost 
technologies had not been implemented. There were other lessons drawn 
which indicated the inadequate community participation, the weak linkage 
between water supply and sanitation and inadequate pricing systems. Was 
there any monitoring done by the central government? Apparently, the 
central government had little control over the states when they 
implemented centrally sponsored schemes. On the other hand, how 
seriously did state governments take the guidelines of the central 
government? Were they willing but unable to comply in the face of the 
harsh realities of under-equipped state government departments, poorly 
trained contractors and local governments lacking awareness? Or did the 
state governments take the central government guidelines for granted, and 
were unwilling to comply with such ambitious guidelines, so continued in 
their established practices? 
The fresh targets for the Eighth Five-Year Plan were fixed at a more 
modest level as compared to its ambitious predecessor. The plan also came 
with a number of new guidelines: urban local bodies should be enabled to 
levy water supply charges up to a level to cover - at least - the operation 
and maintenance costs; the involvement of the private sector in 
construction and maintenance of water supply was to be encouraged; state 
governments should not become responsible for operation and 
maintenance of water supply systems, but leave this responsibility to the 
urban local bodies; implementation of water supply and sanitation 
programmes were to be done in a decentralised manner with the 
involvement of the district administration, urban local bodies, NGOs and 
people; and municipal budgets should have separate allocations for 
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operation and maintenance of water supply and sanitation in order to 
ensure sufficient provision for these often neglected tasks. In line with the 
targets set for the rural water supply and sanitation sector, the budgets 
from the states and union territories were also increased in real terms. 
Particularly rural sanitation received a financial boost. 
The national Eight Five-Year Plan was replaced by the Ninth Five-
Year Plan (1997-2002) in April 1997. 
7.3 Intra-sector and inter-sector priorities in the national 
five-year plans 
Had the increasing urbanisation and the mounting problems of urban 
poverty been reflected in the above proportional increase in outlays in the 
consecutive five-year plans for this sector? Did the central government of 
India weigh its priorities between water supply and sanitation, urban 
development and housing? 
While the national five-year plans policy statements did not 
elaborate any shift in priorities, the outlays may indicate such shifts. The 
table 7-3 below provides an insight into the intra-sector and inter-sector 
budget priorities from the first five-year plan onward. The share of the 
housing and urban development sector as a whole has been fluctuating, 
mainly because of the redefinition and addition of sectors. For example, 
when the urban development sector was added the overall outlay improved 
in 1974 and helped in maintaining and expanding its share. The overall 
picture improved quite drastically when the rural and urban water supply 
sub-sector was added in 1980. However, when in 1992 rural water supply 
and sanitation was shifted to the Ministry for Rural Development and the 
Ministry of Social Welfare, the outlays reduced. As a result, the outlays for 
the whole sector shows a see-saw pattern. It is a typical pattern in policy 
making where issues lose ground over time in the political arena and, 
thereby, their budgetary share. One can observe here that the boost in 
allocation is to a large extent attributed to the expenditure in the water 
supply and sanitation sector alone, and, secondly, was a result of the 
international interest in this subject, as well as the pressure to match the 
available funds from multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies. 
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Excluding this particular outlay, the increase in outlay for the housing and 
urban development sector alone, would have been less dramatic and, in 
fact, would be lower than the increase in the total outlay. Table 7-3 also 
shows that the housing sub-sector in the subsequent five-year plans had 
been losing their share throughout. The figures between 1980-97 also 
indicate that the housing sector has been losing to the urban development 
sector while the water supply and sanitation sector have remained constant. 
The wish of the central government to allow the private sector to 
increasingly contribute to the housing production and to enhance the 
control on urban development by centrally sponsored schemes (IDSMT, 
NRY and UBSP) has resulted in this trade. 
So far only actual figures have been compared. Policy interventions 
only become significant if the outlay in real terms increases as well. Table 
7-4 provides a comparison between the outlays in real terms taking the 
Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74) as the base year18 and confirms that the 
addition of water supply and sanitation in the 1980s resulted in a multi-
fold jump in budget allocation as compared to the 1970s. In the second 
half of the 1980s when India's economy was under stress, the budget 
allocation to the whole sector stagnated and, in fact, lagged behind as 
compared to the increase of the total five-year plan outlay. Priorities were 
shifted to other sectors during this period. However, in the 1990s this was 
corrected and the housing and urban development sector received 
increased attention. 
7.4 The National Housing Policy (1992) 
In May 1992, a National Housing Policy was submitted to Parliament 
which was passed in August 1994. The Policy is in effect till today 
(September 1997). It postulated that despite considerable investment and 
continued efforts over successive periods, the housing problem continued 
to be daunting in terms of the large number of homeless households, rapid 
growth of slums and unauthorised colonies, spiralling prices and rents of 
land and houses, rampant speculation, deficient availability of water, etc. 
The discount factor, based on the CPI for urban non-manual employees, is for the 
outlay of the Fourth FY? 1.0, for the Fifth FYP 0.591, for the Sixth FYP 0.388, for the 
Seventh FYP 0.260, for the two Annual Plans 0.1685 and for the Eighth FYP 0.142. 
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The policy also observed the inadequate supply of affordable housing from 
both public and private sectors, and acute shortage of funds for the 
development of settlements and extension of city level infrastructure, 
which was aggravated by the institutional deficiencies of housing agencies 
and urban local bodies. The housing shortage in urban areas was estimated 
to be 10.4 million (1991) and 20.6 in rural areas. The requirement for 
upgradation and new construction over the Eighth Five-Year Plan period 
had been estimated at 249 million units, of which 106 million are in urban 
areas. It was realised that the bulk of this housing need should be built by 
the people themselves, while the Government should seek, to facilitate and 
create an environment where all the impediments to housing activity are 
removed. 
The National Housing Policy set itself the goal to 'reduce 
houselessness'. Other objectives were related to increasing the supply of 
land and finance, promoting appropriate energy saving and cost effective 
materials, assisting in upgradation of existing housing stock and provision 
of minimum basic services and amenities, and undertaking steps for 
improving the housing situation of the poorest sections and vulnerable 
groups by direct initiative and financial support of the state. These 
objectives were translated into a number of guidelines: housing norms 
should account for the regional and climatic differences and the needs of 
particular groups; forced relocation and eviction of slum dwellers should 
be avoided and in-situ upgradation and renovation should be encouraged; 
balanced development of urban centres in the states and increased supply 
of serviced land for various income groups, with a 'preponderant 
proportion for the poorer sections' (p. 7) should be aimed at; cumbersome 
procedures should be simplified and legal hurdles in land acquisition and 
in approval procedures for projects should be removed; and town planning 
laws and regulations should be revised. The Housing Policy also 
recommended utilisation of existing fiscal and taxation instruments to curb 
speculation of (vacant) land; to involve the private sector in financing and 
developing land; to increase investments by central and state government 
in the above policy areas and strengthen local government, as suggested by 
the National Commission for Urbanisation (1988); to introduce tax 
incentives and subsidies to stimulate renovation of existing housing stock; 
and to amend the rent control laws by state governments in order to 
improve and increase the dwindling rental housing stock. An increase in 
public housing finance to 20 per cent should be aimed for by strengthening 
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the existing housing finance institutions, mobilising household savings and 
private investments, and improving access to public housing finance. At 
the same time it was envisaged that the housing finance system as a whole 
becomes self-financing, reducing the share of subsidies. 
The National Housing Policy has been lauded as the first document 
in this area, underlining the government's commitment to address the need 
for housing and to articulate its policy directions. However, it has also 
been criticised from other sides. It has been alleged that the Policy is 
totally urban-industrial and profit-oriented, furthering the interests of 
builders and industry. 'It provides for the poor only insofar as they can fit 
into its plan of affordability' {Imprint, September, 1988, p. 30). While rural 
housing has so far been created from the ambient bio-mass and with little 
monetary inputs, the new Policy propagated the commercialisation and 
trading of construction materials such as wood, bamboo, etc. The Housing 
Policy did not adopt some of the more radical recommendations of the 
international and national fora19, where - for example - a house was 
proclaimed as a fundamental right. The Policy failed to indicate how 
elements, supportive to housing, such as infrastructure, electricity, 
telecommunication and transport, should be programmed and financed 
concurrently. This, in view of the current difficulties of co-ordination of 
the sectorally organised and separately operating state agencies. The 
proposed housing norms (e.g. 25 square meter for a plot) were not taking 
into account the difficulty of land acquisition, the current level of land 
prices and the affordability for the urban poor. Promotion of in-situ slum 
upgradation did not take account of the long legal procedures and court 
stay orders that private land-owners pursue to avoid declaration of such 
slums. Delay and obstruction of more beneficial use of such locations, 
imposes a high cost on alternatives (e.g. land purchase elsewhere in the 
locality) and hampers economic development at large. With regard to 
supply and management of land, the Policy did not take account of these 
harsh realities. Moreover, archaic laws and a corrupt official system 
continue to inhibit and obstruct the success of development efforts for a 
public cause while individuals benefit from the legal provisions of the 
Urban Land Ceiling Acts. The unfortunate outcome of this situation is the 
For example, the Bangkok Declaration on Sustainable Urban Development and 
Management in Asia and the Pacific, 2 November, 1993 and the resolutions adopted at 
the 25th Meeting of the Central Council of Local Government and Urban Development 
at New Delhi on 7 May, 1994. 
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wide spread imbroglio of land classification and registration (Mahadeva, 
1994, Kumar, 1994). 
The Policy did not address how, by whom and with what resources 
cheap, subsidised or free housing should be provided and, at the same 
time, proposing to increase self-financing housing schemes. The Policy 
did, in fact, imply a high degree of cross-subsidies within each housing 
project in favour of the poor which would load the middle income groups 
with an unreasonable proportion of the project cost. The Policy also 
remained silent about the widely known and accepted black money circuit 
in the housing sector. It is estimated that in recent years half to two-third of 
all investment in housing is black or unaccounted-for-money (Kumar, 
1994). After having outlined the long list of policies and intentions of the 
Government of India, the paragraph on the action places had put the 
responsibility of implementation with the state government without 
claiming any role for the central government and, thereby, leaving the 
interpretation and implementation of policy parameters to the whims and 
fancies of the state governments and their agencies. 
7.5 Review of national policies; concluding remarks 
The above analysis of the housing and urban development policies during 
the 1980s and 1990s in particular, invite a number of observations. 
First of all, there exists a long-lasting belief that the government will 
be able to determine urban development through investments, programmes 
and land and town planning policies. When state governments failed to 
make much headway in this area, the response of the central government 
was to introduce more schemes and directives to exert greater control. This 
response showed, however, an inconsistent pattern of 'advance and 
retreat'. In some five-year plans central government control advanced, 
such as in the sixth and seventh, and in others the control retreated, such as 
in the eighth. On the one hand, the central government tended to expand its 
influence onto the state government subjects by introducing schemes, 
finance and national legislation and, on the other hand, the overall policies 
for housing, land and urban development remained vague and lacked 
specific details. This left a large arena for the state governments to tamper 
with the policies and to accommodate the interests of existing political 
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powers. One such area is the linkages and co-ordination between the sub-
sectors of housing, centrally sponsored schemes, state town planning, 
water supply and sanitation which have remained weak. 
This belief of control in urban development was applicable to the 
central and state governments and not to the local governments. Since 
Independence, no faith has been placed in the local government to take 
shape. Only in the late 1980s, when it was realised that the state 
government would have insufficient capacity to control urban development 
and that it could not do without the local administration as partner, a 
legislation for decentralisation of powers was introduced. But again, the 
progress has been slow with the half-hearted pursuance of the central 
government. It took five years to pass the Nagarpalika Act and one can 
expect that the state governments will take longer to integrate the 
necessary changes into the various state acts related to urban local bodies. 
It has been observed in this chapter that the housing and urban 
development sector has not been able to secure its proportionate share in 
the consecutive five-year plans. Its decline in outlay, particularly in real 
terms, does not reflect the increasing urgency for interventions in this 
sector. The cause for this erosion must be found in the political history of 
post-Independent India. The pro- and anti-urban streams have been 
alternating in the political landscape throughout. Secondly, the urban 
sector is not a political entity and a power house in comparison to the 
industry, mine owners and the larger agriculturists. The urban sector is an 
amalgam of various groups of competing interests: small and large land 
owners, builders, financing institutions, business houses, academic groups, 
unions and the urban poor. As India's economic and financial policies are 
the outcome of demand politics, as argued by Shaw (1996), it is no wonder 
that the urban sector has not been able to protect its share and has only 
been able to gain when a new development area such as water supply and 
sanitation, and urban poverty alleviation and employment were put on the 
political agenda in the Lok Sabha. 
A serious impediment to growth of urban development policies is 
the lack of an adequate and uniform understanding about the dynamics of 
city growth. Especially the underlying economic forces and their impact on 
the spatial pattern of growth are little understood and many views and 
perceptions exist (K.P. Singh, 1994). In India, it is still the widespread 
view that urbanisation and the slumming of cities can be stopped by 
stimulating rural development and diverting migration streams to smaller 
cities by providing these urban areas with sufficient amenities and 
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services. The National Commission for Urbanization and the National 
Planning Commission also promulgate this view. In academic circles they 
have been criticised for their display of 'an amazing naivete in providing 
complex analysis of the problems and yet culminating in over-simplified 
programmatic solutions quite far removed from obtaining empirical 
realities, for confusing symptoms for causes and for turning symptoms into 
ends-in-themselves' (H.S. Verma in Misra and Narain (eds.), 1989, p. 60). 
The supply of a sufficient number of houses to particularly the lower 
income groups has been a concern from the First Five-Year Plan. The 
initial approach of the government was to construct houses that later 
changed to financing housing schemes of the established state housing 
agencies. Despite these efforts, the public sector production of houses 
contributed to not more than 1.5 per cent of the annual production. Since 
the mid-1980s, the central government has realised that by this method the 
gap between demand and supply will never be closed and the housing 
shortage will remain gigantic. This called for retracting from direct 
housing delivery and to facilitating housing delivery by the private sector. 
This, however, remained a paper policy. The central government has had 
few ideas on how this policy shift should take place and, moreover, little 
had been done in the sphere of de-regulation, tax and legal incentives. In 
fact, the central government continued to wait passively for the state 
government to not only implement their well intended policy 
recommendations, but also to give them flesh and bones. 
Efforts were continued when the National Housing Policy was 
drafted and was tabled in both houses in 1988. The Policy was a major 
improvement as compared to the previous five-year plan and gave 
direction to the Eighth Five-Year Plan in setting its priorities and 
programmes but again little additional support was provided to the state 
governments. Housing delivery has remained the responsibility of the 
housing finance institutions, the state housing and the slum clearance 
boards. The contradiction in the housing approach persists. On the one 
hand, the policy making central government calls for self-help, in-situ 
slum improvement and appropriate financial support systems and, on the 
other hand, the implementing housing institutions continue to spend the 
bulk of their money in conventional housing stock and clearing and 
demolishing of slums (Mehta and Mehta, 1989). 
Several central government schemes have been initiated as the 
government felt that the state governments were showing too little effort in 
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providing basic amenities to the urban (and rural) poor, in generating 
employment in diverting migration streams away from the larger 
metropolises. It cannot be ignored that these schemes had to carry a 
political message as well, i.e. to please the electorate at the lower end of 
the income scale. State governments did not object to such endeavours and 
obliged as much as possible. The schemes for the Integrated Development 
of Small and Medium Towns and the Minimum Needs Programme were 
launched in the 1970s and more were started in the late 1980s and early 
1990s: the Nehru Rojgar Yojana, the Urban Basic Services for the Urban 
Poor and the Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation and 
Liberation of Scavengers. In the coming chapters these schemes will be 
further discussed.. 
A final remark is required at this point. There is a distinct ambiguity 
in the control that the central government wants to exert over the state 
governments in implementing national policies and programmes that are 
constitutionally state subjects: housing, town planning and urban 
development. The national policy documents and five-year plans observe 
repeatedly negative trends and shortcomings of the implemented policies 
and also identify adequate strategies to overcome these shortcomings. The 
Seventh and Eighth Five-Year Plans, the National Commission on 
Urbanisation and the National Housing Policy are examples of this. 
Despite such observations no clear policy guidelines or reforms were 
offered that would induce proposed policy changes. The main cause of this 
ambiguity, in my view, is the lack of political courage and fear of 
confrontation. Central government institutions do not want to embarrass 
their political masters, the ministers and the Cabinet, for fear of personal or 
départemental retaliation and the Cabinet would not like to endanger the 
feeble centre-state political balance. An over-ambitious central 
government may give wrong messages to the states and invite strong 
political reactions. The delicate political centre-state relations results in a 
central government that articulates paper policies and makes half-hearted 
attempts to make an impact on urban development by fragmented and 
laboratory-scale schemes. The situation at the state governments level and 
in Karnataka in particular, will be discussed in the following chapters. 
8 
Overview of Karnataka's Housing and Urban 
Development Policies 
Although the central government has aimed to provide guidance and 
direction through policy statements and guidelines, central government 
plan funds and centrally sponsored schemes, housing and urban 
development continues to be constitutionally a state subject. It can be 
expected that this subject receives expression in articulated state policy 
statements and guidelines, plan allocations, programmes and schemes and 
a matching organisational set-up suitable to implement these properly. In 
the following sections, the policies and programmes as laid down in the 
five-year plans and other documents are discussed. 
8.1 Early state five-year plans up to 1980 
It is not surprising that in a planned and predominantly agricultural 
economy with a socialist tradition, the irrigation and power sectors alone 
comprise of more than 50 per cent of the total outlay of the Fourth Five-
Year Plan (1969-74). The agricultural production, roads and education 
sectors come a poor second. Surprisingly, the other pillar of socialist 
inspired planned economies, large and medium industries, received only 
2.6 per cent of the total outlay. These sectors put together constitute 69 per 
cent of the total budget provision in the plan and illustrate a strong focus 
on rural development. 
Despite the 'conspicuous growth' in the 1970s, concern was 
expressed about the disappointing employment development in the 
primary sector. In fact, a decline in employment was observed in the 
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sectors of agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying sectors. 
Manufacturing, trade and commerce were the only sectors that showed 
some growth. It was no coincidence that rural-urban migration in 
Karnataka set in during the early 1970s with Bangalore acting as a major 
magnet for job-seekers. The response was typical for this era with the 
government playing a strong role in steering the economy. In total, 29 
schemes were launched aiming to generate employment and income under 
the Special Employment Programme. 
Housing and urban development, received an allocation of only 0.86 
per cent. During the period 1969-74 it was the only sector that exceeded 
the outlay considerably and was at the end of the plan period 3.3 per cent 
of the final state provision. The perception of housing and urban 
development in the Fourth Five-Year Plan was straightforward and 
sectoral: conventional housing schemes, water supply and drainage 
schemes, and the preparation of master plans by the planning authorities. 
There was no reference to other policies for industry or major 
infrastructure development or any mention of alternative housing 
approaches such as slum upgradation and improvement. The latter had 
already caught the attention of the national Planning Commission and 
several World Bank aided schemes were started in Bombay and Madras. 
Such concepts had apparently not arrived as yet in Karnataka. 
As far as water supply, sewerage and drainage are concerned, the 
early five-year plans had given priority to schemes in rural areas and in 
small urban settlements with a population of up to 20,000. The actual 
progress of these scheme had been disappointing. While 61 schemes were 
planned at the cost of Rs. 40 million, only 12 schemes were implemented 
in five years. The state capital Bangalore could no longer rely on local 
ground and surface water sources, so the Cauvery Water Supply Stage I 
Project was sanctioned at a cost of Rs. 90 million that was more than 
double the amount for the rest of urban Karnataka. This project would 
pump water from the Cauvery river to Bangalore through a pipeline for a 
distance of about 100 km. As far as the achievements for housing during 
the Fourth Five-Year Plan period are concerned, it fell short of the target of 
17,500 by nearly 2,000 units. 
In 1977, the state government created the department of Housing 
and Urban Development to strengthen the co-ordination between the 
various housing and water supply agencies. The new department was 
separated from the Health Department and merged with the Municipal 
Administration Department. 
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The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-79) underlined the national 
development objectives and repeated the concern for employment in the 
state: 'Therefore, the new development strategy must be one of 
development and more employment' (Fifth Five-Year Plan 1974-79, p. 
46). Employment would become a major objective of planning and could 
no longer be treated as a secondary objective. A major implication of this 
principle was a better land use and cropping pattern. It was also the onset 
of a drastic land re-distribution policy that has yet had no equal in India. In 
comparison to the earlier five-year plans, the Fifth Five-Year Plan was 
more liberal in approach and saw the role of government at a macro-
economic level, intervening and guiding the market. The state government 
acknowledged the intra-state imbalances that required special programmes 
for providing better infrastructure, education, medical facilities, nutrition, 
roads, etc. A dominant presence of the state government was to be 
maintained in the strategic sectors of power, irrigation and communication. 
Almost 50 per cent of the outlay went into these sectors alone. Another 18 
per cent went to agriculture and allied activities. 
The development in the late 1970s shows a few important trends that 
are relevant to this study. While the average income growth kept pace with 
the national average, the investments in the power sector lagged behind the 
increasing demand for power. As a result of power cuts, the growth was 
disappointing in those sectors that rely heavily on power, e.g. steel and 
iron ore. Moreover, the regional disparity between 1971 and 1979 did not 
change despite the development policies that were initiated. The northern 
districts of Gulbarga and Bidar remained backward, while Bangalore and 
the coastal districts were in the economic forefront. 
Housing, water supply, sewerage and urban development were to 
support two objectives of the Fifth Five-Year Plan. On the one hand, to 
serve economic growth by providing physical and social infrastructure 
and, on the other hand, to serve social welfare by providing 'basic 
amenities of nutritious food, housing, elementary education, drinking 
water and medical facilities and to improve the quality of social service 
and upgrade standards' (ibid., p. 59). Unfortunately, there was no further 
explanation of this ambiguous relationship. The criteria for efficacy and 
effectiveness, or specific targets and indicators for performance were not 
provided. Objectives were translated into schemes, departments created 
and budgets allocated with vague notions of how objectives should be 
translated into targets. Once formulated, physical targets were a sufficient 
yard-stick to obtain political and budgetary support. In this five-year plan 
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the targets were set by the physical achievements of previous plan periods. 
To what extent the new targets contributed to the achievements of the 
plan's objectives remained a remote concern. 
A considerable amount (Rs. 1,160 million) was marked to the 
predominantly rural welfare scheme the Minimum Needs Programme. The 
Minimum Needs Programme included electrification, roads, education, 
mid-day meals, primary health, nutrition, house sites for landless 
agricultural workers, rural water supply, house sites and improvement of 
(urban) slums. Housing and urban development received 3.85 per cent (Rs. 
520 million) of the state outlay, an improvement from the previous five-
year plan. Urban development received Rs. 70 million and housing Rs. 450 
million. The housing sector included rural housing with Rs. 120 million 
and part of the Minimum Needs Programme. Water supply received a 
share of 5.63 per cent (Rs. 760 million) of which half also went to the 
Minimum Needs Programme. In fact, the budget share for water supply, 
sewerage and drainage had been increased and consisted of Rs. 230 million 
for urban Karnataka and Rs. 100 million for Bangalore water supply which 
was to finance the next stages of the Cauvery Water Supply Project. 
The proliferation of slums received considerable attention in the 
Fifth Five-Year Plan and various measures were announced to, on the one 
hand, improve the living conditions and, on the other hand, to clear the 
slums and to provide alternative housing for the slum dwellers. The 
improvement of slums was supported by the Minimum Needs Programme 
in cities with a population of more than 300,000 and by the central 
government Scheme for Environmental Improvement of Slums in cities 
having a population of more than 800,000. For the latter scheme, 
Bangalore was the only city to qualify in Karnataka. The state government 
had also made a budget provision for slum improvement and clearance in 
cities between 100-300,000. Slum improvement and clearance in smaller 
cities did not feature in this plan. The creation of a separate agency was 
announced for handling slum improvement and clearance schemes. To 
enhance Orderly urban development' the Town Planning Department 
received an increased budget to prepare additional urban master plans and 
to establish new urban and town planning authorities in the larger urban 
agglomerations. 
The central government increased the funds for specific schemes 
(centrally sponsored schemes) and decreased the general budget support of 
the development sectors (central sector schemes). This indicated that the 
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central government aimed at a greater control of the development policies 
of the state government. 
In the following sections, the policy documents are discussed that 
pertain to the period of study of this research: 1980-94. 
8.2 Sixth State Five-Year Plan 1980-85 
The Fifth Five-Year Plan was terminated early as political conflicts within 
the Cabinet and with the central government led to the stepping down of 
the Chief Minister Devaraj Urs (Congress (I)) in 1978. A period of two 
years followed in which economic planning was done on the basis of 
annual plans. In 1980, the Sixth Five-Year Plan was approved. The plan 
paid elaborate attention to the population growth which was seen as the 
root cause for unemployment, urbanisation and the proliferation of slums. 
Development was further impeded by the skewed educational system, by 
imbalances in the transport sector, the power crisis, lack of attention to 
rural areas and agriculture and irrigation. The plan also observed that the 
proliferation of slums in Bangalore was caused by the migration of jobless 
people from neighbouring states (Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh1). The 
authors pleaded for a national approach to stop the migration process and 
to provide more services in rural areas through the Minimum Needs 
Programme. The Sixth Five-Year Plan did not conceal the omnipresent 
conflict between the central government led by Indira Gandhi 
(Congress(I)) and the Karnataka Government led by Chief Minister Gundu 
Rao (Janata Party). The plan appealed for greater autonomy and lesser 
central government interference. 
The larger schemes implemented in the 1970s provided a couple of 
lessons: they took too long, they had considerable cost overruns, they 
benefited usually the better off, and did not achieve adequate cost 
recovery. Moreover, too much priority was attached to the large projects at 
the cost of smaller ones which had created an imbalance in infrastructure 
development. The responsible institutions focused too much on the 
The southern States in India were struck by a drought in the second half of the 1970s 
and as result many impoverished farmers and agricultural workers migrated to the larger 
cities. Bangalore was one that received hundreds of thousands of migrants from Tamil 
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and other districts in Karnataka that relied on rain-fed 
agriculture. 
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creation of assets and large scale projects, and failed to maintain the assets 
properly. Greater priority should have been given to reserve funds for 
maintenance. For the first time, the inadequate financial and personnel 
capacity of institutions was addressed. 
The main objectives of the Sixth Five-Year Plan were focused on 
employment and had a classic socialist outlook on intervention in the 
economy: increased arable and irrigated land and industrial capacity 
through creation of infrastructure and power, reduced inequality and 
redistributed agriculture land, to attain self-sufficiency, and to maintain a 
broad package of social welfare, health, nutrition, public distribution and 
poverty alleviation programmes. The Government of Karnataka was 
constrained, however, by paucity of funds and the desired economic 
growth rate of seven per cent per annum was not attained. 
Housing, urban development, water supply and sewerage were 
implicitly understood to support economic growth and also to maintain a 
broad package of social welfare measures that alleviated the worst 
symptoms of urbanisation. Earlier, broad objectives were translated into 
schemes subsequently assigned to and implemented by government 
agencies. Schemes had a certain degree of comprehension and 
exclusiveness in order to avoid overlap and duplication. In this five-year 
plan, however, the schemes seemed to support the expansion and 
proliferation of the implementing state agencies. The key role of the 
Planning Department seemed to have diminished and they no longer 
prescribed the schemes that best served the development objectives and 
left this interpretation to the executive agencies. While there was a vague 
notion of objective-driven formulation of schemes which served as a 
justification of the operation of the government machinery, this had 
transformed into a agency-driven formulation of schemes. 
Urban development 
The chapter on urban development had two distinct sections: improvement 
of slums by the KSCB and town planning by the Town Planning 
Department. The plan failed to explain how these activities were supposed 
to be related and what policy framework would guide the departments' 
annual and five-year plans. Both sections were disconnected, written by 
different authors with obviously different backgrounds and perceptions. 
Apparently, nowhere in the plan preparation were there checks on the 
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existence of policy framework or - at least - shared priorities and 
approaches, the consistency in rationale, justification, presentation and 
structure. For example, the Slum Clearance Board needed a mere one and 
half page to justify an allocation of Rs. 227 million, while the Planning 
Department explained in five pages an outlay of just Rs. 12.5 million. 
Urban problems were explained in the section by the Karnataka 
Slum Clearance Board, as the problems of slums which 'are highly 
congested and unfit for human habitation because of their un-hygienic and 
unsanitary [conditions - hm] in view of their low-lying and un-drainable 
conditions' (ibid., p. 521). 'Hence, they are now proposed to be cleared by 
forming new layouts with proper developed plan', was the conclusion. But 
little had been done about unsanitary conditions due to the lack of staff and 
funds. The newly gained insights and approaches of slum improvements 
and upgradation in the national five-year plans had not trickled down to 
the state level and the Slum Clearance Board. 'Environmental 
improvement', a major component of the Board's activities, was, thus, 
understood as 'sanitary improvement'. Ten years after its constitution, the 
Karnataka Slum Clearance Board had constructed 4,194 tenements at the 
cost of Rs. 34.5 million. In 458 slums, environmental improvements had 
been made at the cost of Rs. 56.8 million benefiting 398,000 slum 
dwellers. This figure compared favourably with the approximately 20,000 
slum dwellers who had obtained a house through the Karnataka Slum 
Clearance Board between 1975-85. 
The rather unrefined section on the problems and solutions of slums, 
was followed by the section on urban planning and the operations of the 
planning department and the improvement boards. The focus was quite 
different and disregarded the ugly urban scenes of slums and urban chaos. 
This section concentrated on the noble task of planning and developing 
new areas on the basis of regional and urban master plans. Also here it was 
argued that more staff and funds will bring about better and planned urban 
development The Planning Department was fast expanding and seven 
more planning units were to start operations during this period. Annual 
reports between 1980-85 showed indeed that for the 25 town planning 
areas, outline development plans and comprehensive development plans 
were prepared which went through the different stages of provisional 
approval, revisions and final approvals. 
The Sixth Five-Year Plan had not anticipated the initiation of the 
centrally sponsored scheme for the Integrated Development of Small and 
Medium Towns (IDSMT) in 1979. Ad-hoc provisions had, thus, to be 
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made in annual budgets in order to contribute the state's share of 50 per 
cent. The Town Planning Department was entrusted with the preparation of 
project reports. This seemed a logical choice as the development of small 
and medium towns was to be conceived in the regional context of 
economic development. Between 1980-85, sixteen small and medium 
towns were selected, and project reports prepared, sanctioned and moneys 
released. Rs. 37.2 million was spent at the end of this period which was 
approximately half the amount released by the central government. 
Progress had thus been slow. 
The fate of urban local governments, a key-theme in the report of 
the Task Force in 1979, was not addressed in this plan. Their weakening 
financial position, their loss of a major source of income in 1979 (octroi) 
was not worthy of mention. In September 1980, however, a commission 
was established to study the financial position of local bodies, to 
recommend certain changes in the existing revenue system and to propose 
delegation of powers. While the 'Committee is expected to submit its 
report shortly' (Annual Report Housing and Urban Development 
Department, 1980-81, p. 3), it took six years before an official report was 
published. In fact, the recommendations of the commission were submitted 
in 1983 and kept 'under active consideration of the Government' (Annual 
Report Housing and Urban Development Department, 1982-83, p. 2). This 
did not lead to any decision or resolution and a new commission was 
formed in 1983. This so-called Local Finance Commission published their 
report after another three years in 1986. Its content will be discussed 
below. In 1980, the Government had the establishing of the Directorate of 
Municipal Administration (DMA) 'under examination'. The Directorate 
was to become a nodal agency and facilitator in the proper administration, 
development and strengthening of urban local bodies, a responsibility that 
rested with the district and divisional commissioners. In 1985, the DMA 
was established and a separate act was enacted that bifurcated some of the 
powers of these commissioners in favour of the newly established agency. 
After the octroi was abolished in 1979, the municipalities received 
octroi compensation in two instalments per year, often towards the end of 
the financial year. Annually, the compensation was increased by 10 per 
cent. This increase was at par with the Consumer Price Index (urban non-
manual employees) in this period. The functioning of the local 
governments was further weakened when in 1980 the state government 
superseded the councils and corporations in preparation for new municipal 
elections. While it was planned to conduct elections in 1981, the Janata 
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government delayed the elections until 1983. During this period, 
municipalities were governed by administrators, for example, by the local 
deputy commissioner or divisional commissioner. The postponement of 
municipal elections had political overtones: the ruling party at the state 
government did not like to be disturbed or challenged by vibrant local 
politics, demanding enforcement of law and order, and draining party 
resources for election activities. Urban areas were also known to be 
Congress strongholds as compared with rural areas. 
Housing 
The section on housing was the domain of the Karnataka Housing Board 
where little perspective or a policy framework was offered. Secondly, the 
section also failed to explain how it related to or co-ordinated with the 
work of the Slum Clearance Board and the Planning Department The 
actual housing policy took the form of a rich palette of housing schemes 
with different target groups and modalities which included: 
1. The People's Housing Scheme was initiated in 1973-74 as a state 
government scheme, aimed at predominantly rural poor. From 1978, 
financial support was provided by the HUDCO and other banks 
joined in 1980. The houses were constructed at a cost of Rs. 3,000 of 
which Rs. 1,500 is a subsidy, Rs. 1,000 a loan and Rs. 500 the 
beneficiary contribution. A special arrangement was made to allow 
house owners to re-construct or improve their houses at a cost of Rs. 
1,500. This component became known as the Experimental Low-
Housing Scheme; 
2. The scheme House Sites to Landless Labourers in Rural Areas was 
initiated in 1972-73. The scheme was an erstwhile central government 
scheme which became a purely state government scheme; 
3. The scheme Housing for the Urban Poor also called the 
Bhagyamandira Scheme, was initiated in 1979-80. It is a state 
government scheme that included both low-cost houses for the 
economic weaker section at a cost of Rs. 3,000 and the improvement 
and development of existing housing stock at the cost of Rs. 2,500. 
Financial and implementation arrangements were on the lines of the 
People's Housing Scheme; 
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4. The scheme House Sites to Weaker Sections in Urban Areas was 
initiated in 1979-80 and is a state government scheme; 
5. The scheme Residential Quarters for Village Level Functionaries was 
initiated in 1980-81 and is also a state government scheme, 
implemented by the Karnataka Housing Board with funds from the 
HUDCO; 
6. The Construction of Houses in Tribal Areas under the People's 
Housing Schemes was initiated in 1979-80 and is also a state 
government scheme; and 
7. The Special Component Plan for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes is not a scheme but a policy of the state government to earmark 
43 per cent of the funds available for the above mentioned schemes 
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
The total outlay for the above schemes was about Rs. 800 million. The 
efforts by the Karnataka Housing Board for the rural and urban poor were 
confined to the People's Housing Scheme and the Bhagyamandira Scheme. 
The maximum unit cost for these schemes proved to be a continuous issue 
of debate and the Board succeeded twice in increasing the ceiling for 
housing construction to Rs. 5,000 in 1985. Increasing cost of building 
materials and very low margins were the main reasons to pursue an 
increase while affordability seemed to be a lesser concern. There was no 
mention of financial viability, affordability, demand and need assessment, 
cost recovery, or success and failures of projects. The schemes seemed to 
be initiated with an intrinsic objective and implemented without any 
reflection on economics, finance, need satisfaction and effectiveness. A 
rough estimate shows that during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85), the 
massive People's Housing and Bhagyamandira Schemes delivered a 
staggering 423,100 improved or newly constructed houses at an average 
unit cost of Rs. 2,403. In comparison, the Board had constructed during the 
same period only 21,005 conventional housing units at an average 
expenditure of Rs. 22,780 per house. 
In 1980, ten cities in Karnataka had an improvement board. The 
improvement boards required no financial assistance from the state 
government as their projects were financed from the HUDCO and by 
commercial loans, from revenues from sales of land and houses and from 
development charges incurred on the owners of developed sites. The 
improvement boards were not mentioned in this plan while they could 
have had a role in shaping Karnataka's housing and urban development 
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policy. Apparently, this five-year plan served as an exercise to claim 
available budgets and less as a policy statement for and by any department. 
Water supply and sewerage 
The water supply and sewerage section referred to the United Nations' 
Water Conference in 1977 and the declaration of the decade 1980-90 as the 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. It was 
estimated that approximately Rs. 150 billion would be required to attain a 
minimum service level for all people in the country. The targets which 
were set by the central government are given in table 8-1. 
Table 8-1: National targets for rural and urban water supply and 
sanitation for 1990 
Sector Targeted coverage in the year 1990 
Urban water supply 100% 
Urban sanitation 80% 
Rural water supply 100% 
Rural sanitation 25% 
Source: Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-85, Government of Karnataka (1980). 
Little more needs to be said as far as targets are concerned. Whether they 
were realistic and attainable was another matter on which the state 
government did not dare to comment. Apparently, and as usually is the 
case, politically inspired targets are less applicable for pragmatic 
considerations. In the Sixth Five-Year Plan these objectives have been 
translated into a number of schemes: open dug wells, borewells and 
handpumps, piped water supply, sanitation, research and development. In 
Karnataka, these programmes were to be implemented by the district 
administration, the sub-district administration (talukas) and by the Public 
Health Engineering Department (PHE). Bi-lateral assistance was also 
'Sewerage' and 'sanitation' are interchanged indiscriminately in the Plan documents. 
However, in the technical literature that refers to Asian countries, 'sewerage' means the 
underground network of sewers leading to a sewage treatment plant. 'Sanitation' is a 
broader concept that includes sewerage and also pit-latrines, vault-latrines, septic tanks 
and other on-site and off-site technical options. 
160 Urban Development in Kamataka 
secured from the Danish Government. The Kamataka Water Supply and 
Drainage Board had submitted a proposal to the central government for the 
amount of Rs. 2,856 million (Annual Report Housing and Urban 
Development Department, 1980-81). However, no support had come from 
the central government. Apparently, the central government considered it 
sufficient to announce national goals and leave the mobilisation of funds 
and implementation to the state governments. 
The plans of the Kamataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board were presented separately with an outlay of Rs. 322 million, divided 
over different schemes. The bulk of this amount was meant for urban water 
supply schemes for cities and towns with a population between 20,000-
50,000. As many municipalities proved incapable of maintaining the 
schemes, the state government appointed the Board to maintain the 
schemes after construction. By 1985, the Board maintained 21 water 
supply schemes and 3 underground drainage schemes. The initial 
enthusiasm disappeared over the years and was replaced by a concern for 
losses and a lack of staff. 
Though being outside the scope of this research, it is important to 
mention the proposed activities in this plan of the Bangalore Water Supply 
and Sewerage (BWSSB). The Cauvery Water Supply Stage II Scheme for 
Bangalore was sanctioned in 1979 at a cost of Rs. 555 million and planned 
for completion in 1982. This target was indeed achieved and the water 
works were put into operation in November 1982. The construction of 
some smaller components continued throughout the Sixth Five-Year Plan 
period and the total expenses increased to Rs. 580 million in 1985. The 
plan commented that the Cauvery Stage II did not satisfy the water supply 
needs of the rapidly expanding city and Stage III of the Project was 
proposed. The project was estimated at a cost of Rs. 1,500 million and an 
outlay of Rs. 350 million was required under this plan. This amount 
exceeded the outlay for the rest of urban water supply in Kamataka and 
illustrates the high priority the state government attached to this basic 
service in the capital. Moreover, the estimate was corrected in 1982 and re-
set at Rs. 2,400 million with a state government contribution of Rs. 800 
million. The state government gave the administrative sanction in June 
1984 while negotiations with the World Bank for a loan of Rs. 800 million 
were not yet completed. As a result, no activities for the Cauvery Water 
Supply Stage III started between 1980-85. 
The section on water supply and sewerage did not provide a 
reflection of an overall policy for achieving any particular targets, e.g. the 
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national target adopted for the International Water Supply and Sanitation 
Decade. It appears that the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board and the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board were more 
concerned with securing sufficient funds for the proposed schemes. 
Priorities between metropolitan, small and medium towns and rural 
agglomerations were not made or based on, for example, backlog or 
deprivation. 
8.3 Seventh State Five-Year Plan 1985-90 
The Seventh Five-Year Plan 1985-90 started off with the observation that 
'despite three decades of planned development, Karnataka's economy has 
become increasingly stagnant' (Seventh Five-Year Plan, 1985, p. 5). 
Particularly the agricultural sector had lagged behind as compared to the 
national picture, and income levels had fallen in real terms since 1974. The 
considerable investments in irrigation had not resulted in commensurate 
growth in the agricultural output. Rural poverty had remained a disturbing 
effect of a stagnating economy. The plan offered two explanations; under-
consumption as a result of severe unequal income distribution, and, 
secondly, wrongly directed and ineffective public investments not 
contributing to increased economic output. However, the authors admitted 
that they did not have a conclusive explanation. The industrial and 
manufacturing sectors had remained robust and had shown satisfactory 
growth. Critical push-pull factors had, thus, continued to trigger rural-
urban migration. The Seventh Plan was equally straightforward in 
admitting that there was an inadequate understanding of the urbanisation 
process. The urban policy interventions were found to be 'unconscious, 
partial, uncoordinated and negative' (ibid., p. 28). In this context the 
Industrial Policy Resolution of 1983 was discussed. The Resolution stated 
that the over-concentration of industries in Bangalore were to be avoided 
and that financial incentives were to be established to disperse industries 
throughout the state. The plan raised doubts about the desirability of this 
policy as it might discourage industries to come to Karnataka altogether 
while Bangalore offered them the advantages of good regional linkages, 
supply, retail, service and labour markets. While the plan raised essential 
policy issues, it failed to draw a definite conclusion or to decide for a 
concrete policy intervention. 
162 Urban Development in Karnataka 
In contrast to the analytical and critical approach toward the existing 
economic problems, the objectives of the Seventh Plan resembled the 
rhetoric of political manifestos: accelerating the growth of the state's 
economy; alleviating poverty and other acute forms of deprivation; 
reinforcing the provision of social goods and services; reducing 
inequalities by providing economic opportunity for socially disadvantaged 
groups; and consolidating the efforts of past investments by emphasising 
productivity and efficiency. No particular mention was made of taking 
away the structural weaknesses of the economy: power, transport, and low 
investment levels in agriculture, industry and manufacturing. Nor did it 
address the earlier critical factors of unequal income distribution, and 
wrongly directed and ineffective public investments. 
Water supply and sewerage 
The Plan observed that during 1980-85 commendable efforts had been 
made to achieve the targets of the Water Supply and Sanitation Decade. 
Some 82,000 borewells and 2,800 piped water supply schemes had been 
completed. Despite these achievements 'the state government is still far 
away from the objective of providing an adequate supply of drinking water 
in rural areas, defined as one borewell for a population of 250' (ibid., p. 
408). The authors reviewed the efforts of the KUWS&DB and BWSSB 
and expressed their doubts about the ability to achieve full cost-recovery. 
The legitimacy of accepting a high level of subsidy for capital intensive 
schemes needed to be reviewed, such as the Cauvery Water Supply 
Scheme for Bangalore in view of the needs and deprivation of water 
supply elsewhere. However, these essential observations did not result into 
any other policy direction, the setting of different priorities or investment 
allocation. On the contrary, the concentration of investments in larger 
urban agglomeration was continued and was justified by suggesting that 
Bangalore was likely to continue to be the industrial nerve centre of the 
state. The available resources were, thus, spread once more over the Public 
Health Engineering Department schemes (borewells and water supply in 
rural areas), the KUWS&DB (for urban water supply schemes) and the 
BWSSB (Cauvery Water Supply Schemes). The plan also stated that the 
'major shift in the investment thrust will therefore be on adequately 
providing the Cauvery Stage III Project for Bangalore City' (ibid., p. 410). 
The balance of power and rate of success in securing funds had apparently 
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tilted towards the BWSSB. Despite the fact that more than 50 per cent of 
urban Karnataka lived outside Bangalore, the BWSSB had been able to 
secure a disproportionate share of the available budget and received an 
outlay of Rs. 2,100 million. The KUWS&DB received only Rs. 885 
million. The hints of the authors for a reconsideration of priorities had 
fallen on deaf ears. The proximity to the political masters in Bangalore, the 
more senior and influential commissioners and chairmen of the BWSSB 
were instrumental in creating a skewed distribution of state government 
funds for urban water supply. 
It was for the first time that the five-year plan presented financial 
computations of a major scheme like the Cauvery Stage III Bangalore 
Water Supply Project. The project would break-even if a water tariff of Rs. 
2.25 per 1000 litres and a sewerage cess of 20 per cent was introduced. 
However, the subsequent annual reports showed that these tariff changes 
had not been made and the water tariff remained at Rs. 1.63 per 1000 litre 
up to the year 1995. Stage III was sanctioned in 1984 and the first 
construction work started in 1985. While the project was to be completed 
by 1987, the construction period was adjusted from three to six years 
shortly after the start of the project and was now to be completed in 1991. 
In 1986, the estimate was revised increasing the total project cost from Rs. 
555 million to Rs. 800 million. The World Bank withdrew from the 
negotiations for a loan as they could not be convinced by the government 
that the project was financially viable. They had noticed that the increase 
in water tariff had insufficient political support and would make the project 
highly dependent on government subsidy. Both the increased project cost 
and the delayed tariff increases implied that, at least, two-third of the 
construction cost had to be covered by a state government grant, 
amounting to approximately Rs. 700 million3. After the Bank's 
withdrawal, other - less scrupulous - financial institutions were to fund the 
estimated Rs. 800 million.. 
The responsibility for the maintenance of schemes by the 
KUWS&DB increased to 32 water supply schemes and four underground 
drainage schemes. The budget provisions for this function was exceeded. 
3
 Based on the continued water tariff of Rs. 1.63 per 1000 litres, a seven-year 
construction period for Stage III and an average cost escalation of 15 per cent per 
annum. Due to increases in prices for construction materials and time overruns in the 
planned construction time, the estimated revenues cover not more than one-third of the 
expenditures. Not included are backlog in collection and non-collection from 
consumers. 
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For example, in the year 1986-87 the expenditure amounted to Rs. 21.4 
million while the provision was less than half of this amount. 
Housing 
The housing chapter in the Seventh Five-Year Plan offered a concise 
analysis of the shortcomings of the public sector to provide housing. The 
freeze of rents at 1961 levels by the Karnataka Rent Control Act had 
discouraged house owners to let out houses for rents, developers to build 
rental housing and owners to maintain their properties at an acceptable 
level. Moreover, it was not evident that the act protected tenants 
effectively from 'rapacious landlords'. The liberal exemptions under the 
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, and the limitations for housing 
societies to acquire and develop large areas of land was observed as 
another damper on housing investment. The authors also observed that the 
local bylaws4 did not allow for low-cost and incremental housing which 
would suit the urban poor better. The required finance for meeting the 
housing needs outstripped several times the total central and state 
government funds. They concluded that a different finance system was 
required which could utilise local savings for financing loan carrying 
housing schemes. Moreover, the financially weak and understaffed 
improvement boards did not allow schemes to be taken up on a large scale. 
The Land Acquisition Act made the acquisition process lengthy, riddled 
with court cases and litigations, disputes about compensations, etc. There 
was also insufficient insight in the need for housing. Housing programmes 
should be based on effective demand (i.e. demand by purchasing power). 
As a panacea, the state government was asked to resort to 'creating 
conditions which induce greater private sector activity in housing' (ibid., 
p. 418) and in the distribution of house sites. Recommendations were made 
for decentralising finance and mortgage systems, changing of building 
bylaws or establishing partnerships with the formal-informal sector. 
However, the authors were apologetic in the face of the many constraints 
and stated that there were 'very limited resources available under the Plan 
for house construction' (ibid., p. 419). No further attention was paid to the 
analysis presented in later sections. The number of Karnataka Housing 
4
 Bylaws which prescribe 3' and 5' off-sets from the boundary of the plot to the building 
and bylaws for floor area per square feet of plot. 
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Board schemes were continued and increased and the Board was not forced 
to implement the recommendations. 
The People's Housing Scheme and the Bhagyamandira Scheme 
continued to be the main activity for the rural and urban poor. The cost 
ceiling was increased twice and raised from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 8,000. While 
the ceiling cost was increased by a factor 2.7 since 1980, the Consumer 
Price Index increased by a factor of 2.2. By 1990 and at the end of the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan, the earlier commendable achievements of the two 
mass housing schemes during the Sixth Five-Year Plan could not be 
equalled. The progress of the by the HUDCO financed housing schemes 
and the experimental low-cost housing scheme, two components of the 
Peoples' Housing Scheme, had reduced to two-third. The progress of other 
components of the People's Housing Scheme and the Bhagyamandira 
Scheme had been disappointing; only one-seventh of the achievements of 
the Sixth Five-Year Plan period. With regard to the conventional housing 
schemes, the Karnataka Housing Board had maintained its progress 
constructing 17,573 houses at an average expenditure of Rs. 45,439 per 
house during this period. This was a remarkable achievement as compared 
to the target of 9,230 EWS, LIG and MIG houses. Considering the 
disappointing achievements in the area of cheap mass housing, on the one 
hand, the remarkable achievements and the strong upward price trend in 
the area of conventional housing during this period, on the other hand, it 
appeared that the Karnataka Housing Board had lost sight of its mission: 
housing for the urban (and rural) low-income groups. Bui worse was still 
to come. 
Slum improvement and the work of the Karnataka Slum Clearance 
Board (KSCB) were briefly addressed in the five-year plan. The progress 
figures over the past plan period did not refer to earlier targets. The 
following annual reports showed that the Board constructed 3,220 
tenements between 1985-90 at an average cost of Rs. 17,547 which is one-
third of the planned construction of 10,700 tenements. However, the outlay 
of Rs. 50 million was depleted and also exceeded. The Board's 
construction of tenements did not only fell short of what was planned, but 
built at a cost that raised doubts about the affordability for the ultimate 
beneficiaries. Moreover, only half of the 7,414 tenements constructed 
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since inception of the Board in 1975 had been distributed5 to the urban 
poor. The other halfwas still in need of basic services such as water supply 
and electricity. As far as slum improvement was concerned, another 310 
slums were improved at the cost of Rs. 37.5 million benefiting 440,000 
slum dwellers. 
Urban development 
Contrary to the earlier plan, the section on urban development addressed 
the financial position of urban local bodies which had not allowed for 
adequate development of infrastructure without government subsidy. A 
solution for this deteriorating situation was, however, not offered and 
hopes were vested on the outcome of the work that was done by the Local 
Bodies Finance Commission. Their report was submitted in 1986 and no 
mention had been made in any of the annual reports of the Housing and 
Urban Development Department in this period. One may conclude that 
little had been done with the Commission's report. The financial position 
of municipalities showed little improvement during this period. The per 
capita income in real terms increased only slightly. In 1988, the term of 
most elected municipal councils and corporations was completed and as a 
consequence, the state government superseded the councils and 
corporations and put them under the control of an administrator until new 
elections were held. This situation was once again prolonged for two years 
until 1990. 
There was no mention of the newly established Directorate of 
Municipal Administration. It was also not clear what role this agency was 
to have in the development of urban agglomerations or in the improvement 
of their financial position. It illustrates again that this five-year plan 
signified an exercise to secure funds rather than to frame policies. 
Nevertheless, the annual reports in the early years of this five-year plan 
period demonstrated a new energy on this front. The DMA issued several 
circulars to improve the administration and management of municipalities. 
For example, a Karnataka Municipal Administrative Service (KMAS) 
cadre was established. The Karnataka Municipalities Act was revised to 
Residents of slums that have been defined to be cleared under the Karnataka Slum 
Clearance Act are eligible for allotment to tenements constructed by the KSCB. After 
application and verification of their identity, they are nominated for allotment. Upon 
completion of the project, the houses are then distributed among the selected applicants. 
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enforce the administrative changes and to provide the directorate with 
enough powers over the municipalities vis-à-vis the divisional and deputy 
commissioners. Awards were given to municipalities that had shown good 
financial performance, a handbook was issued with current regulations and 
a Chief Valuation Officer was appointed to speed up the revision and 
improvement of property tax collections. A number of central government 
and state government sponsored schemes were brought under the purview 
of the DMA: the scheme for Integrated Development of Small and 
Medium Towns in 1986, the scheme for Urban Basic Services in 1988 and 
the Nehru Rojgar Yojana scheme in 1989. 
The hopes that were vested in the changes as suggested by the Local 
Finance Commission (1986) were watered down and frustrated. As a 
matter of fact, two more sources of income for the municipalities were 
curtailed: profession tax and motor vehicle tax. To compensate the 
municipalities for this loss of income, payments were made from 1987 
onwards by the state government. With no effective devolution of powers 
to local bodies and no enhancement of the financial position of 
municipalities, the status and importance of the directorate had come under 
pressure and its purpose become questionable. Moreover, 71 smaller 
administrative urban areas were brought back under the control of the 
district administration in 1987. The enthusiasm with which the DMA was 
started and was seen in the annual reports between 1986-88 faded out in 
the years that followed. The Directorate which was intended to gain a 
status on par with the BWSSB, had become a meaningless organisation 
avoided by civil servants who considered the DMA a 'punishment 
posting'. 
Another section discussed the shortage of land. 'There is an 
emerging irony that the main monopolies left in the market for urban land 
are public authorities ... as they determine the release of fresh land onto the 
market' (ibid., p. 430). The authors argued that when public authorities 
acquired and developed land, the long delays in combination with the 
cumbersome allotment procedures, have had a negative effect on the 
accessibility of land and housing for low-income groups. In other words, 
poor performing public housing and urban development authorities defeat 
the purpose for which they were actually established. 
Planning should also be strengthened and two measures were taken. 
The first measure was the establishment of the Bangalore Metropolitan 
Region Development Authority (BMRDA). The BMRDA was to 
overcome the disappointing planning function of the Bangalore 
168 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Development Authority and to constitute an organisation with more clout 
(with the chief minister as the chairman) and prestige (in the eyes of the 
public as compared to the BDA). In the following annual reports, there was 
little proof of this pursuit. Various projects were presented which did not 
reach beyond the stage of study or investigation. One gets the impression 
that the BMRDA was not an authority that vigorously co-ordinated all 
development in the region, but had become another parallel ly operating 
institution dealing with planning without much concern for 
implementation or for other negative developments, such as the unplanned 
and rapid expansion of the city in the suburbs outside the area of the 
corporation and within the jurisdiction of the BDA. 
The second measure was the establishment of urban development 
authorities. In 1987, the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act 
came into effect to replace the Karnataka Improvement Boards Act of 
1976. Along the lines of the Bangalore Development Authority constituted 
in 1976, twenty improvement boards were transformed into urban 
development authorities in 1988. The new development authorities 
comprised of nine instead of two government officials and three instead of 
five elected representatives. This composition of members provided a 
majority of government officials and more government control and less 
'political' interference. 
To conclude, the Seventh Five-Year Plan was a more consistent, 
analytical, policy-oriented and well written document as compared to its 
shaky and hastily compiled predecessor. The analysis, however, did not 
lead to a comprehensive perspective, policy or direction for housing and 
urban development in the state. It seems that this was beyond the control 
of the authors of this five-year plan. Secondly, at a political level, the 
financial implications of the five-year plan had been taken rather lightly, 
skirting unpopular measures such as increases in water tariffs. 
8.4 Draft Paper Urban Policy in Karnataka, 1985 
Probably the first attempt to develop an urban development policy in 
Karnataka was made in 1985. The Report of the Task Force on 
Urbanisation 1977, the establishment of the Central Ministry of Urban 
Development and the National Commission on Urbanisation both in 1985, 
and the establishment of the Directorate of Municipal Administration in 
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1985 had triggered the preparation of such a paper and its submission by 
the Housing and Urban Development Department to the Cabinet in the 
October 1985. 
The outline of an urban development policy 
The paper observed that the common causes of rural-urban migration had 
been the emphasis on rural and agricultural policies at the cost of adequate 
attention to urban development, ignoring the economic importance of 
cities. The paper aimed to make a stand for a positive policy for 
urbanisation, taking the cities as centres of wealth, culture, education and 
engines of growth. Growth of urban agglomerations had taken place in the 
larger cities and 'Bangalore towers like a colossus over all the other cities 
in the State' (Draft Paper Urban Policy in Karnataka, 1985, p. 7). 'It is 
clear that Bangalore has become dangerously congested and it is necessary 
to take remedial action immediately' (ibid., p. 10). The Government also 
had to pump in huge sums of money for the maintenance and improvement 
of the infrastructure in Bangalore. 'To an important extent this denies other 
regions their full share of resources' (ibid., p. 9). Smaller towns had not 
shown much growth: 'the smallest towns with population below 10,000 do 
not appear to be viable urban centres,... are penniless and are incapable of 
providing basic amenities of an acceptable standard' (ibid., p. 5). 
The paper urged the government to recognise that urbanisation is 
part of a general process of economic transformation. Urbanisation cannot 
be seen in isolation. Secondly, regional planning is indispensable and an 
integral part of the planning process. The draft policy paper rejected 
equitable distribution of investments in any sector which could not be 
effective in controlling urbanisation. Effective urban policy requires 
linkage and co-ordination with policies on agriculture, industry, transport, 
communications, family planning and others. The urban policy would, 
thus, have to link regional planning with investment planning. Urban 
agglomerations have to be categorised according to a functional hierarchy 
and small and medium towns have to be identified selectively where 
economic growth and development can be encouraged. Linkages with 
agricultural hinterlands have to be strengthened and be made mutually 
supportive. In this context, the scheme for Integrated Development of 
Small and Medium Towns would be instrumental. However, as 'funds are 
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provided only for a few components' (ibid., p. 14), more interventions 
were required to achieve any urban policy. 
Special attention was given to the growth policy of Bangalore. The 
Government of India had prescribed a policy of arresting the growth of 
metropolitan cities. As Bangalore is the only metropolitan city that had 
experienced a strong urban growth in the past, the paper supported this 
principle and the authors argued to stop permitting new industries in the 
Bangalore district. However, the state's own industrial development policy 
did not accept this view. New industries have, thus, to be accepted in an 
urban development policy, they concluded. Secondly, they proposed to 
constitute a green belt around Bangalore and not to allow any development 
by giving statutory protection. Thirdly, countermagnets had to be created 
at a distance far enough from the city. Referring to the disappointing 
performance of the countermagnets of Yelahanka and Kengeri at 20 
kilometres from Bangalore, the new countermagnets would have to be at 
least 70 kilometres away. Dharwad, Mangalore, Gulbarga, Raichur and 
Shimoga were suggested. Fourth, inside the Bangalore metropolitan 
region, residential areas should be planned more closely to employment 
centres. In this context critique was aired about the Bangalore 
Development Authority that 'has largely neglected its planning functions 
and has concentrated on the formation of layouts and the allotment of 
sites' (ibid., p. 15). 
The chapter on housing listed various problems with the delivery of 
houses: the negative effect of the House Rent Control Act increased 
construction costs, the inadequate functioning of the land market, partly 
contributed to by speculation and the tardy pace of the state government's 
own development authorities and improvement boards, the inadequacies of 
the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, etc. The paper also delivered 
critique on the priorities of the urban development and housing board 
agencies, particularly the BDA, which gave too low a priority to massive 
low-income housing delivery and the supply of developed land to the 
urban poor. This was to change by organisational restructuring and 
strengthening of their staff as well as an infusion of financial aid. The 
creation of urban development authorities might prove instrumental to 
achieving this goal. Other measures were proposed to strengthen the 
housing sector but the success of these measures 'depend on the priority 
given by Government to urban housing' (ibid., p. 20). 
A short section was dedicated to the approach towards the increasing 
number of slums. The authors commented on the weak financial and 
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personnel position of the Kamataka Slum Clearance Board as compared to 
the BWSSB. As a matter of course, the achievement so far of the 
Kamataka Slum Clearance Board could not be called impressive. To 
ensure more results the Kamataka Slum Clearance Board should confine 
its work to Bangalore, while municipalities were to take care of slums in 
other urban agglomerations. 
The goal of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 
Decade was an important starting point for the policy for water supply and 
sanitation, stressed the Commission. In order to achieve a 100 per cent 
coverage for water supply in rural and urban areas and 100 per cent 
coverage of sanitation in Class I cities and 80 per cent coverage in other 
urban agglomerations, an amount of Rs. 2,884 million for water supply 
and Rs. 1,781 million for sanitation was required. Sewerage had been 
recommended for larger cities by the CPHEEO, not only because larger 
cities are able to provide the necessary maintenance capacities but also 
because the quantity of water to allow sewage to flow properly. Therefore 
such systems were unsuitable for most smaller towns . Instead, low-cost 
and on-site sanitation options were proposed for such towns and cities. 
Improvement of the financial performance of the KUWS&DB and the 
municipalities was required to sustain proper water supply. Water rates 
had, thus, to be revised - though being recognised as an unpopular measure 
- and was 'essential to save the KUWS&DB and the municipalities from 
bankruptcy' (ibid., p. 24). 
Comments 
The paper presented some interesting thoughts about integrated urban and 
regional planning, an insight into existing opinions about the supposed 
thrust areas of the state government agencies and their actual performance 
but fell short of being an urban policy document. The paper did not make 
clear how regional planning and investment planning by the different 
departments should be co-ordinated. Such co-ordination is highly desirable 
but is, at the same time, complicated as consultation and compromise is 
not common among many introvertly organised government agencies. This 
can, nevertheless, be achieved by an adequate framework of policy, legal, 
consultation and organisation. The paper failed to indicate whether and 
The CPHEEO had recommended 150 litres per capita per day which is a distant dream 
for even large cities. 
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how such a framework should exist. The paper expressed the need for a 
functional hierarchy of towns and cities, but failed to indicate the objective 
and methodology of such a functional hierarchy. While it observed that 
smaller towns did not seem viable urban centres, the paper did not address 
the question whether and how such smaller agglomerations should be 
strengthened. The scheme IDSMT - though welcomed for its objective -
was apparently not sufficient. The ideas on the growth control for 
Bangalore, the creation of a green belt and the creation of countermagnets 
had a rather loose character. Little justification, explanation, policy 
implication or follow-up action was provided. The implicit critique on the 
BDA, KHB and Karnataka Slum Clearance Board with regard to their 
development priorities and achievements - though appreciable - was not 
elaborated and translated into measures that had any organisational, 
financial or personnel implication. 
In conclusion, one could say that this urban policy paper - though 
the attempt is commendable - offered a number of distant observations, 
some good ideas and approaches, but failed to outline a policy with an 
acceptable level of clarity, substance and direction. The paper showed 
submission, lack of courage and an unwillingness to challenge existing 
intra-departmental routines and inter-departmental patterns of powers; a 
paper that was doomed to go into oblivion in a short spell of time . 
8.5 Report on Urban Local Bodies by the Karnataka State 
Local Finance Commission, 1986 
The history of the Local Finance Commission goes back to 1980 when a 
committee was established to review the financial situation of 
municipalities and to formulate recommendations to the government for 
the improvement of their financial situation. The commission had three 
members: the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Department, 
the Additional Secretary of Finance and the Divisional Commissioner. 
Although their report was to be submitted shortly, it was not made public 
or referred to once. In 1983, the Karnataka Local Finance Commission was 
constituted with MLAs and a senior IAS officer from the Housing and 
As a matter of fact, it took more than a year to retrieve mis paper. Many officials 
employed at the HUD were not aware of its existence or could recover it from their files 
or libraries. The paper was finally obtained from the private library of an IAS officer. 
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Urban Development Department and Finance Department as members. As 
such, this commission had more status and clout in political decision 
making and their recommendations could not easily be ignored by either 
the Legislative Assembly or the state government administration. Mr. N. 
Lakshman Rau, a retired IAS officer, was the main author of the report. 
The Local Finance Commission submitted their report after three 
years. The report gave a detailed analysis of the financial situation of the 
urban local bodies in Karnataka and observed that 'The entire income of 
municipalities and grants received from Government is being spent to 
defray recurring expenditure only' (Karnataka State Local Finance 
Commission, 1986, p. 11). Particularly, the income situation of smaller and 
medium towns proved to be very weak. The report stipulated that if the 
municipalities had to bring their infrastructure and service levels to an 
acceptable standard8, their income would have to be tripled. One of the 
reasons of the deteriorating income situation of the municipalities was the 
slow growth of income from property taxes. The committee proposed a 
number of measures to enhance the income from this source: an 
independent valuation of properties, a standardisation of the valuation 
system, the removal of exemptions from property tax and the fixation of 
the percentage of the so-called annual rental value. The annual increase in 
octroi compensation should be increased from 10 per cent to 12.5 per cent. 
Other measures related to the rate of division of taxes shared by the local 
and state government were suggested. The Commission did, however, not 
propose a rationalisation and increase in the state government grants as 
requested by the municipalities which would be the only serious strategy 
to triple municipal income levels. 
The Report, therefore, meant little financial consequences for the 
state government and expected a major effort by the municipalities to 
enhance their own income situation. Improving the financial position of 
municipalities - though important - cannot be the panacea for improving 
urban services and development, in my view, as long as other problems 
continued to exist: an inadequate housing and urban development policy, 
the top-down functioning of state level agencies, an inhibited land market 
and the inadequate legal and personnel powers under the existing 
Karnataka Municipalities and Corporations Acts. 
For an acceptable infrastructure and service levels, reference is made to the famous 
Sarkaria Committee Report of 1963 (!). 
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8.6 State annual plans between 1990-92 
By 1990, the political tussles at the centre and yet another crisis between 
the centre and the state made the central government impose presidential 
rule in Karnataka. With no Cabinet in place, annual plans were prepared 
instead of the obligatory five-year plan. The annual plans had to be 
prepared in the absence of 'an approach to and draft proposals for the 
Eighth Five-Year Plan, both at the National and State levels' (Annual Plan 
1991-92, p. 1). A final decision of the National Planning Commission on 
the size of the state Plan was yet to be taken. 
The two annual plans pervaded a caretaker approach. They briefly 
reviewed the past Seventh Five-Year Plan's achievements and extended 
the planned and ongoing activities into the next year without making any 
drastic changes or introducing completely new programmes and projects. 
The targets of the Seventh State Five-Year Plan 1985-90 were seriously 
affected by three consecutive years of drought in southern India. 
Agriculture suffered most severely, but other sectors were affected too. 
Consequently, the state revenues suffered. While a target of five per cent 
per annum was set for the economic growth, the actual annual growth was 
only 3.4 per cent. The targets for irrigation and power generation could 
also not materialise due to the reduction in outlays. The state government 
did not compromise on programmes for employment generation, the 
People's Housing Scheme, the Experimental Low-Cost Houses scheme, 
health and family planning, and other similar schemes. The plans reflected 
little on the past experiences, objectives, strategies and how programmes 
and projects can achieve these objectives. Both state annual plans appeared 
to be a paper exercise and aim to consolidate the share of the various state 
agencies. 
Water supply and sewerage 
The water supply, sewerage, housing and urban development sector had 
not faired badly and particularly the water supply projects received a good 
amount of funds in the two annual plans. Together they constituted 8.6 and 
9.2 per cent of the annual plans of 1990-91 and 1991-92. Water supply and 
sewerage remained the focal point of this sector. While in earlier 
documents the International Decade for Water Supply and Sanitation 
provided the broad targets for 1990, they had not been referred to here. 
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The situation of rural sanitation had been very bleak as little progress had 
been made in the past five years 'because of lack of involvement by the 
beneficiaries' (Annual Plan 1990-91, p. ХШ-Е.2). Urban water supply and 
sewerage continued to be the domain of the BWSSB and KUWS&DB. The 
Cauvery Stage III Project of the BWSSB had to be extended with another 
two years because of delays in finalising the finance for the project. With a 
sanction of the state government in 1984, six years had passed without a 
proper financial foundation. Nevertheless, the works were in full progress 
and an expense of Rs. 1,438 million had already been incurred. The project 
was to be completed by the end of 1991. However, the second annual plan 
announced another delay of two years and Stage III was expected to be 
completed in 1993. As far as the operations of the KUWS&DB were 
concerned, no drastic changes occurred in this period. The weak financial 
position of municipalities was a serious concern to the Board. The 
KUWS&DB urged the state government to take a decision and proposed 
that the government would meet the municipal contribution for new 
projects and relieve the Board from the increasing operational burden 
involved in the maintenance of existing schemes. 
Housing 
The reflections in the Seventh Five-Year Plan with regard to housing 
demand, affordability and finance modalities were not referred to in the 
two annual plans. Housing delivery continued on the same lines and by the 
same agencies. The housing shortage and targets for construction were 
based on housing need figures of 1981 which are extrapolated year after 
year. No fresh assessment had been conducted since then. The annual 
plans estimated that by 1990, Karnataka would be the fifth largest state 
with a housing shortage of 1.6 million units. It is astonishing to see that 
such a simple thumb-rule estimate was accepted for allocating millions to 
the housing sector. 
The People's Housing Scheme constituted a major contribution of 
the Karnataka Housing Board to mass housing for the urban and rural 
poor. This scheme was to be transferred to the Rural Development and 
Panchayat Raj Department. The conventional housing schemes and the 
Bhagyamandira scheme were, thus, left under the purview of the Board; 
two areas where the achievements of the Board had been least impressive. 
The Bhagyamandira scheme continued at a unit cost of Rs. 8,000. 
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However, the Board proposed to increase the unit cost further to Rs. 
16,000. 
Urban development 
The urban development section offered the same menu as they had been 
serving for many years and budget provisions were neatly distributed over 
the existing state institutions. This would allow them to make urban master 
plans, establish more planning units at district levels, execute the Urban 
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, administer municipalities, implement 
the scheme for Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns, and 
to allow the BMRDA and Bangalore Urban Art Commission to function. 
The opposite was true for the central government which had launched a 
number of initiatives in the sector. A new scheme had been introduced in 
Karnataka at the beginning of the 1990s: the Nehru Rojgar Yojana scheme, 
or Nehru's People's Employment scheme, and had three components. The 
state government also contributed to this scheme. During the annual plans 
1990-92, some progress was made with two components of this scheme for 
which all municipalities were eligible. In the first year Rs. 62.1 million 
was spent. With regard to the housing improvement component, cities with 
a population of more than 100,000 were eligible. The application and 
handling of the money was done by the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board 
and little progress was reported in this period. A more elaborate discussion 
of this central government sponsored scheme is provided in chapter 13. 
Another central government sponsored scheme was introduced in the 
annual plan 1991-92: the Urban Basic Service Programme for the Poor 
(UBSP). In chapter 14, a more detailed analysis is presented. The third 
central government sponsored scheme that was introduced in this period 
was the Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation and the 
Rehabilitation of Scavengers. The scheme aims to materialise Mahatma 
Ghandi's dream to eradicate throughout the country 'the inhuman and un-
hygienic custom of collection of human excreta by scavengers'. Chapter 
15 presents a detailed account of the successes and failures of this 
particular scheme. 
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8.7 Eighth State Five-Year Plan 1992-97 
The Eighth State Five-Year Plan 1992-97 took the negative economic 
developments of the 1980s as a starting point. Consecutive years of 
drought and the disappointing increase in irrigation capacity and power 
generation had been the main causes of Karnataka's growth lagging 
behind the Indian average. On the positive side, the economy of Karnataka 
had diversified at the same time providing a better basis for economic 
growth. Also drastic land reforms had taken shape while the efforts for 
alleviation of poverty had been considerable as compared to other states in 
India. Concern was expressed about the decline of state share in the total 
plan outlay of the central government. Karnataka's share was 5.5 per cent 
in the Fifth National Five-Year Plan (1974-79) and declined in the 1980s 
to 4.4 per cent in the Seventh National Five-Year Plan (1985-90). 
However, the state had succeeded in regaining some of this share in the 
intermittent two annual plans. It may be no coincidence that the 1980s had 
been a period in which the Janata Party, an opposition party to the 
Congress(I) at the centre, ruled in Karnataka. This, in spite of the so-called 
Gadgil formula that has to secure an objective and equituous distribution 
of national outlays over the states. The undernourishment with national 
funds is not so much applicable to the central government funds where the 
Gadgil formula is effective, but has been effective in the cases of 
underspending. The central government has the right to re-allocate unspent 
state government outlays to other states. The central government may, 
however, also reserve these outlays and transfer them to the next year's 
state outlay. This discretionary power has been used unfavourably for 
those states that have fallen out of favour with the centre, e.g. Karnataka, 
as one senior IAS officer in Karnataka hinted. And there were indeed 
significant shortfalls in expenditure in respect of transport, water supply, 
housing and urban development. Also under the Minimum Needs 
Programme, the urban component for the environmental improvement of 
slums showed an expenditure of only 77 per cent. While Rs. 5,560 million 
During the Seventh Five-Year Plan period, Karnataka's overall economic growth was 
5.0 per cent against 5.6 per cent for the whole country. For the agriculture sector the 
differences were more remarkable: 2.1 per cent against 3.4 per cent for the national 
average. The Infrastructure Development Index for Karnataka was 95 in 1988-89 
against a national average of 100. People living below the poverty line stood at 32 per 
cent in Karnataka in 1987-88 against 29.2 per cent for the national average. 
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outlay was approved for water supply, housing and urban development 
during the Seventh State Five-Year Plan, only Rs. 4,575 million was spent. 
Besides citing unfavourable climatic conditions and underspending as the 
main causes for the poor economic performance, the analysis remained 
superficial and provided little insight into the internal mechanism of failure 
of economic growth in Karnataka. The performance of the responsible 
state government institutions, the private investors shying away from 
Karnataka, the reasons for farmers not investing in increased production or 
the conduciveness of the political climate for investments were not 
addressed at all. The introspective and self-critical paragraphs of the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan did not find a niche in the Eighth State Five-Year 
Plan document. 
The objective and strategy for the Eighth State Five-Year Plan 1992-
97 was not eluded with great visions or perspectives. The plan was rather 
reactionary and aimed to remedy the perceived shortcomings and to catch 
up with earlier economic growth scenarios. Reduction of poverty, 
generation of productive employment, provision of basic needs to the 
people, sustainable growth in the economy and protection of the 
environment became the broad objectives of the Eighth Five-Year Plan. 
The major targets remained vague. It is ironic to note that 'increasing 
operational efficiencies specifically in sectors like irrigation and power' 
were added as targets of the Eight Five-Year Plan (p. II-3), that 
implementation needed to be strengthened by installation of effective 
mechanisms, strengthened management, technical skills and quantitative 
dimensions of programmes (ibid., p. Π-13), but then left this concern to the 
individual departments to solve. However, no further mention was made in 
the respective paragraphs. Apparently, it was sufficient to make the 
statement. 
A new dimension was added to this five-year plan: the recently 
launched economic liberalisation policy of the P.V. Narasimha Rao 
government at the centre. A separate section was devoted to the new 
thinking and an appeal was made to adopt these: privatisation, 
liberalisation of economic policies, improvement of efficiency of the 
public sector, deregulation, adequate pricing and cost recovery. But again, 
nowhere in the succeeding chapters these policies have been (or had to be) 
translated into actions by the various sectors and departments. What was a 
thrust area in the national policy became a footnote in the state economic 
policy. 
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The outlays were stepped up considerably in a number of sectors of 
the Eighth Five-Year Plan. The total outlay of the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
stands at Rs. 110,000 million which was, in real terms , an increase over 
the outlay of the Seventh Five-Year Plan of 9.3 per cent. As far as the 
outlay for urban water supply, sanitation, housing and urban development 
is concerned, the total amount was fixed at Rs. 12,661 million. Despite the 
backlog in achievements, the total outlay has, in real terms, been reduced 
to 93 per cent as compared to the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Only housing 
maintained its share and apparently the government with its chief minister 
Bangarappa had planned great things for this sector as will be discussed in 
chapter 10. 
Water supply and sewerage 
The paragraph on water supply and sewerage proved an agency-centred 
account of the projects executed and money spent in the Seventh Five-
Year Plan and annual plans periods. The first presentation was by the 
KUWS&DB. While it had a mere Rs. 88.4 million to spend in the Seventh 
Five-Year Plan, the Eighth Five-Year Plan proposed an outlay of a 
staggering Rs. 1,575 million. There were still many cities and towns that 
were underserviced with piped water supply as compared to the norms. 
The need for continued efforts and more projects was, thus, felt beyond 
any doubt11. Indeed, the annual reports between 1992-96 showed an 
increase in projects. Particularly the schemes for larger cities doubled 
between 1992 and 1996. In 1996, the KUWS&DB had 120 schemes under 
implementation while this number had been only 62 in 1990. Cost and 
time-overruns continued to hamper the implementation of projects. The 
main causes were the various liabilities that were loaded onto the 
KUWS&DB; the contribution of urban local bodies for the new 
construction of projects and the expenses for operation and maintenance 
services of schemes that were in the hands of the Board. Earlier pressures 
and pleas to reduce the number of schemes to be maintained by the Board 
Using a discount factor of 0.546 between 1985 and 1992 based on a Consumer Price 
Index for urban non-manual employees. 
" In 1995, only 14 out of 135 surveyed cities and towns in Karnataka have water 
supplied as per norms proposed by the State Finance Commission (State Finance 
Commission, 1996, p. 122). In order to correct mis gap, an investment of Rs. 1,050 
million would be required in the surveyed cities alone. 
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had not resulted in policy change. In 1996, the Board was still maintaining 
26 water supply schemes as compared to 31 in 1990. The result was a 
money crunch and the only panacea was to spread projects expenditure 
over longer periods. A long list of incomplete projects became a common 
feature in the annual reports. The specific problems of water supply 
schemes are further elaborated in chapter 11. 
The presentation by BWSSB summarised the achievements and 
progress of the different stages of Bangalore's Cauvery Water Supply 
Project. Further delay of the completion of Stage III was not expected and 
'the project is likely to be completed in all respect by the end of June 
1992' (ibid., p. XVIE-7). And indeed, the project was put into operation in 
May 1993 with only a couple of months delay and an incurred expense of 
Rs. 2,480 million (Housing and Urban Development Department Annual 
Report 1994-95). This figure compares well with the estimated cost of Rs. 
2,400 million in 1982. However, a new stage had already become 
necessary: 'further augmentation of supply is very necessary and is to be 
done on a war footing' in order to maintain the per capita supply in the 
coming decade (ibid., p. XVI E-8). Therefore and expectedly, a Cauvery 
Water Supply Scheme Stage IV was proposed. The Cauvery Water Supply 
Project Stage IV received the state government's administrative approval 
in June 1995 with a financial outlay of Rs. 10,720 million (Housing and 
Urban Development Department Annual Report 1995-96). The state 
government refrained from subsidising the project by providing budget 
support and opted to give only loan support. Apparently, the state 
government aimed to correct the substantial dependency of the BWSSB on 
state government moneys and forced the BWSSB to function more cost-
effectively and to recover most of the costs from the consumers. 
The overall share of this sector declined from 7.6 per cent in the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan to 5.5 per cent in the Eighth Five-Year Plan. This 
was mainly due to the diminished outlay for Bangalore water supply from 
Rs. 2,100 million in the Seventh Five-Year Plan to 1,099 million in the 
Eighth Five-Year Plan. In real terms12, this was a reduction to 28.6 per cent 
of the outlay in the Seventh Five-Year Plan. 
12
 Using a discount factor of 0.546 between 1985 and 1992 based on a Consumer Price 
Index for urban non-manual employees. 
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Housing 
Housing construction and distribution of housing sites to urban poor had 
been very disappointing over the Seventh Five-Year Plan and the two 
annual plans periods. Since the establishment of the Housing Board, 
56,602 sites had been distributed in urban areas against a target of 148,063. 
Under the Bhagyamandira scheme, 8,739 houses had been constructed 
against a target of 11,000. The distribution of sites under Bhagyamandira, 
scheme was discontinued from 1990-91. Land availability and the high 
cost of land acquisition were the state's main constraints to progress in 
these commendable schemes. The Kamataka Housing Board had fared 
better in terms of low and middle-income housing, according to their own 
report. During the Seventh Fi ve-Year Plan, the KHB constructed 1,059 
LIG and MIG houses against a target of 979. However, these figures had 
been adjusted as the earlier target was not 1,059 but 3,820. In any case, 
these figures were a very marginal contribution to the total housing stock 
increase over a five-year period in urban Kamataka. 
The Congress(I) government of Bangarappa in Kamataka wanted to 
fulfil its election promise to provide houses and sites to the urban and rural 
poor. A new scheme was introduced that would merge the ongoing site 
distribution and house construction schemes in rural and urban areas. The 
new scheme was named 'Ashraya' and was launched in 1991. The scheme 
had stunning and unprecedented targets and a staggering Rs. 4,885 million 
as the outlay. In chapter 10 a detailed account is provided of this scheme. 
The introduction of the Ashraya scheme had changed the break-down of 
the proposed housing outlay of the Eighth Five-Year Plan and ensured a 
larger share for housing as compared to the Seventh Five-Year Plan (from 
5.0 to 5.3 per cent), while the share for water supply, sanitation and urban 
development reduced from 8.5 to 6.3 per cent. 
Conventional housing by the Board also continued and 17,201 
houses were constructed between 1990-96 at the average cost of Rs. 
113,300 per unit. The average construction cost of KHB's conventional 
housing construction rose steeply13 and reached levels that were 
unaffordable for EWS and LIG income groups. Only the better MIG and 
HIG groups would be able to afford such houses. As far as the targets are 
13
 In 1990-91, the Kamataka Housing Board constructed EWS/LIG/MIG/HIG houses at 
and average cost of approximately Rs. 57,300. In 1994-95, these average construction 
costs had gone up to over Rs. 240,000. 
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concerned, the KHB never reached even half of their annual target. It 
remains a question why the KHB had not given more emphasis to the mass 
housing schemes such as the Ashraya and Bhagyamandira schemes and 
rather preferred to concentrate its efforts on schemes that produce 
relatively expensive houses in low numbers. In fact, the annual output of 
houses by the KHB since its inception was just 2,400 and this figure had 
not changed over ten years. This focus cannot be matched with the 
mandate of the Board to provide housing for urban low income groups 
who have more difficulty in getting access to land, finance and properly 
built houses. 
Urban development 
The chapter on urban development in the Eighth Five-Year Plan provided 
a reflection on urbanisation and the necessity of an urban development 
policy. Although the Government of Karnataka did not pass any resolution 
or policy with regard to urbanisation, the five-year plan stressed the 
importance of such a policy. The objective of such a policy would be: 
'a. to evolve a desired pattern of balanced regional development and 
create effective linkages between urban and rural areas; 
b. to distribute the urban population proportionately among various 
classes of town and regions; 
с to contain the rate of growth of metropolitan and other large cities 
by dispersing the economic activities; and 
d. to provide at least a minimum level of services for providing life 
of good quality to people in both urban and rural areas' (Eighth 
Fi ve-Year Plan 1992-97, p. 228). 
The objectives were a reaction to the mounting problems in the larger 
cities and in Bangalore in particular. Urban growth was also perceived as a 
negative phenomenon that had to be contained. The recommendations of 
the National Commission on Urbanisation were adopted and Mysore, 
Hubli-Dharwad and Mangalore had to become National Priority cities and 
Belgaum and Gulbarga State Priority cities. 'These cities have to be 
developed to perform the role of alternate growth centres to Bangalore' 
(ibid., p. 229). The wish to contain growth in Bangalore was, thus, 
translated into a policy of dispersal of growth and economic benefits over 
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a hierarchically organised range of cities and rural areas all over the state. 
The National Commission on Urbanisation had been criticised for 
identifying these National and State Priority cities without sufficient 
insight into local economies and without having undertaken a proper 
analysis (Bijlani, 1989). Such an analysis had also not been conducted by 
the Department of Town Planning. Nonetheless, selected cities might still 
produce a successful dispersal policy if they were supported with a range 
of projects to boost the local economy and create an interesting investment 
climate for entrepreneurs. However, these cities did not obtain any special 
status in the other sections of the Eighth Five-Year Plan. There was, thus, a 
belief that an urban landscape could be created by simply appointing cities 
as 'growth centres' without a proper investment plan. In this sense the 
presented policies were not only theoretical but also showed a certain level 
of naivete. Another weakness was the selection of the cities without taking 
into account the migration that originated from Tamil Nadu and Andhra 
Pradesh. 
The dispersal policy was contrasted by the section written about the 
Bangalore Metropolitan and Regional Development Authority where it 
was proposed to develop a ring of satellite towns situated at a distance of 
50-60 kilometres from Bangalore. No reference was made to the earlier 
mentioned selection of larger cities throughout Kamataka. The adopted 
distance was explained by the negative experience with the development 
of Kengeri and Yelahanka townships close to Bangalore. These towns had 
not developed as independent cities attracting enough economic activities 
and offering sufficient employment to local residents. They had become 
large residential areas instead and had difficulty in finding takers for the 
houses built by the Housing Board. This line of dispersal policy took shape 
when the Kamataka Urban Infrastructure Development Project was 
launched in 1996 with finance from the Asian Development Bank. The 
cities of Tumkur, Mysore, Ramanagaram and Channapatna had been 
selected to receive investments for strengthening their local economies and 
take away the pressures from Bangalore. The total project costs is Rs. 
15,000 million. 
Despite these policies and projects, Bangalore's development was 
further encouraged by the Bangalore Megacity Project with an estimated 
project cost of Rs. 8,050 million. One could conclude that an urban 
development policy is in fact non-existing; no serious reference has been 
made to the outlined urbanisation policy in the Eighth Five-Year Plan or to 
recommendations of the National Commission on Urbanisation. Again the 
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plan was not used to frame an urban development policy but to allow the 
various agencies to plan, budget and implement their projects without 
inter-departmental coherence. 
Another organisation that was represented in the urban development 
chapter of the Eighth Five-Year Plan is the Karnataka Slum Clearance 
Board . The total number of slums in Karnataka was estimated at 1532 
with a population of 1.5 million. The achievements during the Seventh 
Five-Year Plan 1985-90 and the two annual plans 1990-92 had fallen short 
of the target to some extent which was due to problems with land 
acquisition, delays in declaration of slums, legal problems and supply of 
construction materials. The proposals for the Eighth Five-Year Plan 
continued on the same lines of the Seventh Five-Year Plan and the two 
annual plans, i.e. improvement of slums through provision of basic 
amenities, clearance of slums by providing alternative 'EWS housing' and 
environmental improvement of slums under the Minimum Needs 
Programme. The annual reports between 1992-96 showed that the Board 
fared reasonably well in achieving annual targets for the construction of 
EWS houses. Between 1990-96 another 8,773 EWS houses were 
constructed at an average cost of Rs. 32,790. This was a considerable 
increase in the per unit construction cost and a similar pattern as the KHB. 
Under the Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums scheme another 
214 slums and 242,000 slums dwellers were covered at an approximated 
expenditure15 of Rs. 127 million. No progress was reported under the 
Scheme for Housing and Urban Shelter (SHASU, one of the three 
components of the NRY scheme) due to 'lack of funds'. In chapter 13 an 
account is presented of this scheme. 
The section on urban development was concluded with the 
Directorate of Municipal Administration. While strengthening and training 
urban local bodies had been mentioned in earlier plans as a key point for 
their improvement, the section of the DMA did not refer to such intentions. 
Again, the focus was on the implementation of a number of schemes. The 
observation in the plan that the funds under the IDSMT scheme may be 
spread too thinly and a concentration of investment in a small number of 
14
 In 1995, the Department of Housing and Urban Development was bifurcated into the 
Department of Housing and the Department of Urban Development. The Karnataka 
Housing Board and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board were brought under the 
Housing Department and the other agencies remained part of the Urban Development 
Department. 
At an average expenditure of Rs. 525 per head. 
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towns may be more effective, was not taken up any further in this section. 
The annual reports by the Directorate of Municipal Administration during 
this period provided a similar picture with an emphasis on schemes under 
implementation: UBSP, NRY and IPLCS&LS. 
Concluding observations Eighth Five-Year Plan 1992-97 
The Eighth Five-Year Plan invites a number of observations. A five-year 
plan should aim to set goals and objectives for the medium and long-term 
and to develop a vision of the social and economic future of the state 
within a national and possible international context. Based on the capacity, 
available funds and the experiences of the past period, the plan would have 
to set realistic development goals. Such an approach was not to be found in 
the Eighth Five-Year Plan. This five-year plan was more a reaction to what 
had happened in the previous years, a projection of what should have been 
done previously and a multiplication of recent annual plans and budgets. It 
was conservative, reactionary, backward-looking and over-cautious with 
regard to new approaches of liberalisation, private sector involvement and 
decentralisation. For example, the new liberalisation announced by the 
national government was not reflected in the activities of the various 
departments of the state government. Only the introductory paragraphs 
provided lip-service to this new policy. In comparison with the Seventh 
Five-Year Plan document, the Eighth Five-Year Plan provided very little 
analysis of the ongoing social and economic development. It showed a 
lack of insight and non-availability of data to make a proper analysis. 
There was also very little critical reflection on the achievements of 
implemented programmes and projects. The Eighth Five-Year Plan was 
rather defensive, - at times - apologetic and had a strong tendency to leave 
things as they were. 
The Eighth Five-Year Plan also lacked a consistency between 
analysis, objectives, activities and outlays. This was not only true for the 
overall development objectives and the activities of the departments as a 
whole, but also of each agency falling within one department. There has 
been no consistency between what was intended by the department and 
what their agencies would have to do. The section on urban development 
provided an example. The cause of this inconsistency is probably the 
manner in which the plan had been prepared. Each agency had submitted 
its progress report on the previous plan period and proposed an outlay for 
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certain projects for the forthcoming plan. Within the department one-to-
one discussions were held between the agencies' heads and the secretariat, 
mainly to defend the proposed outlay. Little time had been spent looking 
into the overall objectives of each agency or the department as a whole. 
Subsequently, the agencies' activities and outlays could not be tuned to the 
overall objectives. Instead, the agencies' interests dominated with the 
result that there was little overall consistency, co-ordination and 
integration. The sections on water supply, sewerage, housing and urban 
development have in fact been prepared by the individual agencies without 
much final editing. Some provided many details and others very few. The 
level of details was unrelated to the number of projects or the size of the 
requested budget. The argued shift from objective-oriented policy making 
to agency-oriented project formulation has been clearly demonstrated. The 
introductory sections in the plan which reflected the desired state policies 
for the sector appeared to be an add-on rather than a precursor for later 
sections. 
There has been a strong focus on projects and money, on what, 
rather than on why and for whom. Agencies that are ruled by engineers, 
such as the KHB, the KSCB, the BWSSB and KUWS&DB are strong 
examples of this. Their proposals lacked any existential questions or 
proper justification for projects. There was scant reference to national or 
even earlier state government documents. As a result, contradictions 
between what policy documents recommended and what was actually done 
occurred frequently. Performance was too often made synonymous with 
the ability to achieve the proposed expenditure or physical target. There 
was little concern for the quality of output or the social and economic 
impact of activities. This has been particularly true for the engineering 
agencies. 
8.8 Intra-sector and inter-sector priorities in the Karnataka 
State five-year plans 
This section illustrates whether and how the Government of Karnataka 
fixed inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral priorities. The overall share for the 
housing and urban development sector (Table 8-2) had increased in the 
1970s and remained more or less constant in the five-year plan outlays in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Apparently, both the Congress and Janata (Dal) 
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governments attached significant importance to this sector. Among the 
sub-sectors, water supply and sewerage was and has remained important, 
followed by housing. Urban development, the third sub-sector, constituted 
only a small part of the outlay but managed to gain importance at the end 
of the 1970s. With the establishment of the BMRDA and more planning 
authorities in the state, urban development secured nearly one per cent of 
the budget. The obvious fluctuations cannot be explained by a deliberate or 
explicit policy but is related to the various schemes that have been initiated 
in the respective periods, for example, the Bangalore water supply. One 
may recall that the Cauvery water supply project secured a major portion 
of the state budget outlay in the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Fluctuations in 
the other sub-sectors have been less dramatic, although various schemes 
were initiated such as the Ashraya housing scheme at the beginning of the 
1990s. 
In real terms (Table 8-3), the total outlay of the five-year plans and 
annual plans have been increasing since the Fourth Five-Year Plan. While 
this rise was more impressive in the 1970s and 1980s, the latest five-year 
plan showed an increase of about 9 per cent only. This development is also 
reflected in the outlay for water supply, sewerage, housing and urban 
development. While there has been an increased outlay in real terms for 
each sub-sector throughout the 1980s, a decline in the two annual plans' 
and the Eighth Five-Year Plan's overall outlay can be seen. The urban 
development sub-sector and particularly the water supply and sewerage 
sub-sectors suffered a considerable decline as compared to the Seventh 
Five-Year Plan. Only the housing sub-sector secured an increase in real 
terms in the Eighth Five-Year Plan. The high priority given to the 
implementation of the Ashraya housing scheme and a higher degree of 
external and revenue-based financing for Bangalore water supply projects 
have been reflected in these figures. 
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In conclusion, the fluctuations in outlays between sectors and sub-sectors 
cannot be explained by the notions of urgency to tackle particular 
problems or to give shape to policy statements in the introductory chapters 
of the five-year and annual plans. In fact, the distribution of budgets 
between the sectors have been rather constant. Fluctuations are explained, 
as argued, by an increase or decrease in the number of schemes of the 
departments and agencies. These schemes have often been the result of 
contemporary concerns and priorities and have little relationship with 
(any) long-term policies of the state or national governments. They rather 
reflect the contemporary balance of powers between the existing 
departments and agencies. 
8.9 Urban Development Strategy Papers for the State 
Karnataka (1992 and 1994) 
Two other documents bear relevance in this chapter: the Urban 
Development Strategy Papers drafted in 1992 and 1994. To access central 
government funds for the scheme Integrated Development of Small and 
Medium Towns (IDSMT), it is obligatory to elaborate an urban 
development strategy for the state. Since the urban policy paper in 1985, 
Karnataka did not have any outline for an urban development policy. 
Apparently, the state government did not attach a high priority to an 
urbanisation policy and it probably would not have had any statement until 
the Town and Country Planning Organisation in Delhi, the nodal agency, 
insisted on the preparation of an urban development strategy paper. The 
TCPO provided some guidance by issuing a format. Along these lines, the 
Directorate of Municipal Administration prepared the first draft in 1992 
and a second in 1994. While the first had been prepared in order to access 
central government funds and is confined to presenting a pattern of small 
and medium towns that deserve to grow and to be supported by the 
IDSMT scheme, the second paper covered broader issues of urban 
administration, housing, legal and inter-sectoral issues. 
In the first paper, the state government tried to show that it was keen 
to pursue a conscious policy towards urbanisation and solve urban 
problems. For many decades, agencies have existed to guide and shape 
urban development. The Mysore City Improvement Board was constituted 
in 1903 which illustrated Karnataka's active urban policy, so the 1992 
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paper opened. The strategy paper of 1994 provided a detailed analysis of 
the urbanisation pattern based on the census data of 1971, 1981, 1991 and 
other recent studies and as further explained in chapter five. However, both 
the papers were not able to explain the scattered pattern of urban growth 
and stagnation in the state in terms of push and pull factors. 
Another section dealt with the housing problems. Housing shortages 
are based on estimates of existing housing stock, population growth and 
trends of increase in housing stock. For the year 1991, the housing deficit 
in urban Karnataka had been estimated at 524,200 units. This shortage 
would further increase to 768,100 in the year 2001. A break-down for the 
20 districts had also been prepared and the deficits in Kolar, Raichur and 
Uttara Kannada districts would be most urgent by 2001. Shortage of land, 
high cost of building materials and lack of investment in housing were 
seen as the main causes for the growing deficit. However, 'efforts are now 
being made to remove these deficiencies' is the simple and bold 
concluding remark (Urban development Strategy Karnataka State, 1994, p. 
58). 
Of importance in this paper is the reference to the Industry Policy 
Resolution of 1993. It is, in fact, the first time that in any policy document 
reference is made to a policy document of another department. In 1993, the 
state government adopted an Industrial Policy Resolution that had a 
number of clear implications for urban development. The main points of 
this resolution were: 
a. Only non-polluting and high-tech industries would be allowed in the 
Bangalore Urban Agglomeration; 
b. All areas in the state were eligible for industrial development. 
Incentives and tax concessions would be available for any projects; 
с A number of locations would receive priority for industrial 
development. These were Hassan, Raichur, Mysore and Dharwad; 
d. Procedures and legislation would be simplified; and 
e. Supporting measures would be taken with a high priority: 
infrastructure, power generation, training and export promotion. 
The state's urban development strategy, as presented in this document, 
consisted of a number of 'principal features'. The first feature is the 
dispersal of urbanisation and equitable distribution of urban benefits. In 
order to counterbalance the attraction and growth of southern Karnataka 
and of Bangalore in particular, other cities and towns had to be stimulated 
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in their growth, based on their economic potential. Countermagnets have 
to be selected and developed to slow down the growth of Bangalore. These 
countermagnets were to have attributes that made them interesting for 
migrants, investors and industries to settle in such urban areas; and to have 
a sound economic base, educational facilities, health facilities, 
communication and basic amenities. In this context, Mangalore, Hubli-
Dharwad, Gulbarga and Mysore were referred to as premier cities in the 
state. There were also other (chains of) cities with a good regional 
potential: Shimoga, Davangere-Harihar, Bellary-Raichur-Bidar. 
Communication corridors have to be established in order to facilitate the 
growth of these cities. The establishment of urban-rural linkages through 
small and medium towns is the second feature in the urban development 
strategy. This strategy is to avoid continued urban-urban migration through 
schemes such as the IDSMT. The third feature is the development of areas 
with special potential. The West Coast was seen as one of the most 
promising areas. The new Konkan railway line that would connect 
Bombay to Mangalore and the naval, export and power related projects16 
in this region would trigger off further development which needed to be 
supported by investments in infrastructure and communication. The paper 
also indicated the potential resources and institutions that were required for 
the implementation of this strategy. However, little detail was provided 
about the magnitude of financial requirements, the pattern of funding, the 
time schedule and the responsibilities that the named agencies had to take 
for the success of the strategy. 
In conclusion, one can observe that the Urban Development Strategy 
Karnataka paper (1994) was more or less in line with the Report of 
National Commission on Urbanisation, 1988 and to some extent 
Karnataka's Industrial Policy Resolution, 1993. On the one hand, the 
Report of the NCU had been a mere reference point for the authors and 
decision makers of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1993 and, on the 
other hand, it was more likely that the authors of the resolution might not 
have been aware of the contents of the NCU Report. As a matter of fact, 
the Resolution had ignored six of eight cities which were categorised as 
Generating Economic Momentum and selected other cities instead, for 
example, Dharwad, Hassan and Mysore to name the most important ones 
(See table 8-4). 
Such as the construction of an oil refinery, iron ore and steel processing industries, a 
naval base and an atomic power plant. 
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Table 8-4: Status of Karnataka's cities and towns in urban development 
and industrial policy documents 
Name of 
the city 
Bangalore 
Gulbarga 
Davangere 
Shimoga 
Raichur 
Tumkur 
Bidar 
Harihar 
Karwar 
Belgaum 
Hubli 
Dharwad 
Hosur 
Mysore 
Mandya 
Hospet 
Bellary 
Hassan 
Mangalore 
Bijapur 
ReportNCU, 1988 
National Priority City, 
SPUR* and Corridor 
city 
GEM** 
GEM and SPUR 
GEM 
GEM and SPUR and 
corridor city 
GEM and SPUR and 
corridor city 
GEM 
GEM and SPUR and 
corridor city 
GEM 
SPUR and corridor city 
SPUR 
SPUR 
SPUR and corridor city 
SPUR and corridor city 
SPUR 
SPUR and corridor city 
SPUR and corridor city 
-
-
* 
Industrial Development 
Resolution, 1993 
High-tech, non-polluting 
industries 
-
-
* 
Growth centre 
-
* 
-
Western indust. devt. 
» 
-
Growth centre, and 
electronics city 
-
Electronics city 
-
-
* 
Growth centre 
Western industr. devt. 
-
Karnataka Urban 
Development Strategy, 
1994 
Contain growth, 
Megacity project and 
corridor city 
State premier city 
Regional first-line city 
Regional first-line city 
and corridor city 
Regional first-line city 
and corridor city 
Regional first-line city 
and corridor city 
. 
Regional first-line city 
and corridor city 
• 
State premier city and 
corridor city 
State premier city 
State premier city 
Corridor city 
State premier city and 
corridor city 
-
Corridor city 
Regional first-line city 
and corridor city 
-
State premier city 
Regional second-line 
city 
SPUR Spatial Priority Urbanisation Regions 
GEM Generating Economic Momentum 
Source: Urban Development Strategy for Karnataka State, Government of Karnataka 
(1994). 
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As per the Constitution, the state governments are responsible for urban 
and industrial development. Only where the central government would 
financially contribute, some leverage might be exerted in decision making. 
What is also notable in table 8-4 is that the cities of Bidar, Karwar and 
Mandya received a low status in the Urban Development Strategy paper 
while other cities were added: Mangalore and Bijapur, the latter being in 
line with the Industrial Policy Resolution. In the Industrial Development 
Resolution, Karwar and Hassan received a high status which were not 
selected in Karnataka's Urban Development Strategy Paper. There might 
have been political reasons for such inconsistencies. For example, Hassan 
and Mandya are known to be political battlefields between the Congress(I) 
and the Janata Dal, while the coastal cities of Mangalore and Karwar were 
fast becoming strong electoral footholds of the BJP, the opposition party. 
The fact that the strategy paper provided little detail on the modalities of 
finance and implementation indicates that the document was at the 
beginning of its trajectory and had to overcome a political hurdle first: the 
selection of cities and towns for development. In 1994, the Congress(I) led 
Cabinet was to be in office one more year and it was widely predicted to 
lose to the Janata Dal. It was a good reason probably, that no more details 
were provided in this document. 
8.10 Review of Karnataka's policies for housing and urban 
development 
From the above analysis of the housing and urban development policies in 
the 1980s and 1990s in particular, a number of observations can be made. 
It is clear that only the five-year plans obtained an official status, i.e. an 
approval of the legislative assembly, and a budget outlay. All other 
documents and reports have had a administrative status and - at the most -
been a primer for the next five-year plan document. Apparently, the 
Government of Karnataka attached little importance to any draft housing 
or urban development strategy paper. The five-year plans were considered 
sufficient to guide Karnataka's urban development. 
What do the consecutive five-year plans of the Government of 
Karnataka teach us? First of all, the state government was pre-occupied 
with compulsions of rural development. Urban growth was long perceived 
as a negative effect of rural poverty and one that should be contained at its 
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source. Secondly, equality in a traditionally socialist country had been 
translated into an urban policy of dispersal of growth and benefits over a 
range of secondary cities. These had to be hierarchically ordered, a concept 
that is rooted in established spatio-locational theories. These theories do 
not carry any meaning without testing actual economic and socio-
demographic realities. While such concepts have been used in the various 
documents, there was never any verification. The state government 
believed that it could create an urban landscape by simply designating 
certain cities as 'growth centres'. In this sense the presented policies do not 
only signify conceptual adventurism but also a certain level of naivete. An 
example is the urban development policy paper of 1986. 
The role of the central government vis-à-vis the Government of 
Karnataka should be commented upon. The potential influence can be 
measured by the magnitude of the financial outlay and actual achievements 
of the central government sponsored schemes. These have, in fact, been 
rather small in comparison to other investments made in the state 
government schemes. Moreover, the centrally sponsored schemes were 
handled by the Department for Town Planning and the Directorate of 
Municipal Administration, agencies that have always been small and never 
been able to implement large programmes. The real movers of urban 
development under the Secretariat for Housing and Urban Development 
are the housing and water supply boards, i.e. the BDA, BWSSB, KHB and 
the KUWS&DB. Central government control on urban development in 
Karnataka has, thus, been limited on these powerful agencies. Nor has the 
control been strong through the national policy documents and guidelines. 
As observed, these were at best referred to, but provided no guiding 
principle for the location of projects, allocation of funds between 
departments, or policy formulation by other departments, such as the 
Department for Industry and Commerce. 
There has hardly been an attempt in any of the policy documents to 
adequately analyse and understand the dynamics of city growth and rural-
urban migration. Especially the underlying economic forces and their 
impact on the spatial pattern of growth were not addressed. The Seventh 
Five-Year Plan document did make an attempt to start a more deliberate 
urbanisation policy. While the plan raised essential policy issues, it failed 
to draw a definite conclusion or present a comprehensive perspective, 
policy or direction for housing and urban development. The Eighth Five-
Year Plan is no better and lacked, for example, consistency between 
analysis, objectives, targets, activities and outlays. It has been observed 
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that this not only applies between departments but also between agencies 
of one department. As a result, linkages between the sub-sectors of 
housing, centrally sponsored schemes, state town planning, water supply 
and sanitation have been at best weak. 
It has been observed that there has been a shift around 1980 in the 
way schemes were identified. While there was formerly a vague notion of 
objective-driven formulation of schemes, it was transformed into a agency-
driven formulation of schemes. Consequently, overtones of maintaining 
the agency's portfolio and budgets have started to dominate. There was 
also little critical reflection on the achievements of programmes and 
projects. There has been a strong focus on projects, programmes and 
money; on what, rather than on why and for whom. The engineering 
departments, such as the KHB, the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board, the 
В WSSB and KUWS&DB are strong examples of this. 
There have been disappointing achievements in inexpensive mass 
housing by the KHB. Moreover, the remarkable achievements and the 
strong upward price trend of conventional housing during the Seventh and 
Eighth Five-Year Plan periods, illustrate that the Karnataka Housing Board 
has had little interest in serving their main target group: the urban (and 
rural) low-income. 
The achievements in the water supply and sewerage sub-sectors 
have also not been encouraging while doubts were raised about the ability 
to achieve full cost-recovery and also the legitimacy of accepting a high 
level of subsidy for capital intensive schemes, such as the Cauvery Water 
Supply Scheme for Bangalore. These essential observations were without 
consequences and things remained as they were. In the last five-year plan, 
however, the BWSSB was forced to raise more resources from revenues 
and financing institutions instead of turning to the state government for 
support. 
The situation of local bodies is aptly expressed in the words of the 
State Finance Commission: 
'Ironically, the plan documents of neither the Central nor the state 
government have paid any attention to the financial and material 
requirements of Urban Local Bodies even though the urban public 
system is acknowledged to play a positive role in the regional and 
national development processes. On the contrary, what happened 
was that after identifying their overall weaknesses there emerged 
some independent and specialised agencies with their own plans, the 
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execution of which cost unimaginable huge amounts to the already 
starving Urban Local Bodies. Consequently, many cities and towns 
were unaware of their own town plans and many did not even 
attempt their study' (Karnataka State Finance Commission, 1996, p. 
75) 
The perceived technical and financial incapacity of local bodies led to 
fragmentation of functions over several specialised state agencies for water 
supply, housing, sewerage, land acquisition and land development, slum 
improvement and re-settlement and central government sponsored 
schemes. Moreover, the abolition of octroi was a major blow to any further 
self-sufficiency and local self-government in Karnataka. The Directorate 
of Municipal Administration was expected to become the main agency to 
strengthen local governance and assist in urban local bodies in their 
development. With no effective devolution of powers to local bodies and 
no enhancement of the financial position of municipalities, the status and 
importance of the Directorate became questionable. The State Finance 
Commission with regard to Urban Local Bodies held the view that 'it [the 
DMA - hm] became a stumbling block by holding back the approval to the 
resolutions passed by the elected municipal bodies' (ibid., p. 290) and 
proposed its abolishing. 
The overall conclusion is that the urban development policy 
documents analysed in this chapter have not and did not constitute a 
deliberate guide to the urban development in Karnataka. Rather, these 
documents endorse and allow what the established state level agencies 
think is best. The rise and fall of budget Outlays for the state government 
sectors and sub-sectors between 1974-97 have illustrated this. If these 
documents are permissive rather than prescriptive, by what factors are (the 
unwritten, intrinsic) policies, programmes and projects conceived, 
designed, located and implemented? The following chapters aim to 
provide an answer by a detailed study of a number of central and state 
housing and urban development schemes. 
9 
Housing and Infrastructure Investment Patterns in 
Urban Karnataka 
The first step to further unravel the (actual) housing and urban 
development policies in Karnataka is to identify where, what, why and 
how much investment has been made in this sector. What was the per 
capita investment in urban local bodies for housing and urban development 
respectively? Did larger or smaller cities receive more per capita 
investment? Did urban areas with a higher development level receive less 
or more funds than less developed cities? Those cities that received more 
funds, did this priority match with the recommendations of the Report of 
the National Commission on Urbanisation in 1989, the Industrial 
Development Resolution of 1993 and the Urban Development Strategy 
Paper of 1994? Did cities with strong political ties receive more funds than 
those with weak political ties? Was there any consideration for the 
financial situation of the urban local bodies in allocating project funds to 
ensure proper contribution or repayment? These and other questions are 
dealt with in this chapter at an aggregate level for the approximately 170 
cities and towns in Karnataka for the period 1980-94. For this purpose, 
secondary data has been collected from the various state government 
agencies. Secondly, three indices have been developed that serve as an 
indication of the development status, the financial status and the political 
affiliation of each urban local body during the period of study. 
Housing and Infrastructure Investment Patterns in Karnataka 199 
9.1 Karnataka's urban agglomerations 
Under the Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 and the Karnataka 
Municipalities Act, 1964, the urban agglomerations are administratively 
divided into city corporations, city municipal councils, town municipal 
councils, notified area committees, cantonment boards and sanitary boards. 
Totally, there are 176 urban local bodies (See table 9-1). The remaining 78 
urban agglomerations fall under the district administration. The Secretariat 
for Housing and Urban Development is administratively responsible for 
these 176 urban local bodies. 
Table 9-1: Category, number and population size of urban local bodies in 
Karnataka (1994) 
Type Number Population size 
Municipal corporation 
City municipal council 
Town municipal council 
Cantonment board 
Notified area committee 
Sanitary board 
Total 
7 
19 
135 
1 
12 
2 
176 
2,650,659 -
265,971 -
66,660 -
74,865 -
81,257-
303,139 
51,011 
12,412 
23,912 
3,130 
72,481 
Sources: Housing and Urban Development Department, Annual Report 1994-95 
(1995); Government of India, MUOD (1994). 
Statistics about these urban local bodies are generated and retained with 
the municipalities themselves and a number of state government agencies. 
From time to time, a publication of a selection of these statistics is issued. 
Noteworthy in this context are the annual reports of the Department for 
Housing and Urban Development, the Municipal Statistics (1994) 
published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics and the Vital 
Statistics (1993) of city and town municipalities by the Directorate of 
Municipal Administration. While the Municipal Statistics are based on 
administrative and financial information, the latter was based on a survey 
of all 169 CMCs, TMCs, notified area committees, sanitary boards and one 
cantonment board falling under the purview of the Directorate of 
Municipal Administration. Both data refer to the year 1992-93. Initially 
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five urban local bodies failed to produce the requested data. Through an 
extra effort by the author, four urban local bodies produced the data. City 
corporations had not been included and it was also not possible to generate 
statistics in a similar manner. In total, 'vital statistics' have been collected 
of 168 urban local bodies. The survey resulted in a wealth of financial, 
physical, social and economic data1. While most data can be considered 
accurate, the reliability of some data may be doubted2. 
To analyse the implementation of housing and urban development 
policies in about 170 municipalities in Karnataka, it was necessary to have 
a set of indicators. Besides using municipal statistics collected by the state 
government, there was a need for composite indices. Three composite 
indices have been developed which were derived from the research 
questions (chapter 2): a development status index, financial status index 
and political affiliation index. These have been explained in the following 
sections. 
9.2 Development status of urban local bodies in Karnataka 
The development of urban agglomerations depends to a large extent on the 
commercial and industrial activities that have settled in the respective 
towns and cities. The economic vitality of the city or town is usually 
measured in terms of the local gross produce, the volume or weight of the 
produce, the generated employment or the actual revenue income based on 
these activities. Except for the number of registered and licensed industries 
and commercial activities, none of the mentioned indicators have been 
quantified or data generated by any state government institution. Another 
entry point for the assessment of the status of urban local bodies is to use 
1
 For example, data was collected on land use pattern, type and condition of roads, water 
supply situation, sewerage and sanitation facilities, street lights, municipal properties, 
educational and medical facilities, number of telephones, markets, trade licenses, banks, 
hotels, industries, employment, recreational facilities, tourist attractions, number of 
slums and slum dwellers, income and expenditure figures. 
2
 Accurate data pertains to the length and type of roads, number of hotels, restaurants, 
industries, medical and market facilities, water supply and other infrastructure systems, 
and municipal equipment as they are based on existing and maintained municipal 
records. Unreliable data relates to the number of daily visitors to the city, land use 
pattern, registered number of unemployed people, number of slums and their 
inhabitants. 
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indicators that would signify the development status. These are factors that 
would trigger or sustain economic investments and activities, are 
sometimes referred to as 'infrastructure' and 'services'. In this study an 
attempt has been made to compose a development status index based on 
'infrastructure' and 'services' which would encourage and support a local 
economy. These are: 
- presence of a national highway, state highway or district road; 
- presence of a broad or meter gauge railway line; 
- the number of higher education facilities, such as high school colleges 
and polytechnic colleges per 1000 inhabitants; 
- the number of telephone connection per 1000 inhabitants; 
- the number of markets (daily, weekly) and so-called Agricultural 
Produce Market Centres (APMC); 
- the number of hotels and restaurants per 1000 inhabitants; 
- the number of industries per 1000 inhabitants; and 
- the number of banks per 1000 inhabitants. 
It is realised that the presence of these factors do not ensure that a city is 
buzzing with economic activities. However, there is reasonable probability 
that this will be the case and it has been considered sufficient justification 
to construe and use the development status index in further analysis. It has 
also been realised that each of the above factors will not contribute equally 
to the development status and a weighing factor has been applied. More 
weight has been given to those towns with a national highway, a 
agricultural market and a larger number of industries. These factors are 
expected to contribute more to the local economy than, for example, the 
number of educational facilities, telephone connections and banks. The 
development status index has been composed as illustrated in table 9-2. 
Three categories have been distinguished. Those municipalities with a 
development index score higher than 16.0 have been categorised as 'high', 
those between 12.0-16.0 as 'middle' and those lower than 12.0 as 'low'. 
The development status index will be used for later analysis. 
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Figure 9-1: Development status index of urban local bodies in Karnataka 
Arabian 
Sea 
¡angelare Rural 
TAMIL NADU 
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It will suffice to indicate here how the development status index compares 
with the classification of urban agglomerations and the districts in which 
they fall. As one may expect the higher classified urban agglomerations 
also have a higher development status index. However, there are a good 
number of Class III and IV towns that have a reasonably high development 
status index (See table 9-3). 
The geographical distribution of the urban local bodies is illustrated 
in figure 9-1. There are 20 districts in Kamataka which are listed below. 
The south-western districts are coastal, rain-fed and have a moderate 
climate as compared to the north-eastern, interior, drier and hotter districts 
(See also figure 5-1). Figure 9-1 illustrates that the districts of Dakshina 
Kannada, Hassan, Bangalore Urban, Bangalore Rural, Uttara Kannada and 
Chitradurga have more urban local bodies with a higher development 
index. The districts of Mandya, Belgaum and Gulbarga have more urban 
local bodies with lower development index. There is, however, not a very 
clear pattern. At best, one can say that the better developed urban local 
bodies are located in three districts that belong to the southern half of 
Kamataka, while the urban local bodies with a low development status 
index are located in three districts in the northern part of the State. The 
urban local bodies with a low development index are clustered in a few 
areas. Noteworthy is the large cluster of such towns in the border area of 
Belgaum and Bijapur near the state of Maharashtra, and towards the border 
area of Dharwad and Raichur districts. More than half the urban local 
bodies with a low development index can be found in this area. A second 
area with a concentration of urban local bodies with a low development 
index is around Bangalore. Apparently, the economic pull-forces of the 
metropolitan city have kept away development efforts from these smaller 
towns. 
9.3 Financial status of urban local bodies in Kamataka 
The income situation of urban local bodies is determined by the revenues 
that are generated locally through tax and non-tax revenues. As explained 
in chapter 6, urban local bodies in Kamataka have become increasingly 
dependent on state government development grants and subsidies. The 
share of these grants and subsidies indicate usually the financial weakness 
of the municipality; when the deficit is large, the state government will 
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assist to a larger degree. To a lesser extent will it indicate the state 
government's support in development tasks. The income per capita will 
provide a good insight in the resources and effort of urban local bodies to 
generate their own revenues, and their success in lobbying for additional 
financial support from the state government. 
A few remarks have to be made with regard to the interpretation of 
the presented data. As explained in chapter 6, local revenues are to a large 
extent determined by property tax. Property tax is based on the assessed 
rental value of each registered property. The rental value depends on the 
local property market situation and is higher in larger cities and lower in 
smaller towns. Keeping this in mind, the per capita income in larger urban 
local bodies is higher. Local income based on non-tax revenues depend to 
a large extent on the number of commercial enterprises in each town and 
city. And again in this, the larger cities have an advantage over smaller 
ones. Figures are compared in per capita and as much as possible in real 
terms. The data presented below are extracted from four sources: 
- The Local Finance Commission (1986), Report on Urban Local Bodies in 
Kamataka State, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore with financial 
statistics for the fiscal years 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83; 
- Municipal Statistics by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics of 
1994, based on statistics pertaining to the fiscal year 1992-93; 
- Vital Statistics of City/Town Municipalities by the Directorate of 
Municipal Administration of 1993 based on statistics pertaining to the 
fiscal year 1992-93; and 
- The State Finance Commission, Report of the State Finance Commission 
Relating to Urban Local Bodies of 1996 with financial statistics from the 
fiscal year 1994-95. 
With regard to the first source, the last fiscal year 1982-83 has been 
referred to because the payment of octroi compensation had been fully 
established by then, which makes comparison with later years more valid. 
Statistics on municipal finance in Karnataka are known to have 
shortcomings. These are mainly due to inconsistent or incorrect entries of 
income and expenditures by municipalities under the prescribed heads. 
The low educational level of revenue and finance officers, particularly, in 
small towns plays an important role here. For example, there are 
considerable differences between the income and expenditure figures 
presented in the Vital Statistics report (Directorate of Municipal 
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Administration, 1993) and Municipal Statistics report (Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics, 1994) though they refer to the same fiscal year 
1992-93. Another reason is the obligation to show a nil or surplus balance. 
Expenses are sometimes not recorded in the respective years. An example 
is the difference between income and expenditure for the year 1992-93 as 
submitted to the divisional commissioner's office with a close-to-nil 
deficit (Municipal Statistics, DES, 1994) and the considerable gaps in the 
Vital Statistics reported in the questionnaire submitted to the DMA (1993). 
There is also a huge backlog in the preparation of audit reports on 
municipal accounts and, secondly, in the corrections of previous entries as 
per the instructions in accepted audit reports. 
Table 9-4: Comparison of the income situation of urban local bodies in 
Karnataka between 1982-95 
District 
All Corporations. 
(in real terms) 
All CMCs 
(in real terms) 
All TMCs 
(in real terms) 
All ULBs 
(in real terms) 
No. of 
ULBs 
6 
19 
135 
160 
1982-83 
101.26 
101.26 
65.81 
65.81 
47.24 
47.24 
75.92 
75.92 
Income per capita 
(in Rs.) 
1992-93 
391.05 
163.07 
193.54 
80.71 
123.52 
51.51 
256.55 
106.98 
1994-95 
476.74 
168.77 
188.42 
66.70 
124.57 
44.10 
293.92 
104.05 
Increase 
1982-95 
(in %) 
+66.7 
+1.4 
-6.7 
+37.1 
Notes: - Urban local bodies without available data have been excluded. 
- Income includes all municipal revenues, state grants and subsidies. 
- Discount factor factors that have been used for the respective years are 1.00, 
0.417 and 0.354 and are based on the Consumer Price Index for non-manual 
urban labour. 
Sources: State Finance Commission (1996); Local Finance Commission (1986); 
Directorate of Economics and Statistics (1994). 
It can not be ignored also that there is a leakage of revenues, subsidies and 
grants into unaccounted-for purposes which leads to 'adjusted' recordings. 
The presented statistics should, thus, be interpreted with some care and 
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only major trends and patterns analysed. The aggregate figures (See table 
9-4) reveal that the income situation in real terms of town municipal 
councils have been on the decline. Nor is the financial performance of the 
city municipal council comforting with only a marginal increase in real 
income. This is in contrast to the six corporations in Karnataka who have 
achieved a 67 per cent income increase between 1982 and 1995. 
For the purpose of analysis, a financial status index has been 
construed. The index is calculated by taking the per capita income figures 
of 1982-83 (Local Finance Commission, 1986) and of 1992-93 
(Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 1994) in real terms, i.e. at 1982-
83 prices. Six income groups have been distinguished which have been 
combined to three categories. Those municipalities with a per capita 
income of more than Rs. 58.0 have been categorised as 'high', those 
between Rs. 38.0-58.0 as 'middle' and those lower than Rs. 38.0 per capita 
as 'low'. The district-wise results are presented in table 9-5. 
The first observation is that the average per capita income figures 
for the districts are considerably distorted by the income figures of the 
larger city municipal councils and richer municipal corporations. This is 
particularly true for nine out of the twenty districts. District averages 
conceal the impoverished and under-developed urban local bodies. The 
districts which have a larger number of urban local bodies in the higher per 
capita income categories (more than Rs. 58.0) are Hassan, Uttara Kannada, 
Chitradurga and Dharwad and also Belgaum. However, Dharwad and 
Belgaum also have a considerable number of impoverished urban local 
bodies. Districts that are particularly impoverished are Bellary, Gulbarga 
and Bidar with more than half of the urban local bodies with a per capita 
income below Rs. 38.0. 
The geographical distribution is presented in figure 9-2. The cluster 
that was found in figure 9-1 for the development status index can be 
discovered here as well. However, the northern cluster of impoverished 
urban local bodies is more wide-spread and runs from south-west to north-
east with a large concentration of low-income urban local bodies in the 
districts of Dharwad, Raichur, Gulbarga, Bellary and also Bidar. The 
second cluster of low-income urban local bodies can be found more 
distinctively in the south-eastern districts of Bangalore Urban, Kolar and 
also Mandya. The axis runs also from south-west to north-east. The 
economic activities in and around Bangalore has not had a positive effect 
on the income situation of these urban local bodies. 
Housing and Infrastructure Investment Patterns in Karnataka 209 
Table 9-5: Financial status index and average per capita income of urban 
local bodies per district between 1982-92 at 1982 prices 
District Total Average Category financial status index 
ULBs district High Middle Low 
Per capita income categories (Rs.) 
>67.0 >58.0 >48.0 >38.0 >28.0 <28.0 
D.Kannada 
Kodagu 
Mysore 
Hassan 
Chikmagalur 
Mandya 
Shimoga 
В'lore rural 
U.Kannada 
Tumkur 
B'lore urban 
Chitradurga 
Kolar 
Dharwad 
Belgaum 
Bellary 
Raichur 
Bijapur 
Gulbarga 
Bidar 
Total 
11 
1 
8 
6 
4 
5 
4 
8 
8 
6 
4 
5 
10 
19 
17 
10 
8 
17 
10 
5 
166 
Notes: See table 9-4. 
96.04 
94.74 
95.91 
124.66 
60.68 
59.44 
59.23 
50.16 
68.67 
65.11 
144.52 
76.82 
43.99 
88.94 
93.43 
45.34 
56.00 
61.32 
41.32 
37.66 
91.45 
2 
I 
: 2 . 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
4 
1 
2 
33 
2 
2 
1 
1 
I 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
15 
3 
3 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
3 
I 
4 
2 
6 
1 
33 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
1 
3 
2 
3 
4 
2 
2 
29 
1 
1 
I 
3 
1 
4 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
3 
28 
1 
1 
I 
1 
8 
4 
4 
1 
2 
5 
28 
Sources: Local Finance Commission (1986); Directorate of Economics and Statistics 
(1994). 
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Figure 9-2: Financial status of urban local bodies in Kamataka 
Arabian 
Sea 
¡anjre Rural 
TAMIL NADU 
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The per capita income of each urban local body comprises of self-
generated revenues and income through state government development 
grants and subsidies. There is, thus, a degree of dependence on the state 
government for the annual financial bookkeeping. The table 9-6 gives the 
state government grants as part of the total income between 1982 and 
1995. The table illustrates that the state government has been reducing the 
share of grants to urban local bodies. 
Table 9-6: State government grants as part of total income of urban local 
bodies in Karnataka between 1982-95. 
Source of income 
TMCs (nos.): 
Government Grants (%) 
Municipal revenues (%) 
Total income (%) 
CMCs (nos.): 
Government Grants (%) 
Municipal revenues (%) 
Total income (%) 
CCs (nos.): 
Government Grants (%) 
Municipal revenues (%) 
Total income (%) 
1982-83 
213 
42.6 
57.4 
100.0 
14 
42.8 
57.2 
100.0 
6 
41.8 
58.2 
100.0 
Fiscal year 
1992-93 
136 
37.4 
62.6 
100.0 
19 
35.1 
64.9 
100.0 
. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1994-95 
135 
32.5 
67.5 
100.0 
19 
37.0 
63.0 
100.0 
7 
37.8 
62.2 
100.0 
* Municipal revenues include income from taxes, non-taxes, loans, state 
government tax shares, rents, etc. 
Note: The figures may differ from earlier data presented as a different sample has 
been taken, as well as a different source of information for the year 1992-93. 
The Municipal Statistics, 1992-93 of the Directorate for Economics and 
Statistics have been prepared in a different manner than in the other 
documents, hence, the choice for the figures of the DMA for the same year. 
Sources: Local Finance Commission (1986): Directorate of Municipal Administration 
(1993); State Finance Commission (1996). 
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This decline is particularly true for the town municipal councils. It is 
remarkable that those urban local bodies that needed additional support 
most, received less and less financial assistance from the government. In 
other words, the 'poorest became poorer'. 
9.4 Political affiliation of urban local bodies in Karnataka 
It is postulated in the conceptual framework in chapter two that a positive 
affiliation, good rapport, understanding or clout with the politicians in the 
district and at the state capital help to secure projects and funds. For 
example, a municipal council that is dominated by the Congress(I) party 
could approach the MLA of the same party to put in a word with a 
colleague MLA, who is the Cabinet minister responsible for releasing 
funds or listing projects. The council could also approach the Cabinet 
directly in case the MLA is of the opposite party. However, the Cabinet 
may be reluctant to help the council as the MLA may claim this effort to 
be his. In case of an opposition party dominating the council, the MLA 
could pressurise party-members in the Cabinet to earmark funds or 
projects to his or her constituency. However, the funds and projects may be 
directed to rural areas in the constituency in order to give no opportunity to 
the opposition party in the council to claim success and a chance to be re-
elected. Securing funds and projects, would particularly be effective when 
the MLA has become member of the Cabinet, either as a minister or better 
even as chief minister. In both cases, the MLA or minister would build 
goodwill in his/her constituency and political support from the electorate. 
During the next election this minister or chief minister could campaign for 
re-election with ease claiming the accomplishments during his or her 
tenure. This rationale is the basis for the construction of a political 
affiliation index which is summarised in table 9-7. 
The term of a MLA and of a municipal council is five years. It is 
unfortunate that the state government does not maintain records of the 
results of municipal elections. This data is only kept at the municipalities 
and with the district administration3. During the field work, an attempt was 
made to collect this information by a postal questionnaire to all urban local 
bodies. However, the state government did not want to co-operate as they 
3
 The maintenance of municipal election results at the state level was only introduced in 
1996 and it may be possible to verify this part of the proposition in the near future. 
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considered this information 'sensitive' and a postal questionnaire sent 
through the University of Mysore failed because of a very poor response. 
Table 9-7: Rationale of political affiliation index 
Political affiliation 
Dominant party 
in municipal 
council 
Same as Cabinet 
Opposite to 
Cabinet 
Same as Cabinet 
Opposite to 
Cabinet 
ι 
Party of the 
local MLA 
Same as Cabinet 
Same as Cabinet 
Opposite to 
Cabinet 
Opposite to 
Cabinet 
Implication 
Expected impact 
More development 
funds and projects 
More development 
funds and projects, 
possibly outside 
urban area 
No extra 
development funds 
or projects 
No extra 
development funds 
or projects 
Indicator 
Above normal per capita 
investment in housing 
and infrastructure during 
this tenure 
Above normal per capita 
investment in housing 
and infrastructure during 
this tenure 
Per capita investment not 
above normal 
Per capita investment not 
above normal 
While it was not possible to include the composition of the municipal 
council, the index has been built on the affiliation of the local MLA vis-à-
vis the party that constituted the Cabinet. It should be noted that the term 
of a minister is often shorter than five years. It is a common practice in 
Karnataka that the chief minister has to satisfy many allies and he can do 
so by making them ministers for a while. This could be for a few months to 
two or even three years. It hardly happens that a minister serves a full term. 
Even the chief minister may be changed when he is not able to sail safely 
through dissidence, defection and political allegation from the opposition 
and also fellow party men. For example, between 1989-94 totally 47 
ministers served at one point of time in the Congress(I) Cabinet recruited 
from a pool of 77 Congress(I) MLAs. 
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Table 9-8: Top and low ranking urban agglomerations according political 
affiliation index 
MC, CMC or TMC Name of urban Class Total score 
agglomeration 
Top ranking: 
MC 
MC 
TMC 
MC 
TMC 
TMC 
TMC 
TMC 
TMC 
TMC 
TMC 
Bottom ranking: 
TMC 
TMC 
TMC 
MC 
SB 
CMC 
CMC 
TMC 
Bangalore 
Mysore 
Karkala 
Hubli-Dharwad 
Hoovina Hadagali 
Hunsur 
Gowribidanur 
Madhugiri 
Kanakapura 
Birur 
Holenarasipur 
Bailhongal 
Bhalki 
Khanapur 
Belgaum 
Kolar Gold Fields 
Robertsonpet, KGF 
Nipani 
Chamarajanagar 
I 
I 
III 
I 
IV 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
III 
IV 
I 
I 
I 
II 
III 
171.07 
41.60 
34.00 
30.23 
25.03 
24.07 
21.8» 
21.78 
21.20 
20.85 
20.14 
4.00 
4.00 
4.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
The political affiliation index has been construed for each urban local body 
for the period 1978-94, the period of study. The index has been based on 
the following factors: 
1. When the political party of the local MLA is the same as the Cabinet, 
a score of one for each year or a part thereof; no score in case of a 
negative affiliation; 
2. When the local MLA has become a minister or the chief minister, a 
score of two or three points respectively for each year of tenure or a 
part thereof. 
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In this manner, the index score can vary from zero to around sixteen for 
the whole period of study 1978-94. The score could further increase when 
the local MLA had been a minister or chief minister for a greater period of 
time. The score for corporations is higher as there is more than one 
constituency within the municipal boundaries. In these cases, the score 
may go beyond twenty. For example, Bangalore City Corporation obtained 
a score of 171.07. As an illustration, the top and lowest ranking urban local 
bodies are listed in table 9-8 with their respective scores. The geographical 
distribution has been shown in figure 9-3. Four categories have been 
distinguished in figure 9-3. Those municipalities with a political affiliation 
index score of more than 20.0 have been categorised as 'high', those 
between 16.0-20.0, those between 16.0-20.0 as 'above average', those 
between 12.0-16.0 as 'middle' and those lower than 12.0 as 'low'. 
The geographical distribution of the index in figure 9-3 reveal a few 
patterns. The districts of Uttara Kannada, Belgaum and Bidar in the 
northern part of the state have had a poor affiliation with the political 
power in Bangalore in the South. Moreover, there a many urban local 
bodies in the districts of Kolar, Dharwad and Raichur that have a low 
index rating. Proximity to the centre of power seems to matter here. The 
data do not reveal any additional patterns as already observed above. There 
is no distinct geographical concentration of urban local bodies with either 
a low or high political affiliation between 1978-94. They could very well 
be located next to each other. Apparently, factors other than geography 
play a role in the determination of political preference of urban local 
bodies in Karnataka. 
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Figure 9-3: Political affiliation index of urban local bodies in Karnataka, 
1978-94 
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9.5 Investments for housing and infrastructure projects in 
urban local bodies 
Development in urban local bodies in Karnataka is ultimately determined 
by the investments of companies, households, entrepreneurs and 
government. The state government has a number of instruments to guide 
urban development in a particular direction. One important instrument is 
directing state government investments toward such cities and towns. As 
far as urban development is concerned, the state government has a certain 
degree of influence in: 
1. The development of agriculture produce in a region by providing 
irrigation, establishment of agriculture markets, subsidising pump sets 
for irrigation, etc. These investment measures also have a positive 
effect on the commercial activities in nearby cities and towns; 
2. Industrial investments by the provision of land, subsidies and loans to 
private entrepreneurs, or establishment of government owned 
enterprises; 
3. The creation of infrastructure such as roads, schools, hospitals, 
electricity, markets, establishing bus and rail lines, etc.; 
4. The issuance of land use permits, development guidelines and bylaws 
facilitating economic and urban growth; and 
5. The creation of housing, water supply, and other basic city amenities 
and services. 
Regarding the agriculture investments, no data was available other than at 
the district level. Secondly, it is difficult to accrue certain investments to 
urban local bodies as the location of physical output is not known. Thirdly, 
it is even more difficult to attribute such investments, wherever their 
location, to economic development of urban local bodies. In terms of the 
industrial investments, data is available at the level of urban local bodies 
which are presented later in this study for comparison. The Department of 
Industry and Commerce is the responsible state agency and have located 
such projects near urban agglomerations for reasons of labour and 
infrastructure. However, the exact location of investments can be within, 
close or at a certain distance from an urban agglomeration. The exact 
location cannot be determined from the records. However, an attempt has 
been made to categorise the investments as much as possible under the 
nearest urban agglomeration. Another limitation is that such investments 
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have been accrued to one urban agglomeration while other urban 
agglomerations may also have benefited. The social, education, health and 
infrastructure facilities mentioned under the third point, are provided by a 
myriad of institutions such as the Public Health Department, Education 
Department, Health Department, Public Health and Engineering 
Department, the Kamataka Electricity Board, the Karnataka State Road 
and Transportation Corporation and the Railways Ministry of the 
Government of India. It has not been possible to collect information in a 
systematic manner and no reference has been made to these investments in 
this study. It would probably require a study equivalent to this, to be of 
significance. The last two instruments are under the control of the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and have been included 
in this study. Regarding the last instrument, an analysis has been made of 
the investments in each urban local body between 1980 and 1994 with 
regard to: 
1. Housing projects by the KHB as per their own and HUDCO's 
records; 
2. Housing projects by the KSCB as per their own and HUDCO's 
records 
3. Housing projects as per HUDCO's records for all other borrowing 
(state) agencies, mainly urban development authorities; 
4. Water supply projects as per records of the KUWS&DB; 
5. Sewerage and drainage works as per the records of the KUWS&DB; 
6. Low-cost sanitation project as per records of the KUWS&DB; 
7. Low-cost sanitation projects as per records of the DMA and HUDCO 
(IPLCS&LS); 
8. Slum upgrading projects as per records of the KSCB and the 
HUDCO; 
9. Investment under the scheme IDSMT as per DMA/TCPO records; 
and 
10. Investments under the UBSP scheme as per DMA records. 
This list of projects constitutes a comprehensive representation of the 
investments of all agencies falling under the Department for Housing and 
Urban Development. For all projects, the year of sanction and the 
sanctioned project costs have been taken as the base information. In total, 
622 schemes have been included that have been sanctioned between 1980 
and 1994. The total approved project cost amounts to Rs. 21.8 billion. In 
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later chapters, other project information such as progress, actual 
expenditure and re-allocation of project funds are discussed with the 
available project information. There are a number of investments which 
are not or partly included in this study: 
1. The investments by the urban development authorities for land 
acquisition and infrastructure projects, financed by the sale of land or 
by direct seed money from the department or financing institutions, 
other than the HUDCO. These are not known and could not be 
included. There are no public documents that provide such 
information and annual reports of the department provide very little 
and inconsistent details. It would have been interesting to know the 
contribution of these agencies4 to the production of housing stock, 
land and infrastructure in the larger cities of Karnataka. From the 
records, it is known that some of these are rather dormant such as in 
Chikmagalur and Kodagu. In contrast those in Bangalore, Mysore and 
Hubli-Dharwar have played a distinct role in housing and urban 
development; 
2. Housing schemes and infrastructure schemes that are undertaken by 
urban local bodies financed from their own sources and from other 
financial institutions, other than the HUDCO. As most urban local 
bodies included in this study have had very little means for 
undertaking projects on their own, it is expected that the outlays and 
number of projects are negligible; 
3. Projects and works that were undertaken under the special purpose or 
development grants from the state government or the district 
administration (e.g. the 18 per cent reservation for Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes). Many of these funds have been utilised for routine 
repairs and small extensions of roads and drains and not for larger 
infrastructure or housing projects. A large share has also been used 
for paying salaries of municipal employees, for electricity bills and 
loan repayments. The exclusion will probably not effect the outcome 
of the this study. 
4
 In 1980, there were ten improvement boards and in 1995 there were 21 urban 
development boards and one improvement board. 
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Table 9-9: Sanctioned investments for schemes in the housing and urban 
development sector in Karnataka between 1980-94. 
Scheme Investment Per cent of Per capita 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Housing schemes 
IDSMT 
Low-cost sanitation 
Water supply 
Underground drainage 
UBSP 
Slum upgradation 
Other infrastructure schemes 
NRY: SUME, SU WE and 
(in million Rs.) 
8,951 
592 
769 
10,440 
85 
37 
172 
269 
445 
total 
41.14 
2.72 
3.53 
47.98 
0.39 
0.17 
0.79 
1.24 
2.05 
(in Rs.) 
802.85 
53.11 
68.96 
936.40 
7.64 
3.28 
15.42 
24.14 
39.91 
SHASU 
Total 21,760 100.00 1,951.72 
Note: Including housing and infrastructure schemes for Bangalore city. 
Sources: HUDCO, KHB, KSCB, KUWS&DB and DMA records (1995-96). 
In table 9-9, an overview of the total and per capita investments of the 
various housing and infrastructure schemes has been presented and their 
respective share is indicated. The figures of the NRY-scheme have been 
based on available data from the districts. Housing and water supply 
schemes have comprised 89 per cent of the investments in Karnataka 
between 1980-94 which were financed by the state government. Moreover, 
a large portion of these investments went to the city of Bangalore alone. In 
fact, the above figures have been distorted considerably by the housing and 
infrastructure projects for Bangalore as we will see later. The remaining 
investments for specific urban poverty alleviation, employment and low-
cost sanitation schemes have had financial contributions from the central 
government. 
In the section below the selection of the location and outlay of 
housing and infrastructure projects have been examined. The examination 
was done by reconstructing the actual decision making by government 
officials, ministers, MLAs and others. It was not possible to interview the 
many actors that were involved in the hundreds of project decisions. These 
decision makers are, in the case of government officials, not any more with 
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the Housing and Urban Development Departments or have left politics. 
The examination had, thus, to use a number of possibly relevant and 
verifiable criteria for decision making: 
- Urban growth: the rapid urban growth would justify the need to 
improve the housing and infrastructure situation in order to 
accommodate the growing urban population; 
- Satisfying a deficit in housing stock, water supply, urban employment, 
etc. as per objectives of the scheme; 
- Development potential: urban local bodies with a higher development 
potential (as expressed in the development status index) are stimulated 
in their potential by projects. This is in line with the thinking of the 
various national and state urbanisation papers; 
- Political favourism: cities with a favourable political affiliation receive 
more project funds as their interests are better represented at the 
political level (i.e. those with a higher political affiliation index); 
- Dispersal policies: investment in those cities that will decrease the 
pressure on larger cities. The urban dispersal policy notion has been 
laid down in various state government papers and plans; 
- Convergence and co-ordination: in order to benefit from investments 
by other agencies of the state government, schemes of a 
complementary nature are co-ordinated or converged toward the same 
target group and in the same location; and 
- The ability of the urban local body to contribute to the investments and 
repay loan obligations as is the case of most infrastructure projects. 
The following section will analyse housing and infrastructure investment 
separately and then look at how these investments have been co-ordinated 
or converged for each urban local body in Karnataka. 
9.6 Housing investments between 1980-94 
Between 1980 and 1994, 287 housing schemes were sanctioned by the 
Government of Karnataka, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development at the cost of Rs. 8,951 million. These scheme constitute 
74,972 housing units of which 27,513 (or 36.7 per cent) had been reported 
as completed by the middle of 1995. 'Completion' implies the 
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administrative termination of projects and the initiation of allocation to 
beneficiaries. However, there are many schemes that are technically 
completed, and are already (partly) occupied without being officially 
completed. This situation proves at times advantageous for housing 
agencies as it can postpone the start of repayment schedules and distribute 
the houses at politically instigated moments. There are also schemes that 
have officially been completed but are not occupied for want of water 
supply or electricity connections. 
There has been a strong concentration of investment in a few cities 
in Karnataka. The urban agglomerations of Bangalore and Mysore 
absorbed 83.3 per cent of the total housing investment while these cities 
constitute 28.3 per cent of the urban population in Karnataka (See table 9-
10). With another 10.2 per cent of the total investment in 8 larger cities, 
little remained for 67 smaller and medium-sized towns. The remaining 
24.3 per cent of the urban population who live in 94 urban local bodies, 
have not had any housing project between 1980-94. The justification for 
this concentration of investments is the rapid urban growth of these urban 
agglomerations to which the housing agencies responded with the creation 
of housing stock. The annual growth figures of these cities between 1981 
and 1991 are shown in table 9-10. While there is an adequate justification 
for the investment in housing in the eighth urban local bodies, there is no 
justification for investing huge amounts in the slow growing cities of 
Bangalore and Mysore as compared to 171 other urban local bodies that 
showed annual growth rates well above average. A second criterion that 
was applied is the size of the cities. If Bangalore is excluded, the selected 
cities have an average size of 91,216 inhabitants and the remaining urban 
areas have an average population of only 30,537. The preference for larger 
cities is evident. This suggests that the KHB opted for schemes with large 
numbers of units in as few locations as possible and neglected locations 
where the relative need may be higher but would only require small-sized 
projects. These larger cities have also a higher development index as 
illustrated in the previous chapter. The larger housing schemes went to 
those locations where the per capita urban facilities are relatively high (See 
table 9-10) widening the gap between the smaller and deprived towns and 
the larger better serviced cities. 
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Table 9-10: Housing investments and annual urban growth of urban local 
bodies in Karnataka between 1980-94 
Urban local bodies 
Bangalore and Mysore 
8 urban local bodies with 
very high investments 
67 urban local bodies 
with low investments 
94 urban local bodies 
with no investments 
Total 
Share of 
state urban 
population 
(in%) 
28.3 
15.8 
31.6 
24.3 
Housing 
investment 
(in %) 
83.3 
10.2 
6.5 
nil 
100.0 
Average 
annual 
growth 
1981-91 
(in %) 
0.71 
2.50 
2.04 
1.72 
1.64 
Development 
index 
23.0 
20.6 
14.8 
12.5 
13.6 
Source: Project and financial records of the KSCB, KUWS&DB, KSCB, DMA, KHB 
and HUDCO (1996). 
A third justification is the 'political priority' of projects. The relationship 
between the per capita investment and the political affiliation index has 
been given in table 9-11. Additionally, the number of housing projects has 
been provided in the table. The relationship between investments or 
number of projects and political affiliation is only evident in the two larger 
urban agglomerations. Apparently, they had a strong political clout in the 
Cabinet between 1980-94. This clout is not so much due to the political 
strength of each individual MLA, but due to the sheer number of ML As. In 
all other cities the political affiliation index between 1980-94 does not 
show any marked difference. One can conclude that political affiliation is 
not very significant in the allocation of projects and funds to most cities. 
This finding is surprising and against what is found as commonly believed. 
However, the statistics do not support this Obvious connection'. 
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Housing 
investment 
(in %) 
83.3 
10.2 
6.5 
nil 
No. of 
schemes 
(average) 
29.3 
8.5 
2.0 
nil 
Political 
affiliation 
index 
75.86 
13.81 
13.38 
12.38 
Table 9-11: Housing investments and political affiliation of urban local 
bodies in Karnataka between 1980-94 
Urban local bodies 
Bangalore and Mysore 
8 urban local bodies with very high investments 
67 urban local bodies with low investments 
94 urban local bodies with no investments 
Total ^ 1000 L7 13.94 
Source: Project and financial records of the KSCB, KUWS&DB, KSCB, DMA, KHB 
and HUDCO (1996). 
The concentration of investments in the two cities cannot be brought in 
line with the recommendations of the National Commission on 
Urbanisation, the five-year plans or the urban development strategy papers 
(1992 and 1994) that recommended other cities to develop equally (See 
also chapter 8). Moreover, these cities showed a much lower annual urban 
growth rate between 1981-91 as compared to most other urban local bodies 
in Karnataka. From the point of view of fulfilling a housing need, other 
urban local bodies should have had higher priority. The implementing 
agencies responsible for housing projects were apparently not forced to 
follow any urban dispersal policy. Investments were made in cities with an 
existing high level of infrastructure and services (i.e. high development 
status index). One could deduce that the concentrated housing investment 
pattern has, in fact, stimulated rural-urban and urban-urban migration to 
the larger urban agglomerations in the state. The intended dispersal of 
economic development and demographic growth in the State has, thus, 
been restrained by the investment pattern for housing projects by the KHB, 
KSCB, urban development authorities and other agencies. 
The actual selection and allocation policy is, apparently, determined 
by factors other than those presented above. What factors could they be? 
One such factor would be that these choices are inspired by the perceived 
demand for housing in the state. This is particularly true for the Karnataka 
Housing Board which has located most of its projects and investments in 
Bangalore and Mysore. In making their choice, there was no consideration 
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for the actual demographic development or a realistic assessment of the 
effective housing demand. Simple rule of thumb calculations, as illustrated 
in chapter 8, were sufficient to justify more conventional housing schemes 
in these locations. One can also argue that the decision making was 
determined by the political and administrative weight of a number of state 
housing agencies. It is common knowledge that the Bangalore Urban 
Development Authority, the Bangalore City Corporation, the Mysore 
Urban Development Corporation and the Mysore City Corporation exert 
considerable political influence. These agencies do not only have 
ministers, chief ministers and reputed MLAs as board members but are 
also headed by senior IAS officers. It has been argued that since the early 
1980s, the policy in the state has changed from an erstwhile objective-
oriented policy into a agency-oriented policy: schemes do not support 
broad objectives, but support the existence of established agencies. In 
other words, a heavy organisation like the Bangalore Development 
Authority needs to be made justifiable with a large portfolio and many 
projects. 
9.7 Infrastructure investments between 1980-94 
Between 1980 and 1994, 335 infrastructure schemes had been sanctioned 
by the state government at the amount of Rs. 12.4 billion. Water supply 
schemes comprised 84 per cent of these investments, followed by low-cost 
sanitation (6 per cent) and the scheme for Integrated Development of 
Small and Medium Towns (5 per cent). The Nehru Rozgar Yojana scheme 
with 3.6 per cent, the underground drainage (0.7 per cent), slum 
upgradation (1.4 per cent), the scheme for Urban Basic Services for the 
Poor (0.3 per cent) received only small amounts in this period. 
With a total investment of Rs. 1,149 per capita, infrastructure 
constitutes 58.9 per cent of the total investment for urban development. 
The investment pattern is more strongly concentrated as compared to the 
housing investments. Bangalore city stands out with 74 per cent of all 
infrastructure investments. This is mainly due to the highly capital 
intensive Cauvery water supply schemes. About 10 per cent of the total 
investment in infrastructure went to only six cities: Tumkur, Arsikere 
U.A., Gulbarga, Bellary, Tiptur and Hassan. Another 13.8 per cent went to 
66 urban local bodies. Smaller investments, less than Rs. 10 million, 
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constitute only 1.7 per cent of the total and were spread over 74 urban 
local bodies. The remaining 25 urban local bodies did not have any 
infrastructure projects between 1980-94. An obvious reason for the more 
dispersed investment pattern is the difference in objectives of each scheme. 
In chapter 11, an analysis of the selection for each scheme will be made. A 
review of the selection criteria used in this chapter has been conducted 
here. The first criterion is a strong annual growth. There has been adequate 
justification for investment in the group of 6 and 66 urban local bodies 
where the annual growth had been above the average (see table 9-12). 
However, there has been little justification for investing considerable 
amounts in Bangalore while the 99 cities and towns in Karnataka that 
received little or no investment, grew much faster. 
Table 9-12: Infrastructure investments and annual growth of urban local 
bodies in Karnataka between 1980-94 
Urban local bodies Share of Infrastructure Average 
Bangalore city 
6 cities with high investments 
66 urban local bodies with moderate 
investments 
74 urban local bodies with low investments 
25 urban local bodies with no investments 
Total 
urban 
population 
(in %) 
23.8 
7.7 
32.8 
30.1 
5.6 
100.0 
investment 
(in %) 
74.1 
10.4 
13.8 
1.7 
nil 
100.0 
annual 
growth 
1981-91 
(in %) 
0.68 
2.61 
1.85 
1.95 
1.85 
1.64 
Source: Project and financial records of the KSCB, KUWS&DB, KSCB, DMA, KHB 
and HUDCO (1996). 
There is a positive relation between infrastructure investment and 
development status index (see table 9-13). The data shows that those cities 
with a larger share of the infrastructure investment between 1980-94 had 
indeed a better development status index (in 1992-93). One can argue that 
infrastructure investments may have led to this status and, secondly, that 
investments by one department led to the investments by another. What is 
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74.1 
10.4 
13.8 
1.7 
nil 
24.00 
20.17 
15.18 
13.22 
11.12 
evident, is that the per capita output of investments by other departments 
(Public Works, Railways, Telephone, Health, etc.). which is reflected in 
the development status index, has coincided with the investments in 
infrastructure projects. Particularly in the few largest cities this 
convergence of investments has been remarkable. 
Table 9-13: Infrastructure investments and development status index of 
urban local bodies 
Categories of urban local body Infrastr. investment Development 
(in %) index 
Bangalore city 
6 cities with high investments 
66 urban local bodies with moderate investments 
74 urban local bodies with low investments 
25 urban local bodies with no investments 
Total 100.0 13.58 
Source: Project and financial records of the KSCB, KUWS&DB, KSCB, DMA, KHB 
and HUDCO (1996). 
Another justification for the selection and allocation of infrastructure 
projects and funds is the political support through a local MLA(s). The 
relationship between the investments and the political affiliation index has 
been given below in table 9-14. The number of projects have also been 
added in the table. This relationship is also only evident for Bangalore city. 
The political clout is two-fold; due to the strength of each individual MLA 
during a considerable number of years between 1980-94 and, secondly, 
due to the larger number of MLAs in the single case of Bangalore. Political 
overtones in all other cases is not significant as there is little deviation 
from the average political affiliation index in the state. 
A third justification for the selection of projects is the financial 
strength of the urban local bodies to contribute to capital investments and 
to service debt payments. The average municipal income per capita 
between 1982-92 at 1982 prices has been given below in table 9-15. The 
figures indicate that the state agencies have selected those urban local 
bodies which are financially stronger (mostly corporations and city 
municipal councils). 
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Table 9-14: Infrastructure investments and political affiliation of urban 
local bodies in Karnataka 1980-94 
Urban local bodies Infrastructure No. of Political 
investment schemes affiliation 
(in %) (average) index 
Bangalore 
6 cities with high investments 
66 urban local bodies with moderate investments 
74 urban local bodies with low investments 
25 urban local bodies with no investments 
74.1 
10.4 
13.8 
1.7 
nil 
8.0 
4.0 
3.0 
1.4 
nil 
171.07 
14.31 
13.46 
12.63 
12.73 
Total 100.0 1.9 13.94 
Source: Project and financial records of the KSCB, KUWS&DB, KSCB, DMA, KHB 
and HUDCO (1996). 
Table 9-15: Infrastructure investments and per capita income urban local 
bodies in Karnataka between 1980-94 
Categories of urban local body Infrastr. 
investment 
(in%) 
Income 
1982-92 at 
1982 prices 
(Rs. per 
capita) 
Bangalore city 74.1 146.27 
6 cities with high investments 10.4 83.66 
66 urban local bodies with moderate investments 13.8 55.80 
74 urban local bodies with low investments 1.7 48.63 
25 urban local bodies with no investments nil 37.35 
Total 100.0 91.45 
Sources: Project and financial records of the KSCB, KUWS&DB, KSCB, DMA and 
HUDCO (1996); Local Finance Commission (1986); Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics (1994). 
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In conclusion, the pattern of infrastructure investment in Kamataka shows 
a concentration in a limited number of urban agglomerations. One city 
with a share of 23.8 per cent of the urban population received a staggering 
74.1 percent of all infrastructure investments between 1980 and 1994. 
Another 10.4 per cent was absorbed by only 6 cities with 7.7 per cent of 
the urban population. In these few towns, it is obvious that their 
development status is better, their financial position is stronger and the 
strength of their political affiliation is slightly better developed and 
maintained throughout this period. Five out of seven cities have been 
mentioned in one of the relevant policy documents and provide a 
justification for their inclusion. In other towns and cities the urban growth 
rate between 1981 and 1991 had been much higher. It would have made 
sense to invest in a selection of these cities as well and to meet the 
increasing demand for infrastructure services and divert the pull forces of 
the major cities. In total, 66 cities had no more than three schemes during 
this period, while 74 cities had only one or two projects. This meagre 
attention cannot be conducive for a balanced overall economic and 
regional development which the government intended. 
Also here, the above common criteria - except for Bangalore city -
does not sufficiently explain why projects have been selected. One can 
argue that project selection and investment patterns were not determined 
by implementing any urban dispersal policy or by fulfilling a demand for 
infrastructure services. The selection was probably based on departmental 
considerations: water projects for towns where the per capita supply is low, 
slum improvement projects for towns where there is a large population of 
slum dwellers, etc. Again decisions are not policy or objective-oriented but 
driven by compulsions of the agencies. Further analysis on a case-to-case 
basis is presented in the following chapters. 
9.8 Co-ordination of investments for urban and economic 
development in Kamataka 
An important instrument that aimed at a balanced economic and 
demographic development in the state is to converge investments within 
each sector (urban development) and by different sectors (industry and 
urban development, for example) within the same urban local bodies, 
regions or districts. In the policy documents studied (Seventh and Eighth 
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Five-Year Plan, and Urban Development Strategy Paper, 1994), this 
convergence of efforts has been suggested repeatedly. 
Table 9-16: District wise per capita investment in housing and 
infrastructure in urban local bodies in Karnataka between 
1980-94. 
District 
D.Kannada 
Kodagu 
Mysore 
Hassan 
Chikmagalur 
Mandya 
Shimoga 
B'iore rural 
U.Kannada 
Tumkur 
B'iore urban 
Chitradurga 
Kolar 
Dharwad 
Belgaum 
Bellary 
Raichur 
Bijapur 
Gulbarga 
Bidar 
Total 
Total 
ULB* 
11 
Ì 
9 
6 
4 
5 
7 
g 
8 
6 
5 
5 
10 
19 
17 
10 
8 
17 
11 
5 
172 
Average 
district 
(in Rs.) 
366 
0 
1,510 
1,751 
920 
610 
670 
488 
1,113 
3,228 
5,109 
232 
433 
324 
350 
493 
835 
233 
692 
436 
1,952 
Category** per capita investment 
housing and infrastructure (Rs.) 
Housing 
О 
-
ooo 
0 0 
0 0 
0 
0 0 
0 
0 0 
0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
803 
Infrastructure 
О 
-
0 
OOO 
OO 
0 0 
о 
0 
OO 
ooo 
ooo 
0 
0 
о 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 
1,149 
Legend: OOO = high; 0 0 = above average; О = low; and - = no investments. 
* 
** 
Urban local bodies without available data have been excluded. 
'High* is defined as more than Rs. 1000 per capita; 'above average' as more than 
Rs. 400 but less than Rs. 1000 p.c., 'low' as more than Rs. 0 but less than Rs. 
400 p.c. 
Source: Project and financial records of the KSCB, KUWS&DB, K.SCB, DMA, KHB 
and HUDCO (1996). 
Housing and Infrastructure Investment Patterns in Kamataka 231 
Have the agencies within the Department for Housing and Urban 
Development been able to direct their investments selectively to such 
urban local bodies? Has the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development tuned their investments with those made by, for example, the 
Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board, the Karnataka State 
Finance Corporation and the Karnataka Small Scale Industrial 
Development Corporation? The following sections aim to answer these 
questions. 
At the district level, table 9-16 illustrates the degree of co-ordination 
between infrastructure and housing. The table shows a rather random 
relation between housing and infrastructure investments for the districts. 
The only similarity seems to exist in districts with low investment figures 
for both housing and infrastructure. At the level of the urban local bodies, 
the linear correlation between the per capita investment for housing and for 
infrastructure for all 172 urban local bodies is -0.03 and is, thus, 
insignificant. In other words, there was no convergence or co-ordination 
between the housing and the infrastructure investments . 
Housing and infrastructure are important investments in support of 
industrial development. The combination of both would be a good 
incentive for economic growth and development. Information which was 
obtained about the industrial investments in the state over the same period 
stem from three agencies. Information at district level was obtained from 
the Karnataka State Finance Corporation. This organisation provides loans 
to industries that apply for financial assistance from the state government. 
The second agency with statistics at the district level is the Karnataka 
Small Scale Industrial Development Corporation. This organisation has 
been established to strengthen and develop the sector of small scale 
industries. This was considered of particular importance to the wide-spread 
unemployment in rural areas, particular in the North. The third 
organisation is the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board 
(KIADB). Their information is at the level of urban local bodies. This 
agency is an umbrella organisation that approves projects for the 
development and expansion of private and public sector industries. The 
KIADB does not provide financial assistance but approves investments 
and loans from the KSFC, commercial banks, international banks, etc. All 
three agencies have been in existence for more than a decade, but their 
activities became significant after 1985. More than 90 per cent of their 
investments have been sanctioned between 1985 and 1994. 
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In table 9-17 district-wise investments data are presented. This table 
illustrates that the southern districts received more investments than the 
Northern districts. In the northern districts there has been a consistent low 
per capita investment by the industry, housing and infrastructure sectors. 
The only exception is the district of Bidar which received a considerable 
amount from the three industry agencies. The only district where there has 
been a consistent investment by all sectors is Mysore. The districts of 
Chikrnagalur and Bangalore rural have received the highest per capita 
investment of all districts, mainly due to the KIADB. All other Southern 
districts show inconsistent patterns of low and high investments, indicating 
little co-ordination between the concerned departments or tuning of any 
investment policies. The two Bangalore districts, Tumkur, Bangalore 
Rural, Shimoga and Dakshina Kannada serve as an illustration. At the 
level of urban local bodies, the linear correlation coefficients also show no 
significant relationship between the investments of the KIADB and the 
housing or infrastructure investments, either combined or individually . 
In conclusion, one can deduce that the infrastructure investment 
pattern has not been based on policy-minded considerations. Rather, they 
have been based on disconnected considerations of individual departments 
with the result that a number of larger cities received more projects and 
investments. This investment pattern cannot have contributed to reduce the 
forces that drive rural-urban and urban-urban migration to the larger urban 
agglomerations. Any dispersal of economic and demographic growth in 
the state has not been supported by the selection and investment pattern of 
infrastructure projects executed by the KUWS&DB, the DMA, the KSCB 
and other agencies. 
9.9 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presented an analysis of the 172 municipalities in Karnataka 
for which three indices had been developed: a development status index, a 
financial status index and a political affiliation index. There are 
5
 The linear correlation coefficients are as follows: -0.023 for the correlation between 
total investment in housing and infrastructure vs. KIADB investment p.c.; -0.014 for the 
correlation between total investment in housing vs. KIADB investment p.c.; and -0.059, 
for the correlation between total investment in infrastructure vs. KIADB investment p.c. 
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considerable differences in development levels between the better serviced 
and larger cities, and the smaller towns which lack most basic amenities. 
The northern municipalities are the least developed and are also financially 
the weakest. These municipalities are geographically concentrated in a few 
areas. The geographical distribution of the political affiliation index did 
not show any distinct pattern and strongly linked municipalities are located 
next to weakly linked ones. 
This chapter also has aimed to recount the reasons for the selection 
of housing and infrastructure projects. It is obvious that it is not possible to 
replay the decision making processes. An attempt was made to deduct the 
reasons behind these decision and to find common factors among those 
cities and towns that received these projects between 1980-94. Factors that 
have been tested were the annual growth, the development status, the 
political affiliation, the municipal income, the co-ordination with 
investments by other agencies under the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development or other departments falling under Industries and Commerce. 
None of these factors proved, however, convincing and there seems to be 
little consideration for these factors altogether. It has been argued that 
decision making must have had other overriding factors which emerge 
from the analysis: the wish to concentrate large projects in as few locations 
as possible, a preference for the largest cities, agency-centred 
expansionism, personalised reasons and strictly agency-specific reasons 
(quantity of water supply or number of slum dwellers). At this stage no 
satisfactory rationale can be provided. The analogy of the 'garbage can', as 
propagated by J.P. Olson for decision making, dooms large. The following 
chapters seek a better explanation where individual schemes and locations 
are analysed. 
10 
Housing Schemes in Karnataka 
Most urban housing schemes do not have any central government 
assistance and fall within the state policy and organisational framework. 
This chapter, therefore, will first present and reflect on the existing 
housing policies and then deal with the institutions that are responsible for 
their implementation. This is followed by the overall achievements of the 
institutions between 1980-94, the period of analysis. The field studies have 
focused on a selection of housing schemes that have been implemented 
between 1980-94 under the purview of the Housing and Urban 
Development Department . The selection is determined by the agency that 
implemented the scheme and the type of housing scheme (for the common 
public or for special groups such as the urban poor and SC/ST 
communities). The schemes selected are listed below. The completed units 
refer to the period 1980-94. 
1. Housing schemes for urban slum dwellers by the Karnataka Slum 
Clearance Board (5,698 units completed); 
2. The Ashraya housing scheme for the shelterless which was 
implemented by the Karnataka Housing Board (9,838 units 
completed); 
3. The Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing scheme for the shelterless in 
urban areas which was implemented by the Karnataka Housing Board 
(23,458 completed); and 
1
 There are other public sector agencies that build houses for their staff: the Karnataka 
Electricity Board, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, the Bharat 
Electricals Limited, the Bharat Hydraulic Engineering Limited, the Army and the Public 
Works Department. 
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4. The composite housing schemes implemented by the Karnataka 
Housing Board (17,553 units completed). 
There are a number of schemes which have been excluded. They have 
added - in some cases substantially - to the volume of public housing. 
However, they require an extensive analysis and would justify another 
research. These schemes are: 
1. Housing schemes developed and implemented by the 21 urban 
development authorities, improvement boards and by the larger 
corporations in Karnataka (approximately 4,000 units completed). 
2. Schemes for houses and shelter improvement for the economic 
weaker section in rural areas under the Public Housing Scheme 
(315,000 units, most with the financial support of the HUDCO), the 
Neralina Bhagya housing scheme (about 22,500 house 
improvements). 
3. Housing created for special target groups such as housing scheme for 
beedi workers, self-finance housing schemes for high income and 
housing schemes for flood and cyclone affected areas (approximately 
2,000 houses). 
Excluding Bangalore, the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) and Karnataka 
Slum Clearance Board (KSCB) had taken up 230 housing schemes in 78 
municipalities between 1980-94, i.e. in almost half of the urban local 
bodies. The sanctioned cost stood at Rs. 3,532 million which constitutes 49 
per cent of the total investment sanctioned for housing and infrastructure 
by the Department for Housing and Urban Development in these urban 
areas between 1980-94. In Bangalore alone, 57 schemes were implemented 
at a sanctioned project cost of Rs. 5,419 million and include the recent 
National Games Village. This amount is one-and-half times the amount 
that was sanctioned for the rest of Karnataka in a period 15 years. 
Composite housing schemes refers to the HUDCO's nomenclature used for housing 
schemes for all categories of income: EWS, LIG, MIG and HIG. 
3
 A short hand-rolled cigarette. 
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10.1 Housing agencies in Karnataka 
Public sector housing is, foremost, the responsibility of the state 
governments. Most states have established a state housing board for this 
purpose. In many states, public housing is also provided to the lower 
income employees of the Public Works Department, the Police 
Department, the State Transport Corporation and the Industrial 
Development Corporation. The focus in the chapter is on two agencies: the 
Karnataka Housing Board and the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board. 
The Karnataka Housing Board 
The Karnataka Housing Board was established under the Karnataka 
Housing Board Act of 1965 and is the successor of the Mysore Housing 
Board, established in 1956. The Karnataka Housing Board Act, 1965 
specifies that the Board (KHB) is to undertake housing schemes and land 
development schemes. This includes the acquisition of land, the 
development of infrastructure and sites, the construction of houses for any 
class or inhabitant and the sale, letting, distribution and allotment of sites 
and houses. These functions can also be executed on behalf of a 
municipality which surrenders their land to the KHB. After development, 
the assets and liabilities (e.g. maintenance) will handed over to the urban 
local authority. 
The Karnataka Housing Board Rules (1964) define that housing 
schemes should be in compliance with any Outline Development Plan or 
Comprehensive Development Plan. The rules pay extensive attention to 
application procedures, eligibility for allotment, conditions of occupation, 
allotment procedures, determination of rent, duties and rights of the KHB 
and the occupants or prospective buyers. Upon application, the applicant 
has to pay a registration fee, refundable when no house is allotted . The 
finance of the house may carry a partial loan from a housing finance 
institution. The difference between the loan and the provisional price of 
the house has to be paid by the allottee in four equal instalments. The first 
instalment is to be paid within 30 days after the intimation of allotment. If 
the price of house would need to be revised, for example due to time and 
4
 Rs. 1,000 for EWS/LIG (A), Rs. 2,000 for EWS/LIG (B), Rs. 5,000 for MIG and Rs. 
10,000 for HIG. EWS/LIG (A) and EWS/LIG (B) refer to two types of houses offered of 
which the latter is more spacious and expensive. 
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cost overruns, the price of the house is re-estimated at the time of 
completion. The allottee receives a final intimation of allotment with the 
revised price of the house. The difference between the provisional and 
revised price of the house can be substantial which has to be paid in one 
instalment within 30 days from the date of receipt of the final intimation. 
The instantaneous ability of the allottee to make such payments has, thus, 
to be considerable. For the loan-component, lease-cum-sale is often 
offered to the selected allottees. This component is to be repaid in equal 
monthly instalments, at an interest rate to be fixed by the Board, estimated 
according to differential repayment periods5. The Board may opt for 
allotment on outright-sale basis in which case the entire price of the house 
has to be paid before executing the sale. In all cases, the house shall not be 
conveyed or alienated by sale, transfer, mortgage, gift or otherwise by the 
allottee during a period of ten years. The actual sale deed will only be 
executed after at least ten years and after the entire cost together with the 
interest has been paid. The Board may decide to execute the sale deed 
upon request after five years, which will attract a fine between 5-25 per 
cent of the entire cost of the house depending on the income category. 
The Board constitutes a chairman, appointed by the state 
government, the secretary to government in charge of housing, the 
secretary in charge of finance, the chief engineer, the director of town 
planning, the chairman and managing director of the Kamataka Land 
Army, the housing commissioner, the regional chief of the HUDCO and 
five non-official members, also appointed by the state government. The 
Board has one commissioner, often an IAS officer, two chief engineers, a 
secretary, chief accounts officer, 13 executive engineers, 21 assistant 
executive engineers, 1 special land acquisition officer, 1 joint-director 
town planning, 3 assistant architects, all on deputation. In total, of the 627 
working officers the KHB has 391 lower ranked posts who are appointed 
through direct recruitment by the Board and 236 senior posts filled by 
deputation from other departments. There are 254 vacancies (1996). The 
personnel pattern indicates that the KHB is an engineering-oriented 
organisation. This is surprising as housing needs a considerable input from 
the architecture discipline. The Board is organised into 13 divisions, each 
headed by an executive engineer and 32 sub-divisions, each of which is 
headed by an assistant executive engineer. There are 11 vacancies at this 
5
 For EWS/LIG (A) 20 years; for EWS/LIG (B) 15 years; for MIG 12 years; and for 
HIG 10 years. 
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level. A separate division was set up for the National Games Village in 
1995. The National Games Village complex is a large apartment complex 
that has accommodated the athletes of the national games of 1997. In terms 
of finance and expertise, this project is the largest and most demanding 
undertaking that the Board has ever undertaken. A separate chief engineer, 
1 executive engineer and 5 assistant executive engineers were attached to 
this unit. 
The KUB has also been entrusted with the implementation of a 
number of special target group schemes, notably: 
- The housing scheme for beedi workers. It was planned to construct 
some 2,700 houses; 
- The Ashraya Housing Scheme, a scheme for urban and rural 
(land/houseless) poor which was started in 1991 and aimed to 
distribute sites and provide assistance to the construction of 214,000 
houses; 
- Dr. Ambedkar Centenary Housing Scheme, a scheme which was 
launched in 1991 for the construction of 29,880 urban and rural 
houses; and 
- Flood/cyclone victims housing scheme. The KHB had been directed 
to formulate a scheme with a loan component from HUDCO for the 
construction of 28,449 houses for the victims of a cyclone and flood 
which struck Karnataka in October/November 1992. 
Since its constitution in 1965, the KHB has constructed 98,081 houses or 
3,380 houses per annum, as of March 1994 . This is a sizeable 
achievement for a rather small organisation. The HUDCO has been the 
most important financing institution to the Board since 1975. Although 
exact figures are not available, it has been stated by the HUDCO that they 
6
 A Times Research Foundation study conducted in 1996, indicated that the production 
by the KHB of composite housing units (excluding special schemes such as Ashraya, 
NRY, etc.) between 1989-94 was not more than 2,769 per year (p. E.20). This was 
estimated to be 1.63 per cent of the total growth in housing stock in the state over the 
same period. 
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have financed more than 90 per cent of the regular housing schemes of the 
KHB since its inception7. 
Kamataka Slum (Development) Clearance Board (KSCB) 
The problems related to slums are in many states delegated to slum 
clearance or slum development boards. Their main purpose is to either re-
develop the occupied slum area, to re-settle the slum dwellers to new 
housing schemes or to provide improvement of the living conditions in the 
existing slums. In many states, the larger cities have established their own 
slum development wings, e.g. Delhi, Hyderabad, Calcutta, Bombay and 
Ahmedabad. 
The Kamataka Slum Clearance Board (KSCB) was established in 
1975 under the Kamataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 
of 1973. The KSCB's main functions are - although not specified as such 
in the Act - 'to identify slum areas in the state, to take up rehabilitation 
work by constructing EWS houses, to undertake environmental 
improvement of slums, to construct basic and communal amenities and to 
develop sites and provide services' (Annual Report 1994-95, Housing and 
Urban Development Department, p. 116). In the Act, there are two 
important sections. They are defined in Section 3, the Declaration of Slum 
Areas and in Section 11, the Declaration of Slum Clearance Area. 
Under Section 3, a settlement can be declared by a notification as a 
'slum area' when the dwellings are considered unfit for human 
inhabitation. The stated reasons may be: 'dilapidation, over-crowding, 
faulty arrangement and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty 
arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or 
any combination of these factors, detrimental to safety, health or morals' 
(Kamataka Slum Areas Act, 1973, p. 10). After the notification, each 
owner or occupier of a slum dwelling should obtain a registration 
certificate, showing details of the household and a proof of identity such as 
a ration card, birth certificate or election identity card. Thereafter, the Act 
7
 in the period 1980-94, the Annual Reports of the KHB state that they constructed 
50,045 houses at a cost Rs. 2,110 million, while HUDCO's records over the same 
period show that a total of 38,023 were constructed (or under construction) at an 
incurred expenditure of approximately Rs. 2,150 million. Though differences cannot be 
satisfactorily explained, it may be due to the additional constructions undertaken in the 
special schemes such as Ashraya, SHASU under the NRY and Dr. Ambedkar Centenary 
housing schemes. 
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prohibits new constructions or extension of existing buildings in the area. 
Section 3 further enables improvement of the area with basic facilities, 
such as water-taps, bathing places, drains, latrines and waste disposal 
facilities. Expenses for such works and their maintenance may be 
recovered from the slum dwellers 'as arrears of land revenue'. The Act 
also enables improvement to the dwellings. 
Section 11 notifies the area for clearance and eviction of the slum 
dwellers from the occupied area and the demolition of the dwellings. The 
justification for slum clearance may the same as under Section 3. Whereas 
'the most satisfactory method of dealing with the conditions in the area is 
the clearance ... and the demolition of the buildings' (Ibid., p. 21), there is 
no distinction or specification of the conditions for which Section 3 or 
Section 11 would be applicable. Given the often drastic implications of 
displacement of slum dwellers, some safeguards against arbitrariness 
should have been built in, but are not. The Act ignores the common fact 
that the owner of the land is not per se the slum dweller. In the process, 
only the 'owners of the lands' are consulted before notification and they 
have the opportunity to show cause why the notification or clearance order 
should not be passed. Within sixty days after publication of the clearance 
in the government Gazette, either the owner of the lands or the owner of 
the buildings is expected to clear the area and demolish the buildings. 
Upon failure of demolition, a prescribed authority (i.e. the KSCB with the 
help of the Police) will demolish the buildings at the owner's cost. Re-
development is an option provided in the Act under the direction of the 
KSCB. Other sections do protect the slum dwellers (occupants and tenants) 
from eviction by any party after declaration of an area and registration of 
the building. They have a right to appeal and secure possession of the 
beholding, and make payable a compensation for rent to be paid during the 
project period. However, under Section 11 of the Act, slum dwellers have 
no right to housing. It is at the discretion of the government to provide 
alternative housing. 
The KSCB has a chairman and a secretary appointed by the state 
government. The chairman is selected from the political ranks and has a 
total of five official and nine non-official members. The secretary is an 
IAS or KAS officer. The Board is organised into five wings: revenue, 
engineering, statistics, accounts and town planning. The engineering 
division is further divided in two, each headed by an executive engineer. 
One executive engineer has his office in Bangalore and is responsible for 
the sub-divisions of Bangalore 1 and 2, Tumkur, Shimoga, Mysore and 
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Hassan. The second executive engineer has his office in Hubli and is 
responsible for the sub-divisions of Hubli, Bijapur, Gulbarga and Bellary. 
Each sub-division has a local officer and is headed by an assistant 
executive engineer. There are 12 assistant executive engineers employed 
by the KSCB. The Board has a total staff strength of 183 of which more 
than half works in the various divisions and sub-divisions. Half of the 
personnel are deputed mainly from the technical departments (PWD and 
Town Planning). The tenure is about three years on an average. The 
jurisdiction of the KSCB spreads over all city corporations, city municipal 
councils and town municipal councils in the state. According to a recent 
survey Karnataka has 1615 slum areas. 
Since its inception, the Board claims to have improved 982 slums 
with a population of 1.1 million and constructed 12,432 EWS houses at the 
cost of Rs. 237 million (KSCB, March 1994). As far as sites and services is 
concerned 1250 sites have been planned to be acquired and, where 
necessary, to be developed at a cost of Rs. 7 million. However, little 
progress is made because of non-availability of land. Besides slum 
improvement and housing construction, the KSCB has two special 
schemes: 
- The Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation (SHASU) under 
the central government sponsored scheme of Nehru Rozgar Yojana; 
and 
- The scheme of Urban Basic Services for the Poor under which 
community halls and toilets are built. Other social welfare and 
employment components have been dealt by the Directorate of 
Municipal Administration. 
10.2 KSCB housing schemes 
KSCB housing schemes for the urban poor 
Between 1980 and 1994 the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board 
implemented a total of 114 schemes in 56 urban agglomerations in the 
state (Figure 10-1). Bangalore stood out with 19 schemes, followed by 
Yelahanka with 8 schemes, Mysore with 6 schemes and Kanakapura with 
5 schemes. Figure 10-1 illustrates that the Bangalore-Mysore axis has been 
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the focus of activities for the KSCB. The projects were sanctioned for the 
amount of Rs. 379 million of which half (48.9 per cent) went to the earlier 
mentioned four cities. A total of 12,073 units were sanctioned for 
construction. Based on the available data from the municipalities (DMA8), 
it would mean that 9.2 per cent of all slum families were planned to be re-
settled into a house of the KSCB . Progress reports of the KSCB and the 
HUDCO (1995) mention that only 5,698 units were completed by March 
1994 (or 44.8 per cent). The figures presented also show that the unit 
construction cost of these houses was Rs. 31,450. This includes land 
acquisition, housing construction, supervision and administration charges 
of the KSCB and the financing institutions (the HUDCO). The maximum 
loan component for KSCB houses was Rs. 19,50010 in 1994 and implies 
that the state government contributes at least Rs. 11,950 per house. This 
amount would be charged to the allottee. 
How were the cities and towns selected by the KSCB? An obvious 
criterion would be the absolute number of slum dwellers. From the 
analysis of 114 schemes implemented between 1980-94, it shows that the 
larger cities were favoured. The selected cities have an average population 
of 88,500 inhabitants (N=55, excluding Bangalore), while non-project 
towns only have 31,300 inhabitants (N=116). Bangalore urban 
agglomeration has probably more slums dwellers than all other cities in 
Kamataka together and, consequently, has received the most schemes. 
Secondly, the larger corporations of Mysore, Hubli-Dharwad, Gadag-
Betgeri and Bidar have been included and several schemes were also 
implemented there since 1980. Though the total number of slum dwellers 
in the selected cities constitute a major portion of the total slum population 
in Kamataka, the slum dwellers do not comprise a larger section of the city 
population in comparison with other towns and cities in Kamataka. 
For 50 out of 56 cities covered by KSCB schemes, data was available about the slum 
population based on the Vital Statistics Survey conducted by the DMA in 1993-94. 
Unfortunately, Bangalore, Mysore and other corporations were not included. 
Based on an average family size of five members and the figures available from the 
towns where slum populations have been recorded (N=50). 
10
 All KSCB schemes are built for the Economic Weaker Section for which this ceilings 
is applicable. 
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Figure 10-1: Location of Karnataka Slum Clearance Board schemes 
between 1980-94 
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In fact, the slum population in the selected cities (N=50) constitutes only 
11.9 per cent while this is 14.9 per cent in other cities (N=77, DMA 
1994). It is also surprising that a number of cities with a large population 
of slum dwellers have not been included: Ranibennur with 25,000 slum 
dwellers, Sira with 23,000 and Hospet with 20,000, Hindustan Aeronautics 
Ltd. (near the Bangalore airport) with 15,000, Chickmagalur with 12,000 
and Amaravathi with 11,500 slum dwellers. Secondly, these cities have not 
been compensated with assistance under the scheme for Environmental 
Improvement of Urban Slums. On the contrary, these cities received less 
funds per slum dweller12. It seems that the 56 selected cities were doubly 
lucky in that they got more out of the KSCB housing schemes and more 
out of the EIUS schemes. 
There were also cities where the KSCB had started schemes before 
1994 for about 5,700 beneficiaries (KSCB, 1996) and where no slum 
dwellers were registered according to the DMA survey in 1994. Was the 
DMA survey unreliable or have the slum dwellers vanished after the 
scheme was started? Another inconsistency appears in the investment 
pattern. There is no correlation between the investment in housing and the 
number of slum dwellers according to the DMA survey of 1994 (N=49, 
linear correlation: -0.078). Demand and supply have, thus, not been 
related at all. 
The selection of cities has also not been guided by the annual 
growth figures. In fact, the annual growth between 1981-91 has been 1.50 
per cent in the selected cities (N=56), as against 2.01 per cent in all other 
towns (N=116). A plausible explanation for this might be the weaker 
political affiliation. For example, the six excluded cities mentioned above, 
had an average political affiliation index of 10.64 (N=6), below the 
average of 13.94 (N=172). However, at an aggregated level, there is no 
clear evidence that political pressures have been an overriding aspect in the 
selection of towns and cities. The average political affiliation index 
Some caution is required with regard to the stated slum population in the towns and 
cities as they have not been based on a head count but on the assessment by the 
municipal authorities based on available records or simple 'guestimate'. Mis-judgement 
and political biases may have played a role in specifying the slum population for the 
Vital Statistics survey of the DMA (1994). 
12
 While in the cities selected for KSCB housing schemes, the EIUS covered 53 per cent 
of the listed slum dwellers and Rs. 183 per slum dweller was spent, in the other cities 
only 43 per cent of the slum dwellers were covered and an average of Rs. 139 was spent 
(DMA, 1994, KSCB, 1996). 
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between 1978-94 for the selected cities (13.53) does not differ significantly 
from the average of the excluded towns (12.79). An analysis of the 
political affiliation at the year when the schemes were sanctioned, 
however, reveals that out of the 114 schemes, there were 89 schemes 
where the local MLA at the time belonged to the same party as the 
government. Moreover, 17 of them were ministers in or around the time 
the schemes were sanctioned. The most obvious cases are Karkala (chief 
minister), Hubli-Dharwad, Byadgi, Nanjangud, Gundlupet, Chintamani, 
Kanakapura (near Bangalore) and Krishnarajanagar (near Mysore). In only 
25 schemes, the local MLA was from a different party than that of the 
ruling government. 
It is known that the larger cities also received more schemes from 
other departments. It is no surprise that the Karnataka Housing Board, also 
partly responsible for providing shelter for the economic weaker sections, 
has been active in 34 out of the 56 KSCB cities. In fact, eight out often of 
all KHB's schemes have been implemented in these 34 cities and 
constitutes 92 per cent of their investments. However, the magnitude of 
investments by the KHB (per capita) shows a very weak correlation with 
those of the KSCB (correlation +0.1501). The DMA, another agency active 
for slum dwellers and handling central government sponsored schemes, 
also found these cities more worthwhile. Of the 56 KSCB cities, 21 were 
covered by the IPLCS&LS scheme (out of a total of 52 locations) and 18 
were covered by the UBSP scheme (out of a total of 27 locations). 
Experiences with KSCB housing schemes in case-study towns 
Among the seven case-studies, the KSCB had implemented housing 
schemes in Bidar and Gulbarga, the two most northern cities of the sample. 
The official project details are summarised in table 10-1. 
Information collected from Bidar during this research in 1996 
showed that none of the schemes in Bidar had led to an allotment of the 
houses to beneficiaries. The oldest scheme (1981) had been completed and 
was meant for cattle herders who used to live for several months in Bidar. 
Difficulty in identifying the nomadic cattle herders resulted in delay in 
allotment and even after 16 years the houses lay vacant. 
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Table 10-1: Official project details of KSCB housing schemes in Bidar 
and Gulbarga 
Project details 
Number of schemes 
Type of housing scheme 
Year of sanction 
Sanctioned project costs (in 
Rs.) 
Sanctioned number of units 
Estimated unit cost (in Rs.) 
Completed number of units 
(according to 
HUDCO/KSCB) 
Gulbarga 
1 
Urban Low-Income 
Group 
1992 
936,000 
31 
30,194 
0 
Bidar 
3 
Slum Clearance Scheme 
Urban Economic Weaker 
Sections 
1981 
1987 
1994 
755,000 
2,199,000 
650,000 
56 
132 
30 
13,482 
16,659 
21,667 
56 
132 
0 
Source: HUDCO and KSCB records ( 1996). 
The second scheme was taken up in two phases. The first phase of 57 
houses reached completion and are not yet allotted. The second phase of 
75 houses is in different stages of construction. In the third scheme which 
started in 1994, 10 houses were completed up to plinth level, the remaining 
20 are yet to start. We were informed by the local engineer of the KSCB 
that the current cost of building low-income houses under the above 
schemes is 35,000-40,000. This implies that the houses cannot be 
completed within the sanctioned amount without obtaining additional 
budgets. The future allottees will be faced with a steep increase in the price 
and few among the target groups can afford such financial burdens. 
In Gulbarga, the small KSCB scheme of 31 houses faced problems 
of delays since the start of construction in April 1993. The land occupied 
by the slum dwellers and earmarked for the construction of the 31 houses 
became only partly available. Eleven slum dwellers refused to vacate land 
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and, as a result, only 18 units were constructed. The roofs were completed 
in 1995 (HUDCO, 1995) and in a short time the allotment and occupation 
materialised. As the remaining 13 units could not be constructed, it was 
proposed to limit the construction of the houses to 20 units. The Board 
spent up to 1995 Rs. 30,555 per unit on the construction. Interviews were 
held with nine occupants of the houses. The houses - a twin-house type -
have a bathroom/toilet, sewage connection, water connection and 
electricity connection. Only four respondents proved to be owner-occupant 
and the others have rented the house from the actual owner at an average 
rent of Rs. 191 per month. The occupants have an average household 
income of Rs. 1,544 and do not belong to the EWS category but to the LIG 
category13. They are satisfied with the houses and all considered it to be an 
improvement as compared with their earlier situation. However, they had 
problems with water supply and sewerage. Respondents were not aware of 
any loan conditions and had not taken a loan and, therefore, had no 
liabilities to the KSCB or bank. 
The few interviews held in Gulbarga show that once the houses are 
allotted and occupied they constitute a considerable improvement in living 
conditions for the beneficiaries. It remains a puzzle as to why the Board is 
unable to allot houses on a larger scale. Secondly, the field information 
also indicates that the official information does not conform to the reality. 
Schemes have been registered as completed and a completion certificate 
was issued, while in reality they were not completed and houses not 
allotted to the beneficiaries. This has two implications: financial assistance 
from the HUDCO is cut off as the project file has been closed and, 
secondly, the KSCB cannot be forced to allot the houses to the 
beneficiaries as also in their files the schemes have been registered as 
completed without any reference to actual occupation. Apparently, little 
importance is given by the KSCB to actual allotment and the securing of 
loan repayment by owner-occupants. This, indeed raises, doubts about the 
goal of the KSCB in implementing housing schemes; is it to create housing 
stock for the urban poor or is it to create assets for individuals who benefit 
from speculation in prime land or to create benefits to the KSCB officials 
and others in the process of tendering and award of work to contractors? 
This is based on the income categories defined by the Government of India and 
applied by all housing agencies and the HUDCO. The EWS category has an income of 
less than Rs. 1,250 per month per household, the LIG between 1,250-2,650 per month 
as per norms of November 1994 (HUDCO, 1995). 
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10.3 KHB composite housing schemes 
KHB composite housing schemes 
Between 1980 and 1994 the Kamataka Housing Board implemented a total 
of 163 different schemes in 55 urban agglomerations in the state (See 
figure 10-2). Most schemes are so-called composite schemes in which 
houses for all income categories are built according to certain key 
guidelines prescribed by the government and the financing institution 
(HUDCO)1 . Bangalore stood out with 34 schemes, followed by Mysore 
with 15 schemes, Shimoga with 10 schemes, Yelahanka, Mangalore and 
Gulbarga with 10 schemes each. Figure 10-2 illustrates that many schemes 
can be found around the Bangalore-Mysore axis. In fact, the four districts 
that cover this axis make up 70 of the total of 163 schemes. The districts 
with the highest housing deficit (Urban Development Strategy paper, 
1994) have received a small number of the schemes (Raichur, Uttara 
Kannada and Kolar). Moreover, Kolar has not received a single scheme. 
The projects were sanctioned for an amount of Rs. 3,482 million of which 
two-third (68.7 per cent) went to the four districts that cover the Mysore-
Bangalore axis. This excludes one scheme which was started in Bangalore 
in 1994: the National Games Village15. A total of 48,066 units were 
sanctioned for construction and the progress reports of the HUDCO (1996) 
mention that 17,553 units were completed by March 1994 (or 36.5 per 
cent). The figures also illustrate that the per capita investment in the 55 
cities was Rs. 460 and that the total construction cost per unit is Rs. 72,451 
over the period 1980-94. As per HUDCO-rules this would resemble the 
average costs of a middle-income home taking into account the prescribed 
ceilings over the whole period. 
14
 The Government of India prescribed that in order to avail of HUDCO-finance for 
composite housing schemes, at least 10 per cent of the units should be for EWS, less 
than 45 per cent for LIG and less than 45 per cent for MIG/HIG. Housing agencies 
would, thus, usually go for the ratio 10-45-45 per cent in order to maximise financial 
feasibility and returns. 
15
 This prestigious scheme for 3,700 high-income apartments amounts to a staggering 
Rs. 4,500 million. 
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Figure 10-2: Location of Karnataka Housing Board schemes between 
1980-94 
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How were the cities and towns selected by the KHB? An obvious 
criterion would be the effective housing demand reflected in the registered 
numbers of applicants or projections of such demands. However, nowhere 
in the state can one register in advance for a house from the KHB and 
neither have there been any effective demand surveys conducted on a 
regular basis. Once a scheme is announced and initiated, one can apply for 
a house. The number of houses for the scheme are already fixed. Hence, 
the KHB seems to go by other indicators. First of all, cities around the 
Mysore-Bangalore axis have been receiving most projects and funds 
between 1980-94. The KHB had, thus, followed the initial strategy of 
dispersing the growth of Bangalore to townships around the city. 
Yelahanka provides a good example. However, by the mid-1980s the five-
year plans and draft urban development strategy papers speak of dispersal 
of growth to other regions further away from Bangalore. Shimoga is the 
only example where massive investment took place by the KHB in the late 
1980s. 
The second criterion that has been applied is the size of the cities. If 
one excludes Bangalore, the other selected cities have an average size of 
91,216 inhabitants. The remaining urban areas have an average population 
of only 30,537. The preference for larger cities is more evident than in the 
case of the KSCB. One other criterion that could have been considered is 
the growth of the cities. Between 1981-91, the annual growth of the cities 
which had a KHB scheme (N=54, excluding Bangalore) was 2.11 per cent 
per annum which is slightly higher than in the excluded towns and cities 
(N=117) where the annual growth was 1.77 per cent. However, among the 
latter group there are several large and fast growing cities that did not 
receive a housing scheme: Bidar, Kolar and Harihar. From the aggregated 
political data, there is no clear evidence that political pressures have been 
an overriding factor in the selection of these towns and cities. The average 
political affiliation index between 1978-94 for the selected cities (13.46) 
does not differ significantly from the average of other towns (12.82). 
However, a close look at political affiliation in the year in which the 
schemes were sanctioned reveals that, out of the 163 schemes in 122 
schemes there was a local MLA of the same party as the ruling 
government. Moreover, 33 of these MLAs were minister in and around the 
time of sanctioning. The most obvious cases are Bangalore (several 
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ministers and one chief minister), Karkala (opposition leader and later 
chief minister). In the cases of Hoovina Hadagali, Moodabidre, Hubli-
Dharwad, Mysore, Hunsur, Dandeli and Haliyal, one or more ministers) 
were part of the Cabinet at the time of sanctioning. Only 41 schemes were 
sanctioned at a time when the local MLA was of a different party than that 
of the ruling government. 
It seems, thus, that the selection of the towns has not only been led 
by the size of the cities or by the proximity to Bangalore but by the 
strength of the political affiliation through the local MLA. One could argue 
that convenience and the wish to handle projects from the main office in 
Bangalore rather than from one of its divisional offices may apply here. 
The magnitude of projects in, for example, Yelahanka and Mysore alone 
would provide a good incentive to keep things as close to one's chest as 
possible, i.e. under the tight control of the commissioner and the chairman. 
It will be no surprise that the KSCB has been active in 34 out of the 
55 KHB cities. In fact, seven out often schemes have been implemented in 
and 81 per cent of the sanctioned investments have been earmarked for 
these 34 cities. As illustrated earlier, the magnitude of per capita 
investment by the KHB shows a weak correlation with those of the KSCB 
(correlation+0.1501). 
The design of the lay-outs and the houses of composite housing 
schemes is mostly done by the officers of the KHB. In a few cases, an 
architect was hired to make a lay-out and housing design. Most KHB 
housing schemes have a so-called 'PWD-look': a grid lay-out, 
standardised plot sizes, one-plot-one-house concept, grouped income 
categories, abundant use of oversized beams and pillars, the preference for 
symmetry, similarity and uniformity, square forms and conventional 
materials. Architects consider such schemes lacking any creativity in the 
use of open space, green and internal space, ignoring individual needs for 
light and colours, etc. Even if architects were involved in the design, their 
'complicated' designs were transformed into 'PWD-hybrids' by the field 
engineers during implementation, as recalled by one reputed architect in 
Mysore who disowned his efforts in the Shimoga and Mysore schemes. 
It is not uncommon in the politics in Karnataka to extend certain projects to the 
constituency of the opposition leader. This may have two reasons: the first is to mitigate 
the ferocity of opposition by extending such 'favours' and the second is to support their 
own candidate by the time of elections who can claim that his government has made this 
project possible. Such a claim by the opposition leader would not be believed. 
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Experiences with KHB composite housing schemes 
Among the seven case-studies, the KHB had implemented composite 
housing schemes in five locations: Chamarajanagar, Chikmagalur, 
Kunigal, Sirsi and Gulbarga. In Hospet, the KHB also provided housing 
under the NRY scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation (SHASU). 
The SHASU will be discussed in chapter 13. There was another housing 
scheme of the KHB in Hospet which did not take off as land acquisition 
litigations came in the way of project implementation. The official details 
of those projects implemented in the case-study towns are summarised in 
table 10-2. 
Households interviews have been held in composite housing 
schemes, except in Gulbarga. At the time of the thesis field work, research 
was undertaken by the Indian Human Settlements Programme (IHSP) in 
one of the housing schemes in Gulbarga (Vokkalgera composite housing 
scheme with 362 units). To avoid duplication of efforts Gulbarga, no 
households questionnaires were held there. The results of the IHSP-study 
have been referred to for which an acknowledgement is appropriate here17. 
Most schemes were quickly implemented and completed within two or 
three years after sanctioning but the process of allocation and finishing the 
basic infrastructure, such as water supply and electricity connection took 
another two to three years. Actual occupation of the houses in each of the 
cases materialised, thus, four or five years after sanctioning. Occupation 
does not only take long due to lack of amenities but also because of a lack 
of demand. In fact, few housing schemes are preceded by a demand 
survey, i.e. number of units and the probable price that one can achieve. 
The survey was conducted in early 1996 by students of the BMS College of 
Engineering, Architecture Faculty in Bangalore. The IHSP-research aimed at looking at 
the post-occupancy changes by the residents. They collected information about the 
(changed) morphology of the neighbourhood as well as interviewed 37 households 
belonging to different income categories. 
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For example, in a large lay-out of 2,000 sites developed by the 
Chikmagalur Urban Development Authority the sales have been very 
slowly. After the initial efforts to achieve physical results, there seems to 
be no pressure to mobilise revenues through allotment and initiation of 
loan repayment. Even after allotment, several problems with public 
facilities remained: poor water supply, unmetalled roads, overflowing 
drainage, sewage disposal, waste collection and lack of development and 
maintenance of open spaces. These problems relate particularly to the 
lacking co-ordination with other departments such as the KUWS&DB, the 
KEB and the local governments. The late allotment is for other reasons as 
well: 
- Administrative procedures involved in announcements, listing, 
registration and verification of applicants. 
- The unavailability of financial information which would allow to 
arrive at a final cost price. 
- Actual allotment is also delayed due to speculation purposes by the 
KHB. 
- Original applicants back out, delay payments or start legal procedures 
against the KHB. 
- The cumbersome preparation of lease-cum-sale documents. 
The household interviews in the four case-studies provided a number of 
observations. Table 10-3 gives the general characteristics of the 
respondents. As compared to household interviews held for other 
programmes, the household size is smaller, the income almost double and 
the number of earners less. A similar pattern was found in Gulbarga, but 
households are slightly larger in this settlement (5.6 members). The source 
of income is more secure as most income earners have a job in the public 
sector (62 per cent). Daily wage earners and construction workers are only 
a small group among the income earners (1.4 per cent). In Gulbarga, 
however, most individuals earn their income from their own business (70 
per cent). 
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Table 10-3: General characteristics respondents of KHB composite 
housing schemes 
Characteristic 
Location 
Number of respondents (N=) 
Average household size 
Average monthly household income (in Rs.) 
Number of earners per household 
Main occupation income earners (N=139, in %) 
- Government service 
- Business 
- Agriculture 
- Other 
Type of house (in %) 
- EWS 
- LIG 
- MIG 
- HIG 
- Other/not identified 
Average duration of stay (in years) 
Owner-occupants (in %) 
Tenant-occupant (in %) 
Average monthly rent (N=60, in Rs.) 
Household interview results 
Kunigal, Chamarajanagar, 
Chikmagalur and Sirsi 
111 
4.33 
3,638 
1.25 
62 
19 
12 
7 
13 
44 
48 
1 
5 
2.8 
43 
57 
367 
The income distribution of the sample reflects well the composition of 
housing schemes: 10-45-45 per cent for EWS, LIG and MIG/HIG 
respectively. More than half of the owners have not occupied the house 
and have rented it out to tenants who pay an average of Rs. 367 per month. 
The research results in Gulbarga also suggest that half of the allottees have 
sold the house to others within two to three years. In the four case studies, 
10 out of 48 owner-occupants are not the first owner/allottee. This could 
not be verified among the tenant-occupants. It, however, illustrates that the 
allottees have a commercial objective in the housing schemes: to rent it out 
or to sell it off shortly after possession. This defeats any control of 
allocation of houses to prescribed income groups shortly after allotment 
and is in violation of the Karnataka Housing Regulation. 
All respondents have a water supply connection, a bathroom and 
toilet and - except in Sirsi - also have a sewerage connection. Most 
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respondents appreciate the house which they found comfortable to Jive in 
(42 per cent) and considered the house an improvement over their previous 
house (58 per cent). However, more than half of the respondents were 
critical of some of the details. Particularly the roofs, doors and walls they 
found of poor quality and workmanship. The same complaints have been 
reported from the residents interviewed in Gulbarga. Positive reactions 
were given about the quality of plumbing, plastering, windows and 
flooring. Three-quarters of the respondents (including 16 KSRTC tenants 
in Kunigal ) had made changes and improvements to the house: a water 
tank, a compound wall, shelves in the kitchen and rooms, and electrical 
fitting and plumbing. Similar small improvements have been reported from 
Vokkalgera housing scheme in Gulbarga. Very few (14 cases) have made 
more drastic changes, such as adding a room, a first floor or 
bifurcating/parting the rooms. The same has been reported from the 
Gulbarga study where the surveyors could only identify 37 houses out of 
362 houses where major post-occupancy changes had taken place. In the 
four case-studies, owner-occupants spent an average of Rs. 31,000 on 
these changes (N=64), while the 16 tenants spent Rs. 7,900 on average on 
improvements. 
There were critical comments about the neighbourhood facilities. 
See the table 10-4 below. Water supply and drainage is a common 
problem. In Gulbarga, the residents were critical about the state of 
maintenance of roads, garbage collection and open and green space. Here, 
water supply, drainage and other facilities were 'acceptable'. 
Transportation is another problem; the lay-outs are not well linked by 
public transport. Therefore, almost half of them, have their own mode of 
transport. The households spent an average amount of Rs. 325 per month 
on transport which comprises 10 per cent of the household income. This is 
a substantial amount considering other costs for living. 
The Kamataka State Road and Transport Corporation had purchased these houses in 
Kunigal for their employees for a nominal rent (Rs. 40 and 70 per month). The 
employment and accommodation security made these tenants to spend some money on 
their rented house. 
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Table 10-4: Prominent neighbourhood problems in KHB composite 
housing schemes mentioned by respondents 
Neighbourhood Kunigal Chamarajanagar Chikmagalur Sirsi 
problem (N=35,in%) (N=25,in%) (N=40,in%) (N=ll,in%) 
Drainage 
Water supply 
Roads 
Bus connection 
Street lights 
40 
37 
63 
11 
80 
64 
60 
36 
64 
8 
45 
15 
3 
35 
0 
64 
100 
36 
27 
18 
As a large group of occupants were not the original allottees, it was 
difficult to obtain significant information about the application, loan and 
allotment procedures. Notwithstanding the fact that the respondents could 
not provide the requested details, some interesting observations have 
emerged (See table 10-5). 
Table 10-5: Application, loan and repayment details of respondents KHB 
composite housing schemes 
Characteristics Response 
Total number of respondents 111 
Number of owner-occupants (in %) 48 (43) 
Number of first owner-occupant and original applicant 38 (34) 
(in %) 
Difficulty in application procedures KHB (N=38) 19 
Payment of registration fee (N=38) 34 
Average amount registration fee (N=30*, in Rs.) 3,340 
Payment of deposits (N=38) 18 
Average amount deposit (N=8*, in Rs.) 33,960 
Approximate value of the house (N=3 8, in Rs.) 117,700 
Loan taken for the house (N=27*, in Rs.) 63,800 
Respondents repaying loan (N=3 8) 38 
Status of repayment (N=38) 
Repaid full 7 
Still repays 31 
Average years of repayment (N=38) 3.92 
* In these cases, there has been non-response. 
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From the above table, one can conclude that only one-third of the 
respondents are the original owner-applicants. Most of them have paid a 
registration fee of around Rs. 3,340 and half of them a deposit (only eight 
could mention the amount of the deposit which is around Rs. 33,960). 
Interestingly, the value of the house assessed by the respondents is at least 
twice the cost which has appeared in the official records of the KHB and 
the HUDCO. In other words, the purchase has been a good investment. 
The specified loan amount is indeed, closer to the specified construction 
cost of the houses and stands at an average of Rs. 63,800. Repayment of 
the loan is common and most have been repaying the loan over the last 4 
years. Most of them pay to the KHB (N=28). In other words, the 
repayment routine and discipline is well established in composite housing 
schemes. This is an encouraging finding as compared to the more populist 
housing schemes of the KSCB, like the Ashraya housing scheme and 
others as we will see later. 
Do the economically weaker section indeed live in EWS-houses and 
do the high-income group households live in HIG-houses three to four 
years after occupation. Out of the 106 cases , only 25 households live in a 
house type corresponding to their income (See table 10-6). Most MIG and 
HIG households live in houses meant for a lower income group. One 
reason is that due to gradual income increases, the previous LIG household 
may have become MIG and the MIG household a HIG household. 
Accepting this argument, this would apply for 57 respondents of the 
sample. Another reason may be due to the applicants having understated 
their household income at the time of application, and a plausible 
explanation in at least 13 cases of this sample. There are a number of odd 
cases in which low-income (EWS) households live in LIG and even MIG 
houses. These are mostly cases in which outsiders sponsor their living: 
retired persons and students. 
The five cases in which the house type was not identified have been excluded in this 
table. 
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Table ¡0-6: Monthly household income compared with type of KHB 
house 
House type Monthly income category households* Totals 
EWS 
LIG (I+II) 
MIG(I+II) 
HIG 
Totals 
EWS 
4 
5 
3 
-
12 
LIG 
4 
10 
3 
-
17 
MIG 
5 
21 
10 
-
36 
HIG 
8 
32 
1 
41 
13 
44 
48 
1 
106 
EWS: < Rs. 1,250 p.m.; LIG: Rs. 1,250-2,500 p.m.; MIG: Rs. 2,500-4,000 
p.m.; and HIG: > Rs. 4,000 p.m. 
10.4 The Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing 
schemes 
The Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing scheme and the Ashraya housing 
scheme are two schemes that started at the same time, had slightly 
different target groups and were meant largely for the urban poor. The two 
schemes are also similar in their technical design, costs and locations, and 
have had the same nodal agency in urban areas: the Karnataka Housing 
Board. It is for these reasons that both housing schemes are dealt with in 
this section. 
The Ashraya Housing Scheme 
By the end of the 1970s, the needs of the urban poor had drawn the 
attention of the Government of Karnataka and a separate Bhagyamandira 
housing scheme was initiated. In 1979, Rs. 3,000 was made available for 
the construction of a simple, one»room house with Rs. 1,500 as subsidy, 
Rs. 500 as beneficiary contribution and Rs. 1,000 as loan. These cost 
ceilings were increased every other year and stood at Rs. 9,000 in 1990 
when the subsidy was fixed at Rs. 1,000, the loan component at Rs. 6,000 
and the beneficiary contribution at Rs. 1,000. The Bhagyamandira scheme 
also extends financial assistance for the improvement of existing houses. 
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The Kamataka Housing Board was appointed as the nodal agency for 
channelling loans and subsidies of the Bhagyamandira scheme and the 
DMA was involved for supervising the municipalities from 1985 onward. 
Between 1979 and 1994, 37,000 houses were constructed and 14,500 
houses were improved under this scheme. 
In 1991, the newly elected Congress(I) government of Bangarappa 
took up the noble task in making a real impact in the delivery of houses for 
the poor, both, in rural and urban areas. A new scheme was introduced for 
the 'siteless and shelterless' and merged the ongoing site distribution and 
house construction schemes in rural and urban areas, i.e. the Public (rural) 
20 
Housing Scheme and the Bhagyamandira (urban) Housing scheme . The 
new scheme had been named 'Ashraya' and was launched on 19 
November 1991, the birth day of the late 'Mother of the Nation', Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi. Besides helping the poor, the scheme was also a political 
statement by the new chief minister who knew 'where to get the money 
and how to spend it'. The scheme had the following components, targets 
and outlays: 
1. The annual distribution of 175,000 sites in rural areas at the cost of 
Rs. 132.5 million co-ordinated by the deputy commissioners in the 
districts. 
2. The construction of 175,000 EWS houses in rural areas at the cost of 
Rs. 2,625 million, also co-ordinated by the deputy commissioners. 
3» Urban housing under the Bhagyamandira scheme was discontinued 
and reformulated into three components to be executed by the 
Kamataka Housing Board: 
- 50,000 sites to be acquired and subsidised up to 50 per cent by 
the state government. The other 50 per cent would be borne by 
the beneficiaries; 
- 30,000 EWS houses in urban areas outside Bangalore with an 
increased ceiling cost from Rs. 8,000, previously applicable 
under the Bhagyamandira scheme, to Rs. 16,000 per unit. Rs. 
14,000 would come as a loan from the HUDCO; and 
- 30,000 LIG-II houses in Bangalore city with a ceiling of Rs. 
33,000 for which Rs. 28,000 would come as a loan from the 
HUDCO. 
These schemes were not completely terminated. The KHB and DMA were forced to 
complete the backlog that existed in 1991 (!) and continued at least up to 1997. 
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4. The housing improvement component under the Bhagyamandira 
scheme was terminated in 1989 and would be revived as the Neralina 
Bhagya scheme. 
The total outlay for the Ashraya scheme alone was a staggering Rs. 4,885 
million; Rs. 3,367 million for rural schemes and Rs, 1,518 million for 
urban schemes. This would have to result in the provision of 720,000 sites 
and 350,000 EWS and LIG houses during the Eighth Five-Year Plan, a 
baffling target indeed. Annual targets were to be set 'subject to availability 
of beneficiaries'. Moreover, Bangarappa had announced the scheme 
without having had proper consultations with the Department for Housing 
and Urban Development. In fact, nothing was arranged for at the time of 
announcement; the chief minister called the secretary of the department 
and instructed: 'You talk to HUDCO and I will talk to them [the KHB -
hm]\ At the executing level there were many doubts about the 
arrangements for implementation, the securities, the organisational 
capacities and the supposed repayment. The huge and unprecedented want 
for funds made the new government to look for a financier. The HUDCO 
was the most obvious choice and pressures at the highest level were 
mobilised to obtain loan support from a reluctant HUDCO. Chief Minister 
Bangarappa 'refused to take no for an answer and arm-twisted HUDCO 
into agreeing' commented the India Today (15 October 1992). The 
HUDCO had, thus, to agree and supported the scheme with a loan of Rs. 
1,760 million. 
During the first one and a half year of the scheme only 600 houses 
were completed (V. Moily in the Deccan Herald, 18 November 1993). The 
scheme became subject of rumours of corruption and mal-practices. 
Various organisational problems surfaced: the lack of involvement and 
wrong selection of beneficiaries, the poor quality of work by contractors, 
the lack of supervision, and the lacking infrastructure on the housing sites. 
The Ashraya scheme became part of the downfall of Bangarappa's 
government which was toppled in December 1992. For a while the scheme 
came to a grinding halt. The government was replaced by another 
Congress(I) Cabinet headed by Veerappa Moily. The new government 
decided to revive the scheme. 
As the Ashraya scheme obtained a high political profile, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development did not fail in issuing 
many circulars and government orders between 1991-95. After 1992, the 
new government orders became more elaborate, explanatory and illustrated 
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more preparation before issuance. Apparently, the Moily government tried 
seriously to rehabilitate the blotted image of the Ashraya scheme and make 
it work. 
As announced, the beneficiaries of the scheme should be the 
shelterless and siteless. The Ashraya schemes should reserve 53 per cent of 
the houses for the SC/ST and Other Backward Classes, while the Dr. 
Ambedkar and Bhagyamandira housing schemes should solely be for 
SC/ST. The experience with private contractors in the first year had been 
such that they were banned from the revived scheme. The houses should 
either be constructed by the Kamataka Land Army Corporation or by the 
engineering cells of the government. It was also made compulsory for the 
beneficiary to contribute by labour which was the pragmatic translation of 
the 'greater need for the involvement of beneficiaries' (Government of 
Kamataka, 1995, p. 21). Quick-fix solutions were introduced for financing 
the scheme, contracting, identification of the beneficiaries, monitoring of 
the construction and recovery of the loan component from the 
beneficiaries. In fact, most of these responsibilities were vested with the 
block development officer and tahsildar, the lower administrative level in 
rural areas. In another circular, the municipal chief officers and 
commissioners were made responsible for the identification, construction 
and administration of the Ashraya houses in urban areas. The identification 
and allotment of sites and houses would be decided by a Task Force 
Committee in which a local MLA, the deputy commissioners (DCs) and 
others would have a seat. It was also decided that in each constituency 500 
Ashraya houses would be constructed21. The year 1993 was the peak year 
in which the KHB was expected to construct 20,000 units by March 1993 
and another 20,000 three months later (Government Order, 8 January 
1993). Bear in mind that the average production of the KHB was never 
more than 4,000 per year. The KHB could avoid major responsibilities and 
confine their role to the co-ordination and the channelling of money. 
Γα/иЫе еІ co-ordination committees were established to monitor 
progress. The stream of circulars were also to revise earlier targets, 
locations and outlays and they, in fact, demonstrated the managerial and 
organisational weaknesses of the apparatus in implementing such a large 
It may be obvious that this was not so much based on the number of site and 
shelterless in the constituencies but rather to secure local political commitment and 
allow the local MLA through his chairmanship in the Task Force to allot sites and 
houses. 
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scheme. The funding came initially from government budgets and was 
partly the cause of the poor progress. From 1993 onward, the financial 
support from the HUDCO and the HDFC assumed greater importance. 
As one can expect, in June 1993 the government observed that 'there 
was a considerable gap in the achievement of fixed targets by the 
Karnataka Housing Board' (Government of Karnataka, 1993), with the 
result that the construction of houses was transferred from the KHB to the 
deputy commissioners. Another government order was issued in 1993 to 
allow the purchase of land at a fixed rate of Rs. 1,500-3,000 per site. Many 
MLAs and also the chief minister took part in meetings at the district level 
to monitor the progress and to ensure that land was acquired, and that sites 
and houses were constructed and distributed. From 1991 till the middle of 
1994, this scheme was the apple of the eye of many local politicians and 
MLAs. 
The annual reports between 1991-94 showed a constant change of 
targets and achievements. Even in one annual report, the KHB's target and 
achievement figures were not consistent. Achievements of one completed 
year were changed in the next annual report. One cannot avoid the 
impression that these changes were the result of mal-administration and 
statistical jugglery to show results and to conceal under-performance. The 
official figures of progress were remote from the achievements on the 
ground. Initially, the KHB was to construct 235,000 houses but as the 
years passed these targets had been adjusted to a mere 14,719 of which the 
KHB had completed 9,838 urban and 1,154 rural houses by December 
1994. The main argument to reduce the role of the KHB was that it did not 
have the capacity to implement and monitor many schemes in hundreds of 
urban and local locations. In 1992, it was decided that the KHB would 
only handle schemes with a contract value of at least Rs. 220 million and 
the smaller contracts by the DCs. The table 10-7 provides an overview of 
initial targets, revised targets and the achievements in March 1995 for 
urban and rural housing. 
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Table 10-7: Targets and achievements of the Ashraya housing scheme by 
KHB and DCs in Kamataka (urban and rural) 
Agency 
KHB 
DCs offices 
Initial target 
(Jan. 1993) 
40,000 
66,000 
Revised target 
(Oct./Dec. 1993) 
15,065 
90,944 
Completed 
(March, 1995) 
12,381 
65,251 
Achievement 
of initial and 
revised target 
(in%) 
82.2 
(31.0) 
71.7 
(98.9) 
Source: Annual Report Housing and Urban Development Department 1995-96, 
Government of Kamataka (1996). 
The achievements of the offices of the deputy commissioners have been 
commendable, keeping in mind the ever-increasing targets. The 
performance of the KHB does not look unfavourable either which was 
made possible by adjusting the targets toward the actual results. 
The Ashraya scheme has been criticised all along. In October 1992, 
a report in the national fortnightly magazine India Today listed the flaws 
of the Ashraya scheme. It pointed out that the target is 'ludicrously 
unrealistic'. Unrealistic for what the government agencies had shown till 
that date. Another arrow was aimed at the fact that Congress(I) MLAs 
were involved in the identification of land and beneficiaries, and issuing 
identification documents to the individuals who were not entitled to either 
22 
a site or a house. 'The process of giving the ID -slip is merely a ploy 
whereby local leaders can make a lot of money', commented one 
beneficiary in the same magazine. Only after payment of bribes, they may 
actually get the proper documents. Those who can pay can get a house and, 
as a result, sites and houses are distributed to ineligible people. The role of 
the Task Force Committees was criticised not only for favouring 'the 
undeserved', but also allowing unsuitable and unplanned areas to be 
prepared as sites under the scheme . Another point of critique were the 
Identity. 
For example in and around Bangalore tank beds were converted into sites. These 
areas were neither fit for human occupation or allowed to be developed for sites under 
the Kamataka Town Planning Act (Deccan Herald, 11 February 1995). 
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irregularities that had taken place in the selection of contractors and the 
unwarranted large advance payment they took. In order to show progress, 
several tricks have been used, such as letting people sign for a house which 
they already had in possession and even built at their own expense. 
When the Congress(I) government lost the elections in December 
1994, the new Janata Dal government was initially reluctant to soil its 
hands on the Ashraya scheme. The irregularities in the implementation of 
the scheme had forced the Moily government in 1994 to initiate an 
investigation by the Corps of Detective (CoD) into the mal-practices and 
alleged corruption. Their interim report was submitted in June 1995 and 
the final report in October 1996. The report pointed toward a few 
contractors, a few KHB officials and two junior IAS officers previously 
posted at the Housing and Urban Development Department25. The charges 
were related to false progress and materials delivery reports, signed by 
these officials on basis of which payments to contractors were made. In 
this 'conspiracy', bribes of Rs. 50,000-100,000 were accepted by the 
charged officials, according to the CoD-report (Deccan Herald, 17 
December 1996). The money-making conspiracies also included the 
preparation of fake bills and bank guarantees for which the co-operation of 
local bank officials was established (Deccan Herald, 2 September 1994). 
In 1995, the new Janata Dal government decided ultimately to continue the 
scheme and abolished the Task Force Committees and replaced the 
political members by officials. 
Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing scheme 
The late Dr. Ambedkar belonged to the community of 'untouchables' 
(Harijans or 'children of God' as Mahatma Gandhi called them). Dr. 
Ambedkar was one of the very few among his community who had the 
chance to study, become an established lawyer and a political foreman who 
strove for the upliftment of these communities. He was a minister in the 
first national Cabinet and was the architect of the Indian Constitution. To 
This refers to the normal procedure of shortlisting of contractors and the verification 
of registration of the contractors under the classification of the Public Works 
Department. 
25
 As often happens with the conclusions of CoD reports, they find lower government 
officials guilty as well as contractors but rarely their superiors, the senior officials or the 
responsible ministers. Bureaucratic hierarchy works in these circumstances to the 
disadvantage of the lower officers. 
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commemorate his hundredth birthday, a scheme was launched in 1991 
along with the infamous Ashraya scheme for the provision of sites and 
houses for the urban and rural poor belonging to the communities of 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Dr. Ambedkar Centenary 
scheme was much less in the lime light as compared to the Ashraya 
scheme. The scheme obtained the same modalities as the Ashraya scheme. 
However, in rural areas the loan component was replaced by a full subsidy 
contribution from the government. The scheme was implemented in rural 
areas by the Social Welfare Department and co-ordinated in urban areas by 
the Karnataka Housing Board. This co-ordination implied that the KHB 
would prepare the project documentation and the application for a loan to 
the HUDCO. Upon sanction by the HUDCO and the government, the KHB 
functioned as a conduit of moneys to the deputy commissioners who 
would then implement the schemes in the various urban localities. By the 
end of 1995, the Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing scheme had targeted to 
complete 59,634 houses. The completion of 31,992 houses was reported in 
1995-96 (Housing Department Annual Report 1995-96, p. 2)26. 
Experiences with the Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing 
schemes in case-study towns 
In all seven case-studies, one or both of the Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar 
Centenary housing scheme have been implemented. The official project 
details are summarised in table 10-8. Households interviews have been 
conducted in schemes which were occupied" . 
Most schemes were initiated within one year after its launch in 1991. 
Information provided by the HUDCO and local officers, revealed that most 
schemes were completed within two or three years after sanctioning. 
Also here the figures have to be taken with some caution as targets and achievements 
for the same financial year differ from one annual report to another. 
In several locations, houses were constructed and were habitable but not occupied. 
This explains in a few case-studies the difference between the number of allotted houses 
and the number of interviewed households. 
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However, the finishing of the houses such as plastering, flooring and 
sometimes roofing was often incomplete. Local officers explained that the 
allocated budget of Rs. 16,000 per unit had often already been depleted. In 
cases where the work was awarded to the Karnataka Land Army, the 
construction was of a satisfactory quality. In other locations the quality 
was very poor (e.g. in Kunigal and Gulbarga). A former mayor and 
contractor commented28: 'Its design and its way of construction is very 
bad: their life is not longer than three or four years'. Even before 
occupation some of houses were already falling apart, confirmed another 
former deputy mayor. The use of pre-fabricated steel frame doors and 
windows, hollow concrete blocks and asbestos-cement sheets has been 
common as it would make construction easy and fast. The government had 
made the use of these materials obligatory by one of its orders. However, 
the durability of these materials proved to be short-lived and in several 
places, windows and doors had come loose or had been stolen. Fortunately, 
these materials were not used everywhere and some schemes had made use 
of locally available and more conventional materials. The provision of 
basic infrastructure such as water supply, electricity connection and street 
lights did not materialise in most locations. These problems - once again -
relate to lack of co-ordination with other departments such as the 
KUWS&DB, the KEB and the local governments. Most locations also 
have not been properly laid out or landscaped and provided with metalled 
roads or proper drains. Some schemes appear as houses planted in an 
agricultural field, waiting for the infrastructure to sprout. 
The allotment had been done by the local Task Force Committee. 
While the official allotment ratio has been fairly good - as shown in the 
table above - , .actual occupation has been observed to be poor. For 
example, of the 84 allotted Ashraya houses in Chikmagalur only 15 were 
occupied, in Kunigal only 18 houses were occupied of the 43 Ashraya and 
50 Dr. Ambedkar houses. One reason being the missing infrastructure and 
another the distant location. A third reason is that allottees had no intention 
to occupy these houses but to sell them off after some time, as some of the 
occupants told. The field work also revealed that several houses were 
occupied for free in name of the owner, for example in Kunigal, to avoid 
unwanted occupation or theft of materials. These occupants belong to the 
poorest who had accepted minimal living conditions and lack of basic 
The quotations of locally interviewed people have been kept as literally as possible as 
the noted quotations reflect much better the local sentiments. 
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amenities over the life in a slum. Discussions with these occupants also 
revealed that several allottees already had a house in the town and, thus, 
cannot be considered as 'shelterless or siteless', the target group of both 
schemes. 
That the Ashraya houses have not been allotted to the eligible poor 
has also been mentioned by several officials and politicians who were 
interviewed in the case-study towns. In Chikmagalur, local councillors 
made an effort to forward their own people for such schemes, reported 
municipal officials: 'ninety per cent of the selection is not good. To the 
maximum extent, the beneficiaries are relatives and friends of the 
councillors and party workers', one added. The use of 'bogus beneficiary 
certificates' has been reported in Kunigal. Due to the allegations of 
nepotism and the lack of basic infrastructure, the Ashraya houses in 
Gulbarga have remained unoccupied29. In Kunigal, the allotment of 
Ashraya houses and sites was irregular and a bribe of Rs. 1,000 had to be 
paid, reported a local newspaper editor. Another editor commented that not 
more than 30 per cent of the sites were allotted to the right beneficiaries. 
The government had introduced a lottery system to make an end to this 
practice, but the proposal was quickly withdrawn in the next government 
order. There were other views as well. A local councillor and former 
council president in Chikmagalur praised the schemes: 'It has been located 
in a good place, it has all facilities and allotment was also completed in 
1995'. A positive exception is the Ashraya housing scheme in Sirsi where 
the houses have been constructed and completed in a satisfactory manner 
and the occupants/allottees also seem to belong to the right income group. 
The municipal commissioner also praised the scheme. As mentioned, some 
moneys had been re-allocated to 50 house-owners to improve their houses 
or to construct houses on already owned plots. While the physical results 
have been satisfactory, the actual target group has not been reached; they 
are neither shelterless or siteless. The same applies for the 21 site owners 
in Bidar who received moneys under the Dr. Ambedkar scheme to 
construct houses. Another exceptional and positive comment about the 
Ashraya scheme came from a minister under the Moily government and 
former member of the Ashraya Task Force Committee: '80 - 85 per cent of 
The official explanation that was given by others is that the allotment could not be 
done as the municipal elections were due. Prior to elections all such decision that may 
favour the ruling party are indeed postponed by government order. 
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the houses have been allotted to the deserved beneficiary' and he added 
voluntarily 'only in 15-20 per cent of the cases has there been misuse'. 
Besides the issue of allotment to ineligible persons, the selection of 
the sites invited critical comments. A local politician in Chikmagalur did 
not see the sanctity of the location of the Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar 
housing schemes as they are 'located on prime land'. He added that the 
local MLA and member of the Task Force, had a hand in the selection of 
the site and in the allotment in favour of some of his local partymen. After 
allotment, the 'beneficiaries' had sold it off at Rs. 40,000, encashing on the 
value of the land. 'Only the site is the profit, the house is a waste' 
commented one former president in Kunigal. Whatever the quality may be, 
the construction of the houses has provided benefits for others: 
'councillors have taken commission to allow the work by the contractor' 
commented two local politicians in Kunigal. Moreover, the government 
schemes have helped in political equations. The properties that were 
'appropriated' by the local political elite and distributed to their partymen 
are, thus, used to settle debts, to strengthen their network and to oblige 
political workers whose services may be dearly needed in the next round of 
elections. 'It is a bogus scheme; poor quality, bad location, and in the 
name of the poor, officials, politicians and contractors get benefited' 
summarised a local party leader and MLA contender. While their critique 
has been bold indeed, one wonders how much of it is factually true. The 
validity of the criticism is particularly in question when there are 
contradicting reports, such as in Chikmagalur. However, 'where there is 
smoke, there will be fire' may also hold true here. 
The household interviews in the case-studies provide a number of 
observations. Table 10-9 gives the general characteristics of the 
respondents. One should realise that the respondents had opted to live in 
an often incomplete and badly serviced house and may not reflect the 
group of initial allottees. As compared to household interviews held for 
other programmes (UBSP, NRY and IDSMT), the household size and 
income are similar. Surprisingly, the household income of occupants of 
Ashraya housing schemes is much lower than those of the Dr. Ambedkar 
housing scheme, while the number of earners per household is higher. The 
source of income is insecure as most income earners have a job as urban 
daily wagers or work in the agricultural sector. The houses are mostly one-
room units. 
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Table 10-9: General characteristics of respondents in Ashraya and Dr. 
Ambedkar Centenary housing schemes 
Characteristic 
Locations 
Number of respondents (N=) 
Average household size 
Average monthly household 
income (in Rs.) 
Number of earners per 
household 
Main occupation income 
earners (in %) 
Government service 
Business 
Agriculture 
Daily wage 
Construction 
Other 
Type of house (in %) 
One room-cum-kitchen 
Two rooms 
Three rooms 
Bathroom 
Owner-occupants (in %) 
Tenant-occupant (in %) 
Average monthly rent (N=8, 
inRs.) 
Ashraya housing scheme 
Kunigal, 
Chamarajanagar, 
Chikmagalur, Sirsi and 
Bidar 
52 
4.87 
1,494 
2.54 
1 
7 
22 
58 
11 
1 
79 
21 
0 
29 
100 
(Kunigal, 36%) 
(Kunigal, 
(Kuniga! 
0 
, 64%) 
50 
1 only) 
Dr. Ambedkar Centenary 
housing scheme 
Chamarajanagar, 
Chikmagalur and Bidar 
26 
5.85 
1,723 
2.27 
3 
3 
3 
81 
7 
3 
54 
19 
27 (Sirsi only) 
42 
100 
0% 
n.a. 
However, in 20 per cent of the cases two rooms have been made. In S irsi, 
where moneys for the Dr. Ambedkar housing scheme have been utilised 
for house improvement, three room houses were found among the sample. 
A good number of respondents also have a separate bathroom. Bathrooms 
were not part of the scheme but several respondents have constructed one. 
In contrast to our own field observations and the comments by local 
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officials, politicians and other citizens, all respondents claimed that they 
own the house. An exception is Kunigal where only 36 per cent of the 
occupants are owners and the rest are tenants. Are the occupants indeed the 
allottees? The findings seem to refute the field survey information, e.g. 
that a caretaker has occupied a the house on behalf of the allottee . 
With regard to the basic facilities and appreciation of the houses, 
table 10-10 provides an overview. As observed earlier, not even half of the 
respondents in Ashraya schemes have a water supply provision in or near 
their house and less than 20 per cent have a sewage or power supply 
connection. The situation in Dr. Ambedkar housing scheme is better where 
over half of the respondents have a sewage and power supply connection. 
These facilities are also mentioned as the major problems of their 
neighbourhood besides the absent street lights and proper roads. Many 
complain about the quality and finishes of particularly the floors and 
plastering. Nonetheless, the houses are appreciated and a vast majority 
consider them an improvement over their previous situation. Few want to 
move elsewhere. The comfort and security of property are the main gains 
of the schemes. 
Research results with regard to the application, loan and allotment 
procedures are presented in the next table 10-11. One-third of the original 
applicants said they had some problems during the applications. Common 
reasons were the non-cooperation of the officials, the demand for identity 
and registration papers, and demand for bribes. Indeed, about one-third 
made payments in one form or the other notwithstanding that in both 
schemes deposits, registration fees or other payments are not required. 
These respondents indicated a registration fee of about Rs. 650 and a 
deposit of Rs. 2,300. These amounts are in addition to the loans. In the 
Ashraya scheme, more than half of the original applicants mentioned that 
no loan was taken, apparently under the impression that the houses may be 
for free31. In any case, even those who mentioned that they had taken a 
loan were not repaying at the time of the research. 
It cannot be ruled out that the fear for authorities or anybody asking questions about 
property and occupation rights, may have triggered false statements. 
1
 Whether the house was for free or not, was not asked. Most respondents who said 
they had not taken a loan, were surprised by the question as if they had been told 
differently. 
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Table 10-10: Basic facilities and appreciation by respondents in Ashraya 
and Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing schemes 
Characteristic Ashraya housing scheme Dr. Ambedkar Centenary 
housing scheme 
Locations 
Number of respondents 
(N=) 
Water supply (in %) 
Sewage connection (in %) 
Electricity (in %) 
Advantages house 
(mentioned by more than 
30% of respondents) 
Disadvantages house 
(mentioned by more than 
30% of respondents) 
Appreciation construction 
Problems 
location/neighbourhood 
Kunigal, Chamarajanagar, 
Chikmagalur, Sirsi and 
Bidar 
52 
42 
17 
19 
Comfort, good 
construction and security 
of property 
Far from work and too 
small 
Majority are satisfied, but 
more than 50% complain 
about quality and finishing 
of plastering and flooring. 
Plumbing does not exist in 
96% of cases 
Street lights, schools, 
power supply, roads, 
Chamarajanagar, 
Chikmagalur and Bidar 
26 
31 
58 
54 
Security of property and 
comfort 
None 
Majority are satisfied, but 
more than 50% complain 
about quality and finishing 
of plastering and flooring. 
Plumbing does not exist in 
89% of cases 
Drainage, latrines and 
water supply 
(mentioned by more than 
30%) 
Consider new shelter an 
improvement (%) 
- Yes 
- Partly 
- No reply 
Respondents who want to 
improve house (in %) 
Respondents who want to 
move elsewhere (in %) 
drainage 
73 
14 
14 
11 
81 
19 
0 
8 
276 Urban Development in Kamataka 
Table 10-11: Application, loan and repayment details of respondents in 
Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing schemes 
Characteristic Ashraya housing scheme Dr. Ambedkar Centenary 
housing scheme 
Locations Kunigal, Chamarajanagar, 
Chamarajanagar, Chikmagalur and Bidar 
Chikmagalur, Sirsi and 
Number of respondents (N=) 
Number of first owner-
occupant (in %) 
Difficulty in application 
procedures 
Payment of registration fee 
Average amount registration 
fee (in Rs.) 
Payment of deposits 
Average amount deposit (in 
Rs.) 
Approximate construction 
cost of the house (in Rs.) 
Loan taken for house 
Loan amount (in Rs.) 
Respondents repaying loan 
52 
43 
(83) 
13 
9 
647 
(N=7*) 
9 
2,295 
(N=9*) 
22,537 
(N=27*) 
20 
13,800 
0 
26 
26 
(100) 
s 
7 
Not significant 
(N=3*) 
4 
No significant 
(N=2*) 
23,545 
(N=22*) 
25 
11,880 
Ö 
In these cases, there has been non-response. 
In the Dr. Ambedkar Centenary scheme most respondents confirmed that 
there was a loan amount attached to the allotment but here also no one has 
been repaying. The stated loan amount resembles the specified loan of Rs. 
14,000, but at the same time shows that most are not exactly aware of the 
amount as a loan. It seems that neither the deputy commissioners office or 
the KHB have informed the applicants properly about the loan obligations 
and have not taken any steps to recover the loans. As a result, the Ashraya 
housing scheme has become another liability to the government. In the 
years to come general tax revenues of the government have to reserved to 
repay the HUDCO. 
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10.5 The role of the implementing agencies 
In the following section the roles of agencies that have participated in 
housing schemes in Karnataka between 1980-94 are analysed: the 
Secretariat for Housing and Urban Development, the Karnataka Housing 
Board, the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board and the HUDCO. 
The Secretariat for Housing and Urban Development 
It is a fact that no project is approved or financial assistance finalised 
without the approval of the Secretariat for Housing and Urban 
Development. It is, rather, in the trajectory toward the actual execution of 
the projects that the secretariat assumes an important role. Once the project 
is under way, their involvement reduces. The secretariat has taken a 
facilitating role toward the two agencies that are essential for housing 
schemes in the state: the KHB and the KSCB. During implementation, the 
secretariat would only assume a role when projects would get seriously 
delayed, or when problems arose that received undue public or political 
attention32 or when additional funding would be required as a result of cost 
escalation. Besides the reporting of physical progress, there would not be 
much of pressure to prove technical quality or financial performance. The 
secretariat would take a reactive role; act when problems occur, and not act 
if matters seemed normal. 
This understanding between the secretariat and the agencies could 
not work for the Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar housing schemes. When these 
schemes were launched, the implementation required the involvement of 
the deputy commissioners and as the KHB did not take a leading role, the 
secretariat had to continue their active involvement. There was, as 
explained, a frantic activity to draft and issue guidelines for the 
implementation of these schemes and, secondly, to secure financial support 
from the government and the HUDCO. The government orders and 
circulars were not well prepared or thought through. Many such circulars 
had to correct previous ones, leading to chaos and incomprehension among 
those who had to implement the scheme. The understaffing of the 
secretariat and the regular transfer of senior administrative officers were 
This could be due to the poor work of the contractors, legal litigations with regard to 
land or title deeds, misbehaviour or misappropriation of government officials, delays in 
allotment procedures, complaints about irregularities in allotment, etc. 
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not conducive to a smooth implementation of the scheme. Besides these 
limitations, the secretariat could hardly cope with the ambitious targets, the 
need for huge amount of funds at a short notice and with the need of an 
instant organisational capacity that none of their agencies could generate. 
The Karnataka Housing Board may have looked as the better option, but 
the secretariat should have realised that the targets would never be 
achieved in the stipulated time. The reader may wonder why the secretariat 
did not decline the responsibility for the implementation of the schemes. In 
the Indian bureaucratic system, this would have been a grave disobedience 
and would have invited a strong reaction from the Cabinet and the 
Assembly; the responsible administrators would have been suspended with 
immediate effect. The pre-mature announcement of the chief minister 
created a situation in which there was no way out without a loss of face to 
the electorate, the Assembly and the press. There was, thus, no choice. 
The Karnataka Housing Board 
In the absence of a national or state housing policy, the Karnataka Housing 
Board had to go by the outlays and targets of the five-year plans. The 
respective plans do not provide clear guidelines for housing; the 
identification of needs, the priority areas or groups, the medium and long 
term production targets or the role of the Board in regulation of and 
contribution to the housing market. It was only in 1992 that a National 
Housing Policy was accepted by the Parliament. Karnataka followed in 
1995 by the preparation of a draft state housing policy, which is as yet to 
be accepted by the Assembly. (1997) The KHB also did not feel the urge to 
prepare their own policy document There were housing commissioners, 
recalled one former HUDCO officer, who had attempted to develop such 
plans but never succeeded in getting sufficient support from the Board or 
the executives (senior engineers). It was to a large extent at the discretion 
of the government, the ministers and the Board to decide what course the 
KHB should take, what housing schemes should be undertaken and by 
what standards the performance of the KHB should be measured. As a 
result, the KHB had to accommodate ad-hoc decisions and was entrusted 
with the implementation of schemes for which it could not have developed 
any capacity. The Ashraya housing and the National Games Village 
scheme are examples. As illustrated in this chapter, the selection of 
schemes often had a political bias with a strong influence of the Cabinet 
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members. 'The Board implements schemes which signify rather a political 
manifestation than anything else', admitted one senior government official, 
'There is no priority, no focus', he added to underline the overriding 
discretionary and ad-hoc decision making. A proper policy, project 
formulation and appraisal system may indeed have protected the KHB 
from such political interventions but none were allowed to develop these. 
The KHB never became a semi-independent housing institution but 
had to react to the wishes and - at times - whims of the government. But 
were they interested in acquiring such a status? It has also been illustrated 
from the various government documents that the Board focused on the 
initiation and implementation of conventional (composite) housing 
schemes. There has been little attention and interest in low-cost housing 
schemes. As mentioned earlier, the KHB does not have a procedure to 
assess the housing demand for the state or for any individual scheme. The 
design of the scheme is determined by the requirement of the financier and 
by the contemporary perception of the Board members of what might be 
desirable and saleable. The mis-match between demand and supply has 
also been demonstrated in this chapter for the several districts and 
schemes. The reputation of the Karnataka Housing Board has been poor 
for over a decade, as far as the quality of housing and time-bound 
implementation of projects is concerned. There are countless instances of 
poor quality of work, unfinished work, irregularities in construction and 
allotment procedures, and misappropriation of project finances. These 
have been addressed regularly in the Assembly as well as reported in 
Karnataka's daily newspapers. There has been no sense of accountability 
toward the prospective buyers, who have paid registration fee prior to 
project implementation 3. Interviewed government officials admitted the 
poor performance of the Board. In 1995, the then minister of housing, Mr. 
Basavaraja Rayareddy, added to the poor reputation of the KHB by 
introducing the 'kick test'. He assessed the quality of houses built by the 
KHB by literally kicking the walls. During one of his surprise visits in 
Bijapur, such walls failed and legal action was announced against the local 
contractor and personnel of the KHB. It was the first time that a 'first 
information report' was filed with the police {The Hindu, 26th April 1995). 
The minister also announced that the Board would be revamped in order to 
For example in Tumkur, a registration fee was collected in 1985 from applicants for a 
composite housing scheme. The scheme had not been completed after almost ten years 
for 'reasons of want of funds' (Deccan Herald, 3 May 1993). 
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end its bad reputation and to improve its financial position; many rules and 
regulations in the working of the Board would be changed. However, his 
tenure was only two years and little progress has been reported till date. 
Despite the quality of the houses and their reputation, KHB houses 
are sold and occupied. What makes these houses attractive to prospective 
buyers? The main reason is that for many people it is not possible to get a 
site or a house on the market at prices that the KHB offers. Particularly, the 
EWS and LIG houses carry an intrinsic subsidy component which 
underrates the value of the properties. To that extent it serves the purpose 
to provide access to land and housing for lower income groups. 'The 
people are attracted by the low price of the land; the house is an additional 
benefit', commented a reputed architect. 'This also attracts ineligible 
people, who soon after the allotment of houses, sell it at a higher price to 
income groups that would otherwise not have obtained such houses. The 
subsidy principle is, thus, defeated in the first year itself in many such 
schemes', he concluded. Housing schemes have become a liability to the 
government as the recovery of loans from the allottees proved difficult. 
Exact figures are not available, but the chief and general manager of the 
National Housing Bank stated that the recovery of the agencies on a 
national scale is not more than 55-60 per cent34: 'What to do about this 
poor recovery, I would not know. It is a political matter', he concluded in 
desperation. In other words, there is not sufficient political commitment 
from the state government to make the housing boards to recover loans. A 
study conducted by the Times Research Foundation stated that the 
recovery of the Karnataka Housing Board between 1989-94 has been 
approximately 57 per cent and confirms the stated figures35 (Times 
Research Foundation, 1996, p. 105). 
When the Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar Housing schemes were 
launched, the Chief Minister S. Bangarappa had not set his targets in 
consultation with the concerned agencies, or had proposed any technical 
and financial planning. On the contrary, he had imposed the targets on the 
baffled Department of Housing and Urban Development. Inevitably, the 
role of the KHB in these schemes has been poor. 'At the time of 
A study conducted by the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy in 1994, 
revealed that the recovery of loans from beneficiaries by four housing boards in 1992-93 
was 88.9 per cent in Tamil Nadu and 5.0 per cent in Andhra Pradesh (p. 167). 
" The Times Research Foundation had done research among five housing boards. The 
recovery of these agencies varied considerably: 74 per cent in Tamil Nadu and 47 per 
cent in Assam (1996, p. 105). The KHB was, thus, an average case. 
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Bangarappa their [KHB - hm] performance was pathetic' commented a 
senior government official. It was clear right from the start that the KIIB 
was not interested in the actual implementation headaches of the Ashraya 
housing scheme. In several meetings they underlined that no organisational 
changes would be made to overcome the problems of implementation of 
this scheme. Rather they opted for passing on the executive functions to 
the districts and taluk level administration; 'Commissioner KHB indicated 
that the KHB does not propose to increase the organisational set up of the 
Ashraya housing scheme which is a one-time requirement. Therefore, the 
other ways and means to overcome the shortcomings of organisational 
inadequacies are being met by creating task forces at taluk level headed by 
local MLAs and representatives of the Public Works Department and Zilla 
Parishad engineer who will be responsible for monitoring' (State level 
review meeting, June 1992). The HUDCO had all reasons to be concerned 
about the lack of commitment of the borrowing agency and the poor 
chances of recovery of the staggering loan of Rs.T,760 million. 
The experience with the Ashraya scheme is only an example of the 
poor overall functioning of the KHB. The interviewed resource persons 
provided a range of reasons why the KHB has continued to function in this 
manner. An often stated reason is that the officers and commissioners of 
the KHB are transferred on a regular basis and, consequently, there is 
never any continuity in the operations or proposed changes in the working 
routines of the Board. The transfer system also results in the lack of 
commitment to the organisation's aims and most posted officials have, 
therefore, become self-interested, explained one former HUDCO officer. 
The recently drafted Karnataka Housing Policy (1995) also addresses the 
poor commitment and states that the 'performance of the officers who are 
on deputation to the KHB shall be thoroughly scrutinised and those who 
lack integrity and satisfactory functioning will be repatriated' (Karnataka 
Housing Policy, p. 11). The large number of engineers determine the 
culture within the Board. The KHB has inherited the customs, practices 
and conventions of the engineers who belong to the Public Works 
Department and similar departments, i.e. a strong emphasis on technical 
design and execution of work. Most engineers are not exposed to low-cost 
housing technologies or incremental housing approaches which are more 
suitable for the lower incomes groups. They stick to their conventional 
engineering principles. 
An endemic reason for the poor functioning of public agencies is the 
lack of technical and financial feasibility assessment, financial planning, 
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financial management and a proper organisational set-up. Proper 
documentation and file keeping has been for long a severe constraint on 
the Board. The KHB has also no proper project-based accounting system 
or quality monitoring and evaluation mechanism. There also seems to be 
little interest in such improvements . 'Nobody cares and nobody looks at 
things properly', commented a HUDCO official. As a result, the KHB is 
faced regularly with liquidity problems and delayed payments to 
contractors. Projects come to a standstill as a result and schemes cannot be 
completed as the additional funds required for completion await approval. 
Secondly, fund releases are 'discretionary and based on the preferences of 
individuals' commented another HUDCO officer. Whenever, attempts 
were made to improve the financial management of the Board, there has 
been resistance from within and outside the Board. 'Ministers have no 
attitude for this. It is difficult to discuss such matters in details or at 
length', commented a former housing board commissioner. Financial 
management is also hampered by the so-called 'single purse system', i.e. a 
single account for all projects. This proved to be of advantage when 
immediate action was called for after decisions were made at the political 
level. The single purse system also adds to the invisibility of project 
balances, over- and underspending, cost control, etc. The progress figures 
of the KHB, whether physical or financial, are unreliable as a result. 'They 
may have been cooked up', commented one officer of a financing 
institution. Financial audits are not prepared on an annual basis but at large 
intervals of time. By the time the audit report is issued, the accountable 
officers have been transferred elsewhere or have retired. This all leads to 
uncontrolled practices, time overruns and cost escalation for which the 
allottee is paying the price without any means to protest . 
The Board is 'political' in nature - as officials like to refer it - and 
consist of a mix of 'non-official' MLAs and officials. Also at this level, 
there exists remarkably little concern for financial or organisational 
matters. Short term benefits and physical outputs, i.e. a maximum number 
of contracts, schemes and houses in selected locations, seem to dominate. 
Within the organisation, there is little resistance against those who pursue 
personal benefits and get involved in so-called 'irregular practices'. In fact, 
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 In 1995, project-based accounting was started for a number of housing schemes in 
Bangalore after pressures from their financiers. 
In 1995, housing was brought under the Consumer Protection Act and for the first 
time a residents' society in Mysore sued the KHB under this Act for unlawful price-
increase. 
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one can argue that it has become KHB's corporate culture since the late 
1980s and a place where 'one can make money', commented one senior 
government official, 'endorsed by their political chairman'. This practice 
has been a custom for a long time in the Public Works Department and it 
will be no surprise that this culture has also invaded the KHB. That the 
KHB has no proper accounting, quality monitoring and evaluation will 
only serve those with such intentions and it may be no coincidence that 
such systems do not exist. In such a culture there is no place for 
professional prestige, a concern for social objectives or a commitment to 
the goal of the organisation. It is also no surprise that well intending 
ministers or commissioners have found it difficult to bring about change, 
let alone eradicate this culture. 
For the above reasons the housing schemes have become more 
favourable for middle and high income. Achar (1992) argued in his paper 
that the production of houses for the EWS income category by the Board 
had come down to five per cent per year. The Times Research Foundation 
came to a similar figure of eight per cent between 1989-94, while 49 per 
cent LIG units and 43 per cent MIG/HIG units were produced (Times 
Research Foundation, 1996). 
The Karnataka Slum Clearance Board 
Without doubt the Karnataka Slum Clearance Board has an important 
social objective, i.e. to improve the living conditions of slum dwellers and 
to provide them, where possible, with proper housing. As they are geared 
toward the urban poor, toward the poorly housed and the landless, 
conventional engineering approaches may not work. One has to think of 
creative, low-cost and incremental solutions for access to land, for 
provision of infrastructure and for the delivery of housing that are 
affordable and attainable for slum dwellers. Secondly, other skills are 
required to deal with slum dwellers: to assess their requirements and 
possibilities, to deal with their representatives, leaders and organisations 
and to operate diplomatically within the sometimes politicised 
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environments . It is unfortunate that most officers of the KSCB are 
recruited from the Public Works Department who have little knowledge or 
experience in these areas and are only trained in conventional engineering. 
The involvement of the beneficiaries in planning and implementation is 
negligible. Moreover, there is a lack of co-ordination of the work with the 
urban local bodies who hold obligatory functions for social welfare and 
services provisions to the slum dwellers. It has also been illustrated that 
there is a poor effort and poor performance in the recovery of loans and 
revenues from the beneficiaries. In other words, the operations, the 
working routines and priorities are very similar to the KHB, despite their 
differences in objectives. The observations with regard to the staff and 
organisational culture of the KHB could be repeated here without 
difficulty. Similar observations were listed in the study of the KSCB by the 
Centre for Symbiosis between Technology, Environment and Management 
(STEM)inl99239. 
TheHUDCO 
As a financing institution, the HUDCO's involvement in the daily 
intricacies of housing schemes is rather remote. However, the financial 
conditions prescribe that a fixed portion loan will be allocated for EWS, 
LIG and MIG/HIG. Secondly, their concern with recoverability of loans 
make the HUDCO a kind of watchdog over the housing operations of the 
KHB and KSCB. Without the HUDCO, the agencies would probably have 
arrayed more drastically than at present. HUDCO's appraisal officers do 
scrutinise the agencies' proposals on maximum cost ceilings, on the 
These politicised environments are the result of 'machine politics' (See chapter 3) by 
which local politicians aim to co-opt local leaders and appease the slum dwellers to 
ensure their votes at the time of elections. Slum development and housing schemes 
come in handy and are claimed in trading of favours against votes. Often such 
politicians will promulgate themselves as intermediaries between the KSCB officials 
and the slum dwellers. They can also create problems when KSCB's officers ignore 
them in the stages of project identification, formulation and distribution of houses or 
benefits. 
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 The study by STEM pointed, among other things, at the weak social orientation of the 
organisational structure; the conventional housing approach with little sensitivity for 
specific needs of women and children; no incremental approaches to accommodate the 
limited affordability of the beneficiaries; and the lack of skills among technical staff to 
deal with social, communication and economic development aspects, and to tap the 
support of voluntary or community based organisations in slum development. 
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reservation of houses for the lower income groups, they do go out and 
inspect schemes and progress before the next releases can be justified, and 
they do want to have proof of eligible beneficiaries, etc. In fact, both in 
rural and urban schemes the identification and allocation of houses by the 
borrowing agencies to the right beneficiary has caused serious delays. 
Nevertheless, non-target groups have obtained the benefits (National 
Institute for Public Finance and Policy, 1996). HUDCO's limited mandate 
has narrowed its clientele to the state housing agencies and this has created 
an interdependency. In addition, the increased pressures to show 
performance has made the HUDCO volatile for bargaining and 
compromises. Of late, the HUDCO seems to have become more lenient 
and permissive, while their role in tainted schemes, like the Ashraya, has 
not been impeccable. Institutional and also individual ambitions do not 
seem to match with maintaining a strict compliance with HUDCO's own 
social, financial and technical requirements. 
A considerable difference of opinion exists about the unit cost of 
housing. In order to increase quality of construction, the borrowing 
agencies have urged the HUDCO repeatedly to increase the ceilings set by 
the Ministry of Urban Development. However, the HUDCO has no other 
choice than to stick to these and safeguard affordability for the targeted 
income groups. The HUDCO is also frequently approached for additional 
funding when delays are also faced by the housing agencies during project 
implementation. Additional funding often proves difficult as cost ceilings 
have already been reached and supplemental loans cannot be sanctioned. 
The housing agencies have no other choice but to stop the scheme or to 
complete the scheme with the first instalments of 'fresh schemes'. It so 
happens, that some schemes never took off as the money of the first 
payment had already been spent. This practise cannot have escaped the 
attention of the HUDCO and several 'paper schemes' must have been 
tolerated and, later, written off. 
Although the break-up of sanctioned loans comply with the 
reservation of housing units for different income categories, no 
information is collected about the incomes of the allottees. In fact, the 
borrowing agencies are not forced to keep to these percentages when 
allotting houses. Research has indicated that housing agencies have a much 
less social focus than the HUDCO (National Institute Public Finance and 
Policy, 1994). These findings are also supported by the studies conducted 
by the Times Research Foundation (1996). 
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10.6 Conclusions 
The housing agencies in Karnataka did not have an explicit housing policy 
to go by and this is one of the factors that the programmes and schemes in 
the state seem to be a bizarre palette of interventions in the housing 
market. The only reference that exists are the five-year plans and unofficial 
policy statements. The housing agencies did not feel the need to have their 
own policy or plan either or were pressurised to prepare them. Such policy 
liberty seemed to be more satisfying for those who ran the agencies. In 
their daily operation, the housing agencies show great similarity with the 
way the Public Works Department perceives, designs and implements 
projects: a conventional, physical and engineering approach toward 
solving the problems of slums and housing shortage. The needs of the 
urban low-income and their specific preferences for smaller amounts and 
recurring loans, and flexible loan repayment schedules were hardly 
addressed. 
The preceding sections showed that the output of mass low-cost 
housing schemes have been respectable in terms of number of houses. 
However, the Karnataka Housing Board had not shown much interest in 
these housing schemes, i.e. the Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar housing 
schemes. Moreover, both the KSCB and KHB have been pressurising the 
financing institutions to increase the ceilings for the unit cost of houses 
with little concern about affordability. The question was raised as to why 
the KHB has not given more emphasis on such mass housing schemes and 
rather concentrated its efforts on schemes that produced increasingly 
expensive houses in low numbers; a focus that cannot be matched with the 
mandate of the KHB. Recent developments seem to demonstrate that the 
KHB is drifting still further away from its constitutional mission. The 
strong involvement in the highly capital intensive Koramangala National 
Games Village for high income has been provided as an example. 
Both the KSCB and KHB have concentrated their projects around 
the Bangalore-Mysore axis and two-third of their investments between 
1980-94 has been directed to this area. Although these projects may have 
helped to disperse the growth and take away some of pulling factors of the 
Bangalore metropolis, other regions with severe housing shortages should 
have had a larger share: Kolar, Raichur and Uttara Kannada. The 
concentration of investments has neither been in line with the proposals of 
the National Commission on Urbanisation and the Urban Development 
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Strategies Papers (1992, 1994), which recommended to stimulate growth 
in other urban axes. While the importance of the current selection of 
project cities can be supported, there were many other cities and towns that 
have shown a high urban growth rate between 1981-91 or had a large 
number of slum population. The 'need' for housing in these cities was at 
least as high as in the selected cities. Moreover, these cities were not 
compensated by other schemes that may have ameliorated the housing 
conditions of the urban poor, such as the Environmental Improvement of 
Urban Slums by the KSCB. What has been evident in the project selection 
is that political pressures were at work. In more than two-third of the cases, 
the schemes were selected in locations were a local MLA was of the same 
political party as the state government. It seems obvious that they have 
used their fellow partymen in the government to get a housing scheme in 
their constituency. Moreover, in one out of four cases the local MLA was a 
minister around the time of selection of a scheme. 
Actual occupation of the houses in each of the case-study towns 
materialised only four to five years after sanctioning. A major flaw in the 
housing delivery is the tardy provision of basic amenities and the allotment 
of houses to the applicants. This is important from the point of view of 
closing the gap between demand and supply, and more importantly to start 
the recovery of loans as early as possible. Both the KSCB and the KHB 
have given little importance to actual allotment and to secure early loan 
repayment by owner-occupants. The household incomes and the type of 
house they occupy in KHB's composite housing schemes show a fairly 
good correlation. By and large, there is no drastic skewness in the 
distribution of house types and stated monthly household incomes. One 
could say that the allotment procedures of the KHB have contributed to a 
reasonable distribution of house types among the various income groups. 
One should , however, bear in mind that housing market forces also ensure 
that households with higher incomes will opt to live in a larger house and 
those with a small income for a cheaper house. Thus, there is a natural 
tendency to fair distribution of house types among the income groups. The 
common observation that public housing schemes only benefit the better-
off is not supported by the data presented in this chapter. One could, 
however, dispute the built-in distribution ratio of 10 per cent for EWS, 45 
per cent for LIG and for MIG/HIG. The ratio is not a just reflection of the 
actual income distribution among the urban population. Indeed, the urban 
poor (EWS) consist of 20-40 per cent of the urban population. An 
acceptable counter-argument is that for the EWS and LIG categories 
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special schemes are implemented by the KSCB and KHB. We have seen 
that these special housing schemes did indeed benefit households with 
low-incomes (below Rs. 2,000 per month). 
In KHB composite schemes, the repayment routine and discipline is 
well established in contrast to the poor repayment in the populist housing 
schemes of the KSCB, the Ashraya housing scheme and others. The profile 
of the occupants of KHB's composite housing schemes illustrate that many 
allottees had a commercial objective: to rent out or to sell off the house 
shortly after possession. This defeats, unfortunately, any control of 
allocation of houses to particular income groups and to direct subsidy to 
the lower incomes. The household interviews have illustrated that once the 
houses are allotted and occupied, they constitute a considerable 
improvement in living conditions for the beneficiaries and most are 
satisfied with the houses. However, on some of the basic facilities more 
than half of the respondents were critical. Water supply and drainage is a 
common problem, as well as the state of maintenance of roads, garbage 
collection and open and green space. 
The Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing scheme for the 
urban shelterless and siteless were of a different nature. While, the 
composite housing schemes have served to an extent their purpose, this 
cannot be said of the above two schemes. Inexperience and time-pressures 
compelled that quick-fix solutions were introduced for the financing of the 
scheme, for contracting, the identification of beneficiaries, for the 
monitoring of construction and for the recovery of the loan component 
from the beneficiaries. Various organisational problems surfaced within a 
short period and these have continued for many years: the lack of 
involvement and wrong selection of beneficiaries, the poor quality of work 
by contractors, the lack of supervision, and the lack of infrastructure on the 
housing sites. The Ashraya scheme has been criticised all along. The 
critique has been largely supported by the field work in the five case-
studies. It was pointed out that beneficiaries who were identified were not 
eligible, irregularities were reported in the selection of contractors, false 
progress and materials delivery reports were presented and bribes were 
accepted by the officials. The schemes had attracted many smart citizens 
because of the land that could be acquired cheaply under these government 
schemes, either for possession, for profitable land-transaction by re-sale or 
for rental purposes. The provision of basic infrastructure such as water 
supply, electricity connection and street lights lagged behind and did not 
materialise in most locations. Despite this, many respondents appreciated 
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the occupation of the house and considered it an improvement over their 
previous situation. The comfort and security of property are the main gains 
of the schemes. 
The role of agencies in Karnataka's housing schemes has also been 
reviewed in this chapter. The Secretariat for Housing and Urban 
Development had taken a facilitating role toward the KHB and KSCB and 
would only assume a prominent role, or when projects created problems. 
There would not be much pressure from the secretariat to show either 
technical quality or financial performance. This situation was different in 
the case of the Ashraya and Dr. Ambedkar Centenary housing schemes in 
which the secretariat had to take a leading role throughout. The KHB has 
never been able nor interested in developing into a semi-independent 
housing institution. It accepted the role of reacting to the wishes and, at 
times, whims of the government. There is a strong focus on conventional 
(composite) housing schemes and little interest in low-cost housing 
schemes. The reputation of the Karnataka Housing Board for keeping to 
time schedules and maintaining cost figures has been poor for over a 
decade. Housing schemes also have become a liability to the government 
as the recovery of loans from the allottees proved difficult. Several studies 
have pointed out that the recovery of the housing agencies is not more than 
55-60 per cent. Several internal problems have been discussed that are 
endemic to both the KHB and the KSCB. There is little prime concern with 
financial management or organisational performance but, rather, with short 
term benefits and physical outputs. The regular transfer of officers and 
commissioners/secretaries hampers any continuity of and commitment to 
the organisation. It has been argued that there is also little resistance in the 
KHB against those who pursue personal benefits and get involved in 
irregular practices. In the KSCB, lack of skills among technical staff to 
deal with social, communication and economic development aspects, and 
the ability to tap the support of voluntary or community based 
organisations in slum development were found to be absent. The financing 
modalities of the HUDCO have ensured that a portion of the housing 
schemes should be built and allotted to the urban poor. Moreover, their 
concern with recoverability of loans, make the HUDCO a watchdog over 
the borrowing agencies. However, pressures to achieve financial and 
physical targets have made the HUDCO more permissive of practices and 
compromises that are not to the benefit of the urban poor. 
11 
Water Supply Schemes in Karnataka 
Water supply schemes constitute a major share of the investments by the 
Housing and Urban Development Department in Karnataka. An 
exploration of the perception, selection and implementation of these 
projects is significant to this study. Bangalore city and its surrounding 
areas are supplied through water schemes constructed by the Bangalore 
Water Supply and Sewerage Boards (BWSSB), one of the mightiest 
agencies under the department. All other urban areas are served by water 
supply schemes through the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board (KUWS&DB). This distinction is important as the operations and 
outlay of both agencies are quite different. 
This thesis has excluded the study of housing and infrastructure 
interventions in Bangalore and focused on all other urban local bodies in 
Karnataka, among them seven case-studies in more detail. Of the seven 
case-studies, the KUWS&DB had implemented a water supply project in 
two locations during 1980-94, in Gulbarga and Bidar. In contrast to the 
other housing and infrastructure schemes under study, the focus of the 
field work in these two case-studies was confined to an assessment of the 
project implementation, administrative and technical details. The 
researcher has not undertaken a household survey or an assessment of the 
actual technical improvement of the water supply situation in the case-
study towns. Such a research would have been relevant but warrants a 
separate and more extensive research. However, with the available 
aggregate information, the details from project files in the selected towns 
and with the feed-back from the interviewed government officials and 
others, a reasonable analysis can be made. 
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For the benefit of the non-technical reader, conventional water 
supply schemes consist of a water intake from a river or lake or a 
mechanical bore well from where the water is brought by water mains to a 
treatment plant. After treatment, the water is temporary stored in storage 
tanks and pressurised through pumping and/or overhead tanks and 
transported through a distribution network to supply individual houses 
through (metered) house connections or nearby public taps. Besides this 
so-called piped water supply, one can also find handpumps and open wells 
in urban areas. These last two options are becoming obsolete as a result of 
the depletion and pollution of the shallow ground water. The national 
water supply standard formulated by the Central Public Health and 
Environmental Engineering Organisation in Delhi has been set at 135 litres 
per capita per day (lpcd) for urban areas. 
11.1 Water supply policies in India and Karnataka 
Water supply is very much a state subject and for long it was the 
responsibility of individual households and urban local bodies. The central 
government had a rather remote position with regard to this urban service. 
However, through central government sponsored schemes, water supply 
became a direct investment area, though on a limited scale. 
The Government of India 
The growing problems of appalling living conditions, forced the central 
government to launch the Scheme for Environmental Improvement of 
Slums in 1972 in which the provision of public water taps was an essential 
component. Moreover, water supply and sanitation received special 
attention in the Seventh and Eighth Five-Year Plan as the Government of 
India wanted to follow up on the appeal of international agencies to set 
specific targets during the International Drinking Water Supply and 
Sanitation Decade (1980-90). The water supply (and sanitation) sector 
became a distinct chapter in national five-year plans from 1980 onwards. 
In financial terms it meant a large increase in outlay. As a result, India has 
quite successfully increased the coverage of water supply, particularly in 
rural areas. Soon after the targets for 1990 were announced, it proved that 
these were not to be achieved through expensive and conventional 
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technologies. The Government of India stressed that unless low-cost 
options, beneficiary contribution, community involvement in planning, 
implementation and maintenance were included in the programme 
implementation, the target would remain unattainable. The Planning 
Commission also indicated that the state governments should identify and 
establish adequate institutions, uniform technology approaches and 
designs, proper monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, etc. Few of these 
suggestions were adopted. As predicted, the targets were not achieved by 
1990 and were deferred to 1997, the end of the Eighth Fi ve-Year Plan (See 
table 11-1). 
Table 11-1: Target for urban and rural water supply for 1990 and actual 
achievements between 1985-92 
(in per cent of total population) 
Facility 
Rural water supply 
Urban water supply 
Target for 
1990 
100.0 
100.0 
Actual achievements by 
1985 1990 
56.3 
72.9 
73.9 
83.8 
1992 
(Estimated) 
78.4 
84.9 
Sources: Seventh Five-Year Plan 1985-90, Government of India (1985); Eighth Five-
Year Plan 1992-97, Government of India (1992). 
The national Eighth Five-Year Plan came also with additional guidelines 
for urban water supply: 
- Urban local bodies should be enabled to levy water supply charges up 
to a level to cover - at least - the operation and maintenance; 
- The involvement of the private sector in construction and 
maintenance of water supply should be encouraged; 
- State governments should not become responsible for operation and 
maintenance of water supply systems, but leave this responsibility to 
the urban local bodies; 
- Appropriate links should be forged between water supply and 
environmental sanitation in the planning of new programmes; 
- Implementation of water supply and sanitation programmes are to be 
done in a decentralised manner with the involvement of the district 
administration, urban local bodies, NGOs and people; and 
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Municipal budgets should have separate allocations for operation and 
maintenance of water supply and sanitation in order to ensure 
sufficient provision for these often neglected tasks. 
However, all these observations and appeals will prove of little meaning 
unless the state government takes interest in such changes. What was the 
situation in Karnataka? 
Government of Karnataka 
Until the establishment of the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and 
Drainage Board in 1975, the subject of urban water supply was not an 
explicit item in Karnataka's five-year plans. Water supply is an obligatory 
function of urban local bodies under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 
1964 and the Karnataka Corporations Act, 1976. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
these bodies were not equipped to execute major works and the 
Government of Karnataka then transferred this responsibility to the Public 
Health Engineering Department. This arrangement was also unsuccessful 
as the Department lacked the adequate flexibility and financial leverage to 
urgently and effectively respond to the needs of a rapid urbanising state 
(N1UA, 1988). Consequently, the KUWS&DB was constituted in 1975 on 
the same lines as the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board. 
As far as water supply, sewerage and drainage are concerned, the 
government gave priority in the early five-year plans to schemes in rural 
areas and small urban settlements with a population up to 20,000 and the 
progress of water supply in other urban areas was very limited. Only 12 
schemes were implemented between 1974-79 while 61 schemes were 
planned. On the other hand, greater resources and attention was given to 
Bangalore that could no longer rely on local ground and surface water 
sources. The Cauvery Water Supply Stage I Project was designed and 
approved in 1979 with an outlay of Rs. 90 million. The provision for water 
supply, sewerage and drainage in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85) 
increased considerably and consisted of Rs. 230 million for urban 
Karnataka and Rs. 100 million for Bangalore water supply. The United 
Nations' Water Conference in 1977 and the declaration of 1980-90 as the 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade made its 
impact on the state policies. In the state Sixth Five-Year Plan, the national 
target for 1990 of 100 per cent urban water supply coverage was translated 
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into a number of schemes: open dug wells, borewells and handpumps, 
piped water supply, research and development. By 1990, it was obvious 
that the KUWS&DB, BWSSB and the PHE Department had not reached 
the set targets. The situation of rural sanitation was very bleak as little 
progress had been made 'because of lack of involvement by the 
beneficiaries' (Annual Plan 1990-91, p. XIII-E.2). The targets were 
deferred and 'by the end of the Eighth Five-Year Plan in 19951 it was 
expected that a 100 per cent coverage of water supply will be achieved' 
(Annual Plan 1991-92, p. 176). 
The KUWS&DB had also to take the additional responsibility for 
the maintenance of these schemes. As many municipalities proved 
incapable of maintaining their water supply schemes, the state government 
appointed the KUWS&DB to do so. While there was initial enthusiasm, 
this disappeared over the years and was replaced by a concern for losses 
and a lack of staff. Moreover, the number of schemes to be maintained 
increased as the government transferred more existing schemes to the 
KUWS&DB and, also, newly completed schemes that were kept with the 
KUWS&DB as the municipalities were unwilling to take on an additional 
financial burden in maintaining them. This absorbed an increasing portion 
of the KUWS&DB's revenues. The KUWS&DB urged the state 
government to take a decision in this regard and proposed that the 
government should meet the municipal contribution for new projects and 
release the KUWS&DB of the increasing operational burden of 
maintaining existing schemes. 
In contrast, the water supply for Bangalore received ample attention 
in the 1980s and the Cauvery Stage I was followed by Stage II, III and IV. 
The large outlay in comparison with the rest of Karnataka underlines the 
agency-oriented approach and the apparent political clout of the BWSSB. 
In the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-97), the role of the KUWS&DB 
assumed greater importance and received a larger outlay in that plan. 
While it had a mere Rs. 88.4 million to spend in the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan (1985-90), the Eighth Five-Year Plan approved an outlay of Rs. 1,575 
million. It was realised that many cities and towns were still severely 
under-supplied with piped water supply. The State Finance Commission 
observed in 1995 that only 14 out of 135 surveyed cities and towns in 
1
 The Annual Plan 1990-91 and 1991-92 assumed to be the first plan of the Eighth Five-
Year Plan 1990-95. Later the Eighth Five-Year Plan was prepared for the period 1992-
97 and the two Annual Plans (1990-92) were maintained as separate one-year plans. 
Water Supply Schemes in Karnataka 295 
Karnataka had water supply as per the norms (State Finance Commission, 
1996, p. 122). Apparently the emphasis on Bangalore and its water supply 
problems was flawed and a more balanced approach was taken in the 
Eighth Five-Year Plan. The overall share of this sector declined from 7.6 
per cent in the Seventh Five-Year Plan to 5.5 per cent in the Eighth Five-
Year Plan. This was a result of the diminished outlay for Bangalore water 
supply. The annual reports between 1992-96 showed an increase in 
projects. Particularly the number of schemes for larger cities doubled. In 
1996, the KUWS&DB had 120 schemes under implementation, while this 
number was only 62 in 1990. The pressures to reduce the number of 
schemes maintained by the Board had not resulted in any decline. In 1996, 
the KUWS&DB still maintained 26 water supply schemes against 31 in 
1990. Apparently, the government did not have the means to create 
competent and well staffed municipal organisations. No action was taken 
until 1997 when the state government issued an order transferring the 
operation and maintenance duties back in stages to the municipalities. 
11.2 The Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board 
The Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board was established 
in 1975 under the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Act of 
1974. The KUWS&DB was made responsible for: 
- technical and financial feasibility studies; 
financial and technical assistance to urban local bodies to execute 
water supply and drainage schemes; and 
- the formulation, design, planning and implementation of urban water 
supply and drainage schemes on behalf of the state government or at 
the request of urban local bodies. 
In 1981, the Act was amended and the KUWS&DB was also made 
responsible for: 
- operation and maintenance of urban water supply and drainage 
schemes up to the consumer as directed by the state government; and 
296 Urban Development in Karnataka 
- levy and collection of water rates, fees and other water charges in 
order to operate and maintain such systems. 
The position of the KUWS&DB was further strengthened as the Act 
prescribes that 'no local authority is allowed to investigate, prepare or 
execute any scheme without the approval of the Board' (Section 28). As a 
result, the KUWS&DB took the responsibility of water supply in 172 
urban local bodies. Other technologies cheaper than piped water supply 
systems, such as handpumps, mini-water supply systems based on gravity 
or rainwater harvesting are not part of the Board's mandate. Secondly, 
there are no provisions included for the quality of water to be delivered or 
maintained as per the Government of India's Public Health Engineering 
and Environmental Organisation (CPHEEO) or as per international 
standards (WHO). There are no specifications regarding the minimum 
hours of supply or the quantity of water to be supplied to each household, 
nor are there any contingency provisions in case of the system failing, e.g. 
through water tankers. Different from the Bangalore Water Supply and 
Sewerage Board, the KUWS&DB is not compelled to install and/or 
maintain sewage treatment plants for the urban local bodies or to force 
residents, industries and others to install proper alternative sewage disposal 
units like septic tanks or soakage pits. Its functions are limited to installing 
(under ground) drainage works that collect the sewage flows in urban areas 
through an underground sewer system and, finally, discharging the raw 
sewage to follow its natural course into the environment. There is no 
obligation to treat the sewage. 
The KUWS&DB can charge the urban local body with all costs 
related to the preparation and execution of the scheme, including 
investigations, project report preparation, supervision and administration. 
It can also charge for bulk water supply and other services provided upon 
request of the municipality or instruction by the state government. In case 
the municipality fails to pay their share of levied charges or defaults in 
repaying loans, the state government is entitled to withhold such amounts 
from state grant-in-aids or octroi-compensations and transfer it to the 
KUWS&DB. For a break-up of the financial contribution of each party see 
table 11-2. 
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Table 11-2: Financing modalilties of urban water supply schemes 
KUWS&DB 
Type of urban water supply 
and drainage scheme 
Board Water Supply 
Schemes (Corporations) 
Urban Water Supply 
Scheme (CMCs; pop. > 
50,000) 
Urban Water Supply 
Schemes (TMCs; pop. 
20,000-50,000) 
Piped water supply scheme 
(pop. < 20,000) 
Underground drainage (pop. 
> 100,000) 
LICi ЭГ 
HUDCO 
loan 
50 
50 
50 
0 
70 
State ι 'overnment 
contribution 
Loan 
20 
25 
30 
0 
5 
Subsidy 
0 
0 
0 
100 
0 
Municipal 
share 
30 
25 
20 
0 
25 
Sources: Government of Karnataka (1994); NIUA (1988). 
In Karnataka, 160 out of 172 urban local bodies are under the KUWS&DB 
which have a piped water supply system. These were constructed by the 
erstwhile State Public Health and Engineering Department and, since 
1975, by the KUWS&DB. Of these 160 schemes, 134 municipalities are 
maintaining the schemes themselves. In 26 locations, the KUWS&DB is 
responsible for operation and maintenance. In these cases, the cost of 
operation and maintenance of water supply schemes is borne by the 
KUWS&DB and they are entitled to recover the costs. Presently, the 
KUWS&DB is operating and maintaining seven bulk water supply 
schemes and seven up-to-consumer point water supply schemes 
(KUWS&DB Budget, 1995-96). Here, the KUWS&DB collects the 
revenue directly from the consumers and the urban local bodies based on 
the quantity consumed. In eleven so-called deposit contribution schemes , 
These are schemes requested by the Karnataka Housing Board or one of the larger 
Urban Development Authorities that are undertaking a housing scheme who request the 
Board to install a water supply distribution network. The Board initiates such works 
after payment of a deposit, i.e. the full cost of construction. 
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the KUWS&DB charges the urban local bodies on the basis of the 
expenditure involved in maintaining the works. There are thirteen other 
water supply schemes where the KUWS&DB is maintaining the works that 
are yet to be transferred by the state government to the urban local body 
and where no revenue is earned. 
The acquisition of land is either through purchase from private 
owners or through appropriation through the provision of the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894. The KUWS&DB also has the right to lay pipes and 
mains on private property and can indemnify the owner for loss of income 
or damage. The KUWS&DB is allowed to enter into any contract up to Rs. 
1 million without the state government's approval. 
The Board has a chairman who is also the managing director, three 
directors from the departments of finance, health and municipal 
administration, public works and a number of other officials. The chairman 
and managing director is either a politician, an IAS officer or - lately and 
more rarely - a promoted Chief Engineer. The KUWS&DB has also a 
secretary, a registrar, a financial advisor and accounts officer, one chief 
engineer, one superintendent engineer (Designs) and a superintendent 
engineer each for the Bangalore, Dharwad and Gulbarga circles. Each 
circle is divided into a total of 13 divisions, each headed by an executive 
engineer, and 49 sub-divisions, each headed by an assistant executive 
engineer. Totally, the KUWS&DB has 2,077 employees on its payroll. For 
the operation and maintenance functions, the KUWS&DB has on 
temporary contract or on deputation from urban local bodies, 816 lower 
rank staff (KUWS&DB Budget, 1995-96). 
With regard to the financial position of the KUWS&DB, it has been 
observed that the revenue is not keeping pace with the expenditure (NIUA, 
1988, Kirloskar, 1994). The stagnating revenues are linked with the 
problems of collecting water charges from the beneficiaries and, 
particularly, the urban local bodies. The recovery of water charges 
fluctuated between 3 8 - 5 3 per cent of the total revenue receipts between 
1981-94. At the same time, the revenue expenditure on operation and 
maintenance has increased from 35 per cent in 1981 to around 60 per cent 
in 1994. The decline in financial performance seems to have stabilised but 
is still far from healthy. In the year 1993-94, the expenditure for operation 
and maintenance was Rs. 221 million, against a receipt of Rs. 154 million. 
Moreover, the dues to the Karnataka Electricity Board was a staggering Rs. 
440 million in September 1994 and increasing. The loss in the seven 
consumer point water supply schemes is the largest where the recovery is 
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only 60-65 per cent. The deficit is partly made up by loans from the state 
government, and octroi compensation and grants diverted to the 
KUWS&DB. 
A major bottleneck in the enhancement of the revenue is the 
resistance to increase the water tariffs for bulk and consumer supply. A 
consultant had estimated that a minimum domestic rate of approximately 
Rs. 2.50 per 1000 litres or in the absence of a water meter Rs. 37 per 
month for 1/2" connection pipe has to be charged to make up for all 
operation and maintenance costs, including debt servicing for existing and 
committed loans of future projects (Kirloskar, 1994). Political 
interference , public demonstrations and court injunctions have prevented 
the KUWS&DB from increasing their water tariffs4. The liquidity problem 
further contributes to its financial problems. Time and cost overruns of 
most capital works, the rather loose financial management leading to 
diversion of funds into a few schemes have left other projects without any 
funds to proceed. This has aggravated the situation and also angered the 
public and the politicians. 
11.3 Water supply schemes in Kama ta ka 
Between 1980-94, the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board 
had taken up 72 urban water supply schemes in 58 municipalities 
according to its records (1995), i.e. in about one-third of the urban local 
bodies. The sanctioned project cost at Rs. 1,575 million constitutes 22 per 
cent of the total sanctioned investments for housing and infrastructure in 
urban areas in the same period. The per capita investment in these urban 
areas was Rs. 499. In comparison, the city of Bangalore and its 
surrounding settlements were covered by the stages of the Cauvery Water 
Supply schemes and were sanctioned between 1980-94 at a total project 
cost of Rs. 8,866 million. The per capita investment amounted to Rs. 
In 1995, the study resulted in the forwarding of a government order to enhance the 
water tariff to Rs. 2.50 per 1000 litres for all urban local bodies in Karnataka. The chief 
minister replied at a public gathering in Mysore to a question from the public that the 
new water tariffs would only apply to Bangalore, undoing in a single statement the work 
of months. 
4
 The government order was introduced with effect of 15.10.1996 and the new system of 
water tariffs and connection charges was similar to the suggestions made in the study. 
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3,1325. This is more than five times the sanctioned amount for the rest of 
urban Karnataka (See also table 11-5). This skewed attention and 
investment during the 1980s has been commented upon earlier and a more 
balanced pattern was only initiated from 1992 onwards. 
Selection of the project towns 
The selection of the project towns can be assessed by a number of 
indicators which are presented in table 11-3. The geographical distribution 
of schemes is shown in figure 11-1. The figures indicate that the 
geographical distribution of the schemes by the KUWS&DB has been 
fairly even over all districts. The districts of Hassan, Kolar and Bangalore 
Rural were particularly favoured, while Mysore district has not had a 
single scheme between 1980-94. In addition, a comparison has been made 
of the district-wise sanctioned project costs between 1980-94 (See table 
11-4). 
These tables and figures invite a number of comments. A number of 
districts have despite their poor water supply situation received few 
investments between 1980-94. They are: Bangalore Rural, Belgaum and 
Bidar. The 'neglect' of Mysore district may be attributed to the fact that 
the average water supply is well above the average. The deprivation in the 
Tumkur district, is compensated by a number of large investments since 
the late 1980s. Particularly the districts of Tumkur and Hassan acquired 
schemes with a per capita investment of well over Rs. 1,000. This is not 
due only to the backwardness of the districts but the technical complexity 
of obtaining water from distant sources. For example, the Arsikere/Tiptur 
water supply project involved the construction of a large reservoir and 
canal. In addition to these major public works, a common treatment plant 
will be constructed from where the water will be led by separate lines over 
a long distance to the two towns. 
5
 The urban local bodies of I.T.I., Yelahanka and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited 
(H.A.L.), belonging to Bangalore Urban district, have been included. 
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Table 11-3: Indicators of the selected projects of the KUWS&DB and the 
BWSSB between 1980-94 
Indicator 
Total number of 
schemes 
Number of towns 
Average size towns 
(1991) 
Annual growth 1981-
91 (in%) 
Current water supply 
(1996,inlpcd)** 
Development Index 
Political Affiliation 
Index 
Average annual income 
1982-92 (in Rs. per 
capita) 
Average income per 
capita (1992-93)*** 
Average sanctioned 
project cost (in Rs. 
million) 
Average per capita 
sanctioned investment 
(in Rs.) 
Municipal contribution 
for investment per 
capita (in Rs.) 
Approximate annual 
repayment per capita 
(inRs.)***** 
KUWS&DB 
schemes 
72 
58 
54,366 
2.12 
75.0 
15.16 
13.36 
54.81 
81.93 
23.9 
499.35 
100-150 
30-45 
Other towns and 
cities 
0 
110 
47,303 
1.87 
49.9 
13.79 
12.58 
49.39 
n.a. 
0 
0 
0 
n.a. 
Bangalore* by the 
BWSSB 
3 
4 
70,769 
0.90 
89.4 
17 
49.39 
140.0 
708.77**** 
2,955.2 
3,131.86 
939.56 
200-260 
** 
*** 
Including Yelahanka, I.T.I and H.A.L. urban agglomerations. 
State Finance Commission Report on Urban Local Bodies, 1996. 
Based on DMA Vital Statistics for the year 1992-93. 
Based on Annual Report 1992-93. 
Based on LIC/HUDCO's interest rates and 22/12 years repayment period 
respectively during the initial 3-4 years. 
Source: KUWS&DB and BWSSB records (1996). 
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Figure 11-1: Distribution of KUWS&DB urban water supply schemes in 
Karnataka between 1980-94 
Legend: 
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Table 11-4: District-wise water supply situation, number of schemes and 
per capita investment by the KUWS&DB between 1980-94 
District 
l.B'lore Rural 
2. В'lore Urban* 
3. Belgaum 
MC 
Other 
4. Bellary 
5. Bidar 
6. Bijapur 
7. Chikmagalur 
8. Chitradurga 
9. D.Kannada 
MC 
Other 
10. Dharwad 
MC 
Other 
11. Gulbarga 
MC 
Other 
12. Hassan 
13. Kodagu 
14. Kolar 
15. Mandya 
16. Mysore 
MC 
Other 
17. Raichur 
18. Shimoga 
MC 
Other 
19. Tumkur 
20. U.Kannada 
Totals 
No. of 
cities and 
towns 
8 
4 
1 
16 
10 
5 
17 
4 
5 
1 
10 
1 
18 
1 
10 
6 
I 
10 
5 
1 
10 
8 
3 
4 
6 
8 
171 
Average 
water supply 
(in lpcd) 
27.5 
55.0 
84.0 
48.4 
80.8 
39.2 
65.1 
67.3 
71.8 
155.0 
53.4 
130.0 
42.7 
100.0 
59.8 
81.1 
70.0 
52.6 
77.9 
115.0 
75.5 
60.3 
82.0 
73.2 
37.6 
61.1 
75.0 
Cities and 
towns with 
a scheme 
4 
1 
0 
4 
4 
2 
5 
2 
1 
0 
4 
1 
4 
1 
3 
4 
0 
7 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
3 
2 
58 
No. of 
schemes 
4 
1 
0 
5 
5 
2 
5 
3 
2 
0 
4 
1 
4 
1 
3 
7 
0 
9 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
7 
2 
72 
Per capita 
investm. (ii 
Rs.) 
89.32 
14.63 
0 
97.60 
159.79 
28.99 
48.79 
173.04 
18.16 
0 
40.01 
100.36 
196.70 
424.23 
100.95 
1,131.42 
0 
87.17 
41.89 
0 
0 
15.11 
0 
95.36 
2,555.81 
74.97 
185.28 
* Excluding Bangalore City. 
Source: KUWS&DB records (1996). 
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Was this expensive solution for Arsikere/Tiptur water supply necessary? A 
senior officer of the KUWS&DB mentioned that for the water supply alone 
a much cheaper technology was feasible, i.e. the use of mechanical 
borewells and pumping the water without treatment to the towns. 
However, the minister at that time who originates from this area had 
insisted that the more expensive option should be chosen. The same is true 
for the schemes in Gundlupet and Chamarajanagar according to the same 
source. Though from the aggregate figures there is not much evidence that 
towns with good political ties obtained more water supply schemes than 
others. 
However, disaggregated analysis of the exact time of sanctioning 
makes it clear that here also the representation of government-friendly 
MLAs and ministers are evident. Their influence is not confined to the 
selection of the project, but in some cases to the technical and financial 
details as seen earlier. One can argue that in these larger projects the 
technical and financial advise by experts loses its relevance and the scope 
of commissions can be a major incentive for 'irrational' decisions. Who 
ultimately will carry the burden of debt servicing has not been a main 
concern as it is known from the beginning that the financial position of the 
concerned municipalities will not allow such loans . It appears, indeed, 
that short-term benefits have been the motivation. 
While preparing the schemes, the KUWS&DB is known to work 
independent of the municipalities. There is little consultation during the 
preliminary stages, neither are they involved in the choice of technical 
options. This may be important as the municipalities have to maintain the 
created assets after completion of the project and an insight into the 
technical and financial implications of the scheme would be essential 
(IHSP, 1994). The engineers adhere to the standard designs provided by 
the national water agency, the CPHEEO, and little effort is made to reduce 
cost, for example, by combining schemes for neighbouring municipalities, 
by opting for a combination of piped water supply and the cheaper non-
piped water supply (handpumps). No alternatives are developed or 
presented to the municipalities. At this level, costs are actually of little 
concern to the designers. 
6
 In the quoted Arsikere/Tiptur example, towns with less than 40,000 inhabitants and an 
annual per capita income of around Rs. 150 (DMA, 1994), the annual burden would be 
around Rs. 450 per capita. 
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Financial implications of urban water supply schemes for urban local 
bodies 
Water supply is an essential necessity for the citizens and an obligatory 
function of the municipalities. While the KUWS&DB has taken over the 
design and implementation of water supply schemes, and in some locations 
also the operation, maintenance and collection of water charges, the local 
bodies are expected to contribute financially by: 
- A share of the capital cost of the projects, varying from 20-30 per cent 
depending on the size of the city (See table 11 -2). If municipalities do 
not have such finances, the Government of Karnataka will impose a 
loan on the municipality and retain the repayment of the dues from the 
state government's financial contribution accruing to municipalities; 
- The repayment of the loan component to either the financing institution 
or the Government of Karnataka. The LIC and the HUDCO are the 
financing institutions and their contribution has been approximately 50 
per cent of the project cost; 
- Payment to the KUWS&DB for the production, treatment and delivery 
of bulk water supply to the municipalities; and 
- Carrying the expenditures for the operation and maintenance of the 
distribution network, including the pumping stations, overhead tanks, 
water mains, appurtenances, water meters, meter reading, billing and 
collection operations of the water charges. 
Undoubtedly, these financial liabilities should be within the financial 
capacity of the municipality. But is this the case? Table 11-5 and figure 
11-2 provide an answer. The analysis of the schemes implemented 
between 1980-94 shows that relation between the imposed total financial 
burden and the financial capacity (revenues) of the municipality is at best 
weak. In the graph shown in figure 11-2, the linear correlation factor is 
just +0.260. The expected initial contribution of the municipality for the 
capital investment alone was more than their income for one year. In other 
words, the municipality had to take a loan from the state government for 
mobilising their contribution which constituted Rs. 25-30 per year per 
capita. The loan component is a further Rs. 50-75 per capita per year. 
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Table 11-5: Total burden of O&M expenditures and debt servicing for 
water supply in Kamataka 
Urban local body 
All (N=108) 
TMCs (N=83) 
CMCs (N=20) 
MCs (N=5) 
Per capita total 
burden O&M and 
debt servicing 
1994-95* (in Rs.) 
147.38 
133.49 
140.11 
172.71 
Revenue per 
capita in 1994-
95** (in Rs.) 
216.82 
131.59 
190.92 
350.81 
Total burden as 
percentage of 
annual revenue (in 
%) 
67.97 
101.45 
73.39 
49.23 
* Based on Kirloskar's study for the KUWS&DB of 108 towns (excludes 
Bangalore). This includes labour, chemicals, power charges, bulk supply 
charges and debt services to the LIC, the HUDCO and the government. 
** Based on figures of the State Finance Commission (1996), using figures of 
the year 1994-95. 
Source: Kirloskar Consultants (1994); State Finance Commission (1996). 
Figure 11-2: Annual revenue and total burden of water supply schemes for 
municipalities in Kamataka 
Annual revenue and total burden water supply schemes KUWS&DB 
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Source: State Finance Commission for Urban Local Bodies (1996); Kirloskar (1994). 
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A study conducted in 1994 (Kirloskar) revealed that only 26.7 per cent of 
the cost for the production and treatment of bulk water, operation and 
maintenance of the distribution of water is covered by these two taxes. 
This does not include any debt servicing or municipal contribution for the 
scheme as indicated above. Moreover, the collection performance of these 
receipts has been on the decline. In 1992-93 the collection of water charges 
was not more than 45 per cent of the demand in all urban local bodies in 
Karnataka (Kirloskar, 1994), while this was more than 70 per cent in the 
late 1980s. The total burden for operation and maintenance, including debt 
servicing of water supply schemes, exceeds the annual income of the 
TMCs, is 73 per cent of the annual income of CMCs and 49 per cent of the 
income of MCs (See table 11-5). If one conseiders that 50-75 per cent of 
the municipal income is spent for paying salaries to collect only the solid 
waste, the balance cannot be sufficient to cover the operation and 
maintenance expenditure and also service the debts. In other words, the 
state government bears most of the investment costs and recurrent costs of 
the smaller municipalities. The supposed contributions as shown in the 
table 11-2 remain 'paper guidelines'. While the state government deducts 
the dues to the financing institutions, KEB, KUWS&DB and the state 
government from the octroi compensation, and shares of other taxes, it 
does not cover the required amount. The state government, thus, provides a 
subsidy of over 50 per cent for the supply of water in most urban areas in 
Karnataka. It was for this reason that an adjustment of the water tariff was 
required and for which the Kirloskar study was commissioned in 1994. A 
uniform water tariff system was introduced in 1996. 
Implementation of the schemes 
The above analysis discussed the project modalities before the 
commencement of the projects. What happens when the projects get 
underway? Is the implementation according to the design and the period of 
implementation? While most projects are financially unviable right from 
the stage of the drawing board, the 'affordability' is further eroded by the 
delays in implementation. Schemes are planned tightly under the premise 
that there is no dearth of money during implementation, that supplies of 
materials and labour fit seamlessly and that contractors perform well 
without interruption. However, the following scenario is common for most 
water supply schemes. First of all, the project estimates are based on the 
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Schedule of Rates which is issued by the Public Works Department and 
valid for the year of estimation. Every three to four years, these rates are 
calculated on the basis of actual material and labour costs in the market. In 
the intermediate years the Schedule of Rates is corrected by a fixed 
percentage. This percentage is - by and large - lower than the actual cost 
increases. For example, while the increase in construction materials and 
costs has been close to 20 per cent in the early 1990s, the Schedule of 
Rates was corrected by 10-15 per cent only. Projects start two-three years 
after the year of estimate and actual project costs are, thus, to start with 
underestimated. As projects stretch over a number of years, the project 
documents have a provision for cost escalation which, by rule, cannot 
exceed 10 per cent. Moreover, the state government is often not able to 
release the required funds on time. The required financial schedule and 
cash flow cannot be maintained and payment to contractors is delayed. 
Many contractors are accustomed to start work without being paid for 
months and also paid late, but after two or three months they also face a 
resource crunch and - as often happens - they stop the work until the 
agency comes forward with payment. Resuming the work after an 
interruption again takes more time as sub-contractors, suppliers, labourers, 
equipment and machinery have to be mobilised once again. Some of the 
work has to be re-done as excavated trenches may have collapsed, material 
stolen or the rains may have set in. In the meantime, the cost of materials 
and labour may have gone up, again exceeding the provisions for such 
contingencies. The contractor will indemnify the agency for the extra"cost 
and half-way through the scheme, the KUWS&DB has to request the state 
government for additional funds because of 'unforeseen' cost escalations. 
In 1994, for example, the government approved the revised project cost 
estimates of 41 urban water supply schemes, which showed an increase of 
59 per cent over the original estimates made three years earlier. The state 
government, in turn, has to approach its financiers who are reluctant to 
provide additional funds and a long procedure ensues: submitting 
proposals, technical and financial appraisal of the additional requests, 
meetings and approval procedures within the government. 
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Figure 11-3: Water supply after completion of schemes and investment 
KUWS&DB 1980-94 
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Ultimately, the increased costs are incurred to the municipality who have 
no say or influence whatsoever in the above proceedings. It is no wonder 
that municipal representatives insist that 'the implementation of projects 
should be time and cost bound' (IHSP, 1994) and that the KUWS&DB and 
state government should be held responsible for time and cost overruns. As 
there is no provision in any act for municipalities to refuse the commission 
of schemes , the plea of the municipalities often falls on deaf ears. Besides 
the time and cost overruns, there are incidences of poor quality of work by 
contractors who have tried to cut costs. Supervision of work is inadequate 
The official handing over of the assets for operation and maintenance to municipalities 
after the completion of the works by the KUWS&DB. Housing was recently brought 
under the Consumer Protection Act which provides the buyers the right to start a legal 
procedure against the housing agency. Such provision does not exist between 
government institutions and may be necessary to ensure proper time and quality control. 
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and no -proper sanctions are taken against the poor performance of 
contractors . 
Have the municipalities indeed benefited from the investments? Is 
their water supply situation better after the completion of the scheme? The 
chart (Figure 11-3) indicates that there is not much evidence to believe that 
higher investments have led to better water supply. In at least 20 towns, an 
above average per capita investment in water supply has not led to a daily 
water supply of more than 75 lpcd. 
11.4 Experiences in case-study towns 
In only two of the seven case-studies, i.e. in Bidar and Gulbarga, two water 
supply schemes and one underground drainage scheme have been 
implemented by the KUWS&DB between 1980-94. Table 11-6 provides 
some of the salient features of these schemes. The experiences of these 
three schemes have been presented in the following sections. 
Gulbarga 
While private wells had been in use by the residents, the construction of a 
comprehensive piped water supply system was started in 1965. Gulbarga 
draws water through 1146 borewells from deep groundwater, from the 
Bennithora river and from the Bhosga water reservoir . The river falls dry 
in the summer months, leaving the two other sources to supply water 
throughout the year. Two stages were commissioned between 1978-82 and 
stage III was initiated in 1987-88 at the initial cost of Rs. 128.6 million. 
The supply would increase from 23.2 mid (million litres per day) to 45.4 
mid after the third stage. 
It is a known fact that there are many incidences of supervisors colluding with the 
contractors for kick-backs and poor workmanshipis a result. 
Locally one speaks of a 'tank', which comprises a water pond where rainwater is 
collected by a simple hand-made dam. 
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Despite these efforts, the current water supply is 67 litres per capita per 
day (1994-95, Kirloskar, 1996) and is supplied every day for one hour 
according to the municipal officers10. In older areas of the city, one can 
observe exposed pipelines with perforations made by local residents to 
collect water once the system is pressurised, putting others at risk by 
allowing polluted water to infiltrate the system. Many citizens rely, 
therefore, on their old wells or self-made bore-wells. The severe water 
supply situation led to questions in the Assembly in August 1997 and 
members demanded that 'the government should take action against 
officials responsible for the chaos' {The Hindu, 2 August, 1997). The 
KUWS&DB had taken the whole responsibility of development, operation 
and maintenance of the water supply in Gulbarga. The Corporation had no 
role to play in the water supply. While the KUWS&DB has been 
reasonably successful in the collection of water charges with 70-80 per 
cent of the current demands collected in 1980s, it could in no way cover 
the expenditures". According to a study by the NIUA (1988), the cost 
recovery stood at around 20 per cent between 1982-88, a figure that does 
not deviate from findings elsewhere in the state in 1993-94 (Kirloskar, 
1994). Most of the expenditure goes into the power charges for the KEB 
(48 per cent in 1992-93). The estimated cost of production of water is 
around Rs. 4 per 1000 litres. The total burden of operation, maintenance 
and debt servicing has been estimated at Rs. 54.6 million in 1994-95, while 
the total income of the Corporation for the same year was Rs. 39.8 million. 
Water supply is, thus, a service that cannot be afforded by this corporation. 
The first underground drainage system was sanctioned around 1970. 
Today, about 50 per cent of the city area has been covered by this facility, 
according to municipal officers, and the other half has either a septic tank, 
a dry latrine, or visit one of the 54 public latrines. The number of 
households without any facilities could not be specified by the authorities. 
' The incompatibility of the supply per capita and the hours that water is actually 
supplied is stunning, as in this case. Taking an average water pressure at a mix of public 
and private supply points, the water supply in many Indian cities would never be more 
than 40 lpcd. It suggests that there are substantial losses between extraction and the 
supply of water at the users' end. Several researches in India have indeed illustrated that 
the so-called unaccounted-for-water is between 30-80 percent of the water production. 
In comparison, in most developed countries the unaccounted-for-water is less than 10 
percent. 
The apparent contradiction is due to the low water tariff which is a fraction of the 
actual unit cost of production. 
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Bidar 
A piped water supply system was constructed only in 1952, covering a part 
of the city. A full-scale system was commissioned at a cost of Rs. 5 million 
in 1975 which drew water from the Manjra river. An increased storage 
capacity for the water supply network was implemented in 1987 to cater 
for 50,000 inhabitants by adding overhead tanks and distribution lines at a 
cost of Rs. 1.43 million. Soon this capacity was inadequate for the growing 
population which was estimated to be 50,000 in 1991 but was actually 
108,816 according to the 1991 Census. In 1989-90, a major augmentation 
scheme was initiated at the estimated cost of Rs. 65 million based on the 
Schedule of Rates for that year. The scheme was sanctioned in 1991 and is 
under implementation since 1993. There have been delays due to 
administrative approvals from the KUWS&DB and the Government of 
Karnataka as the design of the barrage had to be altered which required a 
new estimate. Another reason for the delay was the disinterest of local 
contractors because the Schedule of Rates did not compensate sufficiently 
for the excavation work in the laterite soil of the region. The KUWS&DB 
had to obtain a special Schedule of Rates (10 per cent above the normal 
rate for excavation) which approval added to the delays. The current water 
supply is between 25-45 litres per capita per day and is supplied every 
other day for 45 minutes according to municipal officers. The KUWS&DB 
is maintaining the water supply scheme in Bidar. The estimated cost of 
production of water is Rs. 2.2 per 1000 litres (Kirloskar, 1994). The total 
financial burden for operation, maintenance and debt servicing has been 
estimated at Rs. 17.4 million in 1994-95, while the total municipal income 
for the same year was Rs. 10.1 only and there is no scope that the city can 
afford the water supply system that provides them so little water at present. 
The first underground drainage system in Bidar was sanctioned in 
1980 for three sectors. The works started in 1982 and stopped shortly after 
that when the sanctioned amount was depleted. Only one sector had been 
completed. Since then, several steps had been taken to raise new funds and 
to complete the work, and in spite of several notices, work was not 
resumed until 1994. A reason for the stoppage of work was a stay order by 
the court which did not allow the excavation through pieces of land that 
had not been acquired by the KUWS&DB. Another reason was a dispute 
with the contractor about the excavation rates in the laterite soil. 
Excavation was also planned through irrigated land and this work was not 
314 Urban Development in Karnataka 
allowed during the rainy season leading to more delays. The location of the 
treatment plant is also under dispute as well as the compensation to the 
land owner has been objected to and the case is pending in court. It seems 
that the KUWS&DB had done a very poor technical survey and had not 
identified these constraints which could have been anticipated. The system 
is still not in use. According to one resident the scheme remains an 
'underground mystery' that has spread its tentacles for over twenty years 
but never managed to surface, let alone provide the citizens with any 
benefits: 'The scheme is there for 20 years now. Nobody knows where the 
construction is going, what and how they are doing'. Few residents (100-
150, according to the local KUWS&DB engineer) had taken a connection 
to the sewer lines as many others objected to the high connection charges. 
In the meantime, common open drains take care of the discharge of 
domestic and sewage waste water. About 75 per cent of the households 
have either a septic tank or a dry latrine (DMA, Vital Statistics, 1992-93). 
About 6,000 households do not have any facilities and use the open ground 
for defecation. 
11.5 The role of the implementing agencies 
In the following section the role of the agencies is analysed that have had a 
role in water supply and underground drainage schemes in Karnataka 
between 1980-94: the central government, the Secretariat for Housing and 
Urban Development, the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board and the municipalities. 
The central government 
As water supply is a state subject, the central government has had a limited 
role in the policy and programmes of the state government. It was only 
with the announcement of the International Decade for Water Supply and 
Sanitation that the central government assumed a larger role in water 
supply (and sanitation) for particularly rural areas through subsidies and 
arranging for foreign donor money in Karnataka. In urban areas, the 
decade had little meaning for water supply and under ground drainage. Thé 
central government appealed to the state governments to give operation 
and maintenance greater emphasis, to make operation and maintenance of 
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water supply a more local affair and to strive for full cost recovery (Eighth 
Five-Year Plan, 1992). In spite of many similar suggestions and pleas, and 
funds that were made available, the central government has had little 
influence over what the states did. 
The Secretariat for Housing and Urban Development 
As in the case of housing schemes, no project is approved or financial 
assistance is finalised without the approval of the Secretariat for Housing 
and Urban Development. It is in the administrative trajectory before the 
execution of the projects that the Secretariat has a role. Once the project is 
under way, their involvement reduces. During the execution of projects, 
the secretariat only assumes a role when projects are seriously delayed, 
there are problems of undue public or political attention12 or when 
additional funding is required as the result of cost escalation. Besides the 
reporting of physical progress, there is not much pressure to demonstrate 
technical quality or show financial performance. 
The Kamataka Water Supply and Drainage Board 
As with the KHB, the KUWS&DB goes by the annual and five-year plan 
outlays and within that, schemes are identified, developed and 
implemented. The KUWS&DB has not had any medium-term plan which 
would have outlined a systematic approach for tackling deprived areas and 
to augment older schemes in the state. The selection of schemes has on the 
face of it an ad-hoc character and it was shown that political interference is 
not uncommon. The KUWS&DB is in its set-up and functioning similar to 
the other engineering agencies such as the Kamataka Housing Board, the 
Public Works Department and the Public Health and Engineering 
Department. It is, however, rather young and has to deal with a 
discouraging financial environment and troubled clients; the municipalities 
that are neither capable of paying their contribution of the investment for 
the schemes, nor are able to pay and care for operation and maintenance of 
the schemes. This chapter has illustrated that the additional task of 
This could be the poor work of the contractors, legal litigations with regard to ¡and or 
title deeds, misbehaviour or misappropriation by government officials, delays in 
allotment procedures, complaints about irregularities in allotment, etc. 
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operation and maintenance evolved into a financial strangulation over the 
years with diminishing returns and increasing costs. 
The KUWS&DB has its weaknesses in both the professional and 
financial management capacity but proves to be in a much better situation 
than the Karnataka Housing Board. The financially unaffordable schemes, 
the delays in implementation, the cost escalation, etc. can only to a part be 
attributed to the KUWS&DB. Political decisions determine that water 
supply schemes have to be implemented under serious financial and 
operational constraints. The KUWS&DB is also not hampered as severely 
as the KHB by regular transfers. Moreover, the Board of the KUWS&DB 
is far less 'political' in nature and is less dominated by an IAS cadre in 
senior positions. This indicates that the KUWS&DB can operate more 
freely according to their own, i.e. engineering, principles. 
The municipalities 
Whereas the municipalities are the ultimate clients of the water supply 
scheme, their role has been very limited. This situation can partly be 
attributed to the common top-down approach of the KUWS&DB and 
partly to the disinterest among the municipalities in the financial and 
technical intricacies of the schemes and their blind faith in the state 
government to take care of their problems. Once the schemes are 
commissioned and handed over to the municipalities, operation and 
maintenance is more often than not done on a fire-fighting basis. 
Systematic maintenance, either preventive or corrective, is hardly the case 
with technical staff and stores of almost anything in short supply. The 
Kirloskar study (1994) also illustrated that the revenue is totally 
inadequate to cover the basic expenditure for operation and maintenance. 
This eats into the revenue from other sources, including the grants and 
compensations from the state government. As explained, the state 
government holds back transfer amounts in order to settle dues to the KEB, 
the financing institutions and to the KUWS&DB. In spite of this, the state 
government is subsidising urban water supply in Karnataka to a large 
extent. 
Water Supply Schemes in Karnataka 317 
11.6 Conclusions 
While in the housing sector attempts were made to formulate a housing 
policy, the water supply sector never had a proper policy or planned 
programme of schemes. In the early 1980s, the KUWS&DB was well 
established in the sections of the five-year and annual plans. The manner in 
which the KUWS&DB presented itself in these documents underlined the 
shift from scheme-centred to agency-centred policies and budgets. Not 
even the objectives and the targets of the International Water Supply and 
Sanitation Decade provided a guiding principle for this agency. That the 
KUWS&DB aimed to implement as many schemes as possible, was 
conceived as self-explanatory. No questions were asked about deprivation, 
priorities, cost-benefits, coverage or the cost of conventional technologies. 
The KUWS&DB succeeded in securing a steady outlay in the respective 
government plans, but this was never enough to provide a reasonable level 
of water supply in urban Karnataka. The BWSSB did in this respect much 
better as the outlay for the various Cauvery Water Supply Projects was 
many times that of all other urban water supply schemes in the rest of 
Karnataka. The authors of the Seventh Fi ve-Year Plan (1985-90) raised 
doubts about this skewed investment pattern but their observations did not 
lead to any shift in investments. As a result, in most cities in Karnataka, 
water is still supplied for only a few hours per day. Erratic power supply, 
reduction of municipal revenues and insufficient operational staff are 
common causes for this situation. The de-pressurisation of the piped water 
supply network leads to intrusion of polluted ground water in the water 
pipes and sub-optimal functioning of the treatment plants. Moreover, 
during the hours of supply, water pressure is low due to heavy demand and 
the high loss of water through leakage. Safe drinking water is, thus, still a 
dream for many. Households have taken certain measures to overcome this 
situation and, depending on their financial capacity, they have stored water 
in vessels in their houses, built ground tanks or overhead tanks and 
installed their own borewell. Costs are, thus, incurred by households not 
only for making such arrangements but also for medical treatment as the 
result of consuming polluted water. It is obvious that particularly the urban 
poor suffer who have little means to make alternative arrangements. 
As far as the KUWS&DB schemes are concerned, this chapter has 
illustrated that the selection of schemes was, on the one hand, inspired by 
the deprivation of the town and, and on the other hand, by what ML As and 
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ministers had to say about where they considered water supply schemes 
most needed. It was also shown that schemes were not selected on the 
basis of the financial or operational capacity of the municipalities. This led 
to a high degree of state government reliance and subsidy for capital 
expenditures but also to the need to hand over the operation and 
maintenance of schemes to the KUWS&DB on an increasing scale. 
The implementation of projects is hampered by cost and time-
overruns. The main causes are the weaknesses in the state government 
administrative procedures and the various liabilities that are loaded onto 
the KUWS&DB: the contribution of urban local bodies for the new 
construction of projects and the expenses for operation and maintenance 
services of schemes. The result is a money crunch and the only panacea for 
the KUWS&DB is to spread project's expenditure over longer periods. A 
long list of incomplete projects is a common feature in the annual reports, 
requiring revisions of cost estimates as the prices of construction materials 
and manpower escalates each year. The government is forced to divert 
money to undo debts to the HUDCO and the LIC when it may have liked 
to spend it on other public services. 
The resource crunch would not have been so severe if the resource 
base for water supply would not have been so poor: low water tariffs and a 
large gap between demand and collection of water charges. Political 
interference, public demonstrations and court injunctions have prevented 
the KUWS&DB from increasing water tariffs. As a result, the state 
government bears most of the investment cost and recurrent costs of the 
smaller municipalities. The supposed contributions as shown in the 
guidelines have remained 'paper guidelines'. While the state government 
deducts the dues to the financing institutions, KEB, KUWS&DB, 
including those to the state government from the entitled octroi 
compensation, and shares of other taxes, it does not add up to the required 
amount. It has been illustrated that the total burden for debt servicing and 
operation and maintenance exceeds the total income of most urban local 
bodies in Karnataka. The state government has, thus, to provide an 
estimated subsidy of over 50 per cent. The financial burden on the 
municipalities would also have not been so severe if the KUWS&DB had 
made a better effort to seek cheaper technical options and go beyond what 
the engineering and PWD manuals prescribe. Examples have been given 
where very expensive solutions have been chosen while cheaper options 
were available. It has been argued that - under political pressure - the 
project costs had to be increased instead of tailoring the project cost to the 
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financial capabilities of the municipalities. Projects are prepared and 
implemented in a top-down fashion with little involvement of the 
municipalities during these stages nor are they involved in the choice of 
technical options. It is argued that this is essential as the municipalities 
have to maintain the created assets after completion and should know 
about the technical and financial implications of the scheme . 
Have the municipalities who received a water supply scheme indeed 
benefited from the investments? The data presented in this chapter 
indicated that there is not much evidence to believe that investments have 
lead to a better water supply provision. An above average per capita 
investment in water supply had not lead to a daily water supply of more 
than 75 lpcd in at least 20 towns. 
Is all this doing to be attributed to the KUWS&DB, the state 
government and to the ministers and MLAs interfering in decision 
making? Are the local councils to be excused for the state-of-affairs? I do 
not think so. A typical attitude of local councils is not to be inquisitive, or 
to demand information, but just wait and see and - at the same time - to 
expect the 'government' to take care of the financial implications. The 
same expectation exists for the operation and maintenance of the schemes. 
Municipalities have also not shown any eagerness to prove that they have 
the capacity to operate and maintain treatment plants and pumping 
stations. Rather they pose as incapable and understaffed. In Town 
Municipal Councils this is also the case with just one junior engineer to 
take care of all public works. 'Seeking benefits without carrying 
responsibilities' is unfortunately also true for many local councils. As a 
result, the dependence on the state government increased and there has 
been little inclination to prove the much promoted capacity to 'self-
governance'. The recent government order to transfer the operation and 
maintenance functions back to the municipalities must have come as a rude 
shock for many councils. 
12 
The Scheme for Integrated Development of Small and 
Medium Towns (IDSMT) 
The scheme for the Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns 
(IDSMT) which was launched in Karnataka in 1980 and is one of the 
oldest central government sponsored schemes. It is an unique scheme 
because of its integrated character and over 50 towns in Karnataka have 
received some assistance under the IDSMT. 
12.1 Main features of the scheme 
In the early 1970s the national Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74) took note 
of the continuing polarisation in urbanisation and the general 
backwardness of the rural areas. A central sector scheme called the 
Scheme for Integrated Urban Development Programme (IUDP) was 
initiated by the Government of India with the aim of providing financial 
assistance to state governments and union territories to supplement their 
efforts for implementing urban development projects. However, the IUDP 
schemes had little to offer to small and medium towns (NIUA, 1990) and 
until the end of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-79) there was no 
concentrated effort for the development of these towns. There was a 
realisation that instead of welcoming migrants to big and metropolitan 
cities, they should be restricted to smaller urban centres (Town and 
Country Planning Organisation, 1985). In 1975, the Ministry of Works and 
Housing appointed a Task Force on Urbanisation and their report in 1977 
confirmed the neglect of small and medium towns and urged for a more 
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active and positive role in urban development. Moreover, the increasing 
migration to the large cities affected their growth negatively and 
undermined their financial capacity to provide the desired urban services 
and amenities. Consequently, the Government of India came to the 
conclusion that, apart from developing larger cities, attention should be 
paid to smaller and medium towns by investing in infrastructure and other 
essential facilities. It was thought that by doing so these towns could 
provide alternative centres of employment, serve the rural hinterland and, 
ultimately, help to check the ever increasing migration of the rural 
population to a handful of metropolitan cities. The scheme for the 
Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT) was 
established by the Government of India at the start of the Sixth Five-Year 
Plan (1980-85) to, initially, develop 231 smaller and medium sized towns 
and invest about Rs. 10 million in each town with the following two 
simple objectives: 
(a) to slow down the growth of metropolises, and 
(b) to ensure a balanced distribution of urban population. 
To accomplish this, new and improved infrastructure, and essential basic 
services should be provided in a co-ordinated and integrated fashion. This 
would create employment opportunities and stimulate the additional 
investment and further growth of economic activities (RCUES et al, 
1988). The Government of India earmarked Rs. 96 billion as central 
government contribution to be matched by the other state governments and 
municipal funds for towns with a population of 100,000 and below 
(according to the 1971 census figures). The guidelines of the Town and 
Country Planning Organisation (1979) gave preference to district 
headquarter towns, followed by sub-divisional towns, mandi towns 
(agricultural market) and other important growth centres. The guidelines 
also specified that selection should be done in consideration of the rate of 
growth of the district and of the region, and of other investments to take 
place in the rural hinterland. Another important criterion for selection was 
the linkage between employment generation and urban development and 
the capacities of the responsible institutions. Since it was not possible to 
cover the 3029 towns in India which met the specified population criteria, 
an initial number of 231 was fixed during the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The 
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towns were chosen from all states and union territories. However, the 
selection of the towns was left to the state governments. 
The components of the scheme were separated into two sets. The 
first set contained those components which received assistance from the 
Government of India on a matching basis (50:50 per cent) and intended to 
generate employment opportunities in small and medium towns. This set 
included: 
- Land acquisition and development; residential schemes were to 
include sites and services, with or without core housing, but 50 per 
cent of the plots were to be allocated to specific family income 
categories of the so-called economically weaker sections (EWS) and 
20 per cent to low income groups (LIG); 
Traffic and transportation to serve shelter and employment projects; 
projects included construction of new roads and the improvement or 
upgrading of existing roads, but did not include the purchase of motor 
vehicles, and 
Development of markets/mawcfe, provision of industrial estates, 
provision of other services and processing facilities for the benefit of 
agricultural and rural development in the hinterland. 
The central government assistance comprised of a soft loan carrying an 
interest rate of 5.5 per cent per year (increased to 7.5 per cent in 1985), and 
to be repaid in twenty-five years with a grace period of five years. The 
second set of components of the IDSMT scheme had to be funded fully 
from the resources of the state government, implementing agencies and 
local governments. These components aimed mainly at improving the 
urban environment of the towns by improving slums, and by developing 
parks and other public amenities. This set of components included: 
Slum improvement and upgradation, urban renewal and small scale 
employment generation activity; 
- Low cost schemes for water supply, sewerage, drainage and 
sanitation; 
Preventive medical facilities/health care; 
- Parks and playgrounds, and 
- Assistance for the purpose of modifying, wherever necessary, in city 
master plans to permit mixed land use. 
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Besides the above guidelines, the Government of India spelled out a 
number of conditions to avail financial assistance : 
1. The state governments should have an integrated plan for the 
development of the towns concerned, preferably a long-term master 
plan or development plan; 
2. There should be a statutory stipulation in the state to prepare and 
approve master plans and land use controls; 
3. The implementing agencies should be able to repay the loans but also 
to maintain the assets and facilities created under this scheme; 
4. The state governments should follow an appropriate urban land policy 
to mop-up unearned income accruing to private parties as a result of 
the implementation of the development projects; and 
5. If, for any reason, any specific project could not be completed during 
the period in which financial assistance is available, the state 
governments should complete the work with their own funds. 
However useful these conditions may be, the scope and tone of these 
conditions indicate a central government control that is beyond the text 
and the spirit of the Indian Constitution. Secondly, there are no 
instruments to force the state governments to follow these guidelines 
unless the central government withdrew its assistance. Hence, the 
conditions were of little meaning to state governments. It came as no 
surprise that many of these conditions were flouted as we will see later. 
The organisational set-up in Karnataka was designed to involve the various 
levels of government as is shown in table 12-1. 
The progress in the two national five-year plan (1980-90) periods 
was considerable. In the Sixth Plan period a budget outlay of Rs. 960 
million was made available, through which 235 towns were covered and 
Rs. 635.7 million was released. The major share (35.4 per cent) went to 
markets//na/7fife followed closely by sites and services (31.4 per cent). 
Roads, bus stands and terminals and low-cost sanitation accounted for 
most of the rest in an equal share. In the Seventh Plan period, the outlay 
was adjusted to Rs. 880 million from which 145 towns were covered and 
800.6 million was released (TCPO, 1994). 
No. PK 14011/44/70-UD-III-A, Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India, 
dated 20th December 1979, New Delhi. 
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Table 12-1: Responsibilities of agencies under the IDSMT scheme 
Responsibility Agency 
1. Town identification and State housing or urban development department, 
project formulation state planning authorities and local governments 
2. Processing of project reports Town and Country Planning Organisation, Gol 
and monitoring 
3. Approval of projects and Ministry of Urban Development (MOUD), Gol 
release of Gol assistance 
4. Co-ordination at state level State housing or urban development department 
5. Implementation Local governments and other state level agencies 
6. Maintenance Local governments 
Source: TCPO(1979). 
Despite the physical and financial progress, evaluation studies and 
publications2 pointed at a number of shortcomings in the implementation 
during 1980s. In short, the development contemplated by the IDSMT was 
perceived in a compartmentalised manner. The infrastructure was not 
created in an integrated manner in the selected towns, nor was there a 
discernible impact in the surrounding hinterland, nor had they been linked 
to proper state urbanisation strategies. The funds available for the scheme 
were also inadequate and caused investments to be made at a 'sub-optimal 
level'. As a result, the desired objective of reducing migration to the big 
cities was not achieved. Despite the extensive criticism, the Government of 
India felt that the IDSMT scheme 'has been found to have broadly served 
its objectives and has succeeded in creating sufficient infrastructure and 
other assets in the small and medium towns, paving the way for the much 
needed boost to the growth of rural and small town economies' (Town and 
Country Planning Organisation, 1994, p. 2). The criticism was seen as an 
opportunity, as part of the maturation process, to learn from, and to move 
on into the next plan period. 
The IDSMT Scheme was slightly revised for the Eighth Five-Year 
Plan and special emphasis was given to strengthening the economic base 
2
 For example, by the Town and Country Planning Organisation in 1985, the All-India 
Institute of Local Self-Govemment in 1986, the Regional Centre for Urban and 
Environmental Studies in 1988, the National Institute of Urban Affairs in 1990, and by 
D.J. Edelman and H. Mengers in 1996. 
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of the towns with the perspective of integrating the economic base of a 
town with the spatial planning of its region, however, without much of 
explanation. Each state was now required to prepare an urbanisation 
strategy paper covering a ten year period which was to look at past 
urbanisation trends and the future of urban growth in the light of the 
various sectoral policies and investments of the central and state 
governments. This paper would aim to bring out the growth potential and 
functional role of the different urban settlements in the context of the 
projected socio-economic development of the state. The selection of towns 
should now be justified by the state urbanisation strategy but, at the same 
time, prescribing a preference to headquarters of districts having more than 
90 per cent rural population, mandi towns, industrial growth centres, 
tourist centres, pilgrim centres, etc. The selection of towns and inter-se 
prioritisation remained, thus, on the same lines and the purpose of writing 
of an urbanisation paper became questionable. In addition, it was 
emphasised that an assured, multi-source, uninterrupted flow of funds at a 
higher level was 'of utmost importance' to the success of such multi-
sectoral development programmes. 
The scheme suffered due to the failure of the states to provide 
matching funds. It was acknowledged that the scheme should not depend 
solely on Government of India, but should also be supported by 
institutional finance. Consequently, implementation was reorganised to 
include infrastructure loans through the HUDCO and from other financial 
institutions. At the same time, it was accepted that institutional finance 
must be available to implementing agencies at rates which are 'reasonably 
within their repaying capacity' (TCPO, 1994). Under the Eighth Five-Year 
Plan, funding was split between the Government of India, state 
governments and their agencies, and the HUDCO or other financial 
institutions. It was also hoped that the latter involvement would introduce 
greater financial and technical rigour in the examination of project 
proposals. A town project report was to be prepared based on a long-term 
master plan. This report had to clearly identify the infrastructure gaps, 
keeping in mind the projected growth profile and functional activities of 
the town. A cost-benefit analysis and cash flow statement should be added 
for each scheme. The new financing pattern meant a higher contribution 
from the Government of India and the national Eighth Five-Year Plan 
made a budgetary provision of Rs. 1,450 million. The financial assistance 
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from the HUDCO was varied according to the size of the town (See 
Annexure, table II). 
While the IDSMT Scheme initially covered only towns with a 
population of less than 100,000, it would now also include cities as large 
as 300,000 (Annexure, table I). The Town and Country Planning 
Organisation continued to be the final sanctioning authority. The TCPO is 
required to ensure that the project is consistent with the a) the central 
guidelines, b) the state urban strategy paper and priority list and c) the 
master plan/development plan of the town. 
12.2 IDSMT in Karnataka 
The IDSMT was introduced at a time when the Sixth State Five-Year Plan 
was already in motion and state funds had to be reserved in the subsequent 
annual plans from 1980-81. Sixteen towns were selected with a total 
project cost of Rs. 128.8 million. The selection of these towns and basic 
financial details are given in table 12-2. The location of the selected towns 
is shown in figure 12-1. In November 1996, the municipalities reported to 
the DMA that Rs. 158 million was spent on the total number of schemes, 
while the total amount released by the central and state government 
amounted to Rs. 316 million (IDSMT Progress Report, DMA, 1996). 
Almost Rs. 160 million was kept in the project account of the DMA, the 
state level implementing agency, and at the office of the deputy 
commissioner in the district. This underspending was, indeed, one of the 
complaints of the earlier reports of the Town and Country Planning 
Organisation: the limited absorption capacity of the municipalities to take 
up such works. 
The IDSMT had changed hands twice. The Department of Town 
Planning, basically not an implementing agency, was made responsible for 
the preparation of project reports and their implementation in the early 
1980s. While their first function was executed satisfactorily, it was felt that 
the implementation was more suitably placed at the DMA. When this task 
was transferred to the DMA in 1986, they also confiscated the project 
preparation work and for the Department of Town Planning little 
involvement remained in the scheme. While the DMA co-ordinated the 
schemes reasonably well in the earlier years of its existence, its overall 
performance and stature declined in the 1990s. In 1996, amidst a 
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discussion to abolish the DMA, the recently established KUIDFC was 
appointed as the nodal agency for the preparation of project reports and for 
channelling the project funds to the deputy commissioners. 
Table ¡2-2: Details of the IDSMT schemes in Karnataka 1980-96 
IDSMT details 
Number of towns 
added 
Approved cost 
(in Rs. million) 
GoK budget outlay 
(in Rs. million) 
Central government 
assistance released 
(in Rs. million) 
Implementing 
agency on behalf of 
the GoK 
Sixth FYP 
1980-85 
16 
128.8 
n.a. 
32.6 
DTP 
Seventh FYP 
1985-90 
7 
66.9 
57.5 
48.4 
(incl.6thFYP 
projects) 
DTP till 
1986; 
thereafter 
the DMA 
Two Annual 
Plans 1990-92 
9 
96.8 
28.0 
17.4 
(incl. 7th 
FYP projects) 
DMA 
Eighth FYP 
1992-97 
29* 
344.5 
102.5 
50.0** 
(incl. in 90-92 
approved 
projects) 
DMA till 
1996; 
thereafter the 
KUIDFC 
* 19 received first payments. 
•* Up to November 1996. 
Note: Budgets and releases pertain to accumulated projects under implementation. 
Source: TCPO (1995); Progress Report, DMA ( 1996). 
Selection of towns 
There has been no documentation to explain the selection of towns in 
1980-81 for the Sixth Five-Year Plan. An urban strategy paper as desired 
later by the Town and Country Planning Organisation was prepared only in 
1985. Besides general observations, the paper states that the urban policy 
would have to link regional planning with investment planning. Secondly, 
urban agglomerations have to be categorised according to a 'functional 
hierarchy'. Thirdly, small and medium towns have to be identified 
selectively where economic growth and development has to be 
encouraged. Linkages with agricultural hinterlands have to be strengthened 
and made mutually supportive. As 'funds are provided only for a few 
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components' (TCPO, 1985, p. 14), more interventions would be required 
to achieve any urban policy. The guidelines also warned against the 
selection of too many small and medium towns as this would result in the 
resources being spread thinly and result in limited gains for the selected 
towns. 
This remark proved retrospective for towns selected under the Sixth 
Five-Year Plan as the first urban strategy paper for Kamataka remarks: 
'The choice of certain towns also does not appear to have been wise' 
(1985, p. 13). The paper promoted the concept of counter-magnets and 
even new cities at a distance of at least 70 kilometres away from 
Bangalore. The draft paper failed, however, to provide an acceptable level 
of clarity, substance and direction beyond the existing guidelines from the 
Town and Country Planning Organisation. 
Another strategy paper on urban development for the state was 
prepared by the Directorate of Municipal Administration in 1992. This was 
to satisfy the requirement of the Government of India as spelt out in the 
revised guidelines for the IDSMT in the Eighth Five-Year Plan 1992-97. 
The paper was a mere copy of the new guidelines and offered no 
contemplation on counter-magnets, inter-sectoral linkages and 
investments, urban hierarchy of towns or the like. A decision making table 
was presented with 37 towns. The towns were appraised against eleven 
criteria: administrative function, a strong organisational set-up, availability 
of a master plan, centrality, linkage, growth rate, mandi town, tourist town, 
industrial town, commercial town and agricultural town. Thirteen towns 
seemed to have been added later rather hastily and enough time was 
unavailable to complete the table. The appraisal of the 24 towns against 
these criteria had been done in a uncritical manner. All 24 towns qualified 
for the first seven criteria, including a strong organisational set-up and 
centrality. This seems highly unlikely as towns like Ilkal and K.R.Nagar do 
not even have a sufficiently qualified engineer, are not located in the centre 
of other smaller urban areas and are not in the node of the flow of 
agricultural produce. It was more likely that the selection of towns had 
already been made before the preparation of this paper. The attempt to 
justify an already finalised selection process on the basis of the principles 
of the IDSMT guidelines had become a mere paper exercise. 
As there are no better documents to shed light on the deciding 
criteria for selection, I have tried to reconstruct a selection process based 
on official criteria and also added a few criteria that may better explain the 
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towns' selection. In the selection of towns, the Town and Country 
Planning Organisation had provided the following principles: 
1. to become a counter-magnet to larger cities in the state; 
2. to better serve the economic and social needs of the (agricultural) 
hinterland; 
3. to have the potential for economic growth and employment; 
4. to already have the status of district headquarters, or mandi (market) 
town, industrial growth centre, tourist place or pilgrim centre; and 
5. to have a population of less than 100,000 (as per 1971 census) or less 
than 300,000 (as per 1991 census). 
There can be little ambiguity about the administrative status of towns or 
the population size when one takes the figures from the latest census. 
However, the first three criteria were subject to debate and interpretation. 
Is the town of Yelahanka, near Bangalore, the suitable counter-magnet or 
another 100 kilometres away from this metropolis. Can a town with a 
population of 100,000 function as a counter-magnet to Bangalore or 
should it at least have 500,000 inhabitants? What minimum economic 
functions, gross urban product and employment should a city possess? Are 
the selected towns in Karnataka satisfying the guiding principles and 
indicators as mentioned above? Are these municipalities more financially 
sound than others? Unfortunately, few statistics are available to go by, 
except the census figures between 1971-91 and the Vital Statistics 
collected in 1992-93 by the Directorate of Municipal Administration. 
Nonetheless, an analysis of the selected 51 towns provides a number of 
interesting observations (See also table 12-3). 
In order to analyse the validity of selection of IDSMT towns against 
the guiding principles, a number of indicators have been selected that are 
better quantifiable. In addition, the financial position of the town, the 
development index and the political affiliation index (See chapter 9) have 
been added. The following criteria have, thus, been arrived at: 
- Access to a national or state highway; 
- A weekly agricultural market (e.g. an Agricultural Produce Marketing 
Centre); 
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- No competing larger market, or better accessible towns or cities 
within a radius of 20-30 kilometres that have already a trade function 
for agricultural produce; 
- An average or above average urban population growth between two 
census;. 
- Financial capacity of the selected municipalities to repay the loan 
component; 
- The development status index; and 
- The political affiliation index. 
Table 12-3: Characteristics of IDSMT schemes in Kamataka selected 
between 1980-94 
Characteristics 
Annual urban growth 
1981-91 (in %) 
Development Index 
Political affiliation 
Index 
KIADB investment 
(in Rs., p.c.) 
Number of housing 
and infrastructure 
schemes 
Total investment 
housing and 
infrastructure, excl. 
IDSMT (in Rs., p.c.) 
Total investment 
infrastructure, excl. 
IDSMT (in Rs„ p.c.) 
Total investment 
housing (in Rs., p.c.) 
All towns and 
cities (N=172) 
1.64 
14.05 
13.94 
4,473 
3.6 
1,146 
343 
803 
Average IDSMT 
towns (N=50) 
1.93 
15.64 
14.43 
5,561 
5.0 
822 
560 
262 
Correlation index 
total sample 
(N=172) 
n.a. 
+ 0.135 
-0.014 
- 0.067 
n.a. 
- 0.026 
- 0.073 
- 0.024 
Note: Mandai Panchayat Kushal Nagar has been excluded from the IDSMT sample, 
as no data was available. 
Source: DMA and KIADB records (1995-96). 
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Figure 12-1: Selected towns for IDSMT in Kamataka between 1980-92 
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Figure 12-1 illustrates that the selected towns are well distributed over the 
districts. While the districts around the city of Bangalore were slightly 
favoured during the early 1980s, other districts got their share of IDSMT-
projects in the late 1980s and 1990s. The selection of towns followed the 
criteria of the administrative status of the towns. Only 9 out of 51 towns 
are neither a district headquarters nor a taluk headquarters. Out of 51 
towns, only 4 towns are not accessed by either a national or state highway. 
Out of 51 towns, only 5 towns do not have an Agricultural Produce 
Marketing Centre. 
Regarding other factors, the selection is less satisfactory. Out of 51 
towns, 21 are within 20-30 kilometres distance of a larger and better 
serviced town or city. It is unlikely that these towns will become major 
economic growth centres through a scheme like IDSMT, let alone divert 
migration streams from the nearby cities. As an earlier study phrased it: 'it 
was observed that four towns were selected near the Bangalore Metropolis 
which in no way can arrest migration' (RCUES, 1988, p. 160). The 
methodology for selecting counter-magnets as promoted in the draft urban 
policy paper (1985) has been ignored. Moreover, the urban growth figures 
of 26 towns between 1971-81 and 1981-91 had been well below the 
average urban growth figures in Karnataka (See table 12-3). The IDSMT 
towns have a slightly higher development index due to the higher 
administrative status and better access. Over the period 1978-92, 30 out of 
51 towns had a political affiliation index well above the average. 
In fact, most of the towns that were near larger cities had a below 
average urban growth but had a MLA from the same party as the state 
government or even a minister in the Cabinet at the time of selection. 
These include Kanakapura, Holenarisapura, Sahapura, Jamkhandi, 
Karkala, Ramanagaram, Harihar, Kollegal, Gokak, Udupi, Rabhanvi-
Banhatti, Byadgi, Ilkal, Doddaballapur and Mulbalgal. Hence, political 
pressures may have been evident in the selection of a large number of 
towns. With regard to the financial capacity of the selected municipalities, 
the 51 towns have a lower average income between 1982-92 (Rs. 64.17 per 
capita) than the average of all 162 municipalities (Rs. 84.60 per capita). 
Moreover, the linear correlation between the per capita investment by the 
IDSMT and the per capita income between 1982-92 in real terms is weak 
and even negative (-0.186). In other words, the financially weakest 
municipalities tended to receive more per capita funds under the IDSMT 
scheme. 
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12.3 Linkages to other schemes and sectors 
It is understood that a scheme like IDSMT cannot by itself achieve the 
stated objectives and has to be complemented with investments from other 
sources. In the early documents of the IDSMT, this consideration was not 
mentioned explicitly, but was referred to in documents that were released 
in the late 1980s and 1990s. However, it makes common sense to converge 
any development efforts within the department and with other 
departments, notably industry, public works and agriculture. Statistics 
from the Public Works Department and Agriculture Department are not 
available at town level and the comparison has been limited to investments 
by other agencies falling under the Department for Housing and Urban 
Development and the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board, the 
nodal agency for most industrial investments - public or private - in the 
state3. The table 12-3 above provides insight into some of these linkages. 
Within the Housing and Urban Development Department, the 
IDSMT towns received more funds from other infrastructure projects 
(water supply, low-cost sanitation, slum improvement), but distinctively 
less for housing schemes. The total average investment for both housing 
and infrastructure in the IDSMT towns remains well below Karnataka's 
average. Moreover, there is no correlation between the magnitude of 
investment through the IDSMT scheme and the magnitude of investment 
through any other housing and infrastructure scheme as all linear 
correlations are close to nil. With regard to the approved projects by the 
KIADB between 1980-94, the IDSMT towns received a higher average 
investment than other municipalities. However, there is random correlation 
between the magnitude of both investments. This supports the observations 
in earlier chapters that during the selecting process no consultation is held 
with the Department of Town Planning, Directorate of Municipal 
Administration or any other agency falling under Housing and Urban 
Development Department, let alone any agency outside the Housing and 
Urban Development Department. The above mentioned link between 
IDSMT-KIADB and IDSMT-other infrastructure investments may even be 
purely coincidental. 
3
 See also chapter 9. 
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12.4 Implementation of the IDSMT scheme 
During the initial years the Town and Country Planning Organisation 
pressurised the state government to select towns and to submit project 
reports. The Department of Town Planning who was entrusted with this 
task did not succeed in submitting their project proposals in the year 1979-
80. The first schemes were only sanctioned in 1980-81. Subsequently, 
problems emerged for the state government to raise the matching funds 
that had not been budgeted for in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85). It 
took three years before this mechanism was established and a regular flow 
of funds could be maintained for the implementation of the works by the 
municipalities. The deputy commissioners were made responsible for 
overseeing proper tendering, award of contracts and the implementation of 
the works. Monitoring committees were established to administer these 
functions. While these committees functioned properly in the early years, 
it was reported that they became almost defunct by the mid-1980s 
(RCUES, 1988). When the Directorate of Municipal Administration 
assumed responsibility for the co-ordination of the scheme in 1986, this 
created some confusion with regard to the existing administrative 
responsibilities of the deputy commissioners. 
The central government had become apprehensive about the proper 
administration of the loans and insisted that a separate project account be 
maintained so that these funds would not be mixed with other central 
government funds, or utilised for other municipal development 
expenditure. Several circulars were issued by the state government to 
tighten procedures. One such circular dealt with the establishment of a 
district committee for each scheme. The committee had to be composed of 
eight senior district officials. This not only meant a reduction of the 
erstwhile discretionary powers of the deputy commissioner, but also a top-
heavy arrangement for a rather small scheme. This measure did not 
enthuse such officials to meet regularly or illustrate much confidence in 
the deputy commissioners and local governments to expedite the scheme 
adequately. Secondly, the status of the committee vis-à-vis the DMA, the 
chief officer or the president of the municipality had not been clarified. 
Moreover, this additional layer of decision making would not be conducive 
for steady implementation and delays could be expected. Apparently, such 
an arrangement was preferred over vesting powers with one district officer. 
Some did not comply as, for example, the chairman of the IDSMT 
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committee in Bidar (the Deputy Commissioner) who decided without 
further consultation to award a major portion of work to the Land Army at 
rates different from those specified in the project document. This happened 
while another contractor was officially awarded the contract and the work 
had already started. Another example comes from Sirsi where the chief 
officer and deputy commissioner decided to divert money from land 
acquisition to the improvement of street lights4. 
The implementation of IDSMT-schemes in Kamataka brought a 
number of lessons (IHSP, 1994a and 1995a5). Most municipalities lack the 
technical staff to either prepare the project documents or to implement the 
projects properly. Another experience was that the tendering procedure for 
contract work was found lengthy and delaying speedy implementation. For 
example, for tenders above Rs. 500,000, administrative approvals have to 
be obtained from the DMA causing further delay in the start of the work. 
Moreover, the IDSMT committee at the district level was a stumbling 
block to implementation. This also applied to the DMA with regard to 
approving project documents, processing administrative decisions and 
releasing money. There were other observations as well. As the IDSMT 
prescribed only a limited number of components, the municipalities felt 
constrained as they preferred to include other components specific to their 
needs. The project component of sites and services which has been 
favoured by many municipalities were often included in the project 
proposals without a feasibility study. As a result, many municipalities 
faced problems of acquiring the identified land. Land had not been 
earmarked in the Outline Development Plan to be used for residential or 
commercial purposes; the Land Acquisition Act would not allow 
acquisition within a couple of years; and the demanded compensation 
would be many times the estimated project cost. The sites and services 
component materialised in only a few cases. Many municipalities proposed 
to divert the sanctioned amount for sites and services to other project 
components. The second most popular project component was the 
shopping complex and another revenue generating component. The 
The central government had noticed such diversions and the revised IDSMT-guidelines 
issued by the Town and Country Planning Organisation in 1994 meant a further 
tightening of conditions. These were even more complicated, unrealistic and an 
unwarranted interference of the central government in the state government subjects. 
These are based on the discussions held during training programmes for municipal 
officers on the formulation and implementation of IDSMT schemes during 1994-95. 
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fixation of a unit sale price or lease amount had often not been preceded by 
a cost-benefit analysis. Most municipalities went by the prices they got 
locally or were allowed to ask for6. 
Once the projects were under way, cost escalations have been 
common. As the central and state government contributions were fixed and 
not liable for adjustments without lengthy procedures, municipal resources 
had to be resorted to. As commonly known, their liquidity and financial 
savings are extremely poor. This situation does municipalities not allow to 
obtain loans from commercial banks and, as a result, the construction 
would come to a halt for want of funds. Some of these problems could 
have been averted by building and selling off the shopping complex in 
stages which would allow the mobilisation of funds during 
implementation. Since the inception of IDSMT, the repayment of loan 
components by municipalities in Karnataka has been very poor. In fact, 
most municipalities - despite some revenue from IDSMT components - are 
not in a position to repay the loans. 
12.5 Experiences in case-study towns 
Among the seven towns studied four have been included in the IDSMT 
scheme: Hospet, Sirsi, Chikmagalur and Bidar. The details of the scheme 
are given in table 12-4. The first observation is that the proposed IDSMT 
projects had a much higher cost estimate than was ultimately approved. 
Project components and costs were revised by the Town and Country 
Planning Organisation in which the DMA and, sometimes, the 
municipality were consulted. The statistics that were collected from the 
municipalities, the DMA and the Town and Country Planning Organisation 
showed little consistency. There are, for example, inconsistencies between 
the sanctioned project costs. The DMA and Town and Country Planning 
Organisation quoted higher figures than those provided by the 
municipalities. Secondly, inconsistencies existed between the money 
released by the DMA which was often much higher than the amounts 
known to the municipalities. These observations suggest that changes in 
central government assistance are not properly updated in the project files 
Field work has illustrated that the fixation of price ceiling was often constrained by 
local politicians, who were more often than not the takers of the shopping complex 
units. 
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at the DMA and are not communicated systematically to the 
municipalities. Money release to the DCs is also not communicated. What 
the municipalities ultimately receive is equivalent or less than the amount 
of central government assistance. Where the balance of the central 
government assistance and, in particular, the state government assistance 
has gone, is anybody's guess. It may well be that the balance of central 
government assistance is kept at the bank account of the DMA and that 
any state government assistance is kept at the account of the deputy 
commissioner without the knowledge of the municipalities. This is 
surprising as this money constitutes a major loan component which has to 
be repaid by the ultimate beneficiary: the municipalities. On the other 
hand, municipalities also take little effort to verify or update their financial 
data with the deputy commissioner or the DMA7. In only half the cases, 
information was available about the actual expenditure with either the 
DMA or the municipalities. These reports are not prepared regularly. This 
is surprising as the Town and Country Planning Organisation state figures 
on expenditure (March 1994) without municipal or state government 
records to support these. It may well be that the Town and Country 
Planning Organisation has not been informed about the actual expenditure. 
These have not been verified by audit reports till date. 
There were few complaints about the quality of the work which was 
mostly as per expectation. In the four towns, problems with land 
acquisition did not occur as this component - in view of experiences 
elsewhere - had been excluded. Further feed-back was obtained from 
tenants of the shopping complex in Sirsi and the market stalls in Hospet. In 
Chikmagalur and Bidar, the shopping complex and market facilities had 
not yet been completed and no feed-back could be obtained there. Totally, 
27 respondents were interviewed in the two cities. The feed-back on 
selected topics are presented in the table 12-5. 
In the strongly hierarchical bureaucracy in Karnataka» it would also be considered 
impertinent for a city commissioner or chief officer to be inquisitive about money that is 
due to municipalities even if they have to repay this. 
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Table 12-5: Feed-back from tenants of shopping and market complexes 
constructed under the IDSMT schemes in Hospet and Sirsi 
Information on which feed-back 
was obtained 
Number of respondents 
Type of complex 
Tenancy since 
Type of tenancy 
Average registration fee (Rs.) 
Average deposit/advance (Rs.) 
Average monthly rent (Rs.) 
Most* common businesses 
Businesses with one or no 
employees 
Monthly stated turnover (Rs.) 
Monthly stated family income (Rs.) 
Most stated advantages of premises 
Most stated disadvantages premises 
Most stated advantages of locality 
Most stated disadvantages of 
locality 
Most needed facilities on premises 
or locality 
Most tenants improved premises 
Premises improved business as 
compared to previous location 
Tenants who plan to expand 
Tenants who plan to shift 
Hospet 
14 
Concrete floor, walls 
and roof with 
electricity, water supply 
and shutter 
1987 
Rental 
None 
951 
289 
Gunny bag production 
and sale, workshop, tea-
shop and jaggery 
(sugarcane cubes) sale 
12 
16,250 
2,596 
Space 
Space, interior design 
Sufficient customers 
Lay-out building and 
road 
Road improvement, 
waste collection and 
drainage 
Painting, shutter and 
wiring 
Yes 0 
Partly 0 
Little/no 4 
1 
0 
Sirsi 
13 
Concrete floor, walls 
and roof with 
electricity, water supply 
and shutter 
1991 
Hire-purchase 
3,311 
17,308 
1,493 
Grocery, car workshop 
7 
8,403 
3,077 
Space ' 
None 
Sufficient customers 
Competition, high rent 
and few customers 
Parking, waste 
collection, street lights 
and drainage 
None 
Yes 0 
Partly 11 
Little/no 2 
6 
1 
'Most' means stated 3 times or more. 
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From the data one can conclude that the tenants of these complexes are 
indeed petty businessmen who were already based in the city. Their 
businesses have a low turnover and have only a few employees, if any. 
While none are convinced that the occupied premises have improved their 
business, few are considering to move to another location. The stated 
monthly payments by the tenants imply that the shopping complexes are a 
potential revenue earning asset for the municipality with sufficient income 
to repay any loan debts from the HUDCO or any other bank. However, 
prompt completion of the work and a rational fixation of rents and deposits 
based on a proper financial analysis would be required to ensure sufficient 
returns. Secondly, hire-purchase seems to be a better revenue generator 
than tenancy based on rental contracts. However, price fluctuations based 
on demand-supply forces in the commodity market have not been 
accounted for. The fixation of rents as the result of political motives, as 
mentioned earlier, has not been the case in these two examples. 
12.6 The role of the implementing agencies 
The Directorate of Municipal Administration has been the main actor in 
the implementation of the IDSMT scheme in Karnataka. The role of the 
Department of Town Planning has been limited to project formulation in 
the first half of the 1980s, while the KUIDFC got involved only after 1996. 
The comments from municipal officers and the author's personal 
knowledge of the organisations, have helped to formulate an assessment of 
their role and performance. One should realise that the DMA is poorly 
equipped and staffed to execute properly any of their functions. It reflects, 
sadly enough, the low priority that is given to municipal affairs and their 
development as compared to water supply and housing projects executed 
by the KHB and KUWS&DB. The staffing pattern of the DMA has been 
discussed earlier and out of these officers only one assistant executive 
engineer is designated to handle the IDSMT scheme. He receives 
administrative and technical support from the administrative section, the 
assistant director and the director, but the main burden of this scheme is on 
this one officer. IDSMT related tasks are manifold: preparation and 
revision of project proposals, consultation with municipalities and deputy 
commissioners, progress reports, field inspections, ensuring timely release 
of money to the deputy commissioners, correspondence with the Town and 
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Country Planning Organisation and requesting fresh central government 
assistance, correspondence with the Secretariat for Housing and Urban 
Development to raise and release state government contributions, 
meetings, etc. Also the urban strategy papers of 1992 and 1994 were 
prepared by this officer. With the steady increase in the number of 
schemes from 16 in 1985 to 51 in 1992 and another 13 on the anvil in 
1996, it is an impossible task for one officer. The poorly prepared project 
reports, the lapses in updating files and information, in informing the 
municipalities about changes and not having information about the 
financial progress of the schemes can attributed largely to under-staffing. 
A second reason is the qualification of this officer with only an 
engineering background while administrative and financial qualifications 
are required as well. Another factor is the rather short tenure of these 
assistant executive engineers, often not more than two years. A new officer 
would take at least a year to understand the details of the schemes before 
he can become effective in managing their implementation. Other factors 
such as wilful red-tapeism and an imposed obligation of paying 'speed 
money' have not been reported as impeding factors. These, however, did 
play a role when the DMA was headed by administrators of a lesser moral 
stature during 1993-94. 
The role of the Town and Country Planning Organisation has been 
appreciated widely as a 'neutral and non-biased institution' that safeguards 
the principles of selection and monitors proper implementation. The 
distance from the local problems causes communication gaps and delays. 
Some have argued that it would be more appropriate to leave these 
functions to the state government. 
The Secretariat for Housing and Urban Development had a marginal 
role in the implementation of the scheme as most responsibilities were 
mandated to the DMA. The Secretariat, however, has to ensure the 
channelling of central government assistance, mobilising the state 
government share, transferring money to the deputy commissioners and, 
since 1992, arranging for institutional finance from the HUDCO. Inherent 
to the state bureaucracy, these administrative steps take their time as 
executives are little concerned with project-level problems of liquidity, 
cost escalation, payment to contractors, etc. 
The municipalities, as compared to other housing and infrastructure 
schemes in this study, took keen interest in the IDSMT scheme and many 
presidents, commissioners or chief officers made an effort to get the 
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project report prepared and pursued it at the state and central government 
levels. Some even went to Delhi to follow-up with the TCPO. Generally, 
their commitment to the implementation of the projects lasted as long as 
there was money in the project account. 
12.7 Conclusions 
The IDSMT is a comparatively novel scheme which has a number of 
positive elements. There have been some real achievements in terms of 
project objectives and improvement of quality: infrastructure has been 
provided in many towns and this has led to some improvement in the 
quality of life (Edelman and Banerjee, 1994; Edelman and Mengers, 
1996). Another positive aspect is that the IDSMT scheme is seen as an 
evolutionary undertaking that requires a review. When experiences 
accumulated, there was a willingness at the central government to learn 
and, subsequently, to adjust the guidelines. Evaluation studies and review 
seminars have been conducted at regular intervals of time and the central 
government has been receptive to critique. The scheme also provided an 
important opportunity to urban local bodies to obtain finance for 
establishing revenue generating assets which were dearly needed in the 
majority of cases. It also provided an incentive to approach urban 
development in an integrated manner, to distinguish high potential from 
low potential urban growth centres and to design a tailor-made and 
integrated package within the given guidelines both at state and local 
government level. There is not another scheme on this scale in India that 
aims to look beyond one particular sector and seeks to initiate multi-
pronged interventions and contributions to the development of local 
economies. 
However, the above analysis pointed at a number of shortcomings as 
well. The selection of towns followed the guidelines literally but did not 
sufficiently consider the ultimate objective of the scheme: to develop those 
towns that may become economic growth centres. Moreover, financially 
weak municipalities were selected which has undermined the repayment of 
the loan components of the scheme. 'The aspect of repayments is taken in 
a light sense by the civic bodies in Karnataka. The civic bodies are under 
the impression that the state government one day or the other would write 
off the loans. In most cases, the civic bodies are not even thinking of 
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repaying loans out of the income of generated so far' (RCUES, 1988, p. 
165). 
It also unclear why so many towns had to be selected in Karnataka. 
At the moment (1997), almost half of the towns and cities have been 
included. Are all to become counter-magnets to Bangalore, Mangalore, 
Hubli-Dharwad and Mysore? An obvious draw-back is that the available 
resources have been spread too thinly. Moreover, the IDSMT has been 
perceived as a one-time financial injection, presumably with an everlasting 
effect. Though pressures exist to achieve as much coverage as possible in 
terms of number of towns, it is counterproductive as far as the scheme's 
objectives are concerned. It seems indeed that political pressure overruled 
the rational decision making process. A senior administrator of the DMA 
mentioned: 'Political interference is only the case with IDSMT, because it 
has some glamour and more funds. Politicians will try to include their 
town'. Another officer confirmed this and mentioned that small towns like 
Soundhatti, Mallur and Mallavalli have been selected under pressure from 
ministers and MLAs, while there were no justifiable reasons to include 
them. The study conducted by RCUES (1988) observed similar findings: 
'In certain cases, political factors had influenced the selection of towns' 
(RCUES, 1988, p. 160). 
While the scheme aimed for 'integration', the proposals were 
conceived in a compartmentalised manner. The projects components were 
not selected with a view to be mutually reinforcing and stimulate the local 
economy in the selected towns. There was no proper linkage to any 
urbanisation strategies and a discernible impact on the rural hinterland has 
remained a goal that proved to be too far-fetched. Demand surveys and 
feasibility studies for sites and service, shopping complex and low-cost 
sanitation project components did not take place during the pre-project 
phase. In fact, the preparation of the project proposal was done in a great 
haste. No consideration was given to investments by other departments 
falling under the Secretariat for Housing and Urban Development or to 
investments from other government departments. Dovetailing of funds 
available with other departments, such as Tourism, Agriculture, Industrial 
Development and Rural Development have, thus, not been explored in the 
pre-project phase. Difficulties in land acquisition persist for almost any 
development scheme. The purchase of land directly by the municipalities 
at 'registered' prices as per the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is hailed as one 
of the most important arrangements for the IDSMT Scheme. These 
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'registered' prices, however, are not free market prices or the result of 
negotiation and do not account for the market mechanisms pushing up land 
prices when a project is announced. It is a common case that the need for 
large areas of land for a sites and services scheme in the urban periphery 
will push up land prices manifold as compared to the value of adjacent 
agricultural areas. Moreover, sellers and purchasers of land usually register 
their land purchase prices at lower levels than those of actual transactions 
in order to reduce registration fee, stamp duty, income tax and capital 
gains tax. The examples are abundant of IDSMT projects being grounded 
after land owners have filed a case and have alleged that under the same -
albeit ambiguous - Land Acquisition Act the offered land price did not 
comply with current market prices and higher compensation was 
demanded. Jurisprudence has shown to be in favour of the land owners. 
The subsequent delay in land acquisition may take many years. This is not 
to the advantage of the implementation schedule, while the estimated 
project cost will be exceeded. 
After the Town and Country Planning Organisation has transferred 
the central government assistance, the flows and parking places of IDSMT 
money from the central and state government remain unclear. For example, 
while the DMA reported that an amount of Rs. 18.8 million was released to 
the joint IDSMT-accounts, the municipalities reported that only Rs. 9.8 
million was received in their accounts . The IDSMT scheme is poorly 
administered with quite a number of inconsistencies in stipulated and 
outdated figures. There are also information voids, while audit reports are 
not prepared. With the steady increase of schemes and workload, the DMA 
is absolutely understaffed to implement the IDSMT properly. Another 
factor is the lack of continuity with responsible officers being transferred 
regularly. As a result, the administration and monitoring of the scheme is 
poor and suffering from many delays. The institutional arrangements 
between the DMA, the deputy commissioner, the IDSMT committee and 
the municipalities are far from clear. Lack of co-ordination between then 
has resulted into wastage of money and time, as has been illustrated in the 
selected case studies. 
It is not uncommon that in the process of transfers, money is parked in different 
(private) accounts from which interest is drawn at 10-15 percent. The interest accrues to 
individuals and is engineered in collusion with local bank officials. This can happen as 
audit reports are not prepared which will include interests on accounts. Withholding 
payments for days, weeks or months is, thus, to the advantage of such rent-seeking 
individuals. 
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The primary objective of the IDSMT Scheme - improving the 
infrastructure of small and medium towns to provide jobs, boost the 
municipal economy and otherwise improve the attraction of these towns -
in order to stem the rural migration to the bigger cities has hardly been 
successful. Such policies have rarely been successful anywhere and history 
demonstrates that development leads to increasing urbanisation and 
concentration of urban growth in only a few major cities. A comparison of 
the annual growth figures of Bangalore and the IDSMT towns between 
1981-91 shows that there has been no difference between the urbanisation 
pace of towns with IDSMT schemes and those without. A tangible impact 
can, therefore, not be claimed (See table 12-6). If the objective is to cut off 
the flow of migrants to the largest cities, the most effective way is to create 
a very large number of jobs in medium sized cities outside the 
metropolitan areas. First of all, the towns in the IDSMT Scheme are too 
small to become serious counter-magnets for the larger cities in Kamataka. 
Table 12-6: Comparison of annual growth of IDSMT-cities with other 
cities in Kamataka between 1981-91 
Category of cities Annual growth between 
1981-91 (in %) 
IDSMT towns (N=50) 1.93 
Bangalore Urban Agglomeration 3.41 
Other Municipal Corporations (N=5) 1.65 
All urban areas in Kamataka (N=172) IM 
Migration is determined by forces that are beyond the provision of 
infrastructure and shops and one has to accept that urbanisation forces are 
also beyond the capacity of a scheme like the IDSMT. Moreover, while Rs. 
224.8 per capita investment had been approved, only Rs. 52.0 per capita 
had been actually spent (ТСЮ, 1994). The approved per capita 
investments also contrasts with other central government schemes such as 
the Mega-City project for Bangalore. This scheme implemented by the 
BMRDA will invest per capita four times as much in the metropolitan 
cities as compared to the IDSMT towns over the last 15 years. It will, no 
doubt, increase the disparity and make it impossible for small and medium 
towns to compete with the pulling forces of the mega-cities. The data from 
the case-study towns showed that the generation of employment through 
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the IDSMT may be very limited indeed. The field survey illustrated that 
the type of jobs created through shopping complexes, markets and civic 
works hardly create any spin-off effects, e.g. in the service sector. As one 
DMA-officer phrased it: 'But to reach the objectives [of the IDSMT - hm] 
would be a dream. Who bothers about a shopping complex or roads in 
town X when they have planned to migrate to Bangalore. The IDSMT just 
creates nice assets to the town and will generate some revenue. That's all'. 
It may be the time to convert the objectives of the scheme into more 
modest and attainable objectives. 
13 
The Nehru Rozgar Yojana (Employment Generation) 
Scheme 
This chapter deals with the Nehru Rozgar Yojana scheme (NRY) or 
Nehru's Employment Generation scheme. The problem of urban 
unemployment had drawn the attention of the Government of India since 
the 1970s. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-90), the Self-
Employment Programme for the Urban Poor (SEPUP) was introduced. 
This scheme was implemented through the several state agencies and had 
little involvement of the municipalities. 'The government has been actively 
considering the increased participation of the municipalities in the 
implementation of urban poverty alleviation and employment schemes' 
writes the Ministry of Urban Development in October 1989. A new 
scheme was announced in the Parliament by the prime minister on 11th 
October 1989: the Nehru Rozgar Yojana scheme. The scheme was 
launched by the Government of India in the same year with the aim 'to 
uplift the persons living below the poverty line in urban areas' (National 
Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1992, p. 348). The poverty line was based on an 
annual household income of Rs. 8,400 in 1989-90 which was adjusted to 
Rs. 11,850 in 1991-92. 
The scheme had been designed mainly to provide employment to the 
urban unemployed, to add to productive assets of small entrepreneurs and 
to help urban local bodies in improving their services to the urban 
population. It was realised that the attention given to rural employment and 
poverty was inadequate in reducing the growth of urban poverty and 
unemployment. Moreover, the freshly installed National Front government 
led by V.P. Singh wanted to redeem their election promise and tackle 
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unemployment and urban poverty. They believed that it would be able to 
have a distinct impact on the employment situation by a central 
government sponsored scheme. 
13.1 Main features of the NRY scheme 
The objective of the NRY schemes had been translated into three distinct 
components: 
1. The Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises (SUME); 
2. The Scheme for Urban Wage Employment (SUWE); and 
3. The Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation (SHASU). 
Each scheme would have a central, state and local government 
contribution. Table 13-1 summarises the main features of the schemes as 
applicable to the state of Karnataka. When the Ministry of Urban 
Development launched the scheme it provided a larger number of details; 
what responsibilities should be carried by whom, how to go about 
administering the released central assistance, how much should be paid for 
a trainer, for training materials per trainee, etc. The ministry even went as 
far as writing up draft texts for advertisements for local newspaper with the 
request to translate them into the local language, as well as providing 
forms for the registration of workers. Apparently, the central government 
did not have much confidence in the state governments and their agencies 
to prepare such texts. Moreover, for some components, the central 
government had decided to by-pass the state government and to transfer 
central assistance directly to the Zilla Parishads1, the administrative level 
above the district and below the state. A reaction was to be expected and 
during a meeting in March 1990 in Delhi, the state government 
representatives put up a cross fire with the ministry. The ministry had to 
take back a few steps and minuted that the 'valuable suggestions mooted 
by them [State Secretaries for Urban Developments - hm] and the Yojana 
has been recast and the guidelines suitably revised' (Government of 
This led to a peculiar situation in Karnataka when the Chief Accounts Officer, Zilla 
Parishad in Gulbarga was surprised to find an amount of Rs. 5.32 million in his account 
in December 1989 and inquired with the state government Secretariat from where the 
money may have come and for what purpose. 
The Nehru Rozgar Yojana (Employment Generation) Scheme 351 
Karnataka, 1990, p. 59). Many detailed guidelines were abandoned and 
replaced by more general and adaptable arrangements at the discretion of 
the state governments. Some of the changes were: 
The selection of beneficiaries from households living below the 
poverty line was omitted, and replaced by the 'urban poor'. However, 
the focus on particularly SC/ST and 'preferably' 30 per cent women 
was added. 
The earlier presumption that the Scheme for Urban Wage 
Employment was only meant for the payment of wages at a fixed rate 
was replaced by the rule that 60 per cent of the central government 
grant could be spent on material and 40 per cent on labour. This was 
further relaxed by the rule that the ratio would not have to be 
maintained on a town-to-town basis, but had to be maintained for 
each district. The prescribed daily wage was also relaxed and 
considered an indication. 
- Rates for conducting of training were relaxed and guidelines 
considered 'indicative'. 
The amount available under the Scheme for Housing and Shelter 
Upgradation up to the ceiling of Rs. 4,000 could be increased with a 
HUDCO-loan for the economic weaker section. 
Not only the state housing boards would be involved in the Scheme 
for Housing and Shelter Upgradation but also the state slum clearance 
boards and municipalities can take up shelter upgradation. 
At a later stage (1995), all urban areas up to a population of 2 million 
would be eligible for the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment and 
Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation, including Bangalore. 
The ministry learned that if it wanted to succeed in the implementation of 
the prime minister's scheme it would have to pay its respect to the state 
governments' sense of independence, the spirit of the Constitution and the 
various political 'sympathies' toward the ruling government at the centre. 
At the state level, the procedure of implementation had been further 
detailed by government orders. 
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Regarding the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment (SUWE), a proposal 
had to be submitted to an established NRY-committee at the district 
keeping in mind the ratio of 60:40 per cent for material and labour 
respectively. The proposal would be scrutinised by its members and upon 
approval, the deputy commissioner who is also the chairman of the NRY-
committee, would submit a budget request to the Secretariat/Directorate of 
Municipal Administration. After the government approved the district 
allocation, both the state and central government assistance would be 
transferred to the DCs office, upon which the municipalities could claim 
the approved budgets and tender the work with the DCs approval. 
Detailed administration was kept at the municipality and the DCs office. 
The Directorate of Municipal Administration/Secretariat only kept records 
of the requested budgets, the sanctioned and the released amounts, and 
maintained no details about the type and location of the works. 
With regard to the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises (SUME), 
applicants were invited by the municipalities through advertisement and 
intermediation by the councillors or social workers. The applications were 
scrutinised by the municipal office and then forwarded to the NRY-
committee who, upon endorsement, would forward these to the registered 
nationalised and commercial banks2 in the town or city. The banks would 
process the applications and ensure that the applicants had submitted 
adequate proof of identity. Secondly, equivalent assets were to be 
registered as security in case the beneficiaries defaulted in repayment. 
Field inspections were sometimes conducted to verify the address, the 
enterprise and the assets. The banks then sanctioned the loan/subsidy 
amount and released the amount in one or more instalments to the 
applicant. A passbook and account were kept in which - in principle - only 
the loan amount, accumulated interests and repayments were entered. An 
utilisation certificate was prepared by each bank and sent to the so-called 
'lead bank' in the town. The municipality was to collect these certificates 
and send them to the nodal agency at the state government and a copy to 
the chairman of the NRY-committee. The banks advanced the loans and 
received the subsidy amount through the deputy commissioner. It is clear 
that applicants without a proper identity card or assets of some value, for 
example slum dwellers, were not eligible for the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprises. 
In the early years of the NRY when the NRY-committee was not as yet established 
applications were directly forwarded to local banks. 
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Regarding the Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation 
(SHASU), the implementing agency (the KHB in Karnataka) advertised 
the scheme in local newspapers and sought the assistance of the 
municipalities in inviting applications from interested urban poor. These 
would first be screened by the municipalities and then forwarded to the 
implementing agency. The agency would make a request to the HUDCO 
for finance. Upon positive appraisal and sanction, the HUDCO would seek 
block guarantee from the state government for the loan component. 
Subsequently, the HUDCO would release both the subsidy and loan 
amounts to the KHB who would then take care of further implementation. 
Shelter upgradation is understood as improvement of the housing 
conditions by way of self-help, purchase and delivery of construction 
materials and contracted labour. The municipality could be appointed as 
the executing agency. 
The central government provided for all states and union territories 
an outlay of Rs. 1,450 million in the first year 1989-90. The next years 
showed declining amounts and in 1994-95, it stabilised at Rs. 700 million. 
By March 1994, the Government of India claimed that at a national level 
some 530,000 micro-enterprises had been assisted, that almost 48 million 
man-days had been generated under the Scheme for Urban Wage 
Employment and that some 312,000 houses were improved and 168,000 
people trained in various skills under the Scheme for Housing and Shelter 
Upgradation. For the national Eighth Five-Year Plan another Rs. 2,270 
million was budgeted. 
13.2 The NRY scheme in Karnataka 
The Government of Karnataka provided an outlay of Rs. 69 million in the 
first two years 1990-92. It has been reported that Rs. 62 million was 
released as central and state government assistance in the same period. For 
the state Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-97) a provision of Rs. 193 million 
was made. On a national scale, Karnataka made a substantial financial 
commitment to the scheme. 
As the deputy commissioners maintained the records, no town-wise 
reports were submitted to the Secretariat or the Directorate of Municipal 
Administration. Only district-wise figures were available for this research. 
For the seven corporations, city-wise records could be extracted from the 
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files of the Directorate of Municipal Administration (1996) and the 
Housing and Urban Development Annual Reports (1989-96). These data 
provide a number of interesting observations. The first observation is that 
the state government's share to the actual total expenditure of Rs. 372 
million is, according to the guidelines Rs. 139 million (or 37.4 per cent). 
For a scheme that basically supported the municipalities of Karnataka and 
their citizens, this share could be considered substantial. Moreover, over 
half of this amount was a loan and to be recovered from the beneficiaries, 
i.e. the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises. Half way through the Eighth 
Five-Year Plan (in 1994), the state government had spent only 23.4 per 
cent of the allocated amount and had to make up a lot of ground to reach 
its Eighth Fi ve-Year Plan target. The actual expenditures between 1989-94 
shows that 38 per cent was spent for the Scheme for Urban Wage 
Employment, 60 per cent for the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises and 
only 2 per cent for training under the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises. 
Among the various districts, Shimoga, Bidar, D.Kannada and Kodagu had 
spent more than Rs. 100 per capita urban population between 1989-94 for 
all components of the NRY. On the other end, both Bangalore districts and 
Kolar had spent less than Rs. 40. 
Selection of Towns in Karnataka 
After the Ministry's guidelines were relaxed, all towns in Karnataka 
became in principle eligible to receive funding under the Scheme for 
Urban Wage Employment and the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises. 
Most towns and cities in Karnataka have indeed availed of these schemes. 
The only criteria that had been applied was the population of the town as 
per the 1981 Census. As far as the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment 
was concerned, all seven corporations had to be excluded. Since their 
population size was over 100,000, they were only eligible for the Scheme 
for Housing and Shelter Upgradation. 
Why did towns and cities opt for the NRY scheme? As the data has 
been compiled at district level, the analysis can only indicate preferences 
at this level. There is a weak indication that those districts with a higher 
3
 Assuming that the allocated outlays for the NRY scheme in the two annual plans and 
Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-97) were only meant for the state government contribution 
and not as a reservation for the agreed block guarantee for the loan components. 
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development index and political affiliation index4 have to a lesser extent 
availed of the NRY scheme. This would mean that political pressures to 
take up this scheme have not been evident and, secondly, that those 
municipalities with a lower development status found the NRY a welcome 
opportunity to improve some of their municipal facilities. However, the 
correlation is weak (See table 13-2). A more evident correlation exists 
between the urban annual growth and the utilisation of the NRY scheme: 
those districts with a higher annual urban growth rate made less use of the 
NRY scheme. It has been argued earlier that annual urban growth rates in 
Karnataka are neither an indication of growing urban poverty or strong 
economic development. One could, thus, argue that those districts that 
faced a high urban growth did not perceive the NRY scheme as an 
instrument to answer the need for more municipal facilities or create urban 
employment. 
Table 13-2: Correlation between investment per capita of NRY scheme 
and selected indicators for TMCs/CMCs in Karnataka 
Correlation TMCs/CMCs (N=166) 
- 0.1732 Total NRY investment per capita and Development Status Index 
- 0.1633 Total NRY investment per capita and Political Affiliation Index 
- 0.5197 Total NRY investment per capita and annual urban growth 
13.3 Linkages to other schemes and sectors 
A scheme that aims to alleviate urban poverty by the generation of 
employment should aim at those urban areas that have a high degree of 
urban unemployment among the urban poor. Statistics about 
unemployment among the citizens are not generated by local authorities 
and are mostly based on national or state level surveys. Urban poverty is 
undoubtedly linked to the existence and the number of urban slum 
dwellers. One may expect that urban employment generation schemes 
would also aim to benefit from schemes of other departments with similar 
objectives, for example, the UBSP, the IDSMT and the low-income shelter 
schemes of the KSCB. The available data on the NRY scheme only makes 
4
 The development and political affiliation index have been explained in chapter 9. 
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comparison at the district level possible. A brief analysis has been made of 
the per capita investments in all TMCs and CMCs per district of these 
schemes as compared to the NRY scheme (including SUME, SUWE and 
SHASU). Corporations have been excluded for two reasons: for some there 
was no information available about the NRY scheme and, secondly, 
corporations only received funds for the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprises and/or Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation and were 
excluded from the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment. A number of 
observations can be made based on table 13-3. 
Table 13-3: Correlation between investment per capita by the NRY 
scheme and other urban poverty alleviation schemes at the 
district level in Karnataka between 1980-94 
Correlation TMCs/CMCs (N=166) 
- 0.2671 Total NRY per capita and KIADB per capita 
- 0.3295 Total NRY per capita and housing* investment per capita 
- 0.0325 Total NRY per capita and infrastructure* investment per capita 
- 0.1203 Total NRY per capita and UBSP per capita 
+0.0516 Total NRY per capita and slum upgradation by KSCB per capita 
-0.2462 Total NRY per capita and % slum population 
* by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (See also chapter 6). 
None of the figures at the district level show a strong correlation between 
the per capita NRY investments and the investment made by other 
schemes. Moreover, most correlations are negative. The highest correlation 
is between housing and NRY schemes and the lowest is between 
infrastructure and NRY schemes. Does it suggest that municipalities that 
failed to acquire housing and infrastructure projects, had opted for one of 
the NRY schemes? There is no correlation between NRY schemes and the 
per capita funds spent for slum upgradation by the KSCB, another scheme 
clearly targeted at the urban poor. Surprisingly, a negative correlation 
exists between NRY schemes and the percentage of slum population, an 
indication of urban poverty as argued above. Apparently, the magnitude of 
urban poverty has not been a stimulus for local governments to actively 
apply for and obtain funds from the NRY schemes. It has been observed 
that the utilisation of the NRY has been driven by other and more 
individual factors: the knowledge and interest of commissioners, chief 
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officers, local presidents and councillors irrespective of the magnitude of 
urban unemployment, slum population, urban growth and the presence of 
other similar schemes. 
13.4 Implementation 
With regard to the three components of the NRY, detailed observations5 
follow in the sections below. 
The Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises (SUME) 
The Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises caught the attention of 
municipalities when it was launched in 1989-90 and many applications 
were received and processed. In a period of five years, over 38,000 
applicants have received a subsidy and/or loan amount. This figure is well 
above the national average. The average loan and subsidy amount was Rs. 
6,222. This amount is considerably lower than the maximum of Rs. 
16,000-20,000. Only in the cities of Belgaum and Mangalore the amount 
has exceeded Rs. 10,000. The ratio between subsidy and loan has followed 
the guidelines with 27 per cent released as subsidy and the remainder as 
loan amount. Some districts have been considerably more active in 
mobilising applications and making applicants to take the financial 
assistance. Belgaum, D.Kannada and Shimoga stand out in that, more than 
approximately 4 per cent of all urban households6 received an amount 
through this scheme. This is a remarkable achievement. On the other end, 
the districts of Bangalore Rural and Kolar and the seven corporations have 
been rather inactive, where less than 1 per cent of the households received 
some gains. The number of applicants that awaits the receipt of 
loan/subsidy is just over 30,000. When these applicants would receive the 
sanctioned amount, the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises would have 
covered 4.4 per cent of the urban population in the small and medium 
towns and 3.2 per cent in the seven corporations. This would be 
These observation have been based on the figures provided by the DMA on the NRY 
scheme pertaining to the period 1989-94. 
This has been based on an average household size of five, which is an average of all 
households interviewed in this research. 
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approximately 10-15 per cent of the urban poor , As the scheme is still in 
progress this 'coverage' may still further increase. 
To enhance the skills of the urban poor and to increase the 
opportunities for a livelihood, over 5,000 persons have been trained 
between 1989-94; an achievement below the Indian average . The districts 
of Dharwad, Bidar and D.Kannada and the city of Bangalore had made an 
extra effort. While one would expect that an increased number of 
sanctioned applicants would also result in more training efforts and more 
people being trained, there is no correlation between the number of 
persons trained and the number of applications sanctioned9. Apparently, 
these efforts are driven by different reasons. While on an average, the 
actual expenditures on training approximate the guidelines with an average 
of Rs. 1,287 per trainee, the districts of Chikmagalur and Hassan spent Rs. 
5,086 and 12,806 respectively for each trained person. 
It is not easy to make an assessment of the employment which has 
been created - the ultimate goal of the scheme - by the Scheme for Urban 
Micro-Enterprises alone. As we will see, most investments go into stocks, 
tools, equipment and to some extent consumption. Hence, funds spent by 
applicants will result in an increase in turnover or - taking a simplistic 
view - an increase in income by direct expenditure. How much 
employment may have been created by the scheme may vary between 
5,000-25,000 man-years10. 
The Scheme for Urban Wage Employment (SUWE) 
The Scheme for Urban Wage Employment also attracted interest among 
the municipalities and there are only a few municipalities that have not 
made use of this scheme. It provided a welcome additional income. 
The urban poverty in India was 38 per cent in 1990 (Human Development Report, 
1995). 
In March 1994, 168,000 persons were reported to have been trained (Ministry of 
Urban Development, 1995). 
In fact the linear correlation between the number of sanctioned applicants and the 
number of people trained in the 20 districts is -0.0524. 
10
 The range has been estimated on the basis of an optimistic assumption in which the 
investment would directly lead to employment at Rs. 20 per day for a daily wager and, 
secondly, on a pessimistic assumption in which 80 per cent would be lost due to 
unproductive expenditures, devaluation or loss of goods, inflation, payment of interests 
or rents, etc. 
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Between 1989 and 1994, an average of Rs. 20.82 per capita has been spent 
by these towns and cities in the twenty districts of Kamataka. The districts 
of Bidar, Shimoga, Chickmagalur and Kodagu spent over Rs. 50 per 
capita. On the other end, the districts of Bangalore Urban and Rural, 
Bijapur and Chitradurga have not much availed of this scheme. As cities 
with a population of more than 100,000 are not eligible for this scheme, 
the corporation of Shimoga-Bhadravathi received some Rs. 3.61 million. 
This was due to a sanction to one of the towns before it became a 
corporation in 1991. Probably as a result of the smaller size of the works, 
the completion performance is good with an average of 90.4 per cent 
completed, according to official records. The amount spent on labour has 
been 43 per cent for all districts in Karnataka which approximates the 40 
per cent mentioned in the revised guidelines. However, at the district level 
the percentages of labour show strong variations, i.e. from 100 per cent in 
Gulbarga to 13 per cent in Bijapur . The government records state that a 
total employment of 7,077 man-years has been generated between 1989-
94. This would be above the India average and constitutes 5.4 per cent of 
the produced man-days in India in the same period. 
The Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation (SHASU) 
The Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation was less successful in 
Karnataka and had, in fact, never a full take-off. The scheme was initially 
under the Karnataka Housing Board and was transferred to the Karnataka 
Slum Clearance Board in 1992. The scheme was initiated in 1990-91 and 
restricted to thirteen larger cities in Karnataka12. The total number of 
sanctioned beneficiaries was 6,768. The central government sanctioned an 
amount of Rs. 22.5 million, of which Rs. 8.8 million was a subsidy and Rs. 
13.7 a loan from the HUDCO. The state government was expected to 
spend another Rs. 5.6 million, of which Rs. 4.2 million was a loan. The 
total outlay, including loan and subsidies of both central and state 
government amounts to Rs. 28.1 million. The Karnataka Housing Board 
11
 This has been based on a daily labour of Rs. 20-25, taking daily labour higher near the 
Bangalore and the coastal areas and lower in the interior of Karnataka. Some 
percentages that have been estimated result in a very high labour component, which is 
probably due to mistakes in either the specified amount spent or the man-days produced. 
12
 Tumkur, Mandya, Bijapur, Raichur, Belgaum, Hospet, Mangalore, Gulbarga, 
Dharwad, Gadag-Betgeri, Shimoga-Badrivathi, Mysore and Davangere. 
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reported in June 1992 that an expenditure of Rs. 28.18 million had already 
been incurred. At the same time, it was reported (HUDCO, 1996) that only 
3,189 units were completed (47 per cent of the target), 2,999 were under 
progress and 580 had not started1 - a poor performance as compared to the 
national figures14. Moreover, the Housing Board had exceeded the ceiling 
of Rs. 4,000 with a total amount of Rs. 8,837 per unit. One reason has been 
the mis-interpretation of KHB officials in the district offices with regard to 
the ceiling. They had interpreted this amount as the maximum to be spent 
on materials. As a result more was spent due to the hiring of labour, which 
was unquestioned at the main office in Bangalore. 
During a state level meeting in June 1992, it was minuted that 'no 
progress has been reported by the agency for utilisation of the fund 
released to them or a list of beneficiaries submitted' (Government of 
Karnataka, State level meeting, 18 June 1992, p. 12). In subsequent years, 
no sanctions were made and an earlier sanctioned amount of Rs. 65.9 
million lapsed due to the inertia of the Housing Board. Further inquiry 
revealed that the Rs. 22.5 million had been diverted to other projects of the 
Housing Board. For what 'projects' these funds have been used remains, 
however, a mystery. Subsequently, the initial release to the KHB could not 
be transferred to the KSCB when they took over the scheme. The HUDCO 
was able to recover the amount in instalments from the Housing Board. On 
an annual basis, Rs. 1.2 million was paid as interest. Bear in mind that 
there was no loan recovery of any anticipated beneficiaries. The KSCB 
tried to mobilise sufficient applications and received many from Bijapur, 
Raichur, Dharwad, Bellary and Tumkur. However, it was reported that 'as 
the number of applications were inadequate to negotiate for loans, the 
Board could not raise any loan from HUDCO' (Housing and Urban 
Development Department Annual Report., 1993-94, p. 116). In other 
words, the HUDCO could not justify the sanction of another amount to the 
KSCB unless the earlier released amount could be suitably utilised and 
completion of the works duly reported. With the money spent and* no 
physical output to show, it became a matter to be resolved between the 
KHB, KSCB and the Secretariat. Till today the matter remained 
unresolved. The KSCB also tried to negotiate a higher ceiling than the 
Within HUDCO, there have been doubts about the validity of this progress report and 
it is said that the actual figures are much lower. 
14
 The government of India stated in March 1994 that 312,000 houses were upgraded 
under the SHASU. 
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prescribed Rs. 4,000 and in which they failed. They considered the ceiling 
too low to undertake any useful housing and shelter upgradation, 
particularly if one had to find contractors to execute such works. The 
concept of providing construction material for simple improvements, self-
help and self-appointed labour has apparently not appealed to the KSCB. 
The annual report in 1994-95 stated shortly that, the Scheme for Housing 
and Shelter Upgradation 'is not in operation'. The beneficiaries were also 
disappointed in the small amount available under this scheme and were 
reluctant to mortgage any of their assets for the loan component. The 
'response for such schemes are not adequate' observed the deputy 
secretary in the meeting in June 1992. 
For an assessment of the employment created by Scheme for 
Housing and Shelter Upgradation alone, one has to resort to an 
approximation. Most of the expenditures have been spent for the 
improvement of roofing accompanied, at times, with labour provided by 
the KHB to install the roofs. In other places, the amount of Rs. 4,000 was 
provided directly to the urban poor of which most was spent on materials. 
The employment that may have been created by the scheme is estimated 
between 1,450-1,650 man-years15. 
13.5 Experiences in case-study towns 
In all seven case-study towns, information could be collected about the 
NRY scheme. While for all three components data has been collected from 
municipal offices and local banks, beneficiaries of the Scheme for Urban 
Micro-Enterprises have been interviewed to assess the utility of funds and 
the status of repayment. Bank and municipal officials have been 
interviewed about application, release and repayment procedures and 
experiences. These findings are presented in this section. 
The estimate has been based on the assumption that 40-45 per cent of the actual 
amount has been spent on the purchase of materials and the rest on labour at Rs. 20 per 
day. 
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The Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises (SUME) 
From the scattered and incomplete information that could be gathered, the 
Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises took off very well in the first two 
years 1989-91. Thousands of applications were received. For example, in 
Chikmagalur 2502 applications were received, in Gulbarga 2371 and in 
Bidar 4385 applications. The applications were first handed over to the 
municipal office and then forwarded to the NRY-committee in the district. 
The committee approved the applications and passed these on to the 
various bank branches and released the subsidy component (25 per cent) to 
the banks. Up to this point, very little scrutiny would take place. It was left 
to the banks to certify the identity of the persons and the eligibility of the 
applications. The banks, however, did not process and accept many 
applications. For example, in Chikmagalur only 368 applications were 
finally approved, in Gulbarga 1207 and in Bidar only 340. In the other 
case-study towns, approved applications were between 100-400, according 
to local officials. 
From the information provided, it is also evident that the maximum 
amount would not exceed Rs. 10,000. Municipal officers stated that the 
ceiling was either Rs. 10,000 or Rs. 5,000. Apparently, the guidelines of 
the scheme were not well known. The sanctioned amounts varied from a 
low Rs. 3,506 per applicant in Chikmagalur to a high Rs. 5,580 in Hospet. 
After approval of the applications by the banks, the loan and subsidy 
amounts were released to the beneficiaries. This was not always done in 
one instalment as some banks wanted to secure that funds were spent 
properly. There were cases in which no more instalments were made after 
the first payment. As a result, the released amounts were lower than the 
sanctioned amounts. The average released amounts to applicants varied 
between Rs. 1,406 in Chamarajanagara to Rs. 3,506 in Chikmagalur. 
Gulbarga constitutes a better case where 1207 beneficiaries received an 
average amount of Rs. 4,324. As many applications were not processed by 
the banks, subsidy amounts were returned to the district committees. 
Information about the performance of recovery was difficult to 
obtain as many banks considered this information confidential. However, 
some banks in Kunigal (September 1995), Chikmagalur (November 1995) 
and Hospet (August 1995) provided an insight into the repayments of their 
clients. In each quarter an interest amount will be added to the balance loan 
amount. Interest is also paid on accumulated interest. The interest rate is 
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issued by the Reserve Bank of India and varied between 10-12.5 per cent 
between 1989-95 and is added four to six months after the release of the 
loan. Repayments are deducted from the accumulated balance and the new 
balance entered into the register. Balance and repaid amounts are, thus, an 
indication of the repayment performance. In Kunigal, from a sample of 
113 accounts, the average loan amount was Rs. 3,223 and the outstanding 
balance was Rs. 2,763. This means that the beneficiaries have repaid an 
amount of approximately Rs. 1,500!б since the start of the scheme in 1989-
90. In Hospet, the average loan amount was Rs. 5,580 and an amount of 
Rs. 704 had been repaid by the 61 account holders in the provided sample. 
The balance would, thus, stand at an average of approximately Rs. 6,40016. 
In Chikmagalur among a sample of 40, the applicants took a loan of 
approximately Rs. 4,000 and the repayment was approximately Rs. 1,700. 
The balance stood at Rs. 2,850' . The repayment performance in 
Chikmagalur is approximately 37 per cent, in Kunigal approximately 35 
per cent and in Hospet approximately 10 per cent. In these three cases, 
there has been a considerable backlog in repayment. The banks were able 
to recover less than one-third of the amount at the end of the prescribed 
repayment period. 
Interviews with 27 bank, state and municipal officials provided 
valuable additional insights. During the interviews, the selection of 
applicants invited several critical observations: 'There is too much 
political interference when people want to apply'. 'Applicants were often 
rich businessmen who do not need such assistance', added a local 
politician in Sirsi. One municipal official recalled that 40 applicants were 
brought to his office by a councillor. Because of the illiteracy of the 
applicants, the councillor 'took Rs. 3,000 himself and passed on only Rs. 
2,000' to the applicant', he commented further. That intermediaries have 
taken 'commission' has been mentioned by several officials. Bank officials 
concluded that, a scheme with good objectives and applicants with genuine 
The estimate has been based on the assumptions that approximately two-third of the 
amounts was released in the years 1990-91, that the RBI-interest between 1989-91 was 
rate of 10%, and that the repayments were done in the first two years of the scheme. The 
total repayment period is 3 years. 
17
 These actual figures support the above assumptions of the estimated balance and 
repayment figures. 
Among the 27 officials interviewed about the NRY scheme, 13 were bank officials, 5 
municipal officials, 6 local politicians, 2 state officials and one local journalist. 
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intentions, who were mostly also willing to repay were 'spoiled' by local 
politicians who sought personal benefits. 
The functioning of the district committees was found unsuccessful: 
delays in processing applications and lack of representations of the 
participating banks were considered common problems. The establishment 
of a Task Force Committee in 1994-95 with a representative of the local 
lead bank, has been seen as an improvement. Before that, the lead bank 
was not in a position to monitor the performance of the branches in the 
town which were handling the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises, 
commented one lead bank official in Bidar. 'The municipality had tied up 
directly with the branches and we [the lead bank - hm] had no idea what 
was going on. The procedures were very loose here'. However, the 
Chikmagalur Task Force Committee had not been able to meet on a 
regularly basis and did not meet at all between 1994-95, according to one 
bank manager. 
The release of the subsidy component to the banks has shown many 
delays. One lead bank manager explained: 'One cannot expect the banks to 
advance such funds and [awaiting the subsidy - hm] the applicants will 
suffer'. A major concern of the banks is the repayment of the loans. A Sirsi 
bank manager mentioned that he considered the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprises a good scheme and was satisfied with the repayment discipline 
of the beneficiaries. He added that, particularly, women were the better 
clientele. The same has been reported by bank officials in Chikmagalur: 
'They are more serious and do not divert the money. The menfolk do not 
have such an attitude'. Bank officials in all other case-study towns were 
less positive about repayment and they complained that the repayment is 
very poor. However, the repayment discipline was promising in the initial 
years, but deteriorated quickly after 1992. The cause, according to them, is 
that beneficiaries were told by their intermediaries that 'it is a government 
scheme'. For many, this is sufficient to interpret that the funds are for free. 
'They eat, drink and forget about it', another bank official added. As far as 
the utilisation of the funds is concerned, officials were not convinced that 
the funds were used for the purpose for which they had been allocated. 
Repayments of only 15-20 per cent were quoted in Sirsi and Kunigal and 
several banks decided to stop any further releases of funds. In 
Chikmagalur, this measure was a joint decision by the banks and they 
refused to accept any more applications from the end of 1992 onward. The 
Chikmagalur and Sirsi municipality did not pursue better repayment by the 
beneficiaries either or call for new applicants. The reluctance of the banks 
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to release more funds after the first two years has been noticed by local 
councillors: 'The amount released is very less. How can they improve 
[their business - hm] from that', added one councillor in Bidar. Almost all 
bank officials commented that, the taking of commission and the spreading 
of the rumour that the money would be for free by some local politicians or 
intermediaries has resulted in the poor repayment by the applicants. The 
enthusiasm among the banks for this and other central government 
schemes is generally low. 'The schemes have the same problem: 
misutilisation and no recovery', summarised one bank official in Kunigal. 
Moreover, the loan component has to be financed by the banks and there is 
no compensation from the Government of India in the case of defaults19, 
he added, 'To make things worse, today unrecovered balances [outstanding 
loan and interest payments - hm] have to be deducted from our annual 
profits'. 
In the seven case-study towns, 80 beneficiaries had been identified 
through the records of the local banks. From these lists, names and 
addresses have been taken at random and were visited for an interview. 
This is, as far as I know, the first survey ever among such beneficiaries in 
India and provides an unique indication of the success and failures of the 
Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises as perceived by the respondents. The 
general characteristics of the respondents are given in table 13-4. 
From the table, the level of household income indicates that the 
beneficiaries belong to the low-income categories while almost two 
members of the households are earning some income. From the 150 
income earners, half are involved in petty businesses and one-third earn 
their income from daily wage activities. This means that most families 
have an insecure income and rely, to a large extent, on the local labour 
market. Among the 76 entrepreneurs, almost one-third are women. Out of 
80 interviewed respondents, 66 households (83 per cent) are indeed 
involved in some kind of petty business. 
Some banks had insured themselves against such defaults and they could reclaim 60% 
of the non-recoverable assets through this insurance provided by the Corporate Bank, 
explained one bank manager of a Syndicate Bank. However, this provision was 
abolished in 1997. 
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Table 13-4: General characteristics of interviewed beneficiaries of the 
SUME-scheme 
Indicator 
Total sample size (N=) 
Family size 
Stated monthly income household (in Rs.) 
Number of income earners per household 
Income earners that have income from business (in %) 
Income earners that have income from daily 
Households that are in small business 
Number of female micro-entrepreneurs 
Location of the micro-enterprise 
- at home 
- in a separate shop 
- street side/pavement 
- vendors 
-other 
Average number of years in business 
Stated monthly turnover business (in Rs., № 
wage (in %) 
=47, 19 non-response) 
Survey result 
80 
4.7 
1,594 
1.84 
50.7 
33.3 
66 
22 
16 
17 
22 
10 
I 
20.6 
8,243 
The pettiness of business and low household income are also supported by 
the monthly turnover of only Rs. 8,243, stated by 47 respondents2 . 
Moreover, the location of their businesses carries little costs. Out of 66 
enterprising households, only 17 businesses are located in a shop. The 
survey indicates that the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises has indeed 
reached the targeted income section of the urban population. It has also 
been successful in finding the right group of 'entrepreneurs' with small 
businesses, including a large section of women. 
With regard to the application, loan and subsidy amounts and the 
status of repayment, table 13-5 provides an overview. Most applicants of 
the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises were attracted to the scheme* by 
word of mouth information, mostly from relatives, neighbours and 
colleagues. Many respondents added, that they went to a local 
corporator/councillor or a municipal officer to get more information about 
the scheme and seek assistance. 
The other 19 respondents did either not know or did not want to state any figures. 
The Nehru Rozgar Yojana (Employment Generation) Scheme 369 
Table 13-5: Application, loan, subsidy and repayment details among 
respondents SUME-scheme 
Indicator 
Total sample size 
Was informed about SUME by* 
- Colleagues/neighbours/friends 
- Municipal officials 
- Councillor/Corporator 
- Customer 
Amount requested 
- More than received 
- Equal to received 
Problems with application procedure** 
Received help during application from* 
- Councillor 
- Bank official 
- Social worker 
- Municipal officer 
- Others 
People that have spent money to get the subsidy/loan 
Average amount spent to get subsidy/loan (in Rs., N= 
Average time between application and receipt amoun 
37) 
t (months) 
Average loan/subsidy amount received (in Rs., non-response = 1) 
Loan/subsidy amount used for 
- Business 
- Domestic expenses 
- For both 
Number of respondents repaying loan 
- Frequency of repayment 
- Repaid fully 
- Repays daily 
- Repays monthly 
- Repays quarterly 
- Repays irregular 
Number of respondents re-paying loan 
Survey result 
80 
42 
20 
19 
3 
51 
29 
28 
65 
26 
21 
6 
7 
37 
522 
4.2 
5,194 
71 
7 
2 
52 
6 
11 
16 
2 
17 
52 
Some respondents gave more than one answer. 
Submission of proof of identity, guarantors, securities and other conditions. 
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The assistance comprised of getting an application form, filling in the form 
and pursuing its approval. Local councillors/corporators provided such 
assistance to more than 80 per cent of the respondents. It implies that, the 
access to the government and bank is to a large extent facilitated by such 
'intermediaries' and fewer respondents attempted to apply on their own 
and approach the bank or municipal officials directly. However, for many, 
this assistance was not without cost as almost half of the respondents paid 
some money for this 'service'. Over Rs. 500 was paid by this group as 
'commission' and confirms the reports by the interviewed officials. While 
this practice may be detestable, it may have contributed to the fact that 
only four months passed between the application and the receipt of the 
amount. A majority of applicants (64 per cent) were approved for a lower 
amount than they requested, with the average sanctioned amount for loan 
and subsidy being Rs. 5,194. This amount is less than one-third of the 
allowed ceiling of Rs. 16,000 and 20,000. The average amount was the 
highest in Chamarajanagara with Rs. 7,636 and lowest in Gulbarga with 
Rs. 2,929. The highest sanctioned amount has been Rs. 10,000. The 
average amount in the survey is also lower than the state average of Rs. 
6,222. 'The amount has been spent for our business', stated 89 per cent of 
the respondents. Others have spent it partly or wholly for domestic 
purposes, mainly for clearing debts, consumer goods and also weddings 
explained a few. The 'mis-utilisation' of the loan and subsidy amount as 
quoted by several officials is not supported by this survey. The average 
loan amount comes, indeed, to approximately 75 per cent and stands at Rs. 
3,847 for all respondents. Out of 80 respondents, 52 claimed that 
repayment had been completed (6) or is still going on (46) for over the last 
two years. The frequency of repayment differs considerably; some are 
paying daily, others monthly and the largest group irregularly. All these 
are or have been repaying to a bank and not to any intermediary. The 
amount repaid could not be provided by the respondents, nor the 
outstanding balance by the bank. 
The appreciation of the scheme by the respondents reveals that 20 
per cent considered the scheme an improvement for their business, for 41 
per cent, it was partly an improvement and 26 per cent claimed no 
improvement. Hence, the respondents appraised the scheme as relatively 
positive, particularly if one considers that the received amount is less than 
their monthly turnover. There were, when asked, a number of suggestions 
to improve the scheme. A clear suggestion by one group (28) was that the 
amount should be increased. A smaller group (14) was not satisfied with 
The Nehru Rozgar Yojana (Employment Generation) Scheme 371 
the selection procedure of beneficiaries, which they found favouring those 
who had an 'intermediary' or could mobilise some 'political influence'. 
There was only one respondents who totally disapproved of the scheme 
and suggested that it is stopped. However, a majority (37) had no 
suggestions to offer. 
Little information could be obtained about the training efforts under 
the scheme. In the seven case-study towns, in Chamarajanagara, Sirsi, 
Gulbarga and Bidar, training had been conducted. Training in tailoring 
skills, electric wiring and repair of television sets has been extended to 
selected applicants. In Chikmagalur, training has also been given in brick 
manufacturing, mosaic floor making and carpentry. The training has been 
conducted at the regional Industrial Training Institutes. In 
Chamarajanagara, 115 applicants were trained and 56 applicants in Bidar. 
The funds for training are directly released to the training institutes and are 
Rs. 1,020 and Rs. 1,111 per trainee, respectively. In Gulbarga, 185 
applicants were trained between 1989-92 at an average cost of Rs. 735. In 
Sirsi, less than 20 applicants had been trained. 
Scheme for Urban Wage Employment (SUWE) 
The Scheme for Urban Wage Employment has been in operation in the 
five smaller towns of the sample. Gulbarga and Hospet had been excluded. 
The interviewed officials commented that the Scheme for Urban Wage 
Employment is a good scheme. It helps the municipalities to improve, for 
example, their roads and markets assets. The works that have been 
implemented under the scheme are small in scale and would amount from 
Rs. 220,000 in Chikmagalur to Rs. 17,500 in Kunigal. However, the 
number of works could go up to 91, as is the case in Bidar. The works that 
were listed are the construction of road-side drains, repair of roads, 
metalling of markets and bus stands. Since its beginning in 1990-91, the 
progress of these works had been satisfactory and most towns have 
completed these works. The municipalities had, however, difficulty in 
maintaining the 40 per cent share for labour and most have spent less on 
labour and more on material. In Bidar, in some works, more than 80 per 
cent of the project funds were spent on materials. Junior engineers in 
Chikmagalur and Sirsi confirmed this difficulty, but added that they could 
manage 'with some adjustment'. The number of man-days reported varies 
between 7,100 in Kunigal to over 36,000 in Bidar. The salaries paid to the 
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workers were based on the prescribed daily wages, as per Schedule of 
Rates, and is approximately Rs. 25 per day. This figure is also supported 
by the stated expenditures in the towns. This amount was too low and 
should have been Rs. 50-60 per day, mentioned two former politicians in 
Sirsi. One added that, such daily wages were paid under the rural 
equivalent of NRY, the Jawaharal Rozgar Yojana (JRY). In Kunigal, it has 
been reported that the daily wages incurred to the government were higher 
than the amount that was actually paid to the labourers. The reports also 
indicate that most of the man-days were generated in the first two years of 
the scheme and declined drastically in subsequent years. 
Scheme for Shelter and Slum Upgradation (SHASU) 
Among the seven case-studies, Gulbarga was the only city with a 
population of more than 100,000 in 1981 and was, therefore, the only 
sanctioned city for the Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation. In 
1989, the scheme was indeed initiated and 1320 beneficiaries were 
identified. The available funds were directly released to the beneficiaries to 
allow for the purchase of material and hiring of labour, according to the 
municipal officials. The local officials also indicated that the money had 
been used for small repairs and additions to the existing houses of the 
applicants. Since the scheme was started, an amount of Rs. 1.5 million had 
been released by the Karnataka Housing Board to the corporation. A Task 
Force Committee is monitoring the scheme. The corporation records show 
that 358 beneficiaries could complete their housing improvements at an 
average cost of Rs. 3,737. There is still a balance of Rs. 162,000. The total 
amount received as repayment of the loan stands at Rs. 79,531. This is less 
than two instalments21 of a total of 40 instalments over a 10-year 
repayment period. Repayment here is, thus, very poor. Because of the non-
performance of the KHB, subsequent releases did not materialise and 
almost 1000 beneficiaries have waited in vain for funds to improve their 
houses. 
The quarterly repayment amount is approximately Rs. 183, while the total repayment 
till date is only Rs. 222 per beneficiary (October 1995). 
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13.6 The role of the implementing agencies 
In terms of the role of the implementing agencies, the NRY scheme 
provides a small burden to the municipalities and to the implementing 
agencies, under the Secretariat of Housing and Urban Development 
Department. The Scheme for Urban Wage Employment is reasonably 
simple in procedure, with a convenient 80 per cent central government 
subsidy. The Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises is also relatively simple 
as the municipalities only have to mobilise, screen and forward the 
applications to the district committee and the banks. The banks take the 
major burden as they have to deal with the cumbersome procedures of 
administrative and legal appraisal, releases and particularly the recovery of 
the loan amounts. 
At the state government level, the Secretariat has had little 
involvement in the implementation of the NRY. They have been 
instrumental in passing the necessary files and releasing the central and 
state government assistance to the Directorate of Municipal 
Administration, Housing Board and the NRY committees. The Secretariat 
was also instrumental in mobilising the loans from the HUDCO for the 
Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation. 
The Karnataka Housing Board was the key organisation for the 
implementation of the Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation and 
their role has been far from satisfactory. After the initial releases to 
selected corporations in the first two years, subsequent releases did not 
occur as the reserved funds had been depleted and utilised for the Board's 
regular housing schemes. This resulted in, practically, a standstill of the 
scheme in 1991-92 and still continues. The corporations could not 
continue releases to the disappointed beneficiaries. The attempt of the 
KSCB to revive the scheme in 1992, despite the hundreds of applications 
they had received, failed as the prescribed ceiling of Rs. 4,000 was 
considered too paltry a sum to implement anything worthwhile in their 
view. As the state government agencies failed to have the Scheme for 
Housing and Shelter Upgradation take off more convincingly, the HUDCO 
was also not able to have a more instrumental role, even though they had 
taken ample interest not only to transfer central assistance funds but also to 
extend other loan assistance where required. 
The role of the Directorate of Municipal Administration has been 
limited. Besides monitoring the progress of the two schemes SUME and 
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SUWE, the Directorate has been merely a conduit for central government 
subsidy and grants which were transferred to the NRY district committees. 
The state government contributions have been directly transferred to these 
committees and the Directorate had no involvement in this regard. 
Municipalities also tried to minimise the role of the Directorate, for 
example, by approaching the local PWD engineer for technical approval of 
the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment proposals rather than to go to 
Bangalore, one senior official mentioned. Monitoring the Scheme for 
Urban Micro-Enterprises and Scheme for Urban Wage Employment had 
been difficult as the Directorate received information irregularly from the 
municipalities or from the NRY district committees. One reason is that 
NRY district committees, headed by the deputy commissioner, considered 
the Directorate as a lower authority and did not feel the urge to report to 
them regularly. The NRY district committees have taken a rather inactive 
role in the initiation and implementation of the schemes. It has been 
reported that applications for both the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprises and the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment have been 
merely, though aptly, passed on to the state government or the registered 
banks. 
The only institutions that have taken an active role in the SUWE are 
the municipalities: identification of works under the Scheme for Urban 
Wage Employment and implementation of the works were done with a 
high degree of thrust. Most of the sanctioned funds have indeed been spent 
and most of the works completed. As far as the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprises is concerned, the municipal administration had a role in the 
processing of applications and, particularly, the councillors had been 
active in identifying applicants and getting the applications ready for 
forwarding them to the NRY district committee. They perceived the 
scheme as an instrument to broaden the political support among their 
electorate and to earn some income by demanding commission. The 
'machine politics' were (See chapter 3), thus, very much at work here. * 
Lastly, the banks had a considerable role in scaling down the 
Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises. First, the number of applications that 
were ultimately approved were a fraction of the number that had been 
submitted. Secondly, the approved amount has been far below the allowed 
ceiling. This may be understandable from the point of view that, the 
various central government schemes have been imposed on them and the 
loans had to be financed through their own means. Moreover, the banks 
were aware that these central government schemes were 'populist' and 
The Nehru Rozgar Yojana (Employment Generation) Scheme 375 
would show a very poor repayment performance. Allowing too many 
applications would have a negative effect on their financial performance. 
The latter had been aggravated by an order of the Reserve Bank in 1992. 
Previously, the banks could add penalties on non-recoverable loans and 
interests to their profit. In 1992, this practice was abolished and the 
Reserve Bank22 of India issued an order in which these amounts had to 
classified as 'non-performing assets'. Moreover, provisions had to be made 
in their profits to write off these losses: 20 per cent in the first year, 30 per 
cent in the second and the remainder in the third year. Hence, the central 
government scheme became a full liability to these banks. While many 
banks could show profits before 1992, losses had to reported in the 
following years, commented one senior bank official in Mysore. It is no 
wonder that banks became very reluctant to process applications in large 
numbers. As a result, the promising take-off in the years 1989-91 turned in 
to a dwindling scheme. 
13.7 Conclusions 
The NRY scheme had been designed to provide employment to the urban 
unemployed and those living below the poverty line. It was intended to add 
to their productive assets and to help urban local bodies in improving their 
services to the local population. Alleviating urban poverty by the 
generation of employment for the urban poor is a noble objective. 
However, it is also well known that employment schemes depend to a 
large extent on the working of the macro-economy, its growth and reforms. 
Schemes that merely aim at generating man-days will not have a 
noticeable and enduring impact on the labour market situation. It will, at 
best, mitigate the surpressing effects of unemployment for as long as the 
schemes last. This is the case with the NRY scheme. The Scheme for 
Urban Wage Employment and Scheme for Housing and Shelter 
Upgradation are indeed schemes that have generated employment but with 
little impact on local economies. The Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises 
is a scheme that has a potential to uplift small-scale enterprises and to 
bring about strengthening of the local economy. However, the total 
The order was made in order to comply with international banking standards for 
accounting for non-recoverable funds. 
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number of beneficiaries and a one-time investment of Rs. 6,222 per capita 
in Karnataka will certainly not have the desired effect. 
With reference to the goal of the NRY scheme, the selection of 
towns based on the population of the towns seems rather crude and of little 
significance. In aiming to reduce urban unemployment among the urban 
poor, other criteria may have been used like, for example, the stated slum 
population. Analysis of the data at the district level, also support the view 
that those municipalities who opted for the NRY did not perceive the 
scheme as an instrument to generate urban employment. They also did not 
see the NRY as a necessary addition to other schemes of a similar nature. 
What has been suggested in this chapter is that municipalities that failed to 
acquire housing and infrastructure projects, had opted for one of the NRY 
schemes. However, it is more apparent that the utilisation of the NRY has 
been driven by individual factors: the knowledge and interest of 
commissioners, chief officers, local presidents and councillors, irrespective 
of the magnitude of urban unemployment, slum population, urban growth 
and the presence of other similar schemes. 
The government of Karnataka has been committed to this scheme as 
the budget provision between 1989 and 1994 was much higher than in any 
other state. However, as in other states, they also had to face a slow-down 
after the initial years. Half-way through the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the 
state government had to make up a lot of ground to reach its plan target. 
Both the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises and the Scheme for Urban 
Wage Employment, have been the main contributors to the NRY 
expenditures in Karnataka, while some districts acquired more funds than 
others. 
As an employment scheme, the actual man-days that the NRY has 
produced will prove its impact (See table 13-6). It has been estimated 
below that the NRY scheme has taken away not more than 0.1 per cent of 
the underemployment of all urban households who live under the poverty 
line between 1989-94. In other words, the NRY is a minuscule 
contribution to the reduction of the vast urban unemployment. 
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Table 13-6: Employment generated by the three components of the 
NRY scheme in Karnataka between 1989-94 
Scheme Employment generated Employment generated 
between 1989-94 as compared to 
(in man-years) unemployment between 
1989-94 (in %) 
Total unemployment among 3,200,000 100.00 
the urban poor3 1989-94 
SUME 5,000-25,000 0.016-0.078 
SUWE 7,077 0,022 
SHASU 1,450-1,650 0.005 
Total NRY 13,527-33,727 0.042-0.115 
Has the NRY scheme also reached the urban poor? The conducted 
survey among 80 beneficiaries of the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises 
suggests so. Moreover, the plan targets also imply that 10-15 per cent of 
the urban poor may benefit through the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprises. At the moment, the actual reach is one-quarter of the target. 
This in itself, is a commendable achievement and it is regrettable that the 
small amounts provided under this scheme have resulted in a negligible 
impact on urban unemployment. The Government of India's own 
observation that, 'the total outlay as compared to the existing 
unemployment is inadequate' is supported by the Karnataka example. 
While in other states bankers have been rather slow in processing 
and releasing funds for the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises 
(Government of India, 1994), this is not the case in Karnataka. The survey 
has shown that the time between application and release has been a matter 
of a few months. One the other hand, the number of releases as compared 
to the forwarded applications is only a fraction. Secondly, new 
applications have hardly been processed since 1992 when it became clear 
that poor repayment performance of beneficiaries would also apply for this 
central government sponsored scheme. Another, though more recent, 
23
 The assumptions are: an urban poverty at 38 per cent (1990, Human Development 
Report 1995, UNDP); 30 per cent of the family members are potential work-force; and 
an effective underemployment of 50 per cent among the potential work-force in urban 
poor families. 
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reason of new applications not forthcoming is that, a new Prime Minister's 
Rozgar Yojana was launched in 1994, which has a higher ceiling for 
financial assistance to micro-entrepreneurs (i.e. Rs. 100,000, as compared 
to Rs. 16,000-20,000 in the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment). This 
made the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises less attractive to applicants 
who would rather opt for the new scheme, commented a few bank 
officials. 
The Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation may be 
considered as an odd component of an employment scheme although the 
ultimate benefits to the poor are commendable: improved shelter and 
housing. There is, however, little to report from Karnataka. Since June 
1992, there has been no further progress because of 'depletion of funds' as 
the KHB has diverted the initial transfer to other housing schemes. 
Training could have been a sensible investment in helping the urban 
poor to acquire new skills in earning an income. Training has indeed been 
imparted to thousands of applicants, but this has never been a bogey to one 
of the components. The main reason is that, training involved a completely 
different institution which did not co-ordinate with the municipalities or 
the banks. Hence, the training effort became a separated and unconnected 
endeavour. 
Adding to the productive assets of the urban poor, another objective 
of the NRY scheme, refers to the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises. 
The interviews and the surveys reveal some contradictions. One 
contradiction is that misutilisation is not as wide-spread as the interviewed 
officials suggested. The second contradiction is that most respondents 
claimed that they were still repaying the loan amount, though with a 
considerable backlog. The size of the sample may cast doubts on the truth 
of the statement of the officials but cannot deny their years of experience 
with this and similar schemes. The third contradiction is that the 
respondents appraise the scheme relatively positive as compared to the 
interviewed officials. Other points were, however, confirmed. The 
intermediation by local councillors and others does indeed exist on a wide 
scale. While it is suggested that this has reduced the total processing time 
to only four months, the respondents and interviewed officials agreed that 
this system should be abolished. It favours those who do not need it and 
excludes others who are in need of such assistance. A second point of 
confirmation is the payment of commission to these 'intermediaries'. 
While officials quoted amounts that varied strongly, the respondents who 
did pay had to give around Rs. 500. The last point of confirmation is that, 
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the provided loan amount is too low. It should be increased in order to be 
meaningful for their businesses. 
In all cases there has been a considerable default in repayment and 
the banks were able to recover not more than one-third at the end of the 
prescribed repayment period. The enthusiasm among the banks for central 
government schemes is low and the main reason is that these schemes have 
become a financial liability. Refusal of large numbers of applications and 
high loan amounts are now common practice among banks. It seems 
irrational that central government imposes such loss-making schemes onto 
banks and, at the same time, expects them to prove their financial 
performance based on commercial banking principles. It is time that the 
central government abolishes the view that nationalised banks are part of a 
government machinery which have to bear the successes and, more often, 
the failures of the various 'populist' programmes. 
The Scheme for Urban Wage Employment is the component of the 
NRY that has directly contributed to the generation of a verifiable amount 
of man-days. Municipalities were also enthused by the scheme and many 
have benefited; it was a welcome additional income. The reports also 
indicate that most of the man-days were generated in the first two years of 
the scheme and declined drastically in subsequent years. The type and 
magnitude of the works has certainly improved the looks of the towns but 
have not created an economic asset that would have generated lasting 
employment. 
The role of the central government should certainly be praised as 
they - more than the states - felt that something should be done to reduce 
urban unemployment. In their enthusiasm and thoroughness, many details 
were prescribed that were interpreted as an encroachment on a subject area 
that is, by Constitution, the concern of the state government. The initial 
meetings resolved this tension and the guidelines were reformulated into 
suggestive and indicative formulations. As a result of the three different 
components, the procedural and institutional set-up provides a complicated 
picture with four nodal agencies in the case of Karnataka: the Directorate 
of Municipal Administration for smaller and medium sized towns, the 
NRY district committee for all urban areas, the Karnataka Housing Board, 
the Slum Clearance Board and the Secretariat for all corporations. The 
involvement of nationalised and commercial banks and the HUDCO have 
added to the complexity. Particularly, the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprises and the Scheme for Urban Wage Employment entail various 
layers of decisions and are not conducive for effective initiation and 
380 Urban Development in Kamataka 
implementation. Despite this complexity, the burden to each agency 
differed. The municipalities did willingly take a large share of the burden 
as they could directly benefit from the Scheme for Urban Wage 
Employment. The banks were compelled to take the burden of the Scheme 
for Urban Micro-Enterprises. Other agencies have had minor roles. The 
role of the KHB in the Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation needs 
special mention here as it has been a sad history. Lack of interest and poor 
financial management resulted in squandering of the released amounts and 
a de-facto standstill of the scheme shortly after its take off. Shifting the 
implementation of the scheme to the KSCB has also not been a solution, as 
their expectations could not be satisfied with the prescribed guidelines. As 
a result, the Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation has not been in 
operation since the end of 1992. 
14 
The Scheme for Urban Basic Services for the Poor 
This chapter deals with the scheme for Urban Basic Services for the Poor 
(UBSP), another central government sponsored scheme, which was 
launched in its first form in the mid-1980s in Karnataka. Urban poverty in 
India is estimated to be more than 25 per cent among the urban 
population . Moreover, the National Institute of Urban Affairs (1988) 
found that among the urban poor, 68 per cent are women and children. 
Limited skills and education, poor health, high mortality among young 
children, and cultural and social inhibitions to upward movement within 
the labour market, make these groups particularly vulnerable. The lack of 
employment opportunities is one important cause of their poverty and the 
often appalling living conditions and limited access to civic and health 
facilities is another. The Government of India has been implementing 
several programmes to improve the availability of services with regard to 
the living conditions of the urban poor. The Urban Community 
Development scheme, the Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums, 
the Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns, the Integrated 
Child Development Services, the Nehru Rozgar Yojana and low-cost 
sanitation schemes have been introduced in urban areas since the late 
1970s. Among professionals and senior government officials, there had 
been a growing discontent about the implementation of such schemes. The 
There is no agreement on the percentage of urban population living below the poverty 
line. The National Commission on Urbanisation put the urban poverty at 27.7 per cent 
in 1987-88, a figure that is still quoted today. The Human Development Report (World 
Bank, 1995) put the figure at 38 per cent and the research done by the NIUA in 1988 
assessed the urban poverty at 43 per cent. Both definition and assessment method have 
led to different figures. 
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National Commission on Urbanisation crisply summarised this discontent 
in their report: 'the reach of the programmes is limited, there is a high 
degree of inflexibility, there is lack of convergence of programmes, even 
the main targets are often missed, the programmes are still working on a 
laboratory scale' (NCU Report, 1988, p. 97). Indeed, the mentioned 
programmes were implemented by a myriad of institutions with little in-
built convergence: urban local bodies, slum clearance boards, planning 
departments, social welfare departments and engineering departments 
respectively. Moreover, foreign funding by the British, the UNICEF and 
others added to the fragmentation in concepts and approaches. To 
overcome these shortcomings, the Government of India introduced the 
Urban Basic Services Programme (UBS) in the year 1985 on a pilot basis. 
The NCU Report had compelled the central government to prepare a 
National Action Plan for Urban Poverty Alleviation in 1990 and this 
report underlined the need for the Urban Basic Services Programme and 
called for its expansion. The scheme was then renamed as Urban Basic 
Services for the Poor (UBSP). In 1985, it was envisaged to merge the 
schemes of Urban Community Development, low-cost sanitation and 
Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns into a single UBS. 
However, when the UBSP was re-christened in 1990 there were no further 
attempts to absorb these into the UBSP but rather to co-ordinate with these 
schemes. Only the Urban Community Development scheme had been 
wound up and replaced by the UBS. 
14.1 Main features of the UBS(P) scheme 
The aim of the UBS(P) is to improve and upgrade the quality of life of the 
urban poor, especially for the most vulnerable sections - the women and 
children. This aim had been translated into a number of specific objectives: 
The Action Plan presented the Urban Poverty Alleviation Package which included the 
schemes Urban Basic Services for the Poor, the Nehru Rozgar Yojana, the 
Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums, the Scheme of Night Shelter for Footpath 
Dwellers, the Scheme for Low-Cost Sanitation, the Integrated Development of Small 
and Medium Towns, the Overseas Development Agency (UK) assisted projects in five 
major cities and the slum components of World Bank projects in 4 cities and one state. 
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1. To promote and inculcate group spirit and self-help among slum 
communities through education and awareness campaigns; 
2. To provide pre-school education to children and adult education to 
illiterate slum women by organising balwadi (Kindergarten) and adult 
education centres; 
3. To extend mother and child health care services, with special 
emphasis on preventive health care by providing for immunisation, 
nutritious food, oral re-hydration, etc.; 
4. To provide basic amenities like water, sanitation, etc.; 
5. To provide means to supplement the income of the low income slum 
women by providing petty loans and vocational training; and 
6. To enhance and strengthen the capacity of municipal bodies to 
effectively meet the service needs of urban poor. 
There are three strategic principles that have to be adhered to when 
implementing the programme. The first principle is participation of the 
target group when identifying the needs, prioritising the needs and when 
planning, implementing and monitoring the projects. The second principle 
is convergence. It was expected that the funds under the programme would 
not be adequate to achieve the programme's goal. Financial assistance that 
is available under the IDSMT, EIUS, NRY and low-cost sanitation 
schemes should necessarily contribute and be 'converged' with the 
available UBS(P) project funds. The third principle is cost-effectiveness 
and it refers to making available start-up moneys, low-cost technologies 
and sustaining benefits by self-generated means instead of depending 
infinitely on project funds. 
The broad and wide-reaching objectives of the UBS(P) implied that 
many components could be selected and included in the project proposals. 
These have been drawn from the National Action Plan on the Mother and 
Child, adopted by the central government in pursuance of the goals 
announced at the Summit on Children, when the heads of state met in 
September 1990. UNICEF was the main host of the event. These 
components were: 
Non-formal pre-school education for children below six years of age. 
- Nutrition supplement for children below six years and pregnant or 
nursing women. 
- Immunisation for children against diseases. 
3 84 Urban Development in Karnataka 
- Health check-up for pregnant or nursing women and children below 6 
years, first aid and family planning campaign, education and 
assistance. 
- Hand pumps, low-cost latrines, drainage, waste disposal bins, bathing 
rooms, smokeless stoves {chullahs ) and education in personal and 
domestic hygiene. 
- Non-formal education for teenage girls and school drop-outs. 
- Adult education for making women literate and equip them with 
income earning skills. 
- Assistance to the aged by making use of existing state schemes. 
- Assistance to the handicapped under the existing scheme 
implemented by the Ministry of Welfare for the handicapped. 
- Assistance to juvenile delinquents under the existing scheme of the 
Ministry of Welfare. 
- Assistance for rehabilitation of alcoholics and drag addicts. 
- Assistance for sports, cultural activities and promotion of civic 
consciousness under the scheme of the Ministry of Human Resources 
Development (Nehru Yuvak Sangatham). 
The role of non-governmental agencies in the implementation of the UBSP 
was seen as instrumental. They may be involved in the mobilisation of the 
community, in service delivery, in research, in documentation and 
campaigning, in training of target groups, convenors and resident 
volunteers, and in building up neighbourhood committees. It was realised 
that the UBS(P) may be more successful by taking a demonstration 
approach. This may be done by selecting a small number of towns and 
slums first and then its expansion to other areas and cities. 
Smokeless chullahs have been developed by several institutions in India, of which 
Astra in Bangalore is one. The smokeless chullah is a small clay fireplace made to fit 
one or two pans. Firewood is entered below the pan through a cavity and smoke is 
emitted outside the room through a fixed pipe of 2-3 metres in length. When used 
outside, as in some other states, the pipe can be shorter. The chullah saves considerably 
on wood and avoids smoke being inhaled, the suspected cause of respiratory allergic 
reactions and infections. 
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Project implementation 
Detailed guidelines had been developed for the required institutional set-
up and the procedures for the implementation of the programme. The 
central government wanted to make sure that participation and 
convergence are, indeed, established and stipulated as that a well-defined 
organisational set-up and elaborate procedures would be instrumental for 
realising these two principles. The sensitive central-state government 
mandates were put to a test once again. It was surprising that state 
governments in this case have not been fuzzy about the imposition of so 
many programme details4. In table 14-1 some details are provided. 
Table 14-1: Financial pattern of UBS(P) between 1985-94 
Agency 1985-90 1990-92 after 1992 
Central 20% 100% in the first year at 
government Rs. 58 per slum dweller 
and 50% in the second 
year.. Withdrawn in 
1992 and changed to 
100% grant in the same 
year. 
State government 20% 50% from the second 
year onward at Rs. 44 
per slum dweller. 100% 
in 1992 and changed to 
full central government 
support. 
Municipality 20% at the discretion of the 
state government. 
UNICEF 40%* Demonstration towns 
and training activities in 
support of the UBSP 
scheme. 
60% of not more than 
Rs. 75 per slum dweller 
in the first year and Rs. 
50 from the second year 
onward. 
40% of not more than 
Rs. 75 per slum dweller 
in the first year and Rs. 
50 from the second year 
onward. 
at the discretion of the 
state government. 
Training activities in 
support of the UBSP 
scheme. 
* Including capacity building and communication efforts. 
Source: G. Ramachandra Reddy (1995); Government of India ( 1995). 
4
 This in contrast to the other central government scheme: the Nehru Rozgar Yojana. 
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The stipulated financial contributions from various agencies changed over 
time and are shown in the table. After 1990, there has been considerable 
confusion. Initially, there were plans to stop the support of the central 
government and UNICEF all together. This was averted and the central 
government support was maintained as well as limited UNICEF support, 
as shown in the table above. The guidelines were further updated and 
provided with detailed instructions about flows and shares of financial 
assistance to the various organisations. In the first year Rs. 58 (later 
increased to Rs. 75) could be spent per capita and Rs. 44 (later increased to 
Rs. 505) from the second year onward. It was expected that an average of 
Rs. 175 per beneficiary would be spent under the UBSP, equivalent to 
three years of central government assistance. Most of the expenditures 
would be for 'software' and only 25-30 per cent for construction activities. 
The financial assistance comes as a full grant (MUOD draft guidelines 
Urban Poverty Alleviation Package, 1990). 
14.2 UBS(P) in Karnataka 
The UBS(P) was initiated in Karnataka in 1986 during the Seventh Five-
Year Plan (1985-90) with the selection and implementation of 14 towns in 
the district of Tumkur. In 1990, when the UBS was converted into the 
UBSP, six UBS towns were included and other towns and cities were 
added on a yearly basis to a total of 27 in 1995. The UBS had been 
handled directly by the district administration and their women and child 
welfare section officer. It was felt that, it would suffice to keep the 
scheme's implementation as close as possible to the municipalities and 
beneficiaries. When the UBS was scaled up and extended to other districts 
after 1990, this formula was not suitable any longer. The Directorate of 
Municipal Administration became the nodal agency at the state level and a 
separate UBSP-cell with two technical officers was established.' In 
addition, training support was extended to all municipalities and workers 
by the Administrative Training Institute in Mysore where two training 
officers were posted in 1992, with the support of the UNICEF. Overall 
guidance and training support to the state agencies was extended from the 
UNICEF regional office in Hyderabad and the Regional Centre for Urban 
Environmental Studies, also in Hyderabad. 
5
 The variation is due to the change of rates in 1994. 
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At an organisational level, matters had been put in place much better 
in comparison to other schemes. Allocation of central government 
assistance and matching state government grants would be fixed on an 
annual basis and be based on the number of planned beneficiaries (slum 
dwellers) multiplied by a per capita rate. The central government share, 
matched with the state government share, would be transferred to the 
DMA, who in turn would make this amount available to the deputy 
commissioner (or an appointed district co-ordinator for UBSP). He would 
then transfer the earmarked amounts to a separate project account of the 
UBSP town. This account would be kept at the town, with the deputy 
commissioner and the chief officer/commissioner as joint account holders. 
The further release of moneys by the DMA would depend on monthly 
progress reports to be submitted to the deputy commissioner and to the 
DMA, and on the quarterly submission to the DMA of so-called utilisation 
certificates. The certificate is a document signed by the chief 
officer/commissioner in which the sanctioned amount for each component, 
actual expenditure and balance are listed. These and other details have 
been summarised in table 14-2. 
Selection of towns in Karnataka 
The Government of India had instructed each state in 1985 to select a 
district for the UBS scheme. It stipulated that the district should be one of 
the backward areas of the state having a large number of slums and slum 
dwellers. The selected district would serve as a pilot and not only provide 
an opportunity to gain experience with the implementation of the 
programme, but also serve as a demonstration for other towns to be 
selected in future (See figure 14-1). Moreover, the proximity of towns in 
one district would provide logistical advantages as well as require only one 
deputy commissioner, one district committee, and one district project 
director to monitor the scheme. Karnataka selected the district of Tumkur, 
based on the total of slum population in the district6 and started the 
implementation of the UBS in 14 towns in 1986. 
6
 Figures on slum population for towns were not available in 1985, according to the 
project officer at the DMA. 
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Figure 14-1: Location of UBS(P) towns in Karnataka 1980-94 
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Sea 
igaffre Rural 
TAMIL NADU 
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The district is also not far from Bangalore, so that monitoring by the state 
agency would not require long hours of travelling. Moreover, two 
ministers originated from this district. There was, thus, sufficient reasons 
to select this district for the UBSP scheme. 
After 1990, other towns and cities were selected and submitted in 
batches for approval to the Government of India. Out of the 14 towns in 
Tumkur, the activities were continued in six towns. Other towns were 
proposed and added in the subsequent years. Among these, Chitradurga, 
Gulbarga and Hubli-Dharwar were identified in 1991 as 'demonstration 
towns' and received full assistance from the UNICEF. The selection of 
towns and cities after 1990 is not as clearly inspired by the same reasons as 
those selected between 1986-90 (See table 14-3). The percentage slum 
population is not different from other towns and cities in the state and the 
annual growth is even less than the state average. 
It seems that political compromises also had to be made in the 
selection of some of these towns. In 1989, a vast majority of urban areas 
(136 out of 172) had elected a Congress(I) ML A. When 21 towns were 
selected after 1990, 13 towns were represented by a Congress(I) MLA and 
8 towns by MLAs of other parties. Out of these 13 MLAs, seven were 
serving as ministers in the government, including one minister for urban 
development. One may suggest that they have had a hand in their 
selection, more so, because the average slum population in these towns 
was approximately 9.7 per cent, while the slum population in the non-
Congress(I) towns was a staggering 23.6 per cent. In other words, the 
DMA was able to secure the selection of at least 8 towns with a high slum 
population, but had to allow other towns to be included under political 
pressure. These political pressures have been admitted by project officers 
at the DMA, e.g. in the case of Gadag-Betgeri, but mentioned that these 
pressures were not overriding: 'It is only a small scheme with small funds', 
explained the officer. Secondly, those 'political' schemes could be 
included for rational reasons and compliant with the programme criteria, 
according the same officer. 'It was at the discretion of the DMA to select 
the town; there was nobody else involved' reported another project officer 
in Kunigal. The statistics show, however, that the 'political' rationale may 
have been more evident than 'programme' rationale. 
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Table 14-3: Development and urban slum population index of UBS(P) 
towns and not selected towns in Karnataka. 
Indicator Karnataka Pilot towns 1986- Other towns 
90(Tumkur) 1990-94 
N= 
Annual growth 1981-91 
Development index* 
Political affiliation* 
index 1978-94 
Slum population (in %) 
172 
1.64 
13.58 
(N=168*) 
13.94 
11.41 
(N=164**) 
6 
2.13 
17.67 
15.33 
24.05 
As explained in chapter 9. 
Data from some cities was not available. 
Linkages to other schemes and sectors 
The UBS(P) aims to converge various schemes. The EIUS, the IDSMT, the 
NRY and the low-cost sanitation schemes are referred to in the ministry's 
guidelines. In addition, the housing and shelter efforts of the slum 
clearance board for the urban low-income was to be co-ordinated with 
those of the UBSP. The UBSP would also attempt to dove-tail resource 
available from other departments, such as the Department for Women and 
Child Welfare. Unfortunately, no information is available from other 
departments and the analysis has been confined to those schemes that fall 
under the Department of Housing and Urban Development. As illustrated 
in table 14-4, in most UBSP towns, the EIUS and the IPLCS&LS were 
also implemented. This has been to a lesser extent the case for the NRY-
SHASU and IDSMT schemes. The decision for selection of towns under 
the various schemes tool place in different years. It is a matter of 
speculation whether these decisions have been influenced by the fact that, 
an UBSP scheme was under implementation. Likewise, was the selection 
of UBSP towns influenced by the fact that other schemes were 
implemented there? It is a known fact and illustrated in other chapters that 
the selection of ElUS-projects and low-cost housing projects by the KSCB 
is not done at the Secretariat level or in consultation with the DMA or the 
deputy commissioner at the district level. The same applies for the KHB 
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and the KUWS&DB. Even within the DMA such lateral thinking is not 
common, as for example in the case of the IPLCS&LS. At best, one could 
say that the presence of a large slum population in most of the UBSP-
towns made other departments decide to include these towns. 
'Convergence' is, thus, rather the result of external factors than of a 
deliberate and consultative decision making process, which aims to 
channel resources within one department (HUD) toward the same target 
group and towns. 
Table 14-4: Convergence of UBSP schemes in Karnataka with other 
schemes implemented by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development between 1985-94. 
Scheme Karnataka; all Pilot towns UBS Other towns 
towns (N=172) 1986-90 UBSP 1990-94 
(Tumkur) 
UBSP (by the DMA) 
EIUS (by the KSCB) 
NRY-SHASU (by the 
KHB) 
IDSMT(bytheDMA) 
LCS (under the IDSMT) 
LCS (by the KUWS&DB) 
IPLCS&LS (by the DMA) 
Low-cost housing schemes 
27 
122 
13 
51 
8 
4 
52 
52 
6 
6 
1 
3 
1 
0 
5 
1 
21 
20 
7 
8 
2 
0 
11 
17 
(by the KSCB) 
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development (1995-96). 
Implementation 
The implementation of the UBS(P) has been different from other schemes 
included in this research. Towns were selected and added every year, based 
on the criteria and pressures mentioned above. Another reason mentioned 
by the technical officer of the DMA was that, due to underspending in 
ongoing schemes, other towns were added to maintain a reasonable 
expenditure level. In this manner, the allocated moneys would not be 
endangered. To select a town may have been easy, but to let matters start 
off from the ground was far from simple. The local commissioner/chief 
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officer and deputy commissioner had to be approached, eligible slums 
identified, a local project officer identified, neighbourhood committees 
established, resident community volunteers identified and a plan to be 
prepared for each slum. It is no surprise that, in most towns only one slum 
was identified where activities would start and only later would other 
slums included. In only 8 out of 27 towns, more than one slum was 
identified at the time of the implementation. In the process, a large part of 
the work had to be done by the two project officers from the DMA. In 
addition, funds from other departments had to be requested to achieve the 
much sought for convergence. In 1995, 'considerable progress' had been 
reported by the DMA in one of their office circulars: 'particularly in 
building up awareness about the scheme, organising the communities and 
co-ordination with other departments at the district' (IHSP, 1995b). 
The releases of central and state government grants were less 
impressive and delays were faced by the implementers. Table 14-5 shows 
the magnitude of delays as on January 1995. The Treasury of the 
Government of Karnataka had developed the art of withholding money for 
more than a year. Apparently, they had difficulty of coping with the 
unconventional budgeting and accounting system of a scheme that 
underwent annual and sometimes quarterly changes, depending on the 
progress of the individual projects. A Treasury that is used to well 
determined and annually fixed budgets had procedural problems with such 
non-routine claims and budgets. Only the signature of a high administrator 
officer would take away their fear of unjustifiable money releases. In 
1994-95 and 1995-96, a budgetary provision of Rs. 15 million and Rs. 25 
million was made for the UBSP scheme. 
In table 14-5, it can be seen that state and central government 
sanctioned an amount to a total of Rs. 57.4 million. This amount includes 
salary costs of the project officers at the DMA and other related costs for 
their operations. The individual budgets for the 27 towns, amounts to Rs. 
36.6 million or just 64 per cent of the sanctioned amount. In November 
1994, the DMA reported that an amount of Rs. 19.4 million was spent or 
Rs. 48 per beneficiary. In other words, only one-third of the sanctioned 
amount could be spent. A major reason is that releases to the project 
accounts were not forthcoming and whatever was released barely covered 
the expenditures, leading to delays in implementation. In fact, the 
expenditures have been covered by the central government releases, not by 
state government contributions. In December 1994, the first state 
government release of Rs. 7.18 million was reported. In 1995-96, another 
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release of Rs. 6.33 million (both central and state government grants) 
followed against a budget of Rs. 25 million. One can imagine that the 
implementation in the field was put the test to, on the one hand, of keeping 
the activities going under a resource crunch and, on the other hand, of not 
showing any lack of commitment from the authorities toward the 
communities, thus, risking to loose precious trust and rapport. In Gulbarga 
'the staff have been moving heaven and earth to get this amount [state 
government contribution - hm] released, but so far it has not been 
released', reported the Hindu on August 3, 1995. The state government 
owed the Gulbarga Corporation an amount of Rs. 915,000. As a result the 
works had come almost to a standstill. 
Table 14-5: Sanctions and releases of central and state government funds 
, for the UBSP scheme in Karnataka (as on January 1995) 
(in million Rs.) 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
Source: 
Central Govt. 
sanction 
14.20 
12.15 
7.38 
11.61 
DMA (1995). 
Central Govt. 
release to DMA 
9.68 
Released in 
the same year; 
rest in 1991-
92 
June 1993 
July 1994 
Not released 
State Govt. 
sanction 
n.a. 
1.98 
4.90 
5.20 
State Govt. 
release to DMA 
n.a. 
Not released 
Not released 
Not released 
Despite such operational problems, the UBSP scheme 'reached' 402,557 
beneficiaries in 27 towns according the Annual Report of the Urban 
Development Department of 1995-96. This is almost 15 per cent of the 
urban slum population in Karnataka; a remarkable achievement with such 
modest means. With what they 'reached' the slum dwellers is obviously 
more important than that they reached them and will be dealt with in the 
next section. 
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14.3 Experiences in case-study towns ' 
Among the seven case-study towns, the UBS(P) was implemented in four 
towns: Kunigal, Hospet, Gulbarga and Chamarajanagar. In Kunigal, the 
project was initiated in 1986 under the UBS and continued after 1990 
under the UBSP. The UBSP scheme was sanctioned in Hospet, Gulbarga 
and Chamarajanagar in the year 1991-92. As mentioned, the activities 
under the UBSP are determined on an annual basis. The municipal records 
show an evolutionary development in activities and expenditures. 
Thereafter, the progress depended to a large extent on the establishment of 
neighbourhood committees, the identification of resident community 
volunteers and the preparation of so-called mini-action plans. More 
activities could be taken up when such structures were in place. The scope 
of activities also depended, to a considerable extent, on the commitment 
and interest of the local UBSP project officer and the municipal chief 
officer or commissioner. Then, there were pressures from the DMA to 
show performance and this has been particularly true for Gulbarga, the 
selected 'demonstration city'. 
The municipal project officer (Assistant Project Officer or APO) in 
each town was selected jointly by the local chief officer/commissioner, the 
district deputy commissioner and the district UBSP project co-ordinator. 
They were mostly recruited and deputed from another office, for example, 
from the Department of Health or Women and Child Welfare. The 
community organisers were recruited in a similar fashion but had the 
involvement of the municipal project officer. Community organisers could 
also be local individuals. Resident community volunteers and convenors 
were appointed by the neighbourhood committee after taking advice from 
the community organisers or assistant project officer. Neighbourhood 
committees could be established as a society under the Registered 
Societies Act, but few have done so. The committees may also open a joint 
account with a bank for the deposits and withdrawals of thrift and credits 
and for the operation of the so-called revolving fund. Many neighbourhood 
committees operate such accounts. Particularly, the thrift and credit system 
in Gulbarga has been very successful. 
Statistical information and records have been based on the information provided by 
the municipalities. They included town action plans, correspondence, government order 
and circulars from the DMA and the deputy commissioner's offices in the various 
district, as far as they were made available. 
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For each year and for each town an action plan was prepared. The 
DMA had issued a format1" which prescribes for each neighbourhood 
committee the stipulated actions for which a budget has to be prepared. For 
each item certain rates, i.e. ceilings, apply. There are a total of 78 actions 
falling in 10 categories: health, immunisation, family welfare, water 
supply, sanitation, social development, economic development, 
community organisation, capacity building, and information, education 
and communication. An eleventh item is project administration and 
constitutes a maximum of 10 per cent of the total cost. Quarterly utilisation 
certificates and monthly progress reports have to be prepared in the same 
fashion for each of the 78 actions and for each neighbourhood committee. 
In 1992-93, there were, for example, 12 neighbourhood committees in 
Gulbarga and the preparation and, more so, monitoring of the expenditures 
for each of these items and for each neighbourhood is a Herculean task. 
The project officers of the municipalities had to spend a considerable time 
in administrative work. The preoccupation with administrative matters has 
indeed been observed during the field work in Kunigal. The field assistant 
noted: 'Meetings between the project officer, resident community 
volunteers and slum dwellers have been rare and this had led to 
dissatisfaction among the resident community volunteers'. The project 
officers hardly go out into the field to guide the convenors and the resident 
community volunteers or have interactions with the slum dwellers 
themselves. Many had to come to the municipal office to meet them. 
Monitoring the progress by the DMA or District administration proved to 
be a difficult task and many completion certificates lacked specific details 
on, for example, the number of chullahs, bathrooms cubicles constructed 
and only total expenditures were mentioned. 
The listed actions stipulate a continuous interaction with the slum 
dwellers, for example to register pregnant women, to list children who 
would need immunisation, to guide pregnant and lactating women and to 
teach them about health, breast feeding, nutrition, etc. This role would 
require trained health workers. In the guidelines of the DMA, provisions 
were mentioned for the employment of such officers, but in none of the 
case-study towns such officers had been employed for a reasonable period 
of time. As a result, the resident volunteers and community organisers had 
to take care of these functions for which they were insufficiently qualified. 
The format had been based on further guidelines issued by the Ministry of Urban 
Development, Government of India. 
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The project officer was generally too busy to get involved at this level. The 
action plans provide for Rs. 100 as compensation for the cost of 
professional input from the Health department. Unfortunately, this did not 
materialise in a systematic way and, at best, a doctor or health worker 
would occasionally visit the community centre to lecture about such 
subjects. There would also be no follow-up by these officers. There are 
dozens of such well intended actions which did not materialise due to the 
absence of professional, frequent and repeated inputs from other 
departments. It was only possible to conduct occasional training in a 
number of skills by officers of the local Industrial Training Institutes. In 
addition, videos were showed on health and visits were made by the 
concerned volunteers and convenors to neighbouring projects. 
The implementation of physical improvements was more successful 
as they required less external inputs. The utilisation certificates also show 
that a large portion of the expenditures had been earmarked for water 
supply (hand pumps), washing platforms, low-cost sanitation13 and 
bathrooms14. It proved difficult to maintain the rule that 25-30 per cent of 
the budget be spent on construction and the rest on social welfare 
activities. For example, in Hospet and Kunigal, almost 75 per cent of the 
approved budget in 1992-93 was for hardware (smokeless chullahs, 
latrines, bathroom cubicles, washing platforms and compound wall). The 
utilisation certificates show a similar pattern: 50-75 per cent of the 
expenditures were allocated for physical improvements. The revolving 
fund from which small loans are provided to women at an average of Rs. 
500 has been another major component of expenditures. 
Interviews with officials and volunteers revealed various other 
issues. One important bottleneck in the implementation of the scheme was 
the flow of funds. The state government share and the contribution of the 
municipality materialised only after long delays. It was one of the reasons 
that the project officer in Kunigal avoided meeting the communities as 
there were no funds to support their activities. In Kunigal, the scheme 
raised considerable enthusiasm in the late 1980s. During my field work 
between 1993 and 1996, the UBSP organisation was still alive and 
The latrines would include a floor with a pan, P-trap, discharge pipe and one or two 
soakaway pits. The walls, door and roof would not be covered under the UBSP scheme. 
In some locations these were covered by the IPLCS scheme. 
14
 These bathrooms consist of a platform with a drain and erected walls with a door and 
a roof of galvanised corrugated iron or asbestos cement sheets. 
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activities were still going on, but at a modest scale. In the early stage of the 
project, funds seemed to flow more easily. Now that the funds relied state 
and local government resources, it proved to be difficult to maintain the 
enthusiasm and momentum at the same level. Kunigal proved to be the 
weaker case among the four cases studied, where many slums dwellers 
were not aware of the UBSP and community participation was weak with 
little interaction existing between the slum workers and the municipality. 
During the interviews, respondents also mentioned that the selection of 
beneficiaries favoured the resident volunteers and their relatives; others 
only got small loans, latrines and bathrooms, it was said. Chamarajanagar 
and Gulbarga are the better cases among the four where the project officers 
took a lot of effort to mobilise the communities, to support the 
neighbourhood committees and resident volunteers, and to establish proper 
mechanisms for identification of slum dwellers and extend assistance. 
They were also successful in mobilising the support from other 
departments. It was observed that these officers were better educated, 
trained as social workers, committed and knew how to mobilise the 
support of the commissioner/chief officer and particularly some of the 
local councillors. In Hospet, the community has been more reluctant and 
'came forward only very slowly', reported the local assistant project 
officer. 
The focus of the UBSP scheme on women and children makes it 
difficult for some neighbourhood committees to achieve quick results. 
Particularly when it came to physical improvements, the men liked to have 
a say and most of the existing conflicts were in these areas: where should 
the handpumps and community centre be located, who would get a 
bathroom or latrine, etc. Mini-plans at slum level, prepared on the basis of 
a self-survey by the neighbourhood committee have been an oddity. While 
the designers of the UBSP conceived the self-survey and neighbourhood 
mini-plans as crucial in the process of community organisation, the 
implementers had missed the intrinsic value of this exercise. Secondly, the 
establishment of the neighbourhood committee would often coincide with 
the preparation of the list of projects to be submitted to the DMA. The 
freshly identified members of the neighbourhood committee were hardly 
consulted and neither their ideas were the basis of the first plans. In later 
editions of the annual proposals, their role was more evident. In all cases, 
door-to-door surveys or participatory project preparation had not taken 
place. The first plans were, thus, based on the observation and views of the 
municipal project officers without an elaborate consultation process or 
The Scheme for Urban Basic Services for the Poor 401 
field survey. There were also pressures to launch the scheme in the first 
year itself and this required a hasty top-down approach. Similar 
observations have been made in five towns in Andhra Pradesh by 
Ramachandra Reddy: 'the slum development plans were prepared by the 
municipal staff and did not reflect the real needs of the people, but only 
perceptions of the staff (1994, p. 63). That people themselves articulate 
their needs, formulate a plan, determine the required inputs and shoulder 
the materialisation of implementation has, thus, remained in the domain of 
the guidelines. There is another reason why the perceived participatory 
process had not taken shape: the perception of the slum dwellers about the 
UBSP. The UBSP is a government scheme and this - generally - invites a 
passive attitude of potential beneficiaries. Community participation is 
often seen by the slum dwellers as something they have to do in order to 
get the promised benefits. This is understandable as the slum dwellers have 
many other daily concerns. 
A slum programme like the UBSP scheme may attract the attention 
of councillors and corporators as it aims to give benefits to a potentially 
large electorate. However, in none of the four case studies this has been 
observed. None of the politicians and other 'non-officials' had much 
knowledge of or involvement in the UBSP. Those who did mention the 
UBSP had a very general impression about the scheme and this was by and 
large positive: 'It is a good scheme' was a common answer. Only in 
Gulbarga, a few corporators took interest in the scheme after the repeated 
effort of the project officer. One reason is that, corporators find it difficult 
to interact directly with women in slums without involving the men as 
well. The corporators could, probably, do without the explicit support of 
women. Male leaders are mostly the main determinants of the fates and 
failures of local politicians in slums and the scheme did not provide much 
direct benefits to the adult male population in slums. Another reason is 
that, the scheme did not provide much of electoral or personal benefits as 
the UBSP is rather modest in size, i.e. the number of slums covered, the 
people reached and the money involved. A last and, probably most 
important reason is that, the achievements of the UBSP could not easily 
and exclusively be claimed by the corporator, as neighbourhood 
committees, convenors, community organisers and a project officer were 
involved. The low interest for the UBSP would also apply at the state 
level. As a former director of the DMA reported: 'MLAs do not show 
much of interest to get their constituency included'. This was felt as a 
relief, so that the project could be implemented without much interference 
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and disturbance. The statistics on the selected towns above showed, 
however, a different picture of political affiliation. 
The above findings may not do justice to the individual efforts and 
the successful examples in the state. Despite the contrast between 
expectation and outcome, many women did take interest in the activities 
and actively participated in neighbourhood committees. However, personal 
benefits were never ignored. The fact that resident community volunteers -
who do not receive any remuneration - received more benefits than others, 
as reported in Kunigal, could be seen as a compensation for their efforts 
and an incentive to contribute their valuable time. There is little ground to 
criticise this established practice. In all slums, neighbourhood committees 
with female members have been established and this may be considered 
another major achievement of the UBSP scheme. The existence of such 
committees may trigger off many other activities by women which go 
beyond the objectives of the UBSP. 
At the town level, action plans are obligatory to obtain any funds 
through the DMA and they have been prepared annually without fail. The 
UBSP guidelines also envisaged the preparation of an action plan at the 
district level. However, they have never been prepared in any district in 
Karnataka. The deputy commissioner failed to see the purpose of making 
such an effort and to commit other departments by a signed document. As 
a result, the co-ordination with other departments was established in an ad-
hoc manner, upon the initiative of the project officer, commissioner/chief 
officer and with the endorsement of the deputy commissioner who could 
decide about these matters at will. 
In the four case-study towns structured interviews were held with 
105 households who had benefited from the scheme. The beneficiaries 
were identified through the local project officers. The main results have 
been presented below (Table 14-6). The respondents' households are 
comparable with households who benefited from other schemes (Ashraya 
and Dr. Ambedkar housing schemes, the NRY and the IPLCS&LS 
schemes), though the number of female members is higher. Household 
incomes are surprisingly high and are mainly due to the number of income 
earners. This income is comparable with the beneficiaries of the low-cost 
sanitation schemes but is higher than those families that benefited from the 
NRY-SUME scheme. 
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Table 14-6: General characteristics of interviewed beneficiaries of the 
UBS(P) scheme 
Indicator Survey result 
Total sample size 105 
Family size 5.26 
Stated monthly income household (in Rs.) 1,811 
Number of income earners per household 2.30 
No. of females per 100 males 122 
Income earners that have income from business (in %) 11.6 
Income earners that have income from daily wage (in %) 54.6 
Income earners that have income from agriculture (in %) 17.8 
The source of income proves to be unstable: from small businesses and 
daily wage jobs. A large group is also employed as agricultural labourers 
near the town. Given these figures, one cannot consider these respondents 
to be among the urban poor as per definition of the Government of India15; 
they are low-income households. Their income does not differ from a large 
segment of the urban population. As their income may allow a better form 
of housing, why would the respondents prefer to live here? When asked an 
open question, such as, what they appreciate most about their 
neighbourhood, one-third were not be able to mention any advantage. 
Another one-third of the respondents had two responses: 'the calmness, 
peacefulness and security' that the neighbourhood offers and the 
'proximity to work'. The rest gave various other answers. Apparently, the 
slums do not only constitute for many a location with distinct advantages 
but also a social entity where the residents feel comfortable. When asked 
specifically, more than 70 per cent of the respondents expressed 
appreciation about facilities such as nearby schools, shops, the low crime 
rate, the availability of power supply and a bus connection. There were 
matters that needed to be improved and, particularly, water supply, 
drainage and waste collection were mentioned by more than 50 per cent of 
the respondents. The need for latrines was mentioned by only 25 per cent 
of the respondents, while the need for health facilities, social facilities such 
as crèches (balwadis) for the children were not mentioned. This pattern of 
'expressed needs' contradicts with the guidelines of the UBSP that focus 
15
 The poverty line has been drawn at Rs. 987.50 per month per household (MUOD, 
1995). 
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on 'soft-ware' components and less on 'hard-ware' components. The much 
needed hard-ware components are supposed to be covered by other 
programmes. There were variations from one case-study to another. For 
example, many respondents in Hospet and Kunigal wanted street lights. 
Respondents came to know about the UBSP scheme mostly through 
the local UBSP officer. Neighbours or local convenors (volunteers) were 
another source of information. The selection of beneficiaries was mostly 
done through the neighbourhood committees and the municipal project 
officers, as reported by the latter. These were often selected from among 
the scheduled and other backward castes, reported the project officer in 
Kunigal. There were only a few cases where local politicians pressurised 
the municipality to include their own favourites, as in one locality in 
Kunigal as reported by a local journalist. As far as the source of finance for 
the scheme is concerned, most respondents said that it comes from 'the 
government' (89 per cent). The municipality was mentioned by a few and 
the donor UNICEF is not known. 
The respondents that were interviewed had all some benefit through 
the UBSP scheme. In table 14-7 these benefits and their appreciation have 
been listed. Among the many possible components under the UBSP there 
are only five components that were remembered vividly: latrines, training, 
the provision of a community ceatre/balwadi, tiles/roofing sheets and 
loans for income improvement. Other components that may have been 
implemented were not remembered or did not reach them. The 
appreciation is positive by more than half the respondents, but is 
disappointing as far as drainage and medical health camps were concerned. 
Apparently, these efforts have not mitigated their problem. Other replies 
indicate that, components with a higher appreciation were those that had a 
lasting impact or a direct material improvement. About 43 per cent of the 
respondents have contributed to the realisation of these components, in 
terms of labour (23 per cent) or by a financial contribution (20 per cent), as 
for example, in the construction of latrines. A contribution by money and 
labour was rare, as well as a contribution in materials. When asked what 
they appreciated least about the UBSP scheme, a small number (20 per 
cent) expressed dissatisfaction. Most (52 per cent) were approving or did 
not want to give a reply (28 per cent). 
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Table 14-7: Appreciation by respondents of received UBSP benefits in 
four case-study towns 
Component 
Total number of respondents 
Latrines/bathrooms 
Training 
Community centre / balwadi 
Roofing material 
Medical health camps 
Immunisation 
Family planning 
Drainage (around the house) 
Loans for income improvement 
Smokeless chullahs 
Water supply 
Washing stone 
Other components 
No reply/do not know 
Received by 
105 
41 
33 
62 
26 
19 
16 
1 
17 
44 
7 
5 
4 
23 
2 
Note: Respondents may have referred to more than one component. 
* Fully or partly. 
n.s. Not significant due to large percentage of non-response. 
Those who dared to express their dissatisfaction mentioned nutrition 
support, immunisation and smokeless chullahs. Apparently, it was easier 
for them to answer a more general question such as, whether the scheme 
had improved the living conditions in the neighbourhood. Twenty per cent 
agreed in the affirmative, 60 per cent mentioned 'partly' and 27 per cent 
said an outright 'no'. 
About some UBSP components, further details were asked and the 
respondents added additional information. Quite a number of respondents 
stated here that they had received benefits which they had not listed earlier. 
Components that were particularly 'forgotten' were small individual loans 
Interviews in low-income areas and slums are hampered by the many on-standers. 
While information about family, income and appreciation of the neighbourhood at large 
is given without any reservation, questions that pertain to opinions about the 
components of the scheme invited considerable reservation and evasion. 
27 
25* 
53* 
17 
6 
n.s. 
n.s. 
2 
n.s. 
0 
5 
1 
16 
11 
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(revolving fund) and the community centre/'balwadi. While the latter may 
be obvious, as these amenities do not provide direct benefits to the 
respondent, the omission of the revolving fund moneys is remarkable. 
Except in Kunigal, community centres/Z>a/waf#s have been constructed in 
the identified slums. Most respondents do visit (75 per cent) the centre. 
There were doubts among the respondents about the benefit of this centre 
to the neighbourhood. Only 27 per cent were convinced that it was 
beneficial, while 58 per cent mentioned that it had only partly benefited the 
neighbourhood. In all four case-study towns, small loans were provided to 
the slum dwellers. Out of the 105 respondents, 44 had received a small 
loan. The amount was Rs. 500. As per UBSP guidelines the loan is to 
stimulate small businesses and income generating activities by the 
households, particularly women. Its purpose is generic, not consumptive. 
When asked for what they had utilised the money, more than half (23) 
mentioned that they had used it for their business, to buy some utensils or 
to improve their shop. However, 17 respondents mentioned that they had 
to use it for paying off debts, to solve domestic problems, for marriage 
functions or to buy medicines. While the urgency for such expenses may 
be legitimate, they are consumptive in nature. 
There is a good repayment discipline with 41 paying regularly. On 
an average, Rs. 123 has been repaid or 25 per cent of the total amount. The 
money is mostly paid to the convenor (by 24) and others pay to a local 
bank (by 17). Payment to the local convenor has the advantage that the 
money can indeed be quickly mobilised for other applicants and it remains 
among the slum dwellers. However, there needs to be a high level of trust 
in the convenor and his/her capacity to administer the money properly. As 
most convenors have a low level of education, this may pose some 
problems when the programme runs for several years and the number of 
participants increase. The handling of loans and repayments by a local 
bank will help in overcoming the administrative risks, but may meet delays 
because of a lack of interest among the bank personnel to administer such 
small amounts. 
One-third of the respondents (33) received some kind of training. 
Tailoring, basket weaving and first aid training programmes were 
conducted. A few received training in embroidery, cloth painting and 
flower cutting. Only 9 individuals said that the training had been useful to 
them, 16 said it was partly useful and they could not apply these skill much 
and 8 were of the opinion that the training was of no use to them. These 
findings support the general observation that training per se needs to be 
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linked to other supporting measures that will allow the beneficiaries to 
utilise the new skills, i.e. by financial support, job seeking skills and 
starting-up support. These were not provided and only a small and 
differently selected group was financially assisted in some kind of 
business. Immunisation was provided to a small group of children in the 
four case-study towns; 16 out 105 respondents (15 per cent) received anti-
polio vaccination for their children. While the project records show that 
other vaccinations were also provided, the respondents only remembered 
the anti-polio vaccination. Nutrition support and family planning, the other 
components of the UBSP, had not been extended to this group of 
respondents. 
14.4 The role of the implementing agencies 
The Ministry of Urban Development has been very elaborate in 
conceptualising and providing guidelines for the UBS(P). The elaborate 
details, particularly the later versions of the guidelines, show a degree of 
ignorance of the ground realities in slums and the intricacies of slum 
development in the various states. For example, the fresh eligibility criteria 
for identifying beneficiaries through a scoring system is 'de facto' not 
feasible, considering the average level of education of assistant project 
officers and convenors. Secondly, the strong focus on health, reproduction 
and maternal functions illustrate a conservative, middle-class perception of 
what women in slums do and want: domesticated child-bearing and 
toddlers-nursing mothers. That there are many women-headed households, 
who have to earn the sole family income, women who have to face 
communal tension, social isolation, alcoholism and male harassment and 
violence had apparently escaped the programme writers. Women 
empowerment has not been a deliberate component of the UBSP scheme 
and this omission makes the programme also conservative in political 
terms. A similar conclusion was drawn by Wishwakarma and Rakesh 
Gupta (1995) when they evaluated the UBS(P) implemented in Delhi. 
The concept for convergence is born out of the limited resources 
available with the central government for the UBSP. Secondly, it is also 
the result of their inability to wrap up their own schemes and to merge 
them effectively into a single scheme as was conceived in the earliest 
documents. As a result, the state governments were introduced to an 
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organisational set-up that conceals the ministry's own shortcomings. The 
UBSP scheme is highly regulatory in nature and an illustration of the 
bureaucratic background of the programme writers, rather than a 
conditional premise for the successful implementation of a scheme. 
Deregulation would have been a suitable approach to achieve a better 
outcome of the scheme. For example, to make available a lump-sum 
amount to be allocated on the basis of mini-plans, which result from the 
interaction and agreement between the neighbourhood committees, 
convenors, community organisers, project officers and the commissioner 
or chief officer. The preparation of mini-plans could be supported by 
mobile support teams from the DMA. 
Although the guidelines envisaged an elaborate institutional set-up 
with distinct inputs from a wide range of officers and departments, the 
reality in Karnataka shows a watered-down version of the guidelines. The 
envisaged set-up at the community level, at the town level and at the level 
of the implementing agency (DMA) has been followed by and large. At the 
DMA a separate cell for the UBSP had been established with two officers 
in charge. The Administrative Training Institute in Mysore had been 
identified as the state training institute and two training officers have been 
posted there who conduct 15-20 training programmes for 300-400 
participants per year in Mysore and in the districts. However, a Town 
Project Co-ordinating Committee has not been established anywhere. The 
deputy commissioner at the district level embodies all co-ordinating 
functions of the UBSP. He, unfortunately, can dedicate little time to the 
tiny scheme of UBSP. There is no separate Assistant District Co­
ordinator , a District Urban Development Authority or Co-ordination 
Council. At the state level, there is no formal State Urban Development 
Authority or a Co-ordination Council. Meetings about the UBSP at the 
highest level are called by the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development Department in an ad-hoc manner, inviting the concerned 
deputy commissioners, the director DMA, the director ΑΉ and -
occasionally - an UNICEF representative. There is no involvement of any 
higher official (chief secretary and finance secretary) or other secretaries 
from other departments (Health Department, Horticulture Department, 
17
 Which could combine the funds available under NRY, ICDS, IPLCS&LS and other 
central government schemes. 
In the 1980s, the assistant deputy commissioner of Tumkur was appointed as the 
Project Co-ordinator for UBSP. 
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Women and Child Welfare department). Officers at the DMA mentioned 
that the envisaged institutional set-up was considered too 'heavy' and not 
commensurate with the level of decisions that need to be taken. Many of 
the issues could be solved at the level of the chief officer/commissioner 
and the deputy commissioner and do not need various authorities and 
councils, they argued. 
The support that was given by the DMA to the municipal project 
officer has been limited. Officials from the DMA made infrequent visits to 
the project towns but more often, assistant project officers had to travel to 
Bangalore to visit the DMA project officers. This is particularly true 
during periods when the town action plans had to be prepared and 
approved. A disadvantage of the present system of submission to the DMA 
is that the revisions of the town action plans become a matter between the 
DMA and the assistant project officer and - occasionally - the chief officer 
or commissioner without the involvement of the neighbourhood 
committee. The APO in Kunigal suggested that such revisions should be 
done in consultation with the neighbourhood committees who are 
supposed to be the owners of the plans19. 
At the community level, it proved difficult to maintain the 
commitment of the resident community volunteers without any 
compensation, reported several assistant project officers in the case-study 
towns. They often came to ask for some kind of salary and the only way 
they could be compensated for their efforts was to provide them with some 
additional benefits under the programme as reported above. It has been 
suggested that a sort of salary may be paid to the convenors and the RCVs 
in order to maintain their commitment and to avoid any suspicion of 
preferential treatment, as is the case. Another recent development is the 
change of roles of the assistant project officers in the municipalities. While 
the assistant project officers should encourage and support initiatives by 
neighbourhood committees and extend technical and financial assistance 
where required, they tend to exercise and expand their control over these 
committees by their administrative powers and make the committees 
depend on them, observed the project officer at the DMA. 
In 1996, the town action plans were submitted to the deputy commissioners where 
they are also approved. The DMA receives a copy of the approved action plans. This 
new systems does, however, not allow for participation of the neighbourhood 
committees. 
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Apparently, the authors of the UBSP guidelines wanted to give the 
UBSP a high administrative profile. It has been observed earlier that, the 
guidelines that came along with central government schemes, demonstrate 
a low level of confidence in the state government apparatus to implement 
their schemes. The level of detail that is contained in the guidelines and the 
elaborate institutional set-up was to make sure that there were no 
deviations from the intentions. The need for high-level state and district 
co-ordinating councils is only inspired by the fear that convergence of 
different schemes and resources will otherwise not work. Implementation 
would slacken if there is no assembly of senior decision makers at the 
various levels who meet regularly and exclusively discuss the UBSP 
scheme. The authors must have been aware that, a high administrative 
profile only follows after a scheme has obtained a high political profile. 
Surprisingly, the ministry's guidelines did not address how to give the 
scheme a higher political profile20. The explanation may be simple: the 
UBSP was launched by the Congress(I)-led central government and the 
ministry wanted to avoid state governments of other political colours from 
claiming any success in the implementation of a populist central 
government scheme. Secondly, while they had no reservation in 
prescribing an administrative set-up, they did not dare to enter into the 
political arena of the states. 
14.5 Conclusions 
As far as the multi-fold objectives of the UBS(P) are concerned the 
programme has succeeded in initiating activities in all selected areas. The 
establishment of neighbourhood committees, resident community 
volunteers and convenors has helped, to some extent, in promoting and 
inculcating group spirit and self-help among slum communities, through 
education and awareness campaigns. The organisation of balwadis 
(Kindergarten) and adult education centres has been instrumental in this 
regard. However, in quantitative terms only a small group of women and 
children may have benefited. Field observations contradict, in fact, the 
claim of the DMA that over 400,000 beneficiaries have been reached by 
For example, for allowing the Minister for Urban Development to chair the proposed 
State Urban Development Authority and allow MLAs of the various urban areas to be 
members of the proposed District Urban Development Authorities. 
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the UBS(P) alone. This is mainly due to the limited capacity to implement 
such activities and limited resources available under the UBS(P) and other 
programmes. The household interviews have indicated that, the extended 
social welfare and monetary support has been only partly effective and 
appreciated. The programme has been more successful in providing basic 
amenities like water, sanitation, etc. and in improving income generating 
opportunities of low-income slum women through petty loans and 
vocational training. However, the long-term impact has been diminished 
by the inadequacy of follow-up and guidance to sustain the initiated 
efforts. The municipal bodies have been enhanced in their capacity to 
increase the services to urban poor by appointing special officers to take 
up the programme. 
The three strategic principles that had to be adhered to when 
implementing the programme, invite the following comments. The 
requirement of preparing annual plans has definitely been instrumental to 
encourage participation of neighbourhood committees when formulating 
the projects. However, the preparation of mini-plans by and in consultation 
with groups of women has not occurred anywhere in Karnataka. 
Participation did not go further than consulting the neighbourhood 
committees and resident community volunteers. It has also been observed 
above that, in Hospet and Kunigal this participation has been limited and 
seemed to fizzle out as the years passed. This situation is caused by the 
fact that there is a difference in perception on why there should be 
participation. While the programme writers believed this may have an 
intrinsic value for the community per se, the implementers see 
participation as instrumental - and at times - obligatory in order to get the 
programme going, while the beneficiaries see it as a necessary effort to be 
traded for the anticipated benefits. For the latter, there will probably be too 
much of participation and, for the former, too little. The principle of 
convergence has been disappointing. It proved difficult to interest other 
departments to spare their people and resources at the same location and at 
the same time. Even within the same department it has been shown that, it 
is rather the result of external factors that various schemes operate in the 
same town, but not necessarily at the same time or location. The physical 
achievements have, therefore, been limited and the UBSP has become, 
over time, an independent and parallel activity in slum areas. The principle 
of cost-effectiveness has, by and large, been achieved as the financial 
inputs have been modest as against the physical outputs. However, the 
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UBS(P) has not been successful in establishing self-generated means and 
subsequently reducing the dependency on project funds. 
The role of NGOs in Karnataka have been negligible. The main 
reason is that there are only a few NGOs active in the selected towns and 
the more resourceful NGOs in Bangalore are reluctant to expand their time 
and energy in other cities. 
The excessive concern of the central government scheme with 
detailed instructions and guidelines has been criticised. The highly 
sophisticated and paternalistic guidelines cannot be justified a priori. It, in 
fact, illustrates the limited confidence of the programme makers in the 
state government and their agencies. Deregulation is called for. Secondly, 
the emphasis of the programme interventions on health, pregnancy and 
nursing of children by women suggests that the concern of women in 
slums is mainly the reproduction and nursing of children. This is only 
partly true. Literature on the life of women in slums reveals that they put 
up with the major responsibility of earning the family income, dealing with 
several domestic social problems, alcoholism and male violence. The 
design of the programme shows little attention to these issues and it has 
been argued that the UBSP has been biased by a conservative and middle-
class interpretation of the problems of slum dwellers. The elaborate 
administrative requirement also proved a burden to the project officers in 
the selected towns and the DMA, who have to spend considerable time on 
project administration and less on field work. 
The selection of towns in the district of Tumkur in 1985 has been 
found justifiable. However, the selection of towns after 1990 has been 
partly influenced by political pressures. The implementation of the UBS(P) 
has been seriously hampered after the central government and the UNICEF 
reduced their share of financial assistance. The Government of Karnataka 
has been slow in releasing funds and the schemes had to float on already 
released central government funds. It has been argued that it not so much 
the government's commitment to assist the programme, but rather the 
unconventional system of budgeting and allocation that proved difficult to 
comply with by the state government's Treasury. This has affected the 
built-up momentum among the communities, which proved difficult to 
maintain as the years passed. The support from the DMA to the project 
officers in the selected towns and the support of these officers to the 
convenors and neighbourhood committees have been limited. The UBS(P) 
has, over time, become an administrative programme rather than a field-
and action-oriented programme. It depends, to a large extent, on the 
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personal commitment and education of the project officer and the interest 
of the local government. In this regard, the city of Gulbarga stands out as a 
true 'demonstration town'. 
Most stipulated actions required high skills and continuous inputs 
from social and health workers from the various sister departments. These 
had been forthcoming rarely and the existing UBSP staff and organisers 
did not have the time and resources to meet these expectations. Secondly, 
many convenors were not adequately trained for such activities. The 
stipulated actions also do not sufficiently reflect the expressed needs of the 
interviewed respondents. They are more interested in hard-ware and less in 
soft-ware. Fortunately, but in deviance with the programme guidelines, 
more hard-ware components were provided than prescribed. This reflects 
that the town action plans were a better reflection of the needs of the slum 
dwellers than the programme guidelines would allow. The non-payment of 
resident community volunteers and convenors has been a burning issue 
that has been insufficiently addressed by the state and central government. 
In the field, the project officers tried to compensate them with additional 
benefits provided under the scheme, but this has invited criticism from 
other residents and other citizens. 
It has been observed that there has been little political interference 
or also interest by the local and state politicians during implementation. 
While this may be an advantage to proceed undisturbed and has been 
appreciated by many field workers and bureaucrats, it has also been a 
draw-back for the allocation and speedy release of state funds. The 
stipulated and extensive organisational set-up with an organisation at each 
level has been adopted in Karnataka in a trimmed down version; it 
transpires pragmatism with a considerable level of discretionary power for 
the deputy commissioner and the secretary of the Housing and Urban 
Development Department. 
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Low-Cost Sanitation Schemes in Karnataka 
In India the use of latrines or bucket latrines is still common in both rural 
and urban areas. The contents need to be removed regularly and this 
service is rendered by private sweepers or 'scavengers' as they are called. 
The collected fresh excreta or 'night soil' is sometimes used for gardening 
but more often dumped in locations, away from habitation and known to 
few citizens. Particularly in urban areas, the problem of sanitation and 
environmental hygiene has assumed a new dimension under the impact of 
rapid urbanisation, densification of settlements, and proliferation of slums. 
A national survey in 1989 indicated that the number of dry latrines in India 
is about 5.4 million in urban areas and 2.2 million in rural areas. The 
number of households that do not have latrine facilities was estimated at 
7.3 million. The survey also indicated that the total number of scavengers 
was 334,000 in urban areas and 66,000 in rural areas. 
The nature of work of the scavengers and their casteless status in a 
society still dominated by a Hindu caste system, have made them the most 
despised section of the working class. Their service is a tabooed and 
ignored subject in India. It was Mahatma Gandhi who drew the attention to 
the miserable conditions and social stigma of scavengers and he initiated 
the upliftment of these people. Since Independence, the liberation and 
rehabilitation of scavengers has received infrequent attention. The main 
strategy of the central government to dispose the practise of 'nightsoiF 
handling is to eradicate the use of dry or bucket latrines and replace them 
with other sanitation options, such as sewer connections, septic tanks or 
sanitary pit latrines. Secondly, the liberated scavengers would need to be 
trained in other skills and supported with initial finance in their efforts for 
self-employment. Till recently, schemes for the liberation of scavengers 
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were being implemented by a number of agencies such as the Ministry of 
Welfare, the Ministry of Environment and Forests under the Ganga Action 
Plan, the HUDCO and the Ministry of Urban Development (MOUD). In 
the absence of proper co-ordination, the deployed resources were not fully 
and adequately utilised. Furthermore, each of the agencies followed a 
different financing pattern, yielding different results. Despite these efforts, 
this section of society continues to suffer from structural social and 
economic handicaps. 
As far as the technical solution of the problem is concerned, the 
conversion of dry latrines into other sanitation options and the construction 
of new latrines for families that still use open air defecation, was pursued 
by the central government and state governments through low-cost 
sanitation schemes. A national (water supply and) sanitation scheme was 
launched in 1954. Budget provisions for water supply and sanitation in the 
successive five-year plans have steadily increased and reached a peak in 
the 1980s. Even with these fairly intensive efforts, only 209 cities of the 
total 4,689 towns and cities have an underground sewerage system. 
According to the same national survey (1989), only 20 per cent of urban 
households in these cities have access to sewerage systems, 14 per cent of 
the households have access to waterborne toilets connected to septic tanks 
and nearly 37 per cent of the urban households are served by bucket 
privies (dry latrines). The remaining 33 per cent have no facilities 
whatsoever. Only eight cities in India have full sewerage systems. Due to 
the prohibitive costs, the targets which were set for the International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 1980-90 had restricted 
sewerage to class I cities (with a population of 100,000 and above). The 
second target aimed at an overall coverage with either sewerage or sanitary 
toilets of 80 per cent of all urban areas. 
The International Decade for Water Supply and Sanitation 1980-90 
encouraged the Government of India to improve the water supply and 
sanitation situation in both rural and urban areas and to eradicate the 
practice of manual scavenging. Indeed, rural water supply and sanitation 
received scheme support and financial assistance under bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral aid programmes. Also in Karnataka rural water supply and 
sanitation schemes were initiated in the 1980s and support came from the 
World Bank, Denmark and the Netherlands. However, urban water supply 
and sanitation has been a late starter. 
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15.1 Main features of the low-cost sanitation schemes 
The low-cost sanitation schemes that were initiated in the 1980s had 
adopted one technology: the two-pit pour-flush latrine (TPPF). A short 
explanation of the two-pit pour-flush latrines will be given before 
elaborating on the two schemes. 
The two-pit pour-flush latrines (TPPF) 
Septic tanks with proper effluent disposal have been considered a suitable 
alternative where sewerage cannot be provided. However, septic tanks 
require periodic removal and treatment of the accumulated liquid sludge, a 
service which has often proved unreliable and unsafe. The septic effluent is 
also a potential medium for mosquito breeding and may cause health 
hazards if not properly disposed. Septic tanks also require a considerable 
amount of water for flushing and for maintaining an optimum flow in the 
tank. For this a water supply connection in bathrooms, toilets and kitchen 
is required. This situation is rather an exception in urban India where 
inadequate and irregular water supply is common in most areas. Moreover, 
the high cost of a septic tank is beyond the affordability of an average 
household. This has led to a search for low-cost sanitation technologies 
that are also affordable, would use less water and would still provide a safe 
technology to dispose human excreta. Domestic and international research 
provided the answer: the pour-flush twin leach pits (or TPPF). The twin-pit 
pour-flush latrine treats sewage from the toilet on-site through 
underground infiltration and biological degradation. It is not suitable for 
the discharge of the waste water from the kitchen or bathroom. The TPPF 
would also provide an economical, long term and appropriate solution for 
excreta disposal until provision of a sewerage system can be afforded. The 
twin-pit pour-flush (TPPF) has the following features: 
1. A squatting pan is set in the floor and is of a design that requires only 
2-4 litres of water for full flushing. 
2. A trap with 20 millimetres water seal (or P-trap) prevents the 
emission of foul smell from the pits and fly/mosquito nuisance. 
3. Two alternatively used leaching pits retain solid matter and allow 
liquid to leach out and gases to disperse into the ground. The pits are 
circular in shape in order to save materials. Its construction should be 
1.5-2 metre apart so as to avoid infiltration from one pit into the other. 
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The use of one pit can vary from one year to many years until it is 
filled up and depends on the number of users and soil conditions. 
Research has pointed out that under normal conditions 3-4 years is 
very common before the change of a pit is required (IHS/IRC/HSMI/-
NHA/CMU, 1993). The contents of the disconnected pit requires 
approximately one year to decompose into a compacted and dry cake 
that is harmless to human beings and provides an excellent fertiliser 
for gardens. 
4. A junction box allows the sewage to flush into one pit and blocks 
entry to the second pit. The block can be changed when one pit is full. 
It can be made of any material as long as it is water tight. 
5. A superstructure with brick walls, plastering on both sides and a low-
cost door and roof. Where this component is not included in the 
scheme, the household may decide to use other materials for the 
enclosure and use cloth, mud blocks, tin sheets, wood, etc., as may be 
locally affordable and available1. 
A low-cost sanitation component under the IDSMT scheme was initiated 
in the 1980s and a few towns and cities were selected in Karnataka. The 
low-cost sanitation component of IDSMT was not eligible for central 
government assistance and wholly financed by the state government. It 
was also left to the state government to decide whether this component is 
financed as a grant, a partial subsidy or as a loan. The records and 
information from field staff showed that this scheme was fully subsidised. 
The second and most important scheme is the Integrated Programme 
for Low-Cost Sanitation and Liberation of Scavengers (IPLCS&LS). The 
scheme was the beginning of a large national scheme for urban low-cost 
sanitation and could be seen as the Government of India's serious attempt 
to make the objectives of the International Decade for Water and 
Sanitation to become to fruitution and to eradicate the persistent practice of 
manual scavenging. The scheme had two objectives: 
1
 In some states, the superstructure has been excluded from the scheme as it was 
expected that the beneficiaries will take care of its construction. As a result, researchers 
found in many locations two-pit pour-flush latrines without a superstructure and without 
any users (IHSARC/HSMI/NHA/CMU, 1993). 
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a) eliminating the inhuman practice of manual scavenging; and 
b) improving sanitation conditions in the country in a time bound 
and concerted manner. 
In 1980-81, a national scheme with similar objectives under the Ministry 
of Welfare, Government of India, and known as the scheme of 'Liberation 
of Scavengers' was executed through the state governments' Scheduled 
Caste Finance and Development Corporations. The achievements have, 
however, been very limited. The Government of India wanted to scale up 
this scheme and launched the Integrated Programme of Low-Cost 
Sanitation for Liberation of Scavengers (IPLCS&LS) in the year 1988-89. 
As per the decision of the Planning Commission, the conversion and new 
construction of latrines was to be handled by the Ministry of Urban 
Development and the HUDCO. The Ministry of Urban Development and 
the HUDCO were considered agencies more competent to deal with the 
physical implementation of urban sanitation. The scheme's aim remained 
the same and the practice of manual scavenging was to be eradicated by 
the end of the Eighth Five-Year Plan, i.e. in 1997. The adopted strategies 
were also similar: (i) converting all dry latrines into twin-pit pour-flush 
latrines, (ii) construction of new twin-pit pour-flush latrines for those 
households who do not have a latrine, (iii) adopting a whole town 
approach, i.e. to cover all households so that there will be no demand for 
manual scavenging in the future and (iv) by amending the existing 
municipal by-laws to prohibit manual scavenging. 
The Planning Commission also decided that the rehabilitation of the 
'liberated' scavengers would be handled by the Ministry of Welfare. This 
was to be done through offering training schemes which would equip the 
now jobless scavengers with skills for which there is a need in the 
agricultural, small industries or service sector . The state government may 
also decide to enrol them into municipal services. The state government 
would have to identify a suitable agency to identify, register and 
rehabilitate scavengers and to train them in the various trades and skills. 
Financial assistance through a mix of loan and subsidy had also been 
envisaged and was budgeted for. In Karnataka, 16,283 scavengers were 
registered in 1981, which grew to 17,208 in 1989 (Ministry of Welfare, 
1991). Two-third are men and the rest women. From the interviews held in 
The Government of India guideline for IPLCS&RS had identified a list of 85 trades 
and skills in which the liberated scavengers may be trained. 
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Karnataka, it is known that quite a number of jobless scavengers were 
enrolled in municipal services. 
By 1988-89, the scheme was re-christened by the Ministry of Urban 
Development into the Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation and 
Liberation of Scavengers (IPLCS&LS), emphasising the construction of 
large numbers of latrines. The emphasis on the rehabilitation of scavengers 
dwindled as did the role of the Ministry of Welfare. The social objective 
was replaced by a technical objective, measurable in number of latrines 
built and funds released. 
Project preparation and implementation procedures 
'Unless the advantages of adopting the twin-pit pour-flush water seal 
latrines are rigorously impressed upon communities and unless its 
adoption is converted to a "felt need" of the community, there is little 
question of a successful implementation' says the guidelines for the 
implementation of the scheme (Ministry of Urban Development, 
Government of India, 1991). The guidelines also prescribed that local 
governments should make a detailed survey of the town regarding the 
actual existing sanitary conditions and to substantiate the need for the 
scheme. This survey had to be carried out ward-wise and would have to 
identify the total number of beneficiaries requiring (a) conversion of 
bucket latrines, and (b) new constructions where there is no latrine. 
Important parameters, like family size, income and willingness to pay, had 
to be checked. Identification of the location of the TPPF latrine had to be 
done jointly by the beneficiary and the municipal engineer, keeping in 
view sensibilities of beneficiary, suitability of access for cleaning the leach 
pits, distance from any nearby water source, and other construction 
considerations. The local body would have to advertise, call for 
applications and select the beneficiaries. An agreement needs to be signed 
between the municipal office and the beneficiary, spelling out the 
beneficiary's obligation for making an initial financial contribution and to 
repay the loan component. A municipal register should be kept in which 
the agreements are listed and a record is kept of payments. 
Based on the survey details, the state government's nodal agency 
should prepare the project proposals and forward these through the 
Government of Karnataka to the HUDCO for technical and financial 
appraisal. Upon technical and financial approval, implementation can start 
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by tendering and awarding the work to pre-qualified contractors. The nodal 
agency should undertake the selection of contractors, the tendering and 
awarding of the work to the lowest bidder. A work order will be issued to 
the contractor and the copy of the same given to the owner for which a 
proforma had been given in the guidelines. The work order will detail the 
exact specification of the unit (5, 10 or 15 users type) and the location of 
the leach pits (within premises, under foot path or under roads). The 
purchase of materials and the disbursement of payment to the contractor 
was to be the task of the nodal agency. The municipal officers have to 
inspect and supervise the quality of the material, the prescribed design and 
specifications. After the work is duly and satisfactorily completed by the 
contractor, a completion certificate has to be signed by the beneficiary and 
the municipal engineer. This will be recorded in the municipal register. 
The completion certificate has to be submitted to the nodal agency which 
will allow for final payment to the contractor. Any operation and 
maintenance services for the latrines also rested with the municipality. In 
addition to the above, the loan recovery from the beneficiary to the DMA 
and the HUDCO was to be the duty of the municipality. 
The financing pattern 
The financial support, i.e. loan and subsidy, are extended simultaneously 
by the HUDCO. The loan and subsidy portion are based on the income of 
the beneficiaries with the objective to target subsidies to lower income 
groups. The subsidy and loan components for these income categories for 
the IPLCS&LS scheme have been presented below in table 15-1 and 15-2, 
and are based on the ministry's guidelines in 1993-943. The difference in 
unit cost between conversions and new construction is mainly due to the 
cost of the superstructure. In the case of conversions, it is expected that the 
superstructure already exists. The central government subsidy is the 
maximum ceiling. If the state government so desires, they may subsidise 
the beneficiary contribution or the loan component in order to reduce the 
burden for the selected beneficiaries. 
The subsidy, loan and own contributions have been adjusted regularly since 1988-89, 
based on the price increases of construction materials and labour. 
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Table 15-1: Subsidy, loan and own contribution for conversions under 
IPLCS&LS scheme (since 1993-94, in Rs. per latrine) 
Financial component 
Monthly income 
Total cost 
Construction cost 
Supervision and 
administrative 
charges 
Interest 
HUDCO loan 
Subsidy 
Own contribution 
EWS 
< 1,250 
2,493 
2,200 
220 
73 
1,247 
1,122 
124 
Income category 
LIG 
1,250 - 2,650 
2,507 
2,200 
220 
87 
1,504 
627 
376 
MIG&HIG 
2,650 - 4,450 
> 4,450 
2,529 
2,200 
220 
109 
1,897 
0 
632 
Source: HUDCO (1996). 
Table 15-2: Subsidy, loan and own contribution for new constructions 
under IPLCS&LS scheme (since 1993-94, in Rs. per latrine) 
Financial component 
Monthly income 
Total cost 
Construction cost 
Supervision and 
administrative 
charges 
Interest 
HUDCO loan 
Subsidy 
Own contribution 
EWS 
< 1,250 
4,434 
3,860 
386 
188 
2,994 
1,122 
318 
Income category 
LIG 
1,250-2,650 
4,473 
3,860 
386 
227 
3,175 
627 
671 
MIG&HIG 
2,650 -4,450; 
> 4,450 
4,526 
3,860 
386 
280 
3,395 
0 
1,131 
Source: HUDCO (1996). 
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According to the present arrangement, the HUDCO provides financial 
assistance to the extent of 50 per cent of the cost at 6 per cent interest 
repayable in 12 years and the balance 50 per cent is arranged by the 
borrowing agency from its own resources. The borrowing agencies would 
have to ensure the timely recovery of the loan component from the 
beneficiaries. For the execution of the scheme, the Ministry of Urban 
Development had stressed that Non-Governmental Organisations could be 
involved who could also render considerable assistance in the recovery. 
The community extension units in the municipalities selected for the 
scheme for the Urban Basic Services of the Poor (UBSP) could also be 
utilised for motivating the community and for technical help. 
15.2 Low-cost sanitation in Karnataka 
The four schemes under the Secretariat for Housing and Urban 
Development, which aimed to improve urban sanitation in Karnataka 
between 1980-94, are: 
1. Low-cost sanitation units constructed by the KUWS&DB under the 
special SC/ST component funds. 
2. The low-cost sanitation component under the IDSMT scheme 
constructed by the KUWS&DB. 
3. The Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation and 
Rehabilitation of Scavengers (IPLCS&RS) under the supervision of 
the KUWS&DB. 
4. The Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation and Liberation of 
Scavengers (IPLCS&LS) under the supervision of the DMA. 
Each government department has the obligation to allocate funds for 
providing services or amenities to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. A 
reservation of 18 percent of their annual budget is common. Likewise, the 
KUWS&DB is obliged to illustrate that they make a special effort for this 
backward group. Besides mini-water tanks, hand pumps and public water 
taps, low-cost sanitation units have been built by the Board in areas with a 
large population of Scheduled Castes4. There were no statistics available 
on the total outlay or number of units constructed by the Board but officers 
Schedules Tribes are a small minority in urban areas. 
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mentioned that a few hundred units have been constructed for this group 
since 1975. Including water supply, some Rs. 4.4 million had been spent 
by the KUWS&DB for the SC/ST between 1980-94 which is a relatively 
small amount (KUWS&DB, 1995). This scheme has for these reasons been 
excluded from further analysis. 
With regard to the IPLCS scheme, the KUWS&DB was appointed 
for their experience of contracted work and the implementation of low-cost 
sanitation units in a number of towns. However, the Board was reluctant to 
take up this scheme. One reason was that the Board did not consider this 
scheme to belong to the thrust of their activities: water supply and 
underground drainage. Secondly, the KUWS&DB was apprehensive about 
the added responsibilities of identification of beneficiaries and loan 
recovery. It was reported that the Board 'could not spare the time and 
personnel to go into loan recovery and so on' (Deccan Herald, 19 
February 1994). Moreover, it was expected that the Board may not have 
the capacity to handle the much larger scheme. Hence, it was conceived 
that the municipalities themselves - with the guidance of another agency at 
the state level - would implement the scheme. As a matter of course, the 
DMA was selected for this task. In 1991, the Directorate took up this 
scheme with a focus on the towns with a population of less than 100,000. 
The features of the three studied low-cost sanitation schemes in 
Karnataka can be found in table 15-3. While the IPLCS&LS scheme is 
well documented, little administrative information is kept about its 
predecessor, the IPLCS&RS and the low-cost sanitation component under 
the IDSMT. 
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Table 15-3: Basic features of three studied low-cost sanitation schemes in 
Karnataka 1980-94 
Basic features 
Implementing/nodal 
agency 
Construction by 
Supervision of 
construction 
Year started 
Number of towns 
Sanctioned project 
cost (in Rs. million) 
Per capita sanctioned 
project cost in 
selected towns 
(1994, in Rs.) 
Number of toilets 
sanctioned 
Average sanctioned 
cost per unit (in Rs.) 
Central government 
contribution 
State government 
contribution 
Beneficiaries' 
contribution 
Loan component 
Low-cost 
sanitation under 
IDSMT 
KUWS&DB 
Contractors 
KUWS&DB's 
engineers 
1980 
δ 
27.9 
61.95 
6,685 
4,172 
no 
yes 
not defined, at the 
discretion of the 
state government 
not defined, at the 
discretion of the 
state government 
IPLCS&RS by the 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
Sulabh International 
and contractors 
KUWS&DB's 
engineers 
around 1989 
3 
7.3 
29.96 
4,849 
1,500 
50% of project cost 
50% of project cost 
yes 
yes, to be repaid by 
beneficiaries 
collected by 
municipalities 
IPLCS&LS by the 
DMA 
DMA 
Contractors 
Municipal 
engineers 
1991 
52 
732.7 
322.45 
189,242 
3,923 
50% of project 
cost 
50% of project 
cost 
yes, depending on 
stated family 
income 
yes, to be repaid 
by beneficiaries 
collected by 
municipalities 
Source: HUDCO, DMA and KUWS&DB records. 
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Figure 15-1: Geographical distribution of towns with low-cost sanitation 
schemes in Karnataka 1980-94 
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Selection of the towns 
The selection of towns under the various schemes provides an interesting 
area of analysis. In figure 15-1 the geographical distribution of the towns 
are indicated. The table 15-4 provides an overview of the characteristics of 
the selected towns. 
The reasons for the selection of IDSMT towns have been discussed 
in chapter twelve. Out of these 51 towns, only 8 towns have been selected 
by the state government for an additional low-cost sanitation component. 
As mentioned, it has been the state government's discretion to add this 
component as they have to provide the financial assistance. These towns 
were selected in 1980-81 and included in the Sixth Five-Year Plan 1980-
85. Thereafter, low-cost sanitation components were excluded from the 
IDSMT scheme. Apparently, the plans announced for a central government 
scheme for low-cost sanitation and the repeated proclamations to 
implement the objectives of the International Decade for Water Supply and 
Sanitation caused the state government to stall any further effort under the 
IDSMT scheme and await financial assistance of the central government. 
However, it took most of that decade before funds started to flow to 
Karnataka. 
When the scheme was announced in 1991, the DMA had sent a 
circular to all urban local bodies reporting to the Directorate. The circular 
invited the municipalities to participate in the new scheme and in an 
attached questionnaire they were asked to specify ward-wise the need for 
conversions and new constructions. There were 52 towns that had replied 
with 'some degree of detail', as one HUDCO officer recalled. Some had 
added a provisional list of beneficiaries and others had just specified the 
numbers of conversions and new constructions. It was not clear on what 
basis the numbers were estimated and whether the municipalities had 
conducted a house-to-house survey or not. 
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Table 15-4: Characteristics of selected towns for low-cost sanitation 
schemes in Karnataka 
Scheme/ characteristic 
Average urban 
population (1991) 
Classification towns** 
Classi 
Class II 
Class III 
Class IV 
No. of units sanctioned 
Approximate 
coverage*** 
(1991, in %) 
Development Index 
Political Affiliation 
Index 
Slum population as % 
of total urban 
population 
Infrastructure 
investment p.c. (excl. 
sanitation, in Rs.) 
Low-cost sanitation as 
% of total infrastructure 
investment p.c. 
No. of towns with water 
supply schemes 
between 1980-94 
Per capita water supply 
(1994) 
All towns in 
Karnataka 
(N=172) 
49,699* 
29 
18 
82 
43 
200,726 
9 
14.05 
13.94 
11.2 
327 
17.4 
59 
79.4 
(N=159) 
Under 
IDSMT 
(N=8) 
56,279 
2 
2 
3 
1 
6,635 
7 
16.13 
13.85 
9.3 
1738 
3.4 
3 
50.6 
IPLCS by 
KUWS&DB 
(N=3) 
80,924 
1 
1 
1 
0 
4,849 
10 
15.00 
9.33 
15.9 
394 
7.1 
1 
75.3 
IPLCS by 
DMA 
(N=52) 
43,698 
7 
7 
32 
6 
189,242 
42 
15.12 
12.54 
13.3 
535 
37.5 
20 
60.9 
Notes: * Excluding Bangalore. 
** The classes refer to the following population sizes: Class I = > 100,000, 
Class II = 50-100,000, Class III = 20-50,000 and Class IV = 5-20,000. 
*** The coverage has been estimated with a average household size of 5. 
This figure is supported by the field research conducted, where the average 
household size was 5.25. However, because of the size and selection of the 
sample, the coverage figure is only indicative. 
Source: Records DMA, HUDCO, KUWS&DB. 
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Pressurised for time, the Directorate took this information without further 
scrutiny, prepared a project proposal and forwarded this to the Secretariat 
and the HUDCO. The 52 towns formed the basis for the first stage of the 
IPLCS&LS. Figure 15-1 shows that towns in all districts were selected. 
However, the districts of Gulbarga, Raichur, Tumkur and Mandya had 
more schemes while the districts of Belgaum, Dakshina Kannada, 
Dharwad, the two Bangalore districts and Hassan had only a few schemes. 
The selection of towns also reflects a reasonable distribution among the 
various sizes and classes of urban areas in Karnataka. While the low-cost 
sanitation schemes implemented by the KUWS&DB tended to include the 
larger towns, the IPLCS&LS tended to include smaller towns falling in 
Class III category (20,000-50,000 population). The development index in 
comparison to the state average reflects the composition of the selected 
towns for each of these schemes. Given the above procedure of selection, it 
is no surprise that there was not any obvious accommodation of political 
pressures. The selection of the IPLCS schemes was more the result of the 
alertness of the local chief officer or commissioner who prepared a prompt 
reply. The political affiliation index in the above table supports this 
explanation. 
The central ministry's guidelines distinguished between latrines for 
five, ten or fifteen users and also suggested models for special 
circumstances where there may a high groundwater table or poor soil 
permeability. In Karnataka, there was no special consideration for the size 
of the family as the design supplied to the contractors by the DMA was 
based on a single model for all locations, soil conditions and sizes of 
families. The design showed one square leaching pit, separated into two 
sections by a water-tight wall. This design was based on a similar square 
pit design in the ministry's guidelines of 1991 for a five-member family in 
locations where there is excellent permeability. A square pit with a 
separation wall was recommended only in cases of densely populated areas 
where there would be no on-plot space. There has been considerable 
debate whether this design is safe. It was argued5 that the liquid contents of 
the pit in use may by-pass the water-tight wall and seep into and 
contaminate the content of the second disconnected pit. As a result, the pit 
contents may not sufficiently decompose and remain biologically 
hazardous. There are many districts in Karnataka with poor permeability, 
Proceedings of the national seminar on Operation and Maintenance of Sanitation 
Systems in Low-Income Areas in India', HUDCO/HSMI, April 1992, New Delhi. 
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with latérite soils and areas with high water tables for several months a 
year. To make matters worse, the Karnataka design was made shallower 
and prescribed different materials for the pit lining and pit covers. 
Apparently, the DMA had considered the saving of materials and labour 
more important than giving attention to the environmental safety, the size 
of each household or variety of sub-soil conditions. 
For pour-flush toilets to function properly, a reasonable level of 
water supply is necessary. The selected towns show a below average water 
supply level (See table 15-4). Secondly, no special attempts have been 
made to overcome these deficiencies and to give these towns special 
preference in the selection of urban water supply schemes. In fact, these 
towns have not had more water supply schemes than the rest of urban 
Karnataka between 1980-94. An inter-departmental co-ordination did 
again not exist with regard to the selection of low-cost sanitation and water 
supply projects. 
15.3 Implementation 
The implementation of the two smaller low-cost sanitation schemes took 
place according to an established routine and along with the other work 
executed by the KUWS&DB. The KUWS&DB has long standing 
experience of preparing tenders, qualification of contractors, selection, 
award and supervision of work. The district offices of the KUWS&DB and 
their staff have taken the construction of low-cost sanitation units in the 
same fashion as their other public works. This applies particularly to the 
latrines under the IDSMT scheme. Field observations6 show that these are 
of good construction standards, all completed with superstructures. The 
main disadvantage of these solid latrines is that the cost is between Rs. 
5,000-7,000, a price that would not be affordable to many households. 
Deviant from their established practice, some work had been awarded to 
Sulabh International. While Sulabh International had been active in Bihar 
and other northern States, they were not known in southern India. Through 
the mobilisation of influence at the central government level, they had 
succeeded in receiving some work in Karnataka in the late 1980s. The 
experiences proved disappointing; many latrines were not completed and 
of a poor quality. Sulabh worked through local sub-contractors who were 
6
 The author has visited more than half of the selected towns between 1992-96. 
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poorly supervised. When the contract was terminated by the Government 
of India, many engineers of Sulabh who were responsible for the work, 
could not be traced. This experience illustrated the failure of a non-resident 
organisation that tried to establish itself without understanding the local 
conditions first, and without reliable partners. As a result, the KUWS&DB 
continued with local contractors. 
The IPLCS&LS scheme under the supervision of the DMA stands 
out from the other schemes by its stupendous target of almost 190,000 
latrines, its ambitious coverage of more than 40 per cent of the population 
in selected towns and a staggering financial outlay of Rs. 732 million. This 
raised many questions; do the municipalities have sufficient capacity to 
conduct the proposed large scale surveys and arrange thousands of 
contracts with beneficiaries, will the municipalities be able to absorb and 
recover such large amounts from the beneficiaries, will there be enough 
takers for the latrines, will there be enough, experienced contractors to 
build these latrines, will the DMA - a rather small and understaffed 
organisation - be able to identify the many contractors and to keep 
technical and administrative control over implementation? Despite such 
questions raised by the state government and at the HUDCO, the 
IPLCS&LS was considered the first and only scheme that would probably 
eradicate manual scavenging and provide a noticeable improvement in 
urban sanitation in Karnataka. Apparently, many officials were carried 
away by the appeal of the 'whole town approach'. 
In 1991-92, the IPLCS&LS was started in a dozen of towns and the 
first feedback came from the municipal and district administrations7. The 
identification of beneficiaries was not done in a systematic manner, nor 
was a prior household survey conducted as recommended in the 
guidelines. Lists had often been prepared with the help of local councillors 
and with information taken from property tax or election records which 
were unsuitable to assess the need for the conversions or new 
constructions, or to assess the willingness and capacity of the beneficiary 
to contribute to the construction and to repay the loan component. Prior to 
construction, there was little explanation about any beneficiary 
contribution and loan repayment. 
Many of the comments have been based on the discussions held during training 
programmes on IPLCS&LS between 1993-94 organised by the Indian Human 
Settlement Programme, an Indo-Dutch development corporation (IHSP, 1993b and 
1994c). 
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In Karnataka, the project was approved on the basis of selecting only 
EWS as beneficiaries, i.e. a maximum of subsidy and a minimum of 
beneficiary contribution. This may be unlikely as in some towns the 
number of constructed units exceeded half the total population. Within 
such a large section of the population one can expect some differentiation 
between EWS, LIG, MIG and even НЮ. It was, however, impossible to 
distinguish between income categories as these details were not requested 
in the questionnaire filled out in 1991. The 'whole town approach' was felt 
contradictory to the presumption that beneficiaries should voluntarily 
contribute to the construction and repayment of the loan component. No 
provisions had been made for the repayment of the loan component: no 
opening of a separate bank account, no proper registration or invoicing of 
the beneficiaries. Most municipalities had not prepared themselves for 
these administrative requirements of the scheme. The implementation 
procedures were also unclear to the municipalities, it was a comment by 
municipal officials. They were kept in the dark about who will award the 
contract for work, who will monitor the construction and who will take 
action in case of poor performance. Secondly, there were no financial 
provisions for the municipalities to conduct such functions. The 
IPLCS&LS implied an additional burden to their already high workload. 
The introduction and promotion of the scheme was not supported by 
proper information, campaigns, demonstration toilets or by mobilising the 
involvement of communities or NGOs. It was assumed that the 
municipalities will do this and that the people will understand the benefits 
as well as be willing to contribute. The long recovery period of the loan 
component would constitute a burden for the municipalities, was further 
another remark. 
In the selection of towns and beneficiaries no consideration was 
given to the sufficient availability of water. In some towns, the acute 
scarcity of water would hamper the functioning of these latrines. As far as 
the choice of technology was concerned, scarcity of space for the 
construction of pits was not a common problem in the selected towns. The 
municipal officials felt that there was no justification for a rectangular pit; 
space was available for the construction of a double circular pit in most 
towns. The standard design did not account for the number of users, while 
it was known that many households in Karnataka are extended families 
and may have more than ten users. The standard design of the pit did 
indeed not account for the soil conditions. While the design was suitable 
for the southern parts of Karnataka where sandy, ferrous and porous soils 
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are found, it proved unsuitable for areas in northern Karnataka where 
clayey and impermeable soils are common, e.g. the so-called black cotton 
and laterite soils in Raichur, Gulbarga and Bidar districts. Deviations from 
the DMA-standard design were reported. For example, junction boxes 
were not provided which prevented the alternate use of the pits, pit covers 
were not water tight which allowed surface water to enter the pit and the 
sludge to become an environmental hazard, and single pits were 
constructed instead of double pits. The eventual maintenance requirements 
for switching from one pit to another, emptying of the contents of digested 
pits and giving assistance in case of technical problems, had not yet been 
thought of. While there was critique in the early stages, the DMA turned a 
deaf ear to these signals. The municipalities could do nothing other than 
oblige and provide assistance in the implementation of the scheme. 
By the middle of 1993, the pace and organisation of implementation 
took a turn when both the director (an IAS officer) and the deputy director 
of the DMA were replaced. The various reports in the local newspapers, 
reports from municipal officers and feedback from government officials 
who were interviewed as part of this research provided the following 
picture . In great haste, many more municipalities were asked to forward 
long lists of beneficiaries. It was not possible to prepare and execute a 
proper survey. It was reported that several persons have been listed twice 
or thrice, and that more than one member of a household had been listed 
and many names had been entered without any prior knowledge. The 
number of latrines per town were in fact de-linked from the potential 
demand. The DMA went ahead with great speed to shortlist contractors. 
Government rules were flouted. Earlier shortlisted and certified contractors 
were replaced by other contractors who did not have the proper 
documentation or an obligatory registration with the Public Works 
Department. Little known contractors were selected. The Indian Express 
reported (7 September, 1994) that some were dummy contractors and were 
family and household members of the deputy director. The production of 
glass-fibre pans, P-traps and footrests was withdrawn from one company 
and given to another firm in Bangalore without following government 
procedures. The contractors and the DMA had agreed on an unit rate based 
Most of the information below has been based on the reports in the Indian Express 
who apparently obtained copies of confidential government reports. Their reports have 
been confirmed during interviews with officials from the Government of Karnataka. Of 
32 government officials interviewed, 5 made specific and detailed comments on the 
low-cost sanitation scheme. 
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on the full cost of the latrines as per the ministry's guideline for 
conversions and new constructions, applying the revised schedule of rates 
for 1993-94 (See also tables 15-2 and 15-3). This included all 
contributions from the central government, the HUDCO loan and the 
beneficiary contribution. Without making an attempt to recover the 
stipulated beneficiary contribution, the DMA went ahead. 
The municipalities continued to be kept in the dark about the 
contractors, where and how many latrines were to be constructed. Many 
contractors arrived at municipalities that were totally unaware of their 
appointment and the contractors started the work randomly, putting up 
latrines at any location. No proper records were prepared or agreements 
signed between the beneficiary and the municipality. In some 
municipalities, it was decided to leave the contractors 'to do what they had 
to do'. The contractors gave the impression to the people that the scheme 
was for free, undermining the collection of any beneficiary contribution 
and loan recovery. Under this assumption, many residents allowed latrines 
to be built near their houses, on empty plots and on the pavements. 
Municipal officers - voluntarily or involuntarily - were made to sign 
completion certificates for numbers of latrines that were not verified for 
their completion, knowing that they would not be questioned as they 
assumed they would be supported by the DMA. Upon hastily obtained 
completion certificates, payment of bills to contractors was done directly 
from the office of the DMA. Municipalities or even the Secretariat had no 
involvement in the payment of these large amounts. While such payments 
in government offices normally take weeks, if not months - to obtain the 
proper administrative and financial approvals - these payment took place 
in a couple of days. In one incident, the payment had the same date as a 
completion certificate. The fact that the DMA could avail of such huge 
sums of money was possible because the HUDCO had made use of their 
discretion to route central government subsidy and loan amounts directly 
to the DMA instead of through the Secretariat. This, in retrospect, was in 
conflict with the Government of Karnataka rules and it is unclear whether 
the HUDCO office was aware of this rule. Deviations have been reported 
from the original design, mostly leading to considerable cost savings and 
9
 In contrast to the BWSSB, KHB and KUWS&DB, the DMA had not been constituted 
as a board with enlarged mandates for receiving and spending funds. The DMA is a 
regular government office sub-ordinated to the rules of the Secretariat and the Finance 
Department. 
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larger profit margins. It has been reported that the actual construction cost 
of latrines was not more than one-third to one-half of the agreed rate. The 
'margins' have further been increased by the difference between the 
certified number and the actually completed number of latrines. 
Frequent reports started to appear in the local newspapers (The 
Deccan Herald and the Indian Express) amplified by the reports of 
municipal officers, district administration and citizens. From the reports, it 
was obvious that a tremendous racket had been engineered by the 
concerned staff of the DMA. The government decided to initiate a 
departmental investigation headed by a senior IAS-officer, who seized 400 
files and submitted a report on July 13, 1994 {Indian Express, 7 
September, 1994). The confidential report and the press coverage forced 
the Cabinet to request the Corps of Detectives to investigate and prepare a 
full report. The concerned DMA officers were suspended and sent on 
leave10. Insiders stated that the chief minister had given his blessings 
which was not without a financial reward. The fact that the investigating 
IAS-officer was sent on leave shortly after he submitted his findings, may 
be a proof of that. In other words, while the tree had been shaken, political 
leaders wanted to avoid too many apples falling out. By September 1994, 
Rs. 310 million had been released to the DMA for the implementation of 
the IPLCS&LS. It has been estimated that the 'leakage' in the scheme has 
not been less than Rs. 50 million and it is likely that it may have been as 
high as Rs. 150 million". Replying to questions from the opposition in the 
Assembly on 7th September 1994, Chief Minister Veerappa Moily said: 
'But don't worry. Those who eat salt have to drink water. No one can 
escape if they have committed an offence'. The CoD-report was accepted 
by the central home ministry in 1997 and they instructed the state 
government to undertake action against the indicted officials. 'Sources said 
the Government would soon book criminal cases against the then director 
of municipal administration M.G. Halappanar and two other officials, 
Ramaswamy and Ramachandra, for their involvement in the scam' 
{Deccan Herald, 24 April 1997). 
The director, one of the indicted officials, resumed office in December 1995. 
The CoD report placed the misappropriation at Rs. 20 million {Deccan Herald, 24 
April 1997). 
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15.4 Experiences in case-study towns 
Out of the seven towns included in this study, five towns benefited from 
the three low-cost sanitation schemes. Some details of the schemes in these 
towns have been presented in the table 15-5. The notion of a 'whole town 
approach' had been attempted in the case of Kunigal where a staggering 
96.5 per cent of the population was to be covered by the new 
constructions. 
In the towns of Hospet and Chamarajanagara, the aim had been more 
modest with 30 per cent coverage. Sirsi also did not fall much behind. 
Chikmagalur fell far below par. However, this scheme was conceived by 
the KUWS&DB and under different premises. 
From the field surveys, the interviews with officials, councillors, 
citizens and beneficiaries in the five towns, a number of observations 
have been elaborated. Most observations pertain to the IPLCS&LS 
scheme. 
Selection of beneficiary 
Going by the statements of the interviewed municipal officers, all the 
selected towns had advertised in the local daily or weekly journals and 
handed out forms. However, the municipalities had received applications 
from a small number of people. No door-to-door surveys were conducted. 
None of the municipalities could show a list of beneficiaries on our 
request. 
In the five towns, 162 households were interviewed who had benefited from a low-
cost sanitation scheme. From the 104 municipal officers, councillors and other citizens 
interviewed during this research, 18 made specified and detailed comments about the 
low-cost sanitation scheme. These comments and the outcome of the 159 household 
questionnaires have been referred to in the following paragraphs. 
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As there was pressure to start the implementation of the scheme, towns and 
cities were selected in a hurry and the number of conversions and new 
constructions was estimated based on crude information or through a 
calculated guess by the local engineer and commissioner/chief officer, it 
was added. It was also admitted that the list of beneficiaries that was 
ultimately submitted to the DMA had little in common with the existing 
need for conversions or new latrines, the income level, etc. Little remained 
of the well intended guidelines to conduct a ward by ward survey, and 
identify beneficiaries as per their expressed need, family size, family 
income, present mode of sanitation, availability of space for TPPF water 
seal latrine, distance of nearest water source, availability and amount of 
household water, mode of disposal of sullage, etc. 
Implementation of the scheme by contractors 
It was expected that the municipality would explain the objectives, benefits 
and technical and financial details of low-cost sanitation scheme to the 
beneficiaries. Besides announcing the scheme in the local newspapers and 
calling for applications, none of the municipalities had made such an effort 
and, secondly, the resident engineers showed little interest in doing so. 
Identification and the on-site location of the TPPF units was decided 
by the beneficiaries and contractor. The TMC engineer was not involved. 
As a result, latrines have been built on locations that are either public 
space, do not observe prescribed set-backs from boundary lines and 
constitute possible environmental or constructural hazard. It has, for 
example, been observed that toilets were integrated into the front boundary 
wall with the pits constructed on the road-side, the latter providing a risk to 
pedestrians and parked vehicles. Moreover, the knowledge of the TPPF 
technology proved limited, e.g. most were not convinced of the advantages 
of two pits and built one instead. Others did not understand why the two 
pits should be used alternatively and left out the junction box so that both 
pits can be used at the same time and avoiding the 'unnecessary' risk of 
blockages at the junction box. One junior engineer in Chikmagalur 
explained that 'one pit was for five users and two pits for ten users'. To 
make things worse, there were no engineers posted in Kunigal and 
Chamarajanagara to supervise the construction. Here daily wage engineers 
are holding these posts who were ignorant of the low-cost sanitation 
scheme. 
438 Urban Development in Karnataka 
The use of sub-contractors has been common in all case-study 
towns. One sub-contractor informed us that he was paid Rs. 1,500 for each 
newly constructed latrine block by the authorised contractor Sri T.A. 
Arasaiah from Mysore. Bearing in mind that the sanctioned amount for 
new constructions was nearly Rs. 4,500, casts doubts on the compliance 
with the specifications at this rates and the use of the substantial 'margins'. 
Incomplete constructions have been observed on a considerable scale in all 
cases: no pits, no covers, no separation wall in the twin-pit and no doors. It 
has also been reported by local residents and sub-contractors that a certain 
percentage has been paid to councillors, commissioners, chief officers and 
also resident engineers. Others reported that the lead-contractor had 
established a good relationship with senior officials of the DMA and also 
state politicians. The contractors exerted pressure on commissioners, chief 
officers and engineers to issue completion certificates without verifying 
the completion or quality of the work. It also happened that upon issuing 
the completion certificates, officials and councillors and even local 'strong 
men' have demanded money from the contractor. The latter has been 
reported without much secrecy from Kunigal and Chamarajanagara. The 
field research has, thus, confirmed the reports by the Indian Express and 
the Deccan Herald. 
The number of sanctioned units (conversion or new) proved more 
than the number of applicants who came forward voluntarily during 
implementation and the sub-contractors faced the difficult task of 
completing the sanctioned latrines within the stipulated period. Hence, 
they coerced the house owners to provide space to construct latrines. Even 
though some already had their own latrines, house owners obliged and 
mentioned during the interviews that these may be 'used by guests or 
workers'. It was further reported, that the sub-contractors selected low-
income areas and slums where the opposition to construction was expected 
to be less, and it was easier and faster to construct a large number of 
latrines on 'undefined' land. Moreover, their low education level and 
awareness helped the sub-contractor to divert from the specifications. 
Some beneficiaries - to the relief of the sub-contractors - allowed 
construction of more than one latrine. The second or third latrine could be 
used to sell the materials or for the storage of wood, fodder or dung. The 
sub-contractor in Kunigal reported, not surprisingly, that he had difficulty 
in building for the agreed amount and, therefore, aimed to construct as 
many latrines as possible in areas that were served by underground 
drainage. He could save, thereby, on the cost of two pits, a junction box 
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and two covers. He also reported that neither he nor the officials disclosed 
information to the beneficiaries regarding any loan or subsidy components. 
They feared that if they did, the beneficiaries might raise objections about 
the quality of the work and refuse the new latrine to avoid repayment of 
the loan. 
In Karnataka, underground conditions in some areas are not suitable 
for the adopted TPPF latrine. In Chikmagalur, for example, the high water 
table in the Hiremagalur area made the constructed latrines ineffective. 
The pits filled up quickly with groundwater and created problems when 
flushing and cleaning. 
Despite the fact that officials of the DMA were suspended and a 
CoD investigation had been initiated in 1995, several local officials were 
reluctant to comment on the scheme. The only comment was that the 
scheme was completely handled by the DMA and that the municipality had 
no involvement whatsoever. Others alleged that the DMA officials made 
money in selecting the contractors, who were even not officially registered 
as contractors or qualified as engineers. One such example was a certain 
Dr. Mokshapathi who is reported to be a part-time lecturer at the 
University of Mysore. He is neither an engineer nor a registered contractor. 
He, nevertheless, succeeded in obtaining a contract to the value of Rs. 7-10 
million for the construction of latrines in Sirsi and the neighbouring towns 
of Uttara Kannada. 
Post-construction repayment, operation and maintenance 
As mentioned above the beneficiaries were mostly unaware of any 
repayment obligation and many heard about this for the first time when 
this research was conducted. It is no surprise that some were nervous when 
on hearing about such a repayment obligation. As per the guidelines, the 
TMC/CMC should maintain and provide assistance for operation and 
maintenance, i.e. repair and emptying of the pits when full. Neither the 
beneficiaries nor the municipal officials were aware of this aspect and 
nothing had been set in motion to that effect. 
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Social and economic profile of interviewed beneficiaries of the 
1PLCS&LS 
A group of 162 beneficiaries of the IPLCS&LS has been interviewed in the 
five case study towns. The outcome gives an insight into their social and 
economic status, their living conditions and the details of the scheme at the 
household level. The number of interviewed households in each town is 
given below in table 15-6. The average income indicates that the 
households do not belong to the EWS category, but to the LIG/MIG 
income groups. In fact, these groups would not have been eligible for the 
maximum amount of subsidy but would have to contribute a larger amount 
both as their own contribution and as a monthly loan repayment. The 
household size ranges between 5.54 and 5.04 and indicates that the 
selected standard design suits the average family size of this sample. 
The housing situation of the respondents (See table 15-7) also 
indicates that these beneficiaries are far from the poorest with most of 
them owning the house, half of the houses having at least two rooms, a 
separate kitchen, a bathroom, a water connection and a large group even a 
sewer connection. The latter shows that there was - in theory - no need for 
a two-pit disposal system as the sewage could be directly discharged into 
the sewer. 
Table ¡5-6: Household size and average monthly income of interviewed 
IPLCS&LS beneficiaries 
Name city/town Sample size Household size Monthly income (in 
Rs.) 
Kunigal 
Hospet 
Chamarajanagara 
Chikmagalur 
Sirsi 
37 
49 
25 
25 
26 
5.5 
5.2 
5.1 
5.4 
5.0 
2,212 
1,880 
2,014 
1,852 
1,643 
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Table 15-7: Domestic amenities of interviewed IPLCS&LS beneficiaries 
Name city/town Owned toilet Bathroom Sewer Water Owner-
before connection connection occupant 
(in%) (in%) (in%) (in%) (in%) 
К uñigal 
Hospet 
Chamarajanagara 
Chikmagalur 
Sirsi 
0.0 
0.0 
12.0 
0.0 
11.0 
72.0 
30.6 
40.0 
24.0 
77.0 
78.5 
22.5 
52.0 
52.0 
11.5 
46.0 
12.3 
56.0 
92.0 
53.9 
89.0 
94.0 
92.0 
100.0 
100.0 
On the positive side, except in Hospet, most households did have a 
domestic water supply connection which would ensure sufficient water for 
flushing of the latrines. The interviews also provided an insight into the 
problems and priorities of people as far as their living environment was 
concerned. Water supply stands out as the major concern of respondents. A 
majority of respondents in three out of the five case studies were 
dissatisfied with the water supply and felt that this needs to be tackled first. 
Secondly was the problem of 'drainage' . Except for Sirsi, respondents in 
all other four towns put 'drainage/latrines' second on their priority list. 
Street lighting and improvement of roads were mentioned next. In other 
words, civic amenities and services are considered important and proper 
sanitation is, thus, felt as a basic need. 
With regard to the application, implementation and technical quality 
of the IPLCS&LS, table 15-8 and table 15-9 provide a summary of the 
findings. Most residents came to know about the scheme after it was 
started, i.e. from the sub-contractor. 
'Drainage' in the context of Kamataka means those amenities that carry away all 
unwanted water, sewage, sludge, etc. In such smaller towns there is no distinct 
conceptual difference between surface drains and underground drains - wherever they 
exist and work; 'drainage' and 'latrines' were used interchangeably by the respondents 
during the interviews. 
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A much smaller group learnt about the scheme from municipal employees 
or neighbours. Apparently, the public announcement in the newspapers 
mentioned by the municipal officers and the call for applications had gone 
unnoticed by the majority of respondents. It is no surprise that few could 
mention details about the scheme, such as where the money comes from 
and that there is a loan component (only 6 percent were aware). In 
Kunigal, Hospet and Sirsi more than half had applied for the TPPF latrine, 
obviously at the start of the actual implementation in the town and when 
the sub-contractors were already in the field. However, overall not more 
than 43 percent had asked for the latrines before construction. 
Surprisingly, a large number of residents (35 per cent) paid some 
registration fee in order to get the latrine constructed at their house though 
these payments have not been accounted for as beneficiary contributions or 
transferred through the DMA to the HUDCO. Supervision was rarely 
executed and, as some of the residents said, done by a municipal engineer. 
This is in contradiction to the statements of some of the municipal 
engineers that they had had no involvement in the scheme. Apparently, this 
was not so. It is interesting to note that the cost at which the residents 
valued the construction was well below the value for which the latrines had 
been sanctioned and much closer to what the sub-contractor in Kunigal had 
been paid. Moreover, some of them contributed by providing stones, pipes 
and also money. Except for Sirsi, the construction of the individual latrines 
was completed and two-third of the families have indeed started to use the 
latrines. 
Their appreciation has been generally positive. Convenience, 
privacy and safety, particularly for women have been mentioned as the 
main advantages. Those who had not started to use them indicated that 
they had converted the latrine into a bathroom or had flushing problems 
(Chikmagalur). Our own technical inspection during the research14 
provided a less positive impression. Where new constructions were made, 
the mixture of mortar has been particularly short of cement, making 
plastering and walls the weaker elements of the superstructure. The doors 
are not expected to last very long because of the quality of the sheet 
material used and the weak hinges and locks. The use of the plastic fibre 
pans was disapproved by many and some residents had opted to buy and 
install their own ceramic pans. These pans require more water to flush and, 
Ibis was done jointly by the author and the research assistant (with a BSc. Civil 
Engineering and MA Urban and Regional Planning qualifications). 
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thus, defeats the concept of the TPPF. While the state of the superstructure 
has scope for improvement, the pits and junctions boxes were worse. 
While the TPPF-technology stands or falls with having in place a junction 
box, this important attribute could only be found in 19 out of 162 cases. 
15.5 The role of the implementing agencies 
The agencies that were involved in the implementation of the three low-
cost sanitation schemes and their respective roles have been summarised in 
table 15-10. As mentioned in chapter 11, the Department of Town 
Planning had initially a role in the selection of towns and the preparation 
of the project proposals for the IDSMT scheme. In preparing the project 
proposals, the department proposed the additional low-cost sanitation 
component for selected towns which was approved by the Secretariat. The 
KUWS&DB was approached for the implementation of this low-cost 
sanitation component while the other components were handled by the 
Department of Town Planning. The field observations illustrated that the 
KUWS&DB had executed the latrines for prices that allowed a solid piece 
of work. Beneficiary contributions and loan repayments were not 
applicable and the KUWS&DB incurred the expenses directly to the 
Secretariat. 
When the IPLCS scheme started in 1988-89, the Secretariat decided 
to continue on the same lines for implementation. The KUWS&DB was 
apprehensive about this new scheme as it would involve them in the 
collection of the beneficiary contributions and the loans. They rather liked 
to stay out of this cumbersome activity and stick to construction work. 
However, in the first one and a half year the KUWS&DB obliged and 
managed to hand over the onerous tasks of money collection to the 
municipality. From a technical point of view, the latrines were constructed 
well, except those that were constructed by the Sulabh International. 
When the IPLCS was scaled up at the beginning of the Eighth Five-
Year Plan and handed over to the DMA, the modest contribution of the 
KUWS&DB was terminated and replaced by a totally different actor. 
Speaking of the role of the DMA in the IPLCS&LS scheme, is speaking of 
a few officials who had captured the scheme and utilised it for their own 
objectives. 
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Table 15-10: Involvement of agencies in various stages of implementation 
of three low-cost sanitation schemes in Karnataka 1980-94 
Stage of 
implementation 
1. Selection of towns 
2. Preparation of 
project proposals 
3. Selection of 
beneficiaries 
4. Administrative and 
financial approvals 
5. Tendering, 
awarding contracts 
6. On-site inspection 
7. Collection of 
beneficiary's 
contribution 
8. Financial assistance 
and sanctions 
9. Progress reports 
and overall 
monitoring 
10. Completion 
certificates and 
handing over 
11. Collection and 
payment loan 
components 
12. Post-project 
operation and 
maintenance 
13. Rehabilitation of 
scavengers 
1 
Under IDSMT 
(N=8) 
Secretariat HUD, 
Dept. of Town 
Planning 
Dept. of Town 
Planning 
KUWS&DB with 
municipal 
engineer 
Secretariat HUD, 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
Not applicable 
Beneficiaries and 
municipality 
Not applicable 
Low-cost sanitation scheme 
IPLCS by 
KUWS&DB (N=3) 
Secretariat HUD 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB with 
municipal engineer 
Secretariat HUD, 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
Secretariat HUD 
KUWS&DB 
KUWS&DB 
From beneficiary by 
municipality, with 
GoK guarantee to 
Gol 
Beneficiaries and 
municipality 
Department of 
Social Welfare 
IPLCS by DMA 
(N=52) 
Secretariat HUD, 
DMA 
DMA 
Municipality (and 
contractor) 
DMA, Secretariat 
HUD 
DMA 
Municipal engineer 
Municipality 
HUDCO, 
Secretariat HUD 
(guarantee) 
DMA 
Municipal Chief 
Officer or 
Commissioner 
From beneficiary by 
municipality, with 
GoK guarantee to 
HUDCO 
Beneficiaries and 
municipality 
Department of 
Social Welfare 
Used abbreviations: See the list on page XVI. 
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The DMA has many dedicated and co-operative officers and it would do 
no justice to blame them for what has happened after 1992. In the 
preceding sections it has been explained that the scheme was turned into 
an unprecedented racket with no other purpose than to make money. 
The Secretariat kept aloof in all three low-cost sanitation schemes as 
with other schemes. They left much of the implementation to the 
respective agency without much control or monitoring. The Secretariat 
took a permissive - if not disinterested - stand, particularly toward the 
IPLCS scheme. They showed little concern for the proper selection of 
beneficiaries, or the modalities for beneficiary contribution and loan 
repayment, or the clarification of the responsibilities between the DMA 
and the municipalities. The proper procedures for administrative sanctions 
and for financial transfers were not enforced, and there was no obligation 
to reporting regularly by the DMA on tendering, awarding and progress, 
except to the HUDCO. As a result, the DMA was allowed to go about this 
scheme for a considerable time without any proper scrutiny from the 
Secretariat15. 
The role of HUDCO in the failure of the IPLCS&LS scheme in 
Karnataka remains unclear. As a techno-financing institution they were 
probably eager to show impressive financial results and were willing to 
accept the grave weaknesses in the established modalities for 
implementation and recovery. Field inspections by their own staff showed 
in an early stage the poor quality of the latrines built and the irregularities. 
However, the management decided to ignore these reports and continued 
in supporting the DMA and releasing funds. Was it the eagerness to show 
performance alone that made them take such decisions, or were there 
'personal motives' involved, as was hinted by some of the interviewed 
officials? 
It is known that the director of the DMA, an IAS-officer promoted from the 
Karnataka Administrative Service, had close ties with Congress politicians. Insiders 
suggested that he used this network to gain support at the minister's and chief minister's 
level. The officials at the Secretariat, although of a much higher IAS-rank, did not dare 
'to disturb' him, fearing repercussions at a time when their transfer to another post was 
eminent. It was only when incriminating newspaper reports came out that the chief 
minister allowed the Secretariat to take action which led to the departmental enquiry. 
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15.6 Conclusions 
The above sections presented an analysis of two schemes: the low-cost 
sanitation scheme under the IDSMT scheme and the Integrated Programme 
for Low-Cost Sanitation and the Rehabilitation, renamed later into the 
Liberation of Scavengers. The first was implemented by the Karnataka 
Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board (KUWS&DB), who were 
initially involved in the IPLCS scheme, later taken over by the Directorate 
for Municipal Administration (DMA). Most of the above analysis pertains 
to the IPLCS&LS scheme implemented by the DMA because of its 
gigantic size and illustrious history. The low-cost sanitation schemes under 
IDSMT and the Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation and 
Rehabilitation of Scavengers that were implemented by the KUWS&DB 
have been modest in size, in expectations and in demands of the 
beneficiaries. One could assess these schemes as reasonably successful. 
The IPLCS scheme had adopted the construction of new latrines and 
the conversion of existing latrines as one of two strategies to do away with 
the demand for cleaning of bucket latrines by the so-called scavengers, the 
ultimate goal of the scheme. The second strategy was to rehabilitate the 
scavengers by training them for other skills and professions. By 1988-89, 
the scheme was widely known as the Integrated Programme for Low-Cost 
Sanitation and Liberation of Scavengers (IPLCS&LS) with a focus on the 
construction and conversion of massive numbers of latrines. The 
rehabilitation of scavengers, the ultimate goal of the IPLCS schemes, 
assumed little meaning for any agency under the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. This burden was conveniently bifurcated and 
brought under the Department of Welfare. It is known that there has been 
no co-ordination between the two departments. The Department of Social 
Welfare did not make any comparable 'grandiose' effort to train and re-
trench the scavengers into other skills and professions. Unemployment and 
poverty would have probably been the result if the IPLCS scheme had 
been successful. To their good fortune, the scheme failed in Karnataka and 
their livelihood has been secured for some more years. 
Within the Secretariat of Housing and Urban Development there 
were doubts about the capacity of the DMA to implement such a large 
scheme. Despite the doubts, it was decided to go ahead with the 
IPLCS&LS as it would be the first and only scheme in Karnataka that 
would probably eradicate manual scavenging and provide a noticeable 
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improvement in urban sanitation. While the 'whole town approach' was 
one premise, the beneficiaries' voluntary contribution to the cost of 
construction and repayment of the loan component another. There were, 
however, many citizens who were not interested in these latrines and 
preferred rather to construct the toilet themselves to guarantee sufficient 
quality and design according to their needs. The DMA ultimately decided 
to go for a 'whole town approach', irrespective of the effective demand 
and the preferences of potential beneficiaries. The introduction and 
promotion of the scheme was not supported by proper information, 
campaigns, demonstration toilets or by mobilising the involvement of 
communities or NGOs. It was assumed that the people would understand 
the obvious benefits and willing to contribute. The well intended 
ministry's guidelines to conduct a survey ward by ward, to identify the 
beneficiaries who had expressed their need for a latrine, the family size, 
the family income, etc. was blatantly neglected. Beneficiaries' list were 
artificially compiled. Contractors faced a difficult task to complete the 
sanctioned latrines within the stipulated period. They coerced the house 
owners, ignorant about the scheme, to provide space for construction 
wherever they wanted and - in some locations - how many they wanted, 
misinforming them that the latrines would be free. Moreover, the average 
income of the beneficiaries indicated that the latrines have been benefiting 
the better-off families. 
The selection of the two-pit pour-flush latrine as a common standard 
throughout Kamataka, did not take into account the size of the household 
or the permeability of the soil. The selection was based on the possible 
saving of materials and labour. Technical inspection during the research 
revealed that the state of the superstructure had scope for improvement. 
While the TPPF-technology stands or falls with the existence of a junction 
boxes, this important attribute was only be found in 19 out of 162 cases 
inspected. The ratio between the sanctioned unit cost and the agreed price 
to be paid to the sub-contractors is a factor three. 
Information from various sources shows that it is obvious that a 
tremendous racket had been engineered from 1993 onwards by a small 
group officers at the DMA. Many rules were flouted and it has been 
estimated that the 'leakage' in the scheme has been between Rs. 50-150 
million. On one occasion the director of the DMA said: 'You have to show 
some courage, otherwise nothing happens. You cannot take all the rules 
too strictly. In fact, I can do anything and nobody can stop me. And if they 
try, I am sure I will get away with it'. His statements do not signify so 
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much his involvement, but rather the mental make-up which has been the 
cause of officials getting involved in corrupt practices. 
Unfortunately, a scheme that has a noble goal has obtained a very 
bad name among the public. Unscrupulous and uncontrolled greed of some 
officials and politicians who connived with the contractors in order to 
make money undid the goal of the IPLCS&LS scheme at the cost of Rs. 
310 million. 
16 
The Role of Administration and Politicians in Urban 
Development Policies in Karnataka 
In the previous chapters the policies, programmes and schemes have been 
described and their successes and failures analysed. The experiences seem 
confusing and incomprehensible. What are we to learn from these 
experiences? The answer lies to a large extent in this chapter that aims to 
analyse two actors who have had a distinct role in the shaping and the 
implementation of these policies and schemes: the administration (in 
particular, the state bureaucracy) and the politicians (both state and local 
politicians). This chapter also reflects on those urban theories that bear 
relevance to this subject. I have drawn to a large extent on the feed-back 
and views that I received during the interviews I held with 34 state 
government officials, among them several senior bureaucrats . 
16.1 The polity 
For western scholars there are several pit-falls when one seeks to 
understand the Indian society and, particularly, the role of public 
administration and politics in urban development. A primary 
misconception would be to believe that there is a strict separation between 
the entities that make the law, that implement the law and that enforce the 
law: the Trias Politica. Although the Indian constitution is built on this 
1
 Most persons I interviewed for this study were very open-minded in providing their 
opinion and their identity has been concealed in order to avoid possible disciplinary 
action against them or to disable future research by others into this interesting area of 
urban governance and politics. 
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principle, the reality is much more diffused. As one senior bureaucrat 
explained: 'We have a hybrid system between an English-European 
administration and an inherited Muslim governance. Today, we have no 
strict separation between bureaucracy and politicians and it looks very 
similar to a feudal master-system'. He referred to the heyday of the 
Mughal empire when the administrative heads of the provinces (subedars) 
were appointed by the emperor, who wielded large powers. The subedars' 
multifarious duties had three main aspects - civil, military and judicial. 
Revenue and financial matters were exercised by the diwan, also appointed 
by the emperor. Both these officers had an array of officers under them, 
while mutual dependency was created with the ultimate power in the hands 
of the emperor. 
Today, one could say that the law makers (politicians) influence to a 
large extent the implementation of the law (the government machinery), 
and also - to an increasing extent - the enforcement of the law (the 
judiciary). In a recent example, a chief minister complained that he had not 
received sufficient support from his coalition partners and the prime 
minister's protection against inquiries about a multi-billion scam by thé 
judiciary". While the judiciary continues to protect their 'immunity' and 
resists encroachment by the politicians, an unknown number have given 
way and got involved in irregular practices. Recently, a number of 
contempt-of-court cases against both politicians and bureaucrats have 
illustrated their resistance to be co-opted. 
The blurring of the principle Trias Politica has been attempted more 
vigorously by the politicians than by the bureaucracy or the judiciary. The 
latter have rather tried to defend their immunity and to ward off the 
growing interference of the political and money power with different rates 
of success as argued above. 
16.2 From a Weberian to an opportunistic bureaucracy 
The shifts in balance of power between the bureaucracy and the politicians 
made the ideals of an Indian administrative system based on Weberian 
principles an illusion. Did such an administration ever exist? Going by the 
literature (Patnaik, 1974, Thakur, 1995, Singh 1994), the British had 
indeed established a bureaucratic elite (The Indian Civil Service) which 
2 , 
i.e. the Central Bureau of Investigation. 
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served them well in the late nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth 
century. A prescribed etiquette was to be followed dealing with the public, 
councillors, subordinates and superiors. The membership to the ICS 
imparted a sense of belonging to a privileged class, a respect for hierarchy, 
status, seniority and anonymity in exercising power. They had to be 
generalist, non-technical, impartial, anonymous, rule-minded and 
extremely adaptable. While the principles were truly Weberian, the 
structure of the administration was partly adopted from the Mughals and 
Muslims who had established a hierarchy of collectors and law keepers 
with far-reaching powers and military means. On the ground, the role of 
the bureaucracy was to maintain law and order and to make sure that 
revenues were collected and transferred to the coffers of the Empire. The 
bureaucrats had, thus, for centuries been the instruments of those who 
ruled, oppressed and exploited. 
Under the influence of the Independence movement and the mass 
support from the lower levels of the bureaucratic administration, the 
congruence with a Weberian bureaucracy blurred. When India established 
a parliamentary democracy in 1947, those who were part of the ICS 
adjusted poorly to the new political situation and tensions between the 
bureaucracy and politicians increased. Moreover, the freshly elected 
politicians found the top cadre of bureaucracy unfit as they had not 
convincingly contributed to the Independence struggle and had served the 
colonisers. The bureaucracy was trained to act upon the instructions of the 
colonisers, not to be development oriented or to develop and execute ideas 
to that effect. Jawaharlal Nehru was also apprehensive about these 
bureaucrats' ability to have a positive role in the development of the new 
and independent nation. And indeed, many bureaucrats confined their 
work after Independence to the traditional role of administration: control, 
maintaining and further developing procedures for revenue collection, law 
and order. During the two decades after Independence the bureaucrats were 
unable to rule alone, and yet no one else could rule without them; they 
could not always achieve their goals, but they could prevent others from 
achieving theirs; they were constrained by the political elite, were 
influenced by private interests and were constrained by them too; and they, 
for their part, constrained others. They were, thus, one of several veto 
groups in a pluralist political system. 
The ideal of an administrative officer to be impartial, to be 'a moral 
and political eunuch' and, on the other hand, forced to serve the political 
leadership has torn the administrative cadre apart. Many wished to 
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maintain a civil servant's detachment from public controversies so that 
public confidence in their impartiality and fairness may remain 
unimpaired; only through complete loyalty and devotion, a permanent civil 
service can serve the government. However, the political reality has been 
quite often the reverse and the neutrality of the Indian bureaucracy has 
been disputed by several authors. 'Indian bureaucracy during Congress 
rule was in collusion with Congress Party leaders and even senior officers 
actively worked for the personal or party interests of the Congress leaders. 
This was done in return for benefits of promotion and better jobs' writes 
Bhambri in The Indian Political Science Review (1971, p.52). 'Promotions 
and rewards no longer depend on merit but on political origins and partisan 
activities' added Prasad (1992, p. 117). Bhambri concluded: 'Hence, to say 
that our civil service is neutral, like many a priori truths, is a deception and 
falsehood'(1971, p. 53). 
A major shift in the balance of power took place when Indira Gandhi 
took office as prime minister in 1966. During her reign the politicisation of 
the bureaucracy took a strong leap. She called for a 'committed 
bureaucracy' in place of the old, indolent, passive, and apathetic one. The 
concept of a committed bureaucracy provided a cover for increasingly 
partisan interference by politicians in the affairs of administration and a 
witch hunt started after those who were not committed. The civil servant's 
response to this development has been twofold. A first group developed a 
mechanism of self-protection: by keeping to the existing rules and 
regulations, they avoided exposure or allegations of mal-administration or 
of poor performance and, at the same time, upholding the inherited 
impeccable status. This group of administrators was, however, slowly 
removed from the forefront of bureaucracy and placed at less essential 
posts. There was, however, a second and rapidly growing group of 
bureaucrats who began to seek and cultivate political affiliations. Their 
career and posting fortunes and misfortunes had become the result of the 
net balance of their political endeavour. It was also this group of officials 
who pursued personal and monetary benefits. The division among the 
bureaucrats characterises the current situation. Those with 'integrity, 
honesty and principles' are now confronted with those who are 
'opportunistic, unprincipled and corrupt', as one senior state government 
official phrased it. Personal differences have always existed which usually 
were settled indoors, never in public. The differences between 'honest' and 
'corrupt' bureaucrats has become increasingly public who show no 
restraint to settle their scores under the eyes of puzzled on-lookers. This 
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was illustrated recently when IAS officers publicly argued among 
themselves whether urban local bodies should receive more powers and the 
state government should speed up the devolution of powers and funds to 
the municipalities. While the matter would otherwise not trigger off public 
discussion, it was a demonstration of one group countering the 
representatives of the other side. Such an incident was unheard of two 
decades ago. The internal differences have, of course, not been unnoticed 
by the state politicians and they seek the co-operation of the opportunists, 
shield them and allow them to take a share of public means as a reward for 
their loyalty. Particularly, the former state cadre (KAS) who have been 
promoted to IAS seem very vulnerable to such attempts. On the other 
hand, the politicians aim to marginalise the 'honest' bureaucrats and the 
current transfer policy in Karnataka is an effective instrument to achieve 
that. 'The nexus between bureaucrats and politicians is getting more and 
more. They [the bureaucrats - hm] get corrupt, make money and live 
comfortably. I have seen many colleagues go like that', elucidated a 
former secretary to government. 'More than 50 percent of the IAS is 
corrupt; the unity is gone', said another. 
This development led to a schism between groups of IAS officers. 
While there was unity and solidarity among all IAS officers earlier, now 
there is envy, frustration, isolation, ridicule and a clash of interests. 
Melancholy because of what is lost and bitterness about what replaced it, 
became common feelings among civil servants. This melancholy was 
expressed by K. Subrahmanyam, an IAS officer and retired secretary to 
central government, when he wrote: 'IAS officers looked up to the chief 
secretary in the state who would stand by them and protect them from the 
local flak. Chief secretaries were able to play that role and had the 
necessary stature to be effective in that role' (Economic Times, 9 February 
1993). The esprit de corps in the service and their mutual trust have been 
destroyed by politicisation. 'If the sources of power [the political leaders -
hm] in a democracy are corrupt, unprincipled and rapacious, how can the 
instrumentalities [the bureaucrats - hm] be pure, honest and efficient?', 
Subrahmanyam questioned (ibid.). 
The established nexus between bureaucrats and politicians has also 
dissolved the mechanisms of 'checks and balances' (Long, 1966) in the 
polity and has allowed corruption to grow rampant. Corrupt politicians 
protect corrupt bureaucrats and vice-versa. This protection works as a 
network; vertically in an organisation between superiors and subordinates 
and horizontally between heads of departments. Ultimately, the judiciary 
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may also be 'involved' and their pursuit politically biased; going fast on 
exposed and unprotected cases and slow on politically well protected 
cases. Karnataka has had several cases which have been unresolved and 
delayed for many years: the Classile computers sale in 1992, the Ashraya 
housing scheme in 1992 and the low-cost sanitation scheme in 1994. 
In well developed bureaucracies, it is believed that administrative 
officers wield power over ignorant and frequently changing ministers; they 
have the advantage of institutional memory, a built-up expertise and access 
to information. In view of the above analysis, this power in Karnataka - in 
my view - would be overrated. Senior officers in Karnataka have lost these 
advantages as they are transferred almost annually, their supposed 
institutional memory decline as well as their departmental 'expertise'. In 
Karnataka, the annual migration season of IAS and KAS officers is from 
May to June and also whenever there is a new government. Hence, the 
balance of power has tilted towards the politicians. It has been remarkable 
that in almost all interviews the year 1969 was identified as the time when 
the politicisation of the bureaucracy was conceived. 
It seems unlikely that this may be the only reason for the present 
state of affairs. An additional root of the strenuous relationship are the 
normative features of the Weberian principles: merit, competition, 
specialisation and impersonality. Moreover, the elitist training and 
administrative powers that are entrusted to civil servants make them 
believe that they are placed above the interests of individuals, that they 
represent the common interest of the public at large and that they have the 
supreme, if not divine, power to distribute public goods. They also 
maintain a certain distance from the public so as not to become partial or 
biased in their judgement. This, in combination with the many IAS-officers 
recruited from the upper castes, makes them indeed the chosen, the divine 
and the supreme. Dharma and Weber prove to be a good match. In the 
eyes of many senior bureaucrats, most claims are particularist, representing 
only smaller sections of the public. Officials are of the view that they are 
not obliged to satisfy the demands of a single elected representative who 
may approach them. Such views and self-image have strained their 
relationship with politicians and bred mutual distrust and contempt. 
Following Haque's (1996) explanation, the Weberian principles and 
self-image have ignored the Indian cultural context. This context is filled 
with ritualism, ascriptive norms, caste structure, informality, extended 
family, seniority-based authority, collective responsibility (as against 
individual responsibility) and are essential values to the Indian society. 
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While the civil servant was to abide to his 'fonction publique', in an Indian 
context, however, he would have to renounce his private interests, deny his 
community, his dharma, his jati and extended family. Abiding to a 
Weberian aloofness would be equal to ignoring his social and cultural 
roots as well as his future. While in a western bureaucracy such an 
aloofness may be associated with integrity, in an Indian society, it may be 
seen as an insult to the community and violation of the rules of servility. 
While nepotism is a western concept which is morally incorrect, the same 
phenomenon may signify social responsibility and caring for the kin in an 
Indian context. There is, thus, an implicit dualism between what the 
bureaucracy would have liked to be and what it actually can be. 
The dualism is also illustrated by the apparent irrational process of 
decision making in bureaucracies. Civil servants in Karnataka do not tend 
to delegate decisions and the more senior a bureaucrat, the larger the 
number of files that await his signature. I do not agree with Lindblom's 
argument that bureaucratic output (decisions) is the result of an 
incremental process, characterised by a 'political rationale' of 
compromises, persuasion and trading between competing and conflicting 
interests. Lindblom (1959) referred to this process of decision making as 
'muddling through'; staged decision making with - on the face of it - little 
sense. Instead, decision making at the bureaucratic level is either inspired 
to satisfy the political masters (i.e. the minister or the local MLA) or is 
based on the 'seniority' of the bureaucrat. 'Seniority' is determined by the 
batch-year in which an officer enrolled into the state or Indian 
administrative service. On many occasions I have observed the ritual 
among bureaucrats in which the 'juniors' are allowed to speak and present 
their arguments but the final word and decision is at the discretion of the 
most senior officer; his word is supreme and unquestioned. The 
presentation of any valid arguments, expertise, merit or common sense 
may or may not be of relevance. Additionally, lack of information, 
expertise and institutional memory result into decisions without much 
consistency or rationale. 'Senior officers often think they know but are, in 
fact, hardly a specialist when they serve so shortly with a department', 
admitted a former secretary to government. I tend to agree with the 
analogy of the 'garbage can' as propagated by J.P. Olsen and J.G. March 
(1976). The Department of Housing and Urban Development may be taken 
as an example. They are indeed ambiguous as far as their intentions, the 
available knowledge, the objectives and organisational procedures are 
concerned. The institutional memory of the department is poor where civil 
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servants are regularly transferred and inexperienced with the subject 
matter. Moreover, lessons are hardly learnt from the department's history 
and this ambiguity gives life to inconsistent preferences, unclear 
operational procedures and a fluid participation in decision making. The 
analysis of the selection of projects in this research has illustrated a 
persistent irrational decision making process in which at times political 
pressures have played an overtone, at times the alertness of a local officer, 
the random submission of proposals and personal decision by the most 
senior officer of the agency. The 'garbage can' is indeed an appropriate 
analogy. 
When the Weberian principles for the bureaucracy prove to be an 
illusion, whom is the bureaucracy serving? The interests of the 'ruling 
classes', i.e. the larger agriculturists, land owners, plantation owners, 
industrialists, mine owners and upcoming urban business houses? Is the 
bureaucracy an instrument in their hands, docile and subordinate? One 
cannot deny that the bureaucracy has nurtured and maintained its own 
interest. The top bureaucracy continues to draw recruits from urban 
educated upper-caste communities who by and large do not belong to the 
aforementioned 'ruling classes'. In fact, the 'ruling classes' have met 
considerable resistance from the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats were 
'highly suspicious of private capital accumulation and often identified 
money-making in trade or industry with greed and dishonesty' (Bardhan, 
1984, p. 58). The socialist rhetoric of equality and distribution of state 
resources served these bureaucrats well and they ensured that favours to 
the 'ruling classes' were not given too easily. Indeed, 'anti-capitalist 
sentiments' are still very much alive in the contemporary Indian 
bureaucracy. When political interests in the vote-banks among the lower 
castes communities increased after the 1960s, the bureaucratic resistance 
also implied an upper-caste community defending their dwindling status 
and influence in society. The elaborate system and knowledge of 
procedures and licenses has been an effective tool to that end. 
The above analysis would not do justice to many bureaucrats I know 
who have a genuine commitment to development and try against all odds 
to make a contribution to the development of their nation and home state. 
Besides, the heavy centralisation of functions, the sheer unmanageable 
workload, the impossibility to know adequate details or to master 
sufficient expertise for the post they are holding, make the current state of 
affairs not their doing and a result of a long historic process in which they 
have had an insignificant role. As in many public sector institutions, 
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change toward a more efficient and rationalised system of public 
administration requires a high and continued political commitment, and a 
bureaucratic persistence for its implementation. Some of them have tried to 
make such changes, as was the case of the Karnataka Housing Board and 
the Directorate of Municipal Administration, but have failed as the 
political commitment and persistence was of short duration. 
16.3 Shifting power balance of state politicians vis-à-vis 
bureaucracy 
With administrative cadres falling apart, their unity eroding and their 
powers dwindling, the powers of politicians increased. The difference of 
authority between a senior civil servant and a local MLA is nowadays 
striking. A local MLA can barge into any government office and summon 
the civil servant of any rank to provide a better service and deal more 
promptly with the complaints that have come to his notice. This is 
particularly true for the MLAs who belong to the same party as the state 
government. Civil servants, including the IAS, can hardly refuse entry to 
these politicians. If they do, and some have, they can expect a call from 
their superior officer and receive a verbal thrashing for not showing 
sufficient respect to the representatives of the people. Civil servants who 
do not oblige also run the risk of being transferred shortly and posted in a 
remote and unwanted job. Several cases have been mentioned in earlier 
chapters. 
However, because of the sheer size of the bureaucracy, the limited 
numbers of politicians and their poor level of organisation, the power of 
the bureaucracy still remains considerable in those areas that are 
complicated, politically unrewarding or that are shielded from the 
politicians. An example are some of the central government schemes 
discussed in this book: the UBSP, the IDSMT and to some extent the NRY 
scheme. 'Complicated' schemes are those in which procedures, 
organisational set-up, sources and destinies of funds are not very visible 
and interference would imply risk and negative exposure. 'Politically 
unrewarding' are those in which the electoral gains are small as compared 
with the efforts that have to be made. 'Shielded' schemes are those which 
have a central government involvement and, at least in Karnataka, no 
sensible politician would like to antagonise the central government as 
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centre-state party politics may be involved. It is just 'not done' at this 
level. 
Except for these secluded areas, the state politicians in Karnataka 
have obtained a powerful position while the position of the bureaucracy 
has become increasingly volatile. 
16.4 Shifting societal powers seeking intermediation by 
pluralist political parties 
It is another misconception that India resembles a pluralist society where 
various interest groups succeed in some form and to some degree to defend 
their interests. The concept of an interest group that is organised through a 
society or association is quite rare. Businesses, consumers, house owners, 
tenants are not organised on a large or permanent scale in India and 
Karnataka. An exception may be the labour unions of, for example, 
municipal workers and factory workers. Only recently, in Bangalore, 
groups of citizens organised themselves to protest against the deterioration 
of living conditions but the level of organisation and the ability to mobilise 
public opinion is still in its infancy. 'Pluralism' in the Karnataka context 
rather exists between parties and, more so, between factions within a single 
party. As the many 'interest groups' are not organised independently, they 
liaise with factions within a party and try to pursue their goals. It may be 
no surprise that parties are a myriad of interests and, thus, the much 
desired party discipline and unity has become an oddity. Particularly the 
Congress(I) party is an amalgam of party members representing various 
contradicting societal interest groups. Manor, a reputed Karnataka scholar, 
observed that after 1980 'it is no longer possible for any single set of social 
forces to exercise dominance in state-level and supra-local politics in 
Karnataka' (Manor, 1989, p. 84). The two parties that have dominated 
politics in Karnataka in the last fifteen years - the Congress and Janata 
(Dal) Party - have now to seek a broad basis among the various interest 
groups and communities. 
Who do the politicians represent, what 'societal interest groups' do 
they serve? It is a misconception to think that an urban elite is ruling the 
cities or the state today. In the early days of urban governance, the local 
councillors and state politicians were indeed elected from among the local 
advocates, teachers, doctors, respected (upper-caste) families, freedom 
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fighters, industrialists, etc. Governing power was, thus, based on 
education, knowledge, status and respect. This has changed drastically and 
more politicians have positioned themselves in politics because of the 
wealth derived from agricultural lands, businesses and communal origins. 
It is not necessarily their own wealth but could very well be the wealth of 
their sponsors. In other words, 'money power' has become a prerequisite 
for gaining political power. Indian parties also expect lavish donations to 
the party-coffers from aspirant politicians. Moreover, electioneering also 
demands increasing amounts of money for campaigning and showering 
gifts and favours. Without a sponsor, politicians stand hardly a chance 
today. At the state level, one can observe that more MLAs originate from 
the land-owning classes. 'Leaders were previously from the urban elite, 
educated in the western tradition. Today the leaders are from the rural 
landowners class', concluded a former chief secretary. The urban elite has 
slowly been expelled from state politics and was replaced by a rural elite 
who brought along values and standards which have been described in 
various studies as a system of patronage (Bardhan, 1984, Baken, 1996). 
One can argue that state governance has been transformed from an urban 
elite system into a rural feudal system. Particularly dominant across the 
parties are the vokkaligas and lingayats who tussle for power from one 
government to the next. 
In urban areas, the new economic powers of commerce, business 
houses, liquor and estate development have distinctively emerged (See 
chapter 5). However, one will only find a few of them among the state's 
politicians. Instead, the emerging (urban) economic powers have 
developed liaison with the state politicians, supporting their parties and 
their (individual) struggles for power financially. In such a system of 
political representation, there will be winners and losers. Winners are those 
lobbies that are economically powerful and resourceful and losers are 
those without such means: the urban poor and a large section of the urban 
middle class. It is no wonder that there is a large degree of frustration and 
cynicism among these groups. The urban poor have not had any pressure 
groups to defend their plea for better housing and basic amenities. 
Nonetheless, their situation has been mitigated by government policies that 
aimed to fight poverty which has ensured that outlays were reserved for 
housing and infrastructure, however, in a minimal and half-hearted 
manner. In the preceding chapter, it has been illustrated that the various 
schemes had a very limited, rather physical perspective on the production 
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of commodities without any aim for urban growth or long-term socio-
economic development of the urban poor. 
The skewed political representation is also demonstrated by the 
weakness of internal party democracy and of the institutions of the 
dominant parties in Karnataka. Consultations with the electorate, party 
members or party workers is very poorly institutionalised and more so 
personalised. There are no fora, party congresses or a culture of party 
assemblies in which overall policies are framed, achievements are 
addressed and mischief punished. The formulation of the political agenda 
is determined by a few party foremen and is more a response to 
contemporary electoral concerns and to a perceived opportunity to gain 
political or even personal mileage. Many say, and I tend to agree, that 
India's politics are 'issue-based' and less oriented to a long-term strategy 
or policy. The little political interest in policy making and five-year 
planning is an ample example of this. In conclusion, the organisation and 
the system of representation of political parties in Karnataka show a poor 
electoral accountability (Jones in Judge et al, p. 74). Apparently, once 
elected one cannot afford to bother too much about long-term goals as the 
politician's life-cycle may be very short. The 'investments' have to met by 
'returns' quickly. Those who sponsor matter more than those who cast 
their vote. 
16.5 Machine politics at the local level 
I have not dealt with the politics at the local level, i.e. in the councils and 
corporations of Karnataka. The earlier chapters have illustrated that the 
politicians after election assume the role of intermediaries for many 
households, particularly the poor who would otherwise not know how to 
successfully access government institutions and civil servants. The concept 
of 'machine politics', developed by Steffens (1963) and further explained 
by Scott (1972), provides a useful analogy. Scott's defined three 
prerequisites under which machine politics can emerge which I consider 
applicable to the politics at local level in Karnataka. These are: 
(a) Political power at local level is fragmented among candidates of the 
major parties and the independent candidates who switch sides 
whenever that would yield better results. Their power is determined 
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by the behaviour of the voters during elections. The electorate cast 
their votes by judging what benefits they have received from the 
previous councillors and how confident they are that the candidate 
may serve them better and has some stake in local politics. Good 
councillors are those that provide them the most; 
(b) There is a growing ethnic cleavage and growing social 
disorganisation between lower and upper castes, between vokkaligas 
and lingayats, and between Hindus and Muslims. A low level of 
education among the majority of voters makes them vulnerable to 
manipulation and dependent on help for getting access to 
bureaucracies, finance, services and shelter; and 
(c) A majority of the electorate is indeed poor and their only tradable 
asset is their vote. In such circumstances, the interest of the poorer 
electorate is short-run and material. The electoral behaviour is, 
however, rather opportunistic with the result that councillors change 
quite often. 
Pre- and post-electioneering is accompanied by patronage, by 
intermediation through local middle-men who lock in the electorate while 
they exert protectionism and expel other contestants from accessing the 
vote banks. A mud-slinging campaign may be adopted or intimidation, 
threats and - at times - brutal violence (Baken, 1996). Once in power, the 
struggle to stay continues and fellow party-men, opposition members and 
independents have to be co-opted, sometimes by payments as one former 
president reported in Chikmagalur. 
Scott argued that India 'has not been characterised by the growth of 
urban machines' (1972, p. 136) and explained that local politicians would 
bank on their own established economic wealth and social status and not 
be dependent on party support to continue their reign. In the case-studies, 
however, it has been apparent that few local politicians can rely on their 
own wealth and most have relied on sponsors: local business houses, 
liquor barons, agriculturists, etc. These sponsors wielded considerable 
power over their protégés and over the favours and disfavours that are 
distributed to electorate. Also after elections the support has to ensure 
access to and stake in the local administration. I would, therefore, argue 
that the 'urban machine' is very much existent at the local level in 
Kamataka. 
At the project level, the much talked about participatory, need-based 
or 'bottom-up' project planning processes have not been established in 
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schemes that could and should have benefited from such processes: the 
mass housing schemes of the KHB and KSCB, the NRY, the IDSMT and 
the low-cost sanitation schemes. Bureaucrats, local municipal officers and 
politicians have no attitude or training in such approaches. The only 
positive exception is the UBSP in which through a rigid organisational set-
up and procedures a participatory approach had successfully been 
established. In the words of Haque (1996), such desired processes may 
again be culturally 'contextless' and are not a reflection of how decisions 
are usually taken at the various levels. Moreover, who is to benefit from 
sharing decision making power? The little interest in bottom-up processes 
is also reflected in the weak democratic organisation of the political parties 
at the local level. Party members are directed by personal interests and by 
their sponsors, and not by a common party discipline or party manifesto. 
Solid party unity does not exist as the councillors, to whatever parties they 
belong, have become the mercenaries of local princes; 'For mercenaries 
are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined, and disloyal; they are brave 
among friends and cowards before the enemy' (N. Machiavelli in The 
Prince, translated by G. Bull, 1995, p. 38). Most politicians, unfortunately, 
will only seek to fulfil their own interest, pay lip-service to all and show a 
good deal of opportunism as far as the electorate is concerned. 
Participation is not a benefit to those who are in power or to those who 
manipulate those in power. The electorate is taken rather for granted after 
elections and otherwise made dependent through 'machine politics'; 'That 
he who builds on the people builds on mud... Therefore a wise prince must 
device ways by which his citizens are always and in all circumstances 
dependent on him and on his authority; and then they will always be 
faithful to him' (ibid., p.32 and p. 33). 
16.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has argued that the constitutional principle of Trias Politica is 
exposed to severe erosion by politicians who aim to enlarge their influence 
over the administrative and even the judicial functions of the state. They 
have succeeded to a large extent to co-opt the bureaucracy and have made 
some headway in gaining control over the judiciary as well. The erstwhile 
ideal of a Weberian-style bureaucracy barely exists anymore and most 
bureaucrats have done away with those principles and have taken the 
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benefits of co-option. Those who are still principled are being 
marginalised. Moreover, the unity and loyalty that existed among 
particularly the top bureaucracy (IAS) is fading and a schism has been 
observed. May be it was meant to be. When we follow Haque's (1996) 
argument, a Weberian-style bureaucracy is out of place in India and does 
not fit in a society that has inherited another more feudal and autocratic 
pattern of decision making and exerting power. The reality of state politics 
is comparable to an Indian form of pluralism. Lobby groups and economic 
power houses are not organised in a western style but use their political 
channels in an opportunistic manner to defend their interests. The party 
does not matters, but the results do. While the state politicians lend an ear 
to these groups, the voice of the urban poor and urban middle class is lost. 
At the local level, the theoretical concept of 'machine politics' (Scott, 
1972) was found appropriate to explain the interaction between the 
electorate, the powerful, the local administration and the politicians. In 
such a constellation, public participation in decision making and electoral 
accountability have to be and were indeed observed to be low. 
17 
Summary and Conclusions 
'Why is it that after so many years, urban development does not take place 
as we want to? What are the factors that have been hampering our policies? 
What has gone wrong and where can we take away those causes and 
improve urban development?' posed the Principal Secretary for Urban 
Development in 1997 during a seminar, provoking the audience. Indeed, 
housing shortages have remained as large as ever, cities and towns remain 
poorly serviced by water supply, sanitation and drainage, migration to the 
largest cities continues unabated and their growth has proved 
uncontrollable and unstoppable despite government policies, regulations 
and interventions. This chapter seeks to answer the same questions that 
triggered off this research in 1994. In the sections below the output and 
outcome of Karnataka's housing and urban development policies have 
been elaborated and the factors are discussed that have contributed to the 
current state of affairs. 
This research had taken a selection of housing and infrastructure 
schemes as indicators for the output and outcome of the Karnataka's 
housing and urban development policies. These schemes were 
implemented between 1980-94 by the agencies reporting to the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Government of 
Karnataka. They included mass low-cost housing schemes implemented by 
the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) and the Karnataka Slum Clearance 
Board (KSCB), the composite housing schemes implemented by the KHB, 
water supply schemes of the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board (KUWS&DB), the scheme for the Integrated Development of Small 
and Medium Towns, the Nehru Rozgar Yojana urban employment scheme, 
the scheme for Urban Basic Services for the Poor and low-cost sanitation 
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schemes all four so-called central government sponsored schemes and 
implemented by the Directorate for Municipal Administration (DMA). A 
detailed research has been conducted of 172 municipalities in the state, 
including six corporations. An in-depth study was made of seven urban 
local bodies2 where several housing and infrastructure schemes were 
implemented between 1980-94. To facilitate analysis, three indices have 
been developed and applied for each municipality: a development index, a 
financial status index and a political affiliation index (See chapter 9). The 
development efforts of the 21 urban development authorities have been 
excluded as sufficient data could not be collected or generated. 
17.1 Output of housing and urban development policies in 
Karnataka 
Between 1980 and 1994, 287 housing schemes and 335 urban development 
schemes were sanctioned by the Government of Karnataka, Department of 
Housing and Urban Development at the cost of Rs. 21.8 billion (US$ 725 
million ). Urban development schemes include water supply, low-cost 
sanitation, sewerage but also a few so-called central government sponsored 
schemes. Almost 90 per cent of this amount went into water supply (48 per 
cent) and housing schemes (41 per cent). Approximately 70,000 housing 
units were completed and at least one out of twenty urban families could 
have obtained or bought a house from the KHB and KSCB. This number 
could have doubled if more schemes had been completed. With regard to 
water supply, the government spent Rs. 499 per citizen to augment water 
supply in one-third of the municipalities in the state. As of now, these 
municipalities have an average water production capacity of 75 litres per 
capita while other urban areas have only 50 litres per capita per day (State 
Finance Commission, 1996). A number of central government schemes 
The central government provides a subsidy or loan, while the state government, 
municipality or beneficiary contribute a matching amount. 
2
 Municipalities and urban local bodies are interchangeably in this research and should 
not be confused with the definitions of urban agglomerations used by the Karnataka 
Municipalities Act, 1976 or by the national census. 
3
 The exchange rate between 1980-1994 changed from Rs. 20 to Rs. 35 per US$. As 
most investments occurred toward the second half of the 1980s and during the 1990s, an 
exchange rate of Rs. 30 per US$ has been applied. 
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helped selected groups of citizens to improve their livelihood and living 
conditions. The scheme for the Integrated Development of Small and 
Medium Towns benefited 51 municipalities in Karnataka and created a 
welcome improvement to their economic infrastructure. Daily markets 
were improved and shopping complexes added. These amenities also 
generated additional revenue. The Nehru Rozgar Yojana scheme benefited 
almost all urban areas and created between 14,000-34,000 man-years 
employment. The scheme succeeded in reaching 10-15 per cent of the 
urban poor. The scheme for Urban Basic Services for the Poor reached 
more than 400,000 beneficiaries according to official records which is 
almost 15 percent of the urban slum population. The low-cost sanitation 
schemes in Karnataka could have had another major impact as it aimed in 
52 towns to replace all bucket latrines and provide all houses without a 
toilet with a two-pit pour flush latrine. At least 10 per cent of the families 
in these towns acquired such a latrine. 
In other words, the physical output of Karnataka's housing and 
urban development policies that took shape in the above mentioned 
schemes have been noticeable and commendable. Particularly the central 
government sponsored schemes have yielded positive results. 
17.2 Outcome of housing and urban development policies in 
Karnataka 
The outcome of the policies has to be assessed against the objectives of the 
schemes. The common objective of all housing schemes is to reduce the 
housing shortage and to provide housing to those who cannot easily 
acquire land or a house through the market. The range of urban 
development schemes aimed, in a nutshell, to either improve the water 
supply and sanitation situation, to improve living conditions, to reduce 
urban unemployment and to generate income for the poor, or to stem the 
migration stream to the larger cities by creating sufficient infrastructure in 
the intermediate cities in the state. Urban poverty alleviation and a 
balanced economic and demographic growth of urban areas have been the 
overall goal of these schemes in the subsequent five-year plans and other 
policy statements of the government. 
While the output by the agencies has been commendable, the actual 
outcome is far less impressive. A first observation is that the distribution 
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of investments was considerably skewed with Bangalore alone receiving 
67 per cent of all housing and urban development investments between 
1980-94. Another handful of cities absorbed a further 10-20 per cent while 
the remainder was thinly spread over a large number of smaller towns. 
Ninety towns did not receive a single housing project between 1980-94 
and 25 cities were excluded from urban development investments 
altogether. This was in contrast to the intended policies of balanced 
economic and demographic development. 
The actual production of housing remained a fraction of the 
estimated shortage, i.e. only 4 per cent. Also housing schemes were 
concentrated around the Bangalore-Mysore axis. Two-third of the 
investment between 1980-94 went to this area ignoring several districts 
with high housing shortages (e.g. Kunigal, Uttara Kannada and Raichur). 
Out of 172 urban local bodies, 161 received very small schemes or none at 
all. These areas grew much faster than the Bangalore-Mysore axis between 
1981-91 and would have justified more housing schemes. The selection of 
schemes has in no way contributed to the sought after urban dispersal 
policies. It has been argued that the concentration of housing schemes 
around the Bangalore-Mysore axis has, in fact, been counter-productive to 
this intended policy. There has been no co-ordination with other agencies 
responsible for slum upgradation, water supply, low-cost sanitation and the 
central government sponsored schemes. A better outcome could also have 
been achieved if the KHB had concentrated on mass low-cost housing 
schemes. In fact, the KHB showed little interest in these schemes. Their 
disinterest led to poor results and performance: incomplete schemes, 
poorly constructed and serviced houses and wide-spread irregularities. It 
has also been observed that due to price escalation of conventional housing 
schemes, low-income families were excluded. Additional payments to 
compensate for the price escalation were beyond their financial 
capabilities. Moreover, the completed schemes remained for several years 
unoccupied for want of basic amenities such as water, roads and 
electricity. Both the KHB and KSCB attached little importance to speedy 
completion of projects and allotment to beneficiaries. This is neither in the 
interest of the targeted group or the financial viability or replicability of 
the projects. The sustainability of particularly low-cost housing schemes 
has become, thereby, questionable as recovery of loans is almost non-
A housing shortage of 1.6 million for the year 1990 was mentioned in the Annual 
Report of 1991-92. 
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existent. Only in the low-volume composite housing schemes a reasonable 
level of repayment and discipline has been observed in the seven case-
studies. Those who obtained a house were reasonably satisfied and 
considered their house a substantial improvement over their previous 
situation. It is regrettable that such widespread appreciation has not been a 
driving force for the housing agencies to increase their efforts. In the case-
studies, there is a reasonable congruence between the house type of 
composite housing schemes (EWS, LIG and MIG/HIG) and the income of 
the households. On the other hand, many original allottees have sold off or 
rented out their houses shortly after allotment. This is in violation of the 
Karnataka Housing Board Rules (1964) and erodes the principle of 
equitable distribution and the cross-subsidy to lower-income families. The 
analysis illustrated that schemes were selected and implemented by criteria 
other than policy directions, stated housing shortage, urban growth, the 
magnitude of slums or the needs of the target group. Schemes were neither 
selected to have optimal co-ordination with the investments by other 
agencies. 
Most water supply schemes were selected on the basis of the 
existing water shortage. It has been observed that there was no correlation 
between the per capita investment and the stated water supply after the 
completion of the project. It suggests that there is not much evidence to 
believe that investments have led to a better water supply situation. The 
sustainability of water supply schemes in Karnataka is seriously 
undermined by costly designs and by the lack of consideration for the 
financial position of the municipalities. In fact, in most cases the 
municipalities are not in a position to make the obligatory capital 
investments or to conduct routine maintenance after the assets are handed 
over by the KUWS&DB. Moreover, most schemes are faced with serious 
cost and time overruns adding to the financial burden. The stated water 
production figures by the KUWS&DB (State Finance Commission, 1996) 
were not matched by the supply observed during field observations. In 
most cities, water is still supplied for not more than a few hours per day. 
The supply of water in municipalities in the northern part of Karnataka for 
just one or two hours every other day is more common. Erratic power 
supply, shortage of municipal revenues, backlog of maintenance and 
repairs, and insufficient staff are reasons for this situation. The de-
pressurisation of water lines leads to intrusion of polluted ground water 
and sub-optimal functioning of the treatment plant. Moreover, during the 
few hours of supply, water pressure is low due to heavy demand and 
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leakage. Safe drinking water is, thus, still a distant dream for many. 
Depending on their financial capacity, households store water in vessels, 
build ground tanks, overhead tanks and install their own borewell. Costs 
are, thus, incurred by the households for making such arrangements and 
for medical treatment as the result of illness caused by polluted water. It is 
obvious that particularly the urban poor suffer. 
The scheme for Integrated Development of Small and Medium 
Towns (IDSMT) is the oldest central government sponsored scheme in 
Karnataka. The objective of the IDSMT is to stem the migration to larger 
cities by providing basic economic facilities and infrastructure in smaller 
and medium towns. The achievements in Karnataka have been 
commendable as the state government has been committed to this scheme 
right from its inception in 1980. By creating better assets in municipalities, 
being flexible to local circumstances and remaining receptive to changes 
when experiences have accumulated, the IDSMT scheme is probably one 
of the best schemes that has been offered to small and medium towns. 
However, there is no evidence that the ambitious objectives have been 
achieved. In fact, urban areas with an IDSMT scheme grew as fast as those 
without a scheme. The outcome has been effected by the fact that too many 
towns were selected, spreading the investment too thin. With only Rs. 52 
per capita spent in these municipalities one cannot expect a tangible 
impact. Co-ordination with other departments, tuning the project to the 
repayment capacity of the municipalities and a more careful selection of 
the towns would have improved the outcome of this scheme. None of these 
considerations have played a role. Ironically, much larger schemes went to 
the Bangalore city where, for example, four times as much is to be spent 
per capita under the Mega-City project. The contradiction between urban 
policy statements and the actual state government investment priorities is 
once again irreconcilable. 
The NRY urban employment scheme has been another 
commendable central government sponsored scheme and proves that when 
a state government is committed positive results can be achieved. Field-
level feed-back illustrated that it reached the urban poor, among them 
many women, generated productive assets and employment. Municipalities 
were also enthused by the scheme and many have benefited. After its 
promising start in 1991-93, the scheme slowed down. A crunch of funds« 
operational problems and poor repayment were the causes. As the scheme 
was temporary and incidental in nature, a significant impact on the urban 
un(der)employment could not be made. An estimate showed that between 
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1989-94 not more that 0.1 per cent of total man-years of un 
(der)employment had been absorbed by this scheme. The outcome was 
further tempered by the poor performance of the KHB in the 
implementation of the Scheme for Housing and Shelter Upgradation 
(SHASU), a component of the NRY. The wide-spread intermediation and 
payment of commissions to intermediaries in the Scheme for Urban Micro-
Enterprise (SUME) and the impossibility of local banks to proceed with 
this component due to wide-spread non-recovery of loans have been other 
reasons for the disappointing outcome of this scheme. 
The scheme Urban Basic Services for the Urban Poor (UBSP) with 
its multi-fold objectives succeeded in establishing neighbourhood 
committees, in mobilising resident community volunteers and convenors, 
and helped - to some extent - to promote and inculcate group spirit and 
self-help among slum communities through education and awareness 
campaigns, particularly among women. The organisation of balwadis 
(Kindergartens) and adult education centres have helped in this regard. The 
household interviews have indicated that the social welfare and monetary 
support extended have been effective and appreciated by many. However, 
the field work also suggested that a much smaller group of women and 
children have benefited as compared to the official statistics. A long-term 
impact has been diminished by the inadequate follow-up of initiated 
activities by other departments (Health, Social Welfare, Education). It 
proved difficult to kindle the interest of these departments, to spare their 
people and resources for the same location and at the same time. Even 
within the Housing and Urban Development Department it was shown that 
joint project implementation is more coincidental than not and that these 
interventions were not necessarily at the same time or in the same locality. 
Thus, the desired convergence only partially took place. The UBSP 
became - over a period of time and as with many other schemes - an 
independent and parallel activity. The proposed participation did take 
place but with a divergent purpose. This was caused by the differences in 
perception or why there should be participation. While the programme 
writers believed this may have an intrinsic value for the community per se, 
the implementers saw participation as instrumental - and at times -
obligatory in order to get the programme going. The beneficiaries, on the 
other hand, saw it as a necessary effort to be traded against the anticipated 
benefits. The principle of cost-effectiveness has - by and large - been 
achieved as the financial inputs have been modest when compared to the 
physical outputs. However, the UBS(P) has not been successful in 
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generating its own means and in reducing the dependency on state project 
funds. 
The analysis of low-cost sanitation schemes in Karnataka seems to 
teach us that larger schemes invite major failures. This has been 
particularly true for the IPLCS&LS scheme implemented by the DMA. 
Other schemes had been modest in size, in expectations and in demands of 
the beneficiaries. Their outcome has been reasonably successful. The 
IPLCS&LS scheme was torpedoed by unscrupulous and uncontrolled 
greed of some officials and politicians who undid the noble goals of the 
scheme. Many towns in Karnataka have been decorated with stone and 
masonry structures which are neither completed nor have been put to its 
intended use. As a result, urban low-cost sanitation improved only very 
marginally. A staggering amount of Rs. 310 million has been wasted, 
scavengers have not been liberated, let alone rehabilitated. 
17.3 Factors that contributed to the output and outcome 
To explain the harsh realities of housing and urban development in the 
state of Karnataka, one cannot provide simple explanations or single 
theories. In this research the interface between politics, government and 
the citizenry plays an important role for which the theories, concepts and 
empirical work of urban sociology and public administration disciplines 
proved of value. The theoretical framework that was explored in chapter 
three provided some tools to make cross-references to scientific research 
and theory-building elsewhere, but these -1 have to admit - have been used 
in a rather eclectic5 manner. I do not pretend to have suitable theories or 
full explanations either, and one has probably to admit that as Mark Tully, 
a former BBC correspondent, phrased it that there are 'no full stops in 
India' when explaining the multi-faced and layered reality. However, there 
were a few warnings. Rüland (1988) cautioned against a legal-institutional 
approach for analysis. Acknowledging his warning, I have followed an 
approach where I have tried to uncover power structures and patterns of 
decision-making and which Rüland called the 'penetrated system' 
approach. While this would suffice as an approach, several factors have 
'not following any one system, as of philosophy, medicine, etc., but selecting and 
using what are considered the best elements of all systems* (The Random House 
Compact Unabridged Dictionary, 1996). 
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been identified and interrelated in the conceptual model presented in 
chapter two. These included the common perception of the role of 
government in development, the socialist tradition of central planning, the 
manner in which the government institutions have been set up, the role of 
bureaucracy, politics and receiving local governments, communities and 
beneficiaries. 
Semi-autonomous urban development forces 
Despite the institutional, legal and policy framework, the reality of urban 
development in India is foremost a semi-autonomous process of 
development. Domestic savings and also black money are spent for 
inflation-proof purposes: jewellery, land and property. The domestic 
savings were about Rs. 1,500 billion in 1991-92 (Dart and Sundharam, 
1995). The exact magnitude of black money is not known, but amounts to 
more than Rs. 3,000 billion or 50 per cent of the Gross National Product 
(Gupta, 1992). Between 12-16 per cent is generated from real estate while 
11 per cent is generated through leakage from public sector investments. 
These amounts are to a large extent reinvested in land and property and 
have been a major force in shaping urban India. The investments by the 
Government of Karnataka in housing and urban development are indeed 
only a small fraction6. The circulation of particularly black money distorts 
sectors where it can be whitewashed more easily, leading to undesirable 
price escalation and contributing to currency inflation. This is particularly 
true for real estate, luxury housing, interior decoration, dowry and 
jewellery. While little research is done in this area, private capital has 
undoubtedly accelerated the conversion of peripheral agricultural and 
unused lands into plots, housing constructions, vertical and horizontal 
expansion, and encroachments. And little had been done to control these 
urban forces by a government that is unable and - at times - unwilling to 
control such developments. 
While the magnitude of black money and domestic savings, or the extent to which 
these are reinvested into housing and properties, is not known for the state of Karnataka, 
my estimate is that the contribution of the state government to the housing and urban 
development sector is not more than 5 per cent and more likely closer to 1 per cent. 
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The perceived role of government 
The government perceived its role as controlling, creating and steering 
urban development. Their policies and schemes were designed to serve 
several ambitious - at times contradicting - goals: to undo the historical 
social inequalities and bring about equity, to stimulate economic 
development, to enhance a balanced urbanisation pattern, to create 
employment, to reduce the housing shortage and the deficit in 
infrastructure services. The goals were, however, not matched by adequate 
funds and their achievement constrained by poorly equipped institutions. 
What is remained remote and disconnected from what should have been. 
This contrast can be observed at several levels: between what the central 
government wants and what the state governments do, what the five-year 
plans intend and what the agencies actually do, what the politicians say 
and what they do, and between what the guidelines prescribe and what the 
executives in the field do. 
Any change has been slowed down by a well engrained caution, 
conservatism, the fear of losing control, unsettling the existing social and 
administrative order. The administrative and political history of India 
provides an explanation for this conservatism. For example, Karnataka had 
an autocratic and elitist administration which maintained order and 
collected revenues under the Mughals and the British. It was founded on 
the long tradition of a societal hierarchy (reinforced by a Hindu caste 
system). Power could be maintained by selectively supporting and 
ignoring the inward-looking and segregated communities which showed 
little interest in what happens to the society as a whole. By birth (or jati), 
some communities have the right to control and rule, and others to be ruled 
and to serve. Urban and educated (upper-caste) middle-class have wielded 
considerable influence in the government machinery and only very 
recently lower-caste communities have made their presence felt in 
administrative functions. Besides an urban elite, two competing 
communities have acquired considerable influence in state politics: the 
land holding and crop growing communities of the vokkaligas and 
lingayats. Their struggle for political power has contributed to a strong 
focus on rural development and a negligence of urban (economic) 
development. The history of political control in the government has for 
most years after Independence been the story of the Congress party. Only 
recently the BJP and Janata Dal parties have become serious contenders. 
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This change in the political balance of powers has brought about the need 
to form broad-based coalitions and the emergence of unstable 
governments. This instability has not been conducive for major policy 
changes, whether they are economic liberalisation, privatisation, 
decentralisation or deregulation of government. 
The role of government agencies in the urban sector has been rather 
permissive, at the most regulatory but less so developmental. As is 
commonly known commissions and bribes help to acquire official property 
documents, building permits, service connections, etc., without particular 
planning control and often ignoring outline development plans. Cities 
grow, thus, in an organic way with economies that are adaptable, 
diversified and dynamic, in which one sector can expand rapidly while 
another declines equally fast. While the major industries and business 
houses determine for a part the wealth and poverty of the citizenry, there is 
always the vast mass of petty businessmen, manufacturers, traders, 
suppliers and retailers providing employment and income to the majority 
of families. Their decisions, their money determines where economic 
functions will be located, where land is converted and where houses will 
come up. 
Recent attempts by the central government to reduce government 
control, to facilitate development by non-government parties and seeking 
partnership failed to root in the housing and urban development sector. To 
exert government control and to have access to public funds has also been 
an instrument for politicians to settle political equations favourably. 
Deregulation would, thus, undermine the base of their political power. 
Centre-state relationship 
The central government aimed through its national housing and urban 
development policies to exert control over state governments in areas that 
are constitutionally state subjects. One reason is that most state 
governments are rather slow in recognising emerging problems and even 
slower in conceiving adequate solutions. The central government had, 
thus, the urge to intervene but was, however, not able to impose these 
policies. To get around this problem the central government sponsored 
schemes. Detailed guidelines prescribed not only how the project should 
be formulated but also provided many details on implementation 
procedures, organisational set-up, reporting routines, technology choice, 
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repayment schedules and materials to be used. In some schemes they 
succeeded in imposing such details on the state governments, for example 
the IDSMT and the UBSP schemes, while in others the central government 
was curtailed in its attempts such as in the NRY scheme and the low-cost 
sanitation schemes. The highly sophisticated and paternalistic guidelines 
of, for example the UBSP, illustrate the little confidence that the 
programme makers had in state government and their agencies. Moreover, 
the elaborate administrative requirements proved a burden to the project 
staff and they had to spend considerable time on project administration and 
less on field work as was observed in the studied towns. 
Another area where the central government has successfully exerted 
control over the state governments is through its financing institution - the 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDCO). The prescribed 
financing pattern and cost ceilings for EWS, LIG and MIG/HIG helped 
ensure that housing schemes were targeted at lower income groups. The 
KHB and KSCB by themselves would not have been so considerate. 
Nonetheless, the bulk of investment in housing and urban 
development remained within the purview of the state government. More 
than 85 per cent of all investments in housing and urban development 
between 1980-94 in Karnataka remained sole state government endeavours 
where no direct central government control was possible. The financial 
outlay and actual achievements of central government sponsored schemes 
have, in fact, been rather small. Moreover, these schemes were handled by 
the Department for Town Planning and the Directorate of Municipal 
Administration, agencies that are small and unable to implement large 
programmes. The real movers of urban development under the Department 
for Housing and Urban Development were the housing and water supply 
boards, i.e. the Bangalore Development Authority, the Bangalore Water 
Supply and Sewerage Board, the Karnataka Housing Board and the 
Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board. 
National and state housing and urban development policies 
National policy documents and five-year plans provide the broad policy 
framework for state governments. These documents appealed to the state 
governments to develop their own housing and urbanisation policies, build 
with low-cost technologies, seek partnership with the private sector and 
non-governmental organisations, encourage greater community 
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participation, improve linkages between water supply and sanitation and 
pricing systems, etc. They also reviewed developments and observed 
regularly the negative trends and shortcomings of implemented policies. 
The national policies provided strategies to overcome these. The national 
Seventh and Eighth Five-Year Plans, the report of the National 
Commission on Urbanisation (1988) and the National Housing Policy 
(1992) are such examples. In spite of these observations and suggestions, 
clear policy guidelines or reforms were not offered that could induce these 
changes. Moreover, promising strategies in these national five-year plans 
and policy statements carried little importance for state government 
policies and even less for the selection and implementation of schemes. 
One reason is that, the central government lacked political courage and 
avoided confrontation. Another reason is that, the central government also 
did not know how to bring about these reforms and satisfied itself by 
merely mentioning the need for these changes and providing a poor service 
to the states that had to implement them. 
On the part of the state government's five-year plans and policy 
statements, a weak relationship was provided between overall development 
goals - sometimes adopted from the national five-year plans and policy 
documents - and the schemes that have to support these. The Eighth Five-
Year Plan, for example, lacks consistency between analysis, objectives, 
targets, activities and outlays. The various chapters on water supply, 
sewerage, housing and urban development are unconnected and have been 
prepared by individual agencies without much cross-references or final 
editing by the secretaries of each department or the planning department. 
In addition, the criteria for efficacy and effectiveness, or specific targets 
and indicators for performance were not provided. Unconnected physical 
targets have become the overriding yard-stick and a sufficient justification 
for political and budgetary support. 
It has been argued that these agencies demonstrate a strong focus on 
what, rather than on why от for whom. Their budget proposals lacked any 
existential questions, a linkage to overall state development policies or a 
proper justification for their projects. There is a scant reference to national 
and even state government plans and policy statements. As a result, 
contradictions between what policy documents recommend and what is 
actually done occur frequently. It was also observed that while in early 
five-year plans there was a vague notion of objective-driven formulation of 
schemes, this changed into a agency-driven formulation of schemes. The 
five-year plans serve a mere administrative and budgetary purpose without 
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a deliberate attempt to provide a policy framework for housing and urban 
development schemes. While Karnataka drafted a housing policy in 1995 
and urban development strategy papers in 1992 and 1994, they never 
acquired an official status. The little interest in policies and the marginal 
importance of these documents for government operations may be the 
reason that five-year plans and policy statement receive very little attention 
from academic and professional circles. The little meaning of these 
documents also shows a disinterest for the Kantian principles of proper 
public administration: reason, fair play, justification, transparency, 
predictability, legitimacy, political and administrative accountability (Van 
Wijk en Konijnenbelt, 1984). 
Even if these five-year plans and policy statements were to be taken 
seriously, there are several weak points. First of all, the state government 
urbanisation was for long perceived as the negative effect of rural poverty 
and a symptom that should be contained at its source. There would, thus, 
be no need for strengthening urban economies and urban development. 
Secondly, it was believed that the problems of rapid urbanisation could be 
solved by a policy of dispersal of growth and benefits spreading over a 
large number of secondary cities. These cities had to be hierarchically 
ordered, a concept that was borrowed from spatio-locational theories. 
There has hardly been an attempt in any of the policy documents to 
adequately analyse and understand the dynamics of city growth and rural-
urban migration. Especially the underlying economic forces and their 
impact on the spatial pattern of growth were not addressed. The state 
government believed that it could be successful in creating an urban 
landscape by simply designating cities as 'growth centres'. While these 
documents suffered from conceptual adventurism, they failed to provide a 
comprehensive perspective, a policy or direction for housing and urban 
development. Again it was left to agencies to decide what they thought 
was best. These documents were, thus, more permissive than prescriptive. 
Urban planning and control 
If there are no policy directions, there is at least the body of town planning 
legislation as laid down in Karnataka's Town and Country Planning Act of 
1964 and the many municipal bylaws. The concept of urban planning had 
adopted an Anglo-Saxon tradition which segregates urban functions. This 
in contrast to the dynamic, multi-functional, multi-layered and organic 
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nature of Indian cities, wards, neighbourhoods, streets and even single 
houses. The foundation of urban planning is the so-called Outline 
Development Plan and Comprehensive Development Plan which 'still 
remains basically physical planning divorced from the economic 
development plans of state and national governments' (Gnaneshwar, 1995, 
p. 294). There are no indications of the financial requirements for 
implementation of development, thus, making the plans rather a theoretical 
exercise. The importance of such master planning is further weakened by 
its advisory role rather than its mandatory status, and by the lack of an 
adequate land policy or land acquisition legislation. Moreover, political 
consultation is often limited and is - at times - deliberately avoided by 
town planning departments so as to avoid undesirable interventions and 
deviations from adopted conventions. The master plan also fails to arouse 
political interest as it does not deal with current problems, the work area of 
local politicians, but deals with issues that are beyond the term of most 
politicians. A review of the concept and effectiveness of the master plan 
started in 1965 but did not reach beyond the level of discussion. Sreemay 
Basu comments that 'it is a sad reflection of the state of planning in India, 
that we find ourselves compelled to debate the same issues at essentially 
the same levels - 30 years later' (1996, p. 31). Basu concludes that it is not 
so much the planners who are unaware or resistant to changes in master 
planning, but rather 'our political ethos, vulnerable and dependent on not-
quite-legitimate money which thrives on chaos and has absolute 
abhorrence for measures to rationalise development' (ibid.). The statement 
suggests that urban planning and controlled growth would obstruct the 
interests of politicians who aim to achieve short-term goals and benefits. 
There would, thus, be a rationale for maintaining a certain degree of 
'chaos' and ineffective urban planning. 
On the one hand, urban planning and regulation did little to actively 
steer development while the side effects of the elaborate legislation were 
more evident. This legislation brought about delays, court litigations, 
locked-up lands and irregular practices by resourceful citizens seeking to 
bypass the legal inhibitions. The counter-productive effects of the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 
1976 have been illustrated in this research. Particularly the sites and 
service component of the IDSMT scheme and the acquisition of land for 
water supply schemes have suffered from these side effects. 
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Selection of project towns 
This study aimed to reconstruct the reasons for the selection of housing 
and infrastructure projects. Factors which would suggest some policy-
oriented decision making were the annual growth, the development status, 
the political affiliation, the municipal income, a co-ordination of 
investments by other agencies under the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development or other departments falling under Industries and Commerce. 
Not surprisingly, none of these factors proved significant and there seemed 
to be little consideration for these factors altogether. It has been argued 
that decision making had other overriding factors: agency-centred 
expansionism, personalised reasons and strictly agency-specific reasons 
(quantity of water supplied or number of slum dwellers). What has also 
been evident in project selection is that political pressures were at work. In 
more than two-thirds of the cases, schemes were selected in locations 
where a local MLA was of the same political party as the state 
government. Moreover, in one out of four cases the local MLA was a 
minister around the time of selection. Political considerations have been a 
major factor in the selection of housing, water supply and IDSMT schemes 
in Karnataka. Political pressures were less significant in other schemes 
such as the NRY, the low-cost sanitation and the UBSP schemes. Here, the 
inclusion of selected towns was not so much the outcome of project-driven 
selection criteria but rather the result of individual factors: the knowledge 
and interest of commissioners, chief officers and local presidents and 
councillors. 
Demand-supply mismatch 
In housing schemes, there is little concern for the effective demand and 
affordability of the targeted groups. In fact, housing demand surveys are 
not conducted regularly. Housing shortages are estimated on the basis of 
rule-of-thumb or outdated figures. Moreover, the ineffective registration 
procedures and the loans and repayment conditions that are unsuitable to 
the unstable incomes of low-income households, have made low-income 
families 'de facto' ineligible for many housing schemes. Their specific 
preferences for smaller amounts and recurring loans, and for flexible loan 
repayment schedules could not be met by the financing institutions. The 
existing housing policies, town planning legislation and building bylaws 
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do not provide for tenure followed by incremental and evolutionary 
housing development by the urban poor themselves and allow only for 
conventional housing approaches. The central government and the Task 
Force on Urbanisation acknowledged in 1977 that the cheapest houses had 
been beyond the means of the Economically Weaker Sections and Low-
Income Groups. But they could do little to make these scheme more 
effective. 
A similar mismatch has been seen in low-cost sanitation schemes. 
Without any survey or promotion campaign, it was assumed that people 
would understand the benefits of the latrines and would be willing to 
contribute. The well intended ministry's guidelines to conduct a survey 
ward by ward, to identify the beneficiaries who had expressed their need 
for a latrine, the family size, the family income, etc. were blatantly 
neglected. Beneficiaries' lists were artificially compiled with the result that 
the sanctioned number of units (conversion or new) was more than the 
number of interested applicants. There were many citizens who were not 
interested in these latrines and rather preferred to construct the toilet 
themselves so as to guarantee sufficient quality and a design according to 
their preferences. Moreover, the average income of the beneficiaries in the 
case-study towns indicated that the latrines have been benefiting to a large 
extent the better-off families. The scheme got nowhere near its original 
goal: the liberalisation and rehabilitation of scavengers. The agencies took 
little interest in this social dimension and were only interested in building 
latrines. This burden was conveniently bifurcated and brought under the 
Department of Social Welfare and it is known that there has been no co-
ordination between the two departments. The Department of Social 
Welfare has not made a comparable effort to train and re-trench the 
scavengers into other skills and professions. The outcome of the scheme 
would have been disastrous for the livelihood of scavengers if the IPLCS 
scheme would have been successful. To their good fortune, the scheme 
failed terribly in Karnataka and their livelihood has been secured for some 
more years. 
A third example is the IDSMT scheme. Demand surveys and 
feasibility studies for sites and service, shopping complexes and low-cost 
sanitation project components did not take place during the pre-project 
phases. In fact, the preparation of the project proposal was done in great 
haste. It has been reported that shops have remained vacant as there was no 
demand and rents have had to be lowered to loss-making levels. 
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The mismatch between demand and supply has also been reflected 
in the choice of technologies in some of the schemes. For example, the 
selection of the two-pit pour-flush latrine as a common standard 
throughout Karnataka, did not take into account the size of the household, 
the wishes of the users or the permeability of the soil. The selection rather 
was based on the possible saving of materials and labour. Moreover, the 
poor and incomplete implementation of these latrines nullified their 
potential for on-site sanitary disposal of human excreta. A second example 
is the choice of technology for water supply schemes by the KUWS&DB. 
The engineers did not make an effort to seek cheaper technical options and 
go beyond what the engineering and PWD manuals prescribed and, thus, 
ignored the poor financial situation of their clients: the municipalities. It 
has been argued that - under political pressure - project costs had to be 
maximised without a concern for the financial capabilities of the 
municipalities. 
An exception is the UBSP in which, due to the stringent central 
government guidelines, need assessment and participation did indeed 
materialise. It seems that the state agencies by themselves have no 
inclination to approach populist schemes in a demand-driven participatory 
manner. 
The functioning of the housing and urban development agencies 
The institutional set-up for urban development and housing has illustrated 
that at both the centre and state level the number of institutions have 
proliferated and expanded. Their financial, personnel and administrative 
strength grew over the years. 
The daily operation of the KHB, KUWS&DB and the KSCB shows 
great similarity to the way the Public Works Department perceives, 
designs and implements a project: a conventional, physical and 
engineering approach towards solving the problems of municipal services, 
slums and housing. And, in fact, most engineers are deputed from the 
PWD. The poor consideration for the needs of the urban low-income has 
already been referred to. There was not much of reflection on economics, 
satisfaction of effective demand, efficiency and sustainability. Moreover, 
the disappointing efforts in the area of cheap mass housing by the KHB, on 
the one hand, and the remarkable achievements and the strong upward 
price trend in the area of conventional housing during the Seventh and 
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Eighth Five-Year Plan periods, and on the other, illustrated that the 
Karnataka Housing Board had lost sight of a major part of its mission: 
housing for the urban (and rural) low-income groups. 
The experiences with the mass low-cost housing scheme have been 
particularly bitter. Illuminating examples were the Ashraya and the Dr. 
Ambedkar Centenary schemes. Lack of involvement, wrong selection of 
beneficiaries, poor quality of work by contractors, lack of supervision, and 
lack of infrastructure at the housing sites were reported in all case-studies. 
Irregularities were reported in the selection of contractors, false progress 
and materials delivery reports were given and bribes were accepted by the 
officials. Understaffing and insufficient experience are not a sufficient 
explanation for the state of affairs. It is a sad fact that organisational chaos 
and the uncontrolled access to large project funds seemed to attract 
opportunists within and outside the government. Citizens, officials and 
local politicians alike took part in the trade and sale of land for profits. 
The KHB has a strong focus on the initiation and implementation of 
conventional (composite) housing schemes. There has been little attention 
and interest in low-cost housing schemes. Besides the Ashraya and Dr. 
Ambedkar Centenary housing schemes, the Scheme for Housing and 
Shelter Upgradation under the NRY was another example. Apparently, the 
professional prestige and margins were unrewarding in such schemes. The 
reputation of the Karnataka Housing Board has been poor for over a 
decade, in particular the quality of housing and time-bound 
implementation of schemes. Several internal problems are endemic to the 
KHB and KSCB. There is little concern for financial management or 
organisational performance. The regular transfers of officers and 
commissioners/secretaries hampers any continuity of and commitment to 
the organisation. In the KSCB, lack of skills among technical staff to deal 
with social, communication and economic development aspects, and to tap 
the support of voluntary or community based organisations in slum 
development were found to be counter-productive. It has been argued that 
there is little resistance in the KHB against those who pursue personal 
benefits or are involved in irregular practices and acceptance of 
commissions. Because of the poor financial and project management, 
housing schemes have become a liability to the government. The recovery 
of loans from the allottees has proved difficult. Exact figures are 
unavailable, but the recovery of the agencies is not more than 55-60 per 
cent. 
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The situation of the KUWS&DB is not much better. The poor 
financial situation of urban local bodies and the government red-tapism 
have loaded significant liabilities on the KUWS&DB: the contribution of 
the urban local bodies for the construction of new projects and the expense 
of operation and maintenance services of water supply systems. The result 
is that the projects' expenditure is spread over longer periods. The 
government is also forced to sluice money to settle debts with their 
financiers when it may have liked to spend on other public services. An 
improvement of the financial situation is frustrated by political 
interference, public demonstrations and court injunctions which have 
prevented the government, municipalities and the KUWS&DB from 
increasing the water tariffs. It has been estimated that the state government 
is forced to provide a subsidy of at least 50 per cent for the supply of water 
in most urban areas in Kamataka. 
Proper financial and administrative management of schemes by the 
DMA has been hampered by severe understaffing. This has been 
particularly true for the ÍDSMT and low-cost sanitation schemes. Proper 
project preparation, monitoring and administration fell far short of what 
was required. No demand surveys or technical, financial or social 
feasibility studies were conducted. During the implementation of the 
schemes, the amounts, flows and parking places of the IDSMT funds from 
the central and state governments could not be properly traced. Examples 
of incompatible figures of transfers and progress have been quoted from 
the three sources; the DMA, the district administration and the 
municipalities. The confusion is partly due to the unclear institutional 
arrangements between the DMA, the deputy commissioner, the IDSMT 
committee and the municipalities. Moreover, there was a poor flow of 
information between these parties. The UBSP and the NRY schemes were 
handled much better. For the UBSP scheme specially designated staff had 
been employed. As a result of the three different components of the NRY 
scheme, the procedural and institutional set-up provided a complicated 
picture with four nodal agencies: the Directorate of Municipal 
Administration for smaller and medium sized towns, the NRY district 
committee for all urban areas, the Karnataka Housing Board, the Slum 
Clearance Board and the Secretariat for all corporations. The involvement 
of nationalised and commercial banks and the HUDCO had added to the 
complexity. Particularly, the Scheme for Urban Micro-Enterprises and the 
Scheme for Urban Wage Employment entailed various layers of decisions 
which was not conducive for effective initiation and implementation. 
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The municipalities did take keen interest in two schemes: the 
IDSMT and the NRY. Some municipalities went as far as to visit Delhi to 
pursue their project with the TCPO. There was a large sense of ownership 
for these schemes. Other schemes, such as housing, water supply and low-
cost sanitation, did not arouse as much enthusiasm as they were 
completely handled by the government agencies in Bangalore. 
As far as the HUDCO is concerned, the financing modalities ensure 
that a portion of the housing schemes should be built and allotted to the 
urban poor. Moreover, their concern with recoverability of loans, make the 
HUDCO a kind of watchdog over the borrowing agencies. And they have 
indeed watched over the social equity of particularly housing schemes. 
However, competition from other financing institutions and pressures to 
achieve financial and physical targets have made the HUDCO more 
permissive of practices that are not beneficial to the urban poor. More 
schemes for middle and higher income groups are financed, field 
inspections have become less frequent and less stringent, quality standards 
are less strictly monitored, re-finance of schemes with time and cost 
overruns is more easily provided and political interference is more 
frequently tolerated and at times nurtured. 
The role of bureaucrats and politicians; increasing discretionary 
powers 
With Independence a struggle for power emerged between politicians and 
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, an elite group of administrators recruited 
from the upper-caste and urban middle-class communities, had undisputed 
powers when they served India's erstwhile rulers. After Independence they 
had to face their new masters - the elected representatives of the people. 
The bureaucracy was also the colour sergeants of systematic and planned 
development which came under pressure with the increasing influence of 
politicians who had shorter term interests in mind. As a result, there has 
been fluctuating political commitment for systematic development 
planning both at the central and state government levels. The responsible 
agencies acquired little political independence and were exposed to 
political influence through their boards and governing councils. The 
outcome of their deliberations and decisions are - at times - suspect, 
pleasing state level politicians and ministers as we have seen. 
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A distinct position in urban development has been held by the civil 
servants belonging to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). It has been 
illustrated that the erstwhile Weberian cadre was transformed into a 
disunited and politicised lot. In fact, a schism was forged between those 
who wanted to maintain the traditional aloofness from the political turmoil 
and those who started to 'co-operate' with the state politicians. The 
divisions of competence between politicians and bureaucrats have faded 
considerably and there is no reservation on the side of politicians to 
encroach onto the responsibilities of the administration. In fact, the 
bureaucracy has been sub-ordinated to a large extent to political objectives. 
The societal interests that drive politicians and indirectly the 
bureaucracy can be characterised as an Indian form of pluralism. This 
pluralism does not exist in the society as a whole with independently 
organised and competing groups, but exists within the realm of established 
political parties. Pluralism exists between parties and more so between 
factions within a single party. As the many interest groups are not 
organised independently, they liaise with factions within a party and try to 
pursue their goals through them. It is not surprising that parties are an 
amalgam of myriad interests and the much desired party discipline and 
unity has become an oddity. The Congress(I) party, particularly, is a 
market place of party members trading the interests of various and 
competing societal groups. 
In urban areas, the interest groups of industry, commerce, business 
houses, liquor and estate development have distinctly emerged. These 
emerging (urban) economic powers have developed liaisons with state 
politicians, supported their parties financially and, thereby, ensured that 
their interests are sufficiently served. In such a system of 'political 
representation', there are winners and losers. Winners are those lobbies 
that are economically powerful and resourceful and losers are those 
without such means: the urban poor and a large section of the urban middle 
class. Where the urban poor and middle-class interests are poorly 
represented and organised, electoral accountability is also neglected. The 
same applies to the smaller towns and cities in Karnataka where individual 
and resourceful families and business houses sponsor and manipulate their 
political protégés; the local councillor or corporator. The political 
manipulation at the local level shows a similarity with the concept of 
'urban machine politics' (Scott, 1972). 
The enhanced power of state politicians had its bearing on five-year 
planning and policy development for the urban sector. While five-year 
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plans are produced to fulfil the central government's requirement to access 
central government funds, they do not - as I have argued - constitute a 
policy framework for housing and urban development in the state. 'Why is 
that the Government of Karnataka does not articulate any housing or urban 
development policy', I asked several senior bureaucrats in the government. 
One former secretary to government explained: 'You see, governments 
come and go, ministers come and go, and secretaries [for Housing and 
Urban Development - hm\ come and go; there is no interest in perspective 
planning beyond five years, they are only interested in programmes and 
projects, not in policies. Secondly, they want to maintain a large amount of 
discretionary powers. Hence, major decisions are taken by contemporary 
preferences and ideas of such ministers and secretaries'. Another former 
secretary to government explained in a similar fashion: 'Politicians 
[ministers and MLAs- hm] want to have a gap so that they have room to 
give favours and to serve the people when they appeal to them'. This study 
has argued that both politicians and bureaucrats aimed deliberately to 
enhance their discretionary powers and, secondly, to limit as much as 
possible the evolution of a system of 'checks and balances', for example 
by the articulation of policies, targets and compliance with well defined 
budgets. 'Checks and balances' are in favour of those who want long-term 
commitments, rationale decision making, control, monitoring and planned 
development and is against those who want to initiate projects and give 
favours whenever and wherever they want. The large discretionary powers 
have also led to 'misuse, corruption and a docile attitude of the public', 
mentioned a former deputy commissioner. The unchecked access to public 
means, has resulted in the vast misappropriation in the Ashraya housing 
scheme and the integrated low-cost sanitation scheme as illustrated in 
chapters 10 and 15. The discretionary powers also came handy in political 
equations, to strengthen political and electoral ties. The role of national 
and state five-year plans are a bleak image of the four functions that they 
are supposed to have in a well functioning democracy (See chapter one): a 
public, political, and administrative and monitoring function. 
Role and status of the local bodies 
In contrast to the expanding state government agencies, there has been a 
sustained neglect of municipalities. They were deprived of financial 
sources and proper administration and their functions were gradually taken 
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away by urban development authorities and town planning authorities. 
Their financial situation has - in real terms - dropped alarmingly over the 
last 15 years, particularly in the small and medium-sized municipalities. 
Overall, the increasing dependency on the state government for housing 
and basic amenities has disallowed local governments any significant or 
pro-active role in urban development. Moreover, poor local leadership, a 
weak democratic system, disinterested citizens and a fragmented personnel 
system have not been conducive to improved self-government and to resist 
the centralisation of powers and resources. 
On the other hand, local governments and their councils have 
behaved passively, and surrendered to a voluntary martyrdom. They were 
not inquisitive, did not demand information, but just waited, watched and 
expected - at the same time - the government to take care of their financial 
situation. It would be a mistake to think that one is not aware of such 
structural weaknesses but the petty and self-centred benefits that are, 
nevertheless, acquired have dissipated the concern for long-term 
development and strengthening of the institutional framework. 
It is now commonly recognised that urban development and housing 
problems cannot be solved without the involvement and active 
participation of local governments. It is realised that it is impossible to 
parachute projects from the state capital and assume that these assets and 
services will satisfy a felt need, and so can be sustained after installation. 
However, the lust for discretionary power at the highest political and 
bureaucratic levels has been at the root of the obvious reluctance to initiate 
devolution of powers and resources to the lower levels of government, i.e. 
the municipalities. 'I am probably the only IAS-officer that is in favour of 
decentralisation. If this is publicly known, I would be cast out from the 
community [of IAS-officers - hm\\ explained a former Bangalore 
commissioner. The much publicised decentralisation movement may just 
prove to be lip-service and may not materialise in its essence or spirit for 
years to come (Mengers, 1997). 
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17.4 Final remarks 
At the concluding section of a major research like this it is suitable to 
make recommendations. I would serve and please policy makers and 
bureaucrats by providing a number of possible improvements within their 
legal-institutional framework. In fact they follow logically from the many 
findings of this research. It has been a dilemma to either present such 
recommendations or to focus this section at the end of this research on a 
few remarks that are at the heart of better housing and urban development 
in Karnataka. I have decided on the latter course and will keep these 
recommendations for another medium. The following remarks are inspired 
by my concern for the urban poor and middle class who have been made to 
suffer because of the government's failure to provide basic amenities and 
shelter. 
There is no country that is as resourceful as India and none in the 
region that has the ability to outclass its neighbours in social and economic 
development. Drive, commitment, imagination, creativity and the ability to 
make things work with little resources are abundant and I have seen these 
in operation in many instances, sometimes, yielding unthinkable results. It 
would also be arrogance to assume that a Westerner can teach an Indian. 
'We - leaders, policy makers you and me - have nothing to learn because 
we go back thousands of years and our first lot of cities were in ruins when 
the developed world was still in the middle and dark ages, and we had 
elaborate waterways and toilets when the West was still going behind the 
trees' writes Chitra Subramaniam in India is for Sale (1997, p. iii). Despite 
the potential and the rich past, the reality of today is, however, quite 
different. There are the inherited and engrained social inequalities, and 
communal divisions which have made it difficult to find the prerequisite 
national unity and patriotism. The divisional forces are indeed deeply 
engrained in the Indian society. 'Nobody lets India down like Indians', 
writes Subramaniam (1997, p. 1). 
There are two aspects that I would like to address here and which 
constitute to me the sand in the machine of urban development: the 
deterioration of the political system and corruption. When the Principal 
Secretary for Urban Development posed his thought provoking question at 
a recent seminar, he himself probably knew the answer best. He sought the 
aid of an audience to tell him that the main cause for the current problem 
of urban development is the deterioration of the political system. A 
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political system that is supposed to defend the interest of the public and 
pursue the economic and social development of the state. Instead, 
politicians are busy pursuing personal gains, seeking the support of and 
bending their operations to the interests of resourceful lobbies, and seeking 
to maximise their benefits during their short tenure. The access to public 
funds is one strategy and anything that comes in the way has to be 
neutralised, whether it is a bureaucrat or an over-prescriptive policy 
statement and budget. Developmental goals, long-term planning and 
budgetary commitment have to make way for their personal short-term 
goals. To have at their disposal a maximum discretionary power is their 
tryst with a selfish destiny. It cannot be denied that the bureaucracy has 
been playing their role in the deterioration of urban governance. The 
number of bureaucrats that have closed an eye to irregularities and were 
co-opted has been increasing over the last three decades. It is unfortunate 
that no other answer can be given than to point at the main cause of the 
current state of affair: the political context in which an administration has 
to work is self-interested, not development-oriented and shows little 
political accountability. The political system is alienated from its original 
purpose and the state administration has been subordinated to this system. 
There is - in my view - little hope for drastic changes when the current 
constellation of powers between politicians and bureaucrats continues. 
The second aspect is that of corruption. Little had been said so far 
about this phenomenon, but it is evident that its manifestations are 
numerous and at all levels. For example, grants, licenses and permits are 
issued in return for bribes or political contributions. Speed money is paid 
to accelerate administrative procedures. Favourable jobs, postings or 
transfers in government services are obtained on payment to senior 
bureaucrats and politicians. Bribes are paid to officials to secure a 
favourable inspection report or completion or utilisation certificate in 
which the collections are invariably shared with higher officials of the 
department concerned. Bribes are paid to alter land use zoning or to 
regularise unauthorised structures, sometimes in violation of the official 
development plan. Bribes are paid to obtain and maintain scarce public 
goods and services, such as electricity, telecommunications, irrigation 
water and railwagon allotment. Bribes and contributions to political 
authorities at various levels, ostensibly to finance elections and post-
election manipulations, are almost a prerequisite to obtain public contracts 
(National Institute for Public Finance and Policy, 1985). What proves to be 
difficult is to quantify the magnitude of corruption and the fruits of 
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corruption: black money. Sudhir Kumar (1994) argued that more than 75 
per cent of the investment in the housing sector comes from black, money. 
Corruption had attracted the attention of academic scholars and an 
extensive body of literature has emerged in the last three decades. For 
some time the discussion focused upon whether corruption could be 
morally justified and whether it has any re-distributive function in society. 
Corruption may have positive effects, as P.M. Ward (1989) summarises: it 
'humanises' the workings of bureaucracy, offering a way through red tape 
and opportunities for face-to-face interaction; it satisfies the unfulfilled 
needs of particular groups; it offers an alternative to political violence; and 
it may even promote growth where it involves high-level public servants 
who reinvest their spoils compared with lower-level functionaries who 
spend it on consumption. However, current thinking is that it strengthens 
the existing inequalities, subverts resources away from the poor and acts 
against the wider interests. In allowing some people to 'jump the queue' 
others are denied access. Moreover, institutional development goals and 
targets - as we have seen - are replaced by personal and material goals, 
undermining any intended organisational and individual performances. 
Corruptive practices deface the reputation of public institutions, reduce the 
trust of the public in parliamentary democracy, the functioning of the 
bureaucracy for a public cause and the political system. The electorate are 
taken for granted as there is little political accountability and are, 
moreover, exploited by those whom they have put in power by their vote 
or by those who have been employed to work in their interest. 
Unless the political system is put back on its tracks and corruption is 
brought down to an acceptable level, any legal-institutional change will, in 
my view, bear little relevance. Any suggestion to that account would be a 
mere tinkering with system that needs to be changed drastically. It would 
mean a 'muddling through' with a machine that has less oil and more sand 
in its moving parts. These considerations are the main reasons why I have 
refrained from making any recommendations on legal-institutional issues. 
When the Principal Secretary posed his provoking question, a silence 
followed that was full of meaning: submission, fear, moral cowardice and 
'intellectual corruption' as the Secretary later phrased it. I do not expect 
much change from either the bureaucracy or politicians. The change has to 
come ultimately from the electorate that should and -1 am convinced - will 
hold their elected representatives and bureaucracy responsible for the state-
of-affairs that has been created in urban Karnataka. Surprisingly, few of 
the many I interviewed knew from where and how this change should 
Summary and Conclusions 495 
come about. Many are rather pessimistic about any change in a society that 
is divided by so many forces. Maybe M.N. Jois, a respected Karnataka 
freedom fighter, holds the answer when he gave his solution for corruption 
in public life: 'The solution is in the hands of the people. They should 
wake up and unify to fight against corrupt people in public life. Nobody 
needs lessons on how to revolt against the government... People can revolt 
against the government even without a leader' {Times of India, 3 August 
1997). 
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Annexes 
Table I: Division of assistance from various agencies for IDSMT schemes 
(1992) 
Category 
A 
В 
С 
D 
Population 
project town 
< 20,000 
20-50,000 
50-100,000 
> 100-300,000 
Project 
cost 
(in Rs. m 
100 
200 
500 
1000 
Gol 
assistance 
ceiling 
State 
share 
(loan) 
¡Ilion) (in Rs. million) (in %) 
36 
72 
120 
180 
24 
48 
120 
120 
Loan from 
HUDCOand 
other financing 
institutions (OFI) 
(in%) 
40 
80 
300 
700 
Table II: Source of funds for IDSMT components 
Project component Source of fund 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Integrated site and service schemes 
Strengthening of link road facilities 
Provision of bus terminals 
Construction/upgradingof roads and side drains 
Development of shopping centres 
Localised drainage works 
Street lighting 
Slaughterhouse 
Provision of tourist facilities 
Cycle/rickshaw stand 
Development of parks and playgrounds 
Traffic management schemes and social amenities 
Construction of retaining walls and slope stability 
measures in hill station towns 
Gol/State 
Gol/State 
Gol/State 
Gol/State 
Gol/State 
Gol/State 
Gol/State 
Gol/State 
HUDCO/OFIs 
HUDCO/OFIs 
HUDCO/OFIs 
HUDCO/OFIs 
HUDCO/OFIs 
Source: TCPO(1994). 
References 
Achar, K.T.V. (1992), 'Housing; going through the roof, in Madhyam, special issue on 
"The Urban Crisis", pp. 7-13, Bangalore 
Acharya, K. (1996), 'It is wiser for industry to invest in pollution control; interview with 
A.N.Yelappa Reddy', Down to Earth, Vol. 5, No.2, June 15, pp. 56-57, Delhi 
Amis, Ph. with I.Blore, R.Slater, B.Mehta and R.Batley (1992), Report on 
Understanding Indian Urban Poverty, prepared for Overseas Development 
Administration of the UK, DAG, Birmingham 
Ashraf, A. (1966), City Government in Calcutta: A Study of Inertia, Asia Publishing 
House, Bombay 
Ashraf, A. (1977) Government and Politics of Big Cities: An Indian Case Study, Concept 
Publishing Company, Delhi 
Asian Development Bank (1995), Asian Development Outlook 1995-96, Oxford 
University Press, Hong Kong 
Atkinson, Α., 77ie Contribution of Cities to Sustainability, Third World Planning 
Review, 16(2), 1994, pp. 97-101, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 
Avasthi A. and A.P.Avasthi (1994), Indian Administration, Lakshmi Narain Agarwal, 
Agra 
Aziz, A. and G.Thimmaiah (1984), The Political Economy of Land Reforms, Ashish 
Publishing House, New Delhi 
Baken, R.J. (1996), Trading Votes for Handpumps; The Development of State and City 
Politics in Andhra Pradesh, India, Urban Research Working Papers, No. 42, Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam 
Basavaraja, K.R. (1984), History and Culture of Karnataka, Chalukya Publications, 
Dharwad 
Bardhan, P. (1984), The Political Economy of Development in India, Oxford University 
Press, Delhi 
Basiston, A.K. (1986), Urban Local Administration; Growth and Development, 
B.R.Publishing Corporation, New Delhi 
Basu, A.R. (1988), Urban Squatter Housing in Third World, Mittal Publication, New 
Delhi 
Basu, S. (1996), 'Master Plan Approach', Space, Vol. 10, No. 1, January, pp. 27-40, 
New Delhi 
Bhambri, C.P. (1971), 'Should India have a committed bureaucracy?', The Indian 
Political Science Review, Vol. V, October - March, No. 1, p. 52-53, New Delhi 
498 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Bhambri, C.P. and P.S. Verma (1973), The Urban Voter, Municipal Elections in 
Rajasthan; An Empirical Study, Ashish Publishing House, Delhi 
Bhattacharya, M. ( 1979), Civic Consciousness and Citizen's Participation, Indian Institute 
of Public Administration, Delhi 
Buch, M.N. (1993), 'Ailing municipalities and citizen's entitlements', The Independent, 
26 April 1993, New Delhi 
Buch, M.N. (1994), 'Saving cities and the state', The Telegraph, 25 July 1994, Calcutta 
Buch, M.N. (1995), 'Traditions and new initiatives of self-governance and citizen's role 
in urban administration', CIVIC conference on Urban Local Self Government and in the 
Context the Nagar Palika Act in Karnataka, 10-12 March, Bangalore 
Cameron, J. (1994), An Indian Summer; A Personal Experience of India, Macmillan 
1974, reprinted by Penguin, Delhi 
Castells, M. (1977), The Urban Question A Marxist Approach, Edwar Arnold, London 
Centre for Symbiosis between Technology, Environment and Management (1992), The 
Karnataka Slum Clearance Board; an Organisational Study, Karnataka Slum Clearance 
Board, Bangalore 
Chandran, E. (1987), Seventh Plan: The planning process, a critical evaluation and 
achievements and progress of the Seventh Five-Year Plan 1985-90, Archna Publication 
Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 
Chaturvedi, T.N. (1995), 'The New Constitutionalism and urban government; 
impending transformation*, paper presented at CIVIC conference on Urban Local 
Government and Decentralization in the Context of the Nagar Palika Act, March 10-12, 
Bangalore 
Cotton, A. and R.Franceys (1994), 'Infrastructure for the urban poor: policy and 
planning issues', Cities, 1994, Vol. II, No. 1, London 
Dahl, R.A. (1961), Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 
Darke, R. and R. Walker (1977), ¿oca/ Government and the Public, Leonard Hill, London 
Date, B.M. (1994), 'Recommendations of State Finance Commission Karnataka', 
Quarterly Journal of the A1ILSG, Vol. LXV, No. 3-4, July-December, pp. 146-148, 
Bombay 
Datta, A. (1995), 'Municipal reform in India: comparative models and processes', 
CIVIC conference on Urban Local Self Government and in the Context the Nagar 
Palika Act in Karnataka, 10-12 March, Bangalore 
Datt, R. and K.P.M.Sundharam (1995), Indian Economy, S.Chand and Company Ltd., 
New Delhi 
Department of Municipal Administration (1987), Handbook on Municipal 
Administration, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore 
References 499 
Devas (1989), Ν., 'New directions for urban planning and management', Papers in the 
Administration of Development, No. 34, Development Administration Group, 
University of Birmingham 
Dharmarajan, K. (1995), 'Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns 
(IDSMT) in India', International IHSP Seminar on Integrated Urban Infrastructure 
Development, 1-4 February, New Delhi 
Diddee, J., V.Rangaswamy (edit., 1993), Urbanisation: Trends, Perspectives and 
Challenges, Rawat Publications, Jaipur/New Delhi 
Dowall (1991), D.A., Urban Management and Land: The Land Market Assessment, A 
New Tool for Urban Management, Urban Management Program Tool, No. 4, 
UNDP/World Bank/UNCHS, Washington 
Edelman, D.J. and Banerjee, R. (1994), 'Fifteen years of Integrated Development of 
Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT) in Karnataka; some observations' in ITP ¡Journal, 
September, Vol. 13, No. 1 (159), Delhi 
Etzioni-Halevy, E. (1983), Bureaucracy and Democracy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London 
Favarcque, C, P.McAuslan (1992), Reforming Urban Land Policies and Institutions in 
Developing Countries, Urban Management Program Policy Paper No. 5, IBRD/World 
Bank, Washington 
Ghosh, Α., S.S.Ahmed, S.Maitra (1995), Crisis in Urban Governance: A Case Study of 
Swat, Institute for Social Sciences, New Delhi 
Gilbert, A. and J.Gugler (1994), Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanization in the 
Third World, Oxford University Press, London 
Gnaneshwar, V. (1995), 'Urban policies in India; paradoxes and predicaments', Habitat 
International, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 293-316, Pergamon Press, Great Britain 
Goldsmith, M. (1980), Politics, Planning and the City, Hutchinson, London 
Government of India (1966), Report of the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee, Delhi 
Government of India (1991), National Scheme of Liberation and Rehabilitation of 
Scavengers and Their Dependants, New Delhi 
Government of India (1993), Centrally Sponsored Schemes for Urban Development 
¡993-94, Ministry of Urban Development, New Delhi 
Government of India (1980 to 1992), Fifth Five-Year Plan 1974-79, Sixth Five-Year 
Plan 1980-85, Seventh Five-Plan 1985-90, Annual Plan 1990-91, Annual Plan 1991-92, 
Eighth Five-Year Plan 1992-1997, Planning Department, New Delhi 
Government of India (1994), 25th Meeting of Central Council of Local Government and 
Urban Development, Ministry of Urban Development, 7 May, New Delhi 
500 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Government of India (1995), A Compendium of Central Schemes for Urban 
Employment, Poverty Alleviation and Housing, Ministry of Urban Affairs and 
Employment, Department of Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation, New Dehli 
Government of Karnataka (1977), Bidar District, Karnataka State Gazetteer, 
Government of Karnataka Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1981), Chikmagalur District, Karnataka State Gazetteer; 
Government of Karnataka Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1982), Karnataka State Gazetteer; Part I and II, 
Government of Karnataka Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1988), Mysore District, Karnataka State Gazetteer; 
Government of Karnataka Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1985), Uttara Kannada District, Karnataka State Gazetteer; 
Government of Karnataka Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1986a), Report of the Second Backward Classes Commission, 
Vol. I, Pattern of Recruitment of Brahmins/Non-Brahmin in Public Services, 1918-27, 
Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka, (1986b), Report on Urban Local Bodies in Karnataka State, 
Local Finance Commission, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1990), Guidelines and Orders issued by the Government of 
India, Government of Karnataka and HUDCO during 1989-90, Housing and Urban 
Development Department, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1980 to 1992), Fifth Five-Year Plan 1974-79, Sixth Five-
Year Plan 1980-85, Seventh Five-Plan 1985-90, Annual Plan 1990-91, Annual Plan 
1991-92, Eighth Five-Year Plan 1992-1997, Planning Department, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1992), Urban Development Strategy Karnataka State, draft 
paper, Housing and Urban Development Department, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1993), Vital Statistics of City/Town Municipalities, 
Directorate of Municipal Administration, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1983, 1985, 1989, 1994a), Karnataka Legislative Assembly 
Reviews 1978-1983, 1983-1985,1985-1989,1989-1994, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1994b), Karnataka State Gazetteer; Decennial Supplement 
(1983-1993), Government of Karnataka Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1994c), Municipal Statistics, Directorate of Economics and 
Statistics, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1994d), Urban Development Strategy Karnataka State, draft 
paper, Housing and Urban Development Department, Bangalore 
References 501 
Government of Karnataka (1994e), Karnataka Ordinance No. 3 of1994: The Kamataka 
Municipalities (Amendment) Ordinance, Government of Karnataka, 30th May, 
Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (19941), Karnataka Ordinance No. 4 of 1994: The Kamataka 
Municipal Corporations (Amendment) Ordinance, Government of Kamataka, 30th May, 
Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1995a), Karnataka Housing Policy; draft, Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1995b), Economic Survey 1994-95, Planning Department, 
Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1996a), Report of the State Finance Commission Relating to 
Urban Local Bodies, State Finance Commission, Bangalore 
Government of Karnataka (1996b), Results elections held on 7/1/1996 to the Municipal 
Corporations, City Municipal Councils, Town Municipal Councils and Town 
Panchayats in the State of Karnataka, State Election Committee, Bangalore 
Government of Mysore (1966), Gulbarga District, Mysore State Gazetteer; Government 
of Mysore Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Mysore (1969), Tumkur District, Mysore State Gazetteer; Government 
of Mysore Publications, Bangalore 
Government of Mysore (1972), Bellary District, Mysore State Gazetteer; Government 
of Mysore Publications, Bangalore 
Gugler, J. (1988, edit.), The Urbanization of the Third World, Oxford University Press, 
London 
Gundu Rao, N.C. (1990), 'Towns and cities get ready for self-rule again', Deccan 
Herald, 20 January, Bangalore 
Gupta, D.B., S. Kaul and R. Pandey (1993), Housing and India's Urban Poor, Har-
Anand Publications, New Delhi 
Gupta, R.G. (1992), 'Housing situation in various metropolitan cities in India and 
proposed housing strategy', ΓΤΡΙ Journal, September, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 11-25, New 
Delhi 
Gupta, S.B. (1992), Black Income in India, Sage Publications, New Delhi 
Haque, M.S. (1996), 'The contextless nature of public administration in Third World 
countries', International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 62, pp. 315-29, Sage 
Publications, London 
Hardoy, J.E. (1989), 'Environmental problems in Third World cities: a global issue 
ignored', IIED, paper for conference on Cities the Mainspring of Economic 
Development in Developing Countries, 6- 10th November, Lille 
502 Urban Development in Kamataka 
Hartshorne, T.A. (1992), Interpreting the City: An Urban Geography, John Wiley & 
Sons, 2nd edition, New York 
Hasan, Z., S.N.Jha and R.Khan (1989), The State, Political Processes and Identity: 
Reflections on Modern India, Sage Publications, New Delhi 
Housing and Urban Development Department (1981 to 1996), Annual Report 1980-81 
through Annual Report 1995-96, Government of Kamataka, Bangalore 
HUDCO/HSMI (1992), Proceedings of the national seminar on Operation and 
Maintenance of Sanitation Systems in Low-Income Areas in India, April 1992, New 
Delhi 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation (1995), The Corporate Story of the 
HUDCO; 1970-1995, HUDCO, Delhi 
IHS/HSMMRC/CMU/NHA (1993), Operation and Maintenance of Sanitation Systems 
in Urban Low-Income Areas in India and Thailand, Final Report, Institute for Housing 
and Urban Development Studies, Rotterdam 
Indian Human Settlements Programme (1993a), Field visit report to Kunigal, Tumkur 
District. February 11, 1993, HUDCO/HSMMHS, Bangalore 
Indian Human Settlements Programme (1993b), Report on the Course "Project 
Formulation, Implementation and Maintenance: Integrated Programme for Low-Cost 
Sanitation and Liberation of Scavengers ", April 22-24, 1993, the Administrative 
Training Institute, Mysore 
Indian Human Settlements Programme (1994a), Report on Project Formulation Courses 
on "Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT)", May 16-20, 1994, 
the Administrative Training Institute, Mysore 
Indian Human Settlements Programme (1994b), Report on the 5-Day Course on Project 
Formulation, Implementation, Operation and Maintenance of Water Supply Schemes, 
October 17-21, 1994, the Administrative Training Institute, Mysore 
Indian Human Settlements Programme (1994c), Report on the 5-Day Project 
Formulation Course for "Low-Cost Sanitation and Solid Waste Management", April 4-
8,1994, the Administrative Training Institute, Mysore 
Indian Human Settlements Programme (1995a), Report on Orientation Course and 
Seminar on "Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns (IDSMT), April 17-
20 and April 21-22, 1995, the Administrative Training Institute, Mysore 
Indian Human Settlements Programme (1995b), Reading Material Settlement 
Improvement and Upgradation, November 11-15, 1995, the Administrative Training 
Institute, Mysore 
Israel, A. (1992), Issues for Infrastructure Management in the 1990s, World Bank 
Discussion Papers No. 171, IBRD/World Bank, Washington 
Jha, G. (1989), 'Constitutional protection to municipal authorities: an overview', 
Nagarlok, Vol. XXI, October-December 1989, No. 4, pp. 1-10, New Delhi 
References 503 
Joshi, V. and I.M.D.Little (1994), India: Macroeconomics and Political Economy 1964-
1991, Comparative Macroeconomic Studies, World Bank, Washington 
Judge, D., G.Stoker and H.Wolman (edit., 1995), Theories of Urban Politics, Sage 
Publications, London 
Kapoor, R.M. and P.B.Anand (1995), 'The functional domain of municipalities and 
municipal finance implications', IHSP International Seminar on Integrated Urban 
Infrastructure Development, 1-4 February, 1995, New Delhi 
Kamataka Industrial Area Development Board (1995), Industrial Growth Prospect of 
Karnataka, April 1995, Government of Kamataka, Bangalore 
Kaul, R. (1993), Caste, Class and Education; Politics of the Capitation Fee 
Phenomenon in Karnataka, Sage Publications, New Delhi 
Kaushik, S.L. (1986), Leadership in Urban Government in India, Kitab Mahal, 
Allahabad 
Khurana, M.L. (1995), 'Cooperative housing in India: the role of HUDCO' in The 
Corporate Story of HUDCO 1970-1995, HUDCO, New Delhi 
Kessides (1993), C, The Contributions of Infrastructure to Economic Development; A 
Review of Experience and Policy Implications, World Bank Discussion Papers No. 213, 
IBRD/World Bank, Washington 
Kingsley, G.Th. (1994), 'Land, infrastructure and the urban poor: changing roles for 
different levels of government', World Bank Seminar of the Poor, February, 
Proceedings, pp. 115-128, Washington 
Kingsley, G.Th., J.P.Telgarsky and B.Walter (1989), India's Urban Challenge; Trends 
and Implications, USA1D Regional Housing and Urban Development Office, Asia, New 
Delhi 
Kirloskar Consultants Ltd. (1994), Uniform water tariff for urban areas in Karnataka, 
draft report, KUWS&DB, Bangalore 
Kistaiah,M. (1985), 'Sarkaria Commission and local self-government',paper presented at 
the Tenth Annual Conference of the Indian Public Administration Association, Waltair, 
Nov. 29 - Dec, 1, New Delhi 
Kopardekar, H.D. (1991a), 'Strengthening municipal government for better 
development management', AIILSG National Conference on Municipal Bodies in India, 
21 October, New Delhi 
Kopardekar, H.D. (1991b), 'People's participation in metropolitan management', 
Quarterly Journal of the All India Institute for Local Self-Government, Vol. LXXI, No. 2, 
April-June, pp. 67-75, Bombay 
Korsten, A.F.Α., Th.A.J.Toonen (1988, edit.), Bestuurskunde: hoofdfiguren en 
kernthema's, Stenfert Kroese BV, Leiden 
Kumar, О. (1987), Sites and Services in Urban Housing in India, Ess Ess Publications, 
Delhi 
504 Urban Development in Kamataka 
Kumar, R. and K.Bhatnagar (1994), 'A study of background and attitudes of IAS 
probationers of 1992 batch and faculty members at LBS NAA, Mussoorie', The 
Administrator, Vol. XXXIX, July-September, p. 67-87, New Delhi 
Kumar, S. (1994), 'Impact of liberalisation on the housing sector and infrastructure 
planning for human settlement development', paper delivered at a seminar on Futuristic 
Planning of Human Settlements for the 21st Century, AIHDA, October 21-23, Kullu 
Kundu, A. (1993), In the name of the urban poor; access to basic services, Sage 
Publications, New Delhi 
Kunst, P.E.J., R.L.Olie, A.G.L.Rommem and J.L.Soeters (1991), Organisatie; Deel 1, 
Sprayt, van Mentgem & De Does BV, Leiden 
Laxman, R.K. (1990), The Best of R.K. Laxman, Penguin Books India (P) Ltd., New 
Delhi 
Laxman, R.K. (1993), The Best of R.K. Laxman; Volume II, Penguin Books India (P) 
Ltd., New Delhi 
Lee, M. (1995), 'The cost of second best: price of land regulation in India', paper 
presented at the International IHSP Seminar on Integrated Urban Infrastructure 
Development, Human Settlement Management Institute, 1-4 February, New Delhi 
Lindblom, CE. (1959), 'The science of "muddling through" ', Public Administration 
Review, pp. 74-88, New York 
Long, N.E. (1954), 'Public policy and administration: the goals of rationality and 
responsibility', Public Administration Review, Vol. 14, winter issue, pp. 22-31, New 
York 
Machiavelli, N. (Translation 1995), The Prince, translated by George Bull, Penguin 
Books, London 
Manor, J. (1989), 'Kamataka: caste, class, dominance and politics in a cohesive 
society', in Dominance and State Power in Modern India by F.R.Frankel and 
M.S.A.Rao (edit.), Oxford University Press, Bombay 
Manor, J. (1992), 'BJP in South India: 1991 general elections', Economic and Political 
Weekly, 13-20 June, p. 120-132, Bombay 
March, J.G. (1976) and J.P.01son, Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, Bergen 
Mathur, O.P. (1993), The State of India's Urban Poverty, National Institute of Public 
Finance and Policy, New Delhi 
Mehta, D. and M.Mehta, (1989), Housing Finance System in Metropolitan Areas of 
India, Sage Publications, New Delhi 
Mengers, HA and D. Edelman (1996), 'Integrated Development of Small and Medium 
Towns; a scheme of learning by doing' in Urban India in Crisis, K. Singh en F. 
Steinberg (edit.), New Age International Ltd., New Delhi 
References 505 
Mengers, H.A. (1991), Community-Based Public-Private Partnership in the Effective 
Management of Urban Infrastructure; Research Report, Indian Human Settlements 
Programme, HSMI/HUDCO, New Delhi 
Mengers, H.A. (edit., 1993, 1994, 1995), Newspaper clippings urban developments 
Karnataka, series 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95, Indian Human Settlements 
Programme, Bangalore 
Mengers, H.A. (1996), 'Integrated action planning in Karnataka towns' in Urban India 
in Crisis, K. Singh en F. Steinberg (edit.), New Age International Ltd., New Delhi 
Mengers, H.A. (1997), 'Urban development by local governments in Karnataka, India: 
who is interested?', paper for congress Mobiliteit in Azië en de Pacific, International 
Institute for Asian Studies (Delft), 4 oktober, Utrecht 
Meshram, D.S. and R.P.Bansal (1992), 'Legal provisions for public participation in 
urban planning process with reference to 74th Amendment Act 1992', draft paper, 
unpublished 
Ministry of Urban Development (1993), Power to the People; the Nagarpalika Act, 
Government of India, New Delhi 
Ministry of Urban Development ( 1994), National Housing Policy, Government of India, 
New Delhi 
Misra, G.K. and M.K.Narain, (edit, 1989), Development Programmes for Urban Poor, 
Centre for Urban Studies, Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi 
Mohanty, B. (edit., 1993), Urbanisation in Developing Countries; Basic Services and 
Community Participation, Urban Studies Series, Institute for Social Sciences, New 
Delhi 
Mohanty, M.N.P (1989), 'State-municipal relationship: an analysis of collaboration and 
control in India', Nagarlok, Vol. XXI, October-December, No. 4, pp. 16-29, New Delhi 
Mosca, G. (1939), The Ruling Class, McGraw-Hill, New York 
Nadkarni, M.V. (1991), India: The Emerging Challenges, Sage Publications, New Delhi 
Nanjundaiya, B. (1995), 'Centre-State relations; remedies at the local level', Deccan 
Herald, 30 March, Bangalore 
National Academy of Administration (1970), Proceedings of the seminar on Local 
Government, Mussourie 
National Commission for Urbanization (1988), Report of the National Commission for 
Urbanization, Government of India, New Delhi 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1985), The Extent of Black Income in 
India: A Qualitative View, Draft Report (mimeo), New Delhi 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (1994), Studies of HUDCO and 
HUDCO 's borrowers, New Delhi 
506 Urban Development in Karnataka 
National Institute of Urban Affairs (1988), Provision of Urban Water Supply; 
Institutional Options, Research Study Series, No. 33, New Delhi 
National Institute of Urban Affairs (1989), Upgrading Municipal Services; Norms and 
Financial Implications, Volume I, Research Study Series, No. 38, New Delhi 
National Institute of Urban Affairs (1990), Integrated Development of Small and 
Medium Towns (IDSMT); An Evaluation Study, January, New Delhi 
Nunberg, B. (1995), Managing the Civil Service: Reform Lessons from Advanced 
Industrialized Countries, World Bank, Discussion Papers No. 204, Washington 
Padhi, A.P. (edit., 1988), State Administration in India, Uppal Publishing House, New 
Delhi 
Pandey, K.K. (1990), 'Resource mobilization for upgrading municipal services', Urban 
India, 10(1), National Institute for Urban Affairs, New Delhi 
Pandey, K.K. (1994), Role of Fiscal Instruments in the Upgrading of Municipal 
Services in Uttar Pradesh, India, Forwarded dissertation, Agra University, Agra 
Patnaik, J.B. (1974), The IAS; Problems of Public Bureaucracy in a Developing 
Country, Dissertation, University of Göttingen, Germany 
Pavarala, V. (1996), Interpreting Corruption: Elite Perspectives in India, Sage 
Publications, New Delhi 
Pederson, J.D. (1992), 'State, bureaucracy and change in India', Journal of Development 
Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, July, p. 616-639, London 
Pernia, E.M. (1993), Urbanization, Population Distribution and Economic Development 
in Asia, EDRC Report Series, No. 58, Asian Development Bank, Manilla 
Planning Department (1988-1994), Economic Survey 1987-88, 1990-91,1991-92, 1993-
94 and 1994-95, Government of Karnataka, Bangalore 
Potter, D.C. (1996), India's Political Administration; from ICS to IAS, Oxford India 
Paperbacks, New Delhi 
Prasad, C.B. (1992), The Changing Scene: Memoirs of a Civil Servant, Commonwealth 
Publishers, New Delhi 
Prasanna, S. (1993), Notes on the Nagar PalikaAct, CIVIC, Bangalore 
Pugh, C. (1990), Housing and Urbanization; A Study of India, Sage Publications, New 
Delhi 
Radakrishnan, N. (1989), 'Housing: a desperate situation', Business India, May 28 -
June 11, pp. 42-52, Bombay 
Ramachandran, R. (1989), Urbanisation and Urban Systems in India, Oxford University 
Press, Delhi 
Rama Rao, S. (1995), 'Reform in the management of urban local finance', IHSP 
International Seminar on Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development, 1-4 February, 
New Delhi 
References 507 
Rangarajan, L.N. (edit, 1992), Kautilya: The Arthashastra, Penguin Book India, New 
Delhi 
Rashid, A.I. (1995), 'Trade, growth, and liberalization: the Indian experience, 1988-
1989', The Journal of Developing Areas, 29 (April 1995), p. 355-370, London 
Ravindra, A. (1996), Urban Land Policy: A Metropolitan Perspective, Concept 
Publishing Company, New Delhi 
Razdan, P.N. (1995), 'Integrated urban development; key issues', paper presented at the 
International IHSP Seminar on Integrated Urban Infrastructure Development, Human 
Settlement Management Institute, 1-4 February, New Delhi 
Regional Centre for Urban and Environmental Studies (1988), IDSMT in Karnataka and 
Tamil Nadu: An Evaluation, Osmania University, Hyderabad 
Rodwin, L. (edit, 1987), Shelter, Settlement and Development, Allen & Unwin, Boston 
Rondinelli, D.A. (1983), Secondary cities in developing countries, Sage Publications, 
New Delhi 
Rondinelli, D.A. and G.S.Cheema (edit., 1988), Urban Services in Developing 
Countries; Public and Private Roles in Urban Development, McMillan Press Ltd., 
London 
Rosenthal, D.B. (edit, 1976), The City in Indian Politics, Thomson Press (India) Ltd., 
Faridabad 
Routray, J.K. (1993), 'Urban and regional planning in practice in India', Habitat 
International, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 55-74, Pergamon Press, Great Britain 
Rüland, J. (1988), Urban Government and Development in Asia; Readings in 
Subnational Development, Weltforum Verlag, München 
Sachdeva, P. (1990), 'Role of political parties in urban local government: a case study', 
Administrative Change, Vol. XVII, No. 2, January-June, pp. 48-57, New Delhi 
Sachdeva, P. (1993), Urban Local Government and Administration in India, Kitab 
Mahal, Allahabad 
Safier, M. (1992), 'Urban development: policy planning and management; practitioners' 
perspectives on public learning over three decades', Habitat International, Vol. 16, No. 
2, pp. 5-12, Pergamon Press, Great Britain 
Sainath, P. (1996), Everybody Loves a Good Drought; Stories from India's Poorest 
Districts, Penguin Books India (P) Ltd., New Delhi 
Saini, N.S. (edit., n.d.), Reading Material on Development Management, Institute for 
Town Planning in India, New Delhi 
Sarkaria Committee (1963), Report of the Committee on Augmentation of Financial 
Resources of Urban Local Bodies, Government of India, Delhi 
Sarma, K.S.R.N. (1986), Financing Urban Development in India, Indian Institute of 
Public Administration, New Delhi 
508 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Saunders, P. (1983), Urban Politics: A Sociological Interpretation, Hutchinson, London 
Savage, M. and A. Warde (1993), Urban Sociology, Capitalism and Modernity, Sage 
Publications, London 
Scott, J.C. (1972), Comparative Political Corruption, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Eaglewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey 
Sengupta, N. ( 1995), Inside the Steel Frame, Vikas Publishers, New Delhi 
Shah, G. (1997), 'Bureaucracy and urban improvement can it made to last?; post-plague 
scenario in Surat', Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXII, No. 12, March 22-28, 
pp. 607-613, Bombay 
Sharma, S.C. (1995), 'The emergence and evolution of HUDCO' in The Corporate 
Story of HUDCO ¡970-1995, HUDCO, New Delhi 
Shaw, A. (1996), 'Urban policy in post-independent India; an appraisal', Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol. XXXI, No. 4, January 27, Bombay 
Singh, H. and M.Singh (1993), Public Administration in India: Theory and Practice, 
Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 
Singh, K.P. (1994), 'National urban policy for India: some issues', AIHDA-seminar on 
Futuristic Planning of Human Settlements for the 21st Century, 21-23 October, Kullu 
Singh, K.P. (1995), 'Impact of New Economic Policies on delivery of serviced land in 
urban areas', paper delivered at AIHDA seminar, February, Darjeeling 
Singh, P. and A.Bhandarkar (1994), IAS Profile: Myths and Realities, Wiley Eastern 
Ltd., New Delhi 
Singh, R. (1988), 'Indian bureaucracy and development', Indian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 34-47, New Delhi 
Sivaramakrishnan, K.C. (edit., 1993), 'Managing urban environment in India towards an 
agenda for action', papers for a workshop on Role of Cities for Management of Urban 
Environment in Asia, RHUDCO/USAID, Times Research Foundation, 26-28 August, 
Bangalore 
Sivaramakrishnan, K.C. and L.Green (1986), Metropolitan Management; The Asian 
Experience, EDI Series in Economic Development, IBRD/The World Bank, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
Skinner, R.J., J.L.Taylor and E.A.Wegelin (1987), Shelter Upgrading for the Poor: 
Evaluation of Third World Experiences, Island Publishing House, Manila 
Spear, P. (1978), A History of India; From Sixteenth to Twentieth Century, Volume 2, 
Penguin Books India, reprinted in 1990, New Delhi 
Srinivas, M.N. (1952), Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India, Oxford 
University Press, London 
Srinivas, M.N. (1964), Caste in Modern India and other Essays, Asia Publishing House, 
Bombay 
References 509 
Srinivisan, R. and B.A.V. Sharma (1965), 'Politics in шЬап India; a study of four 
corporations' in S.P. Aiyer and R. Srinivisan (eds.) Studies in Indian Democracy, Asia 
Publishing House, Bombay 
State Finance Commission related to Urban Local Bodies (1996), Report of the State 
Finance Commission related to Urban Local Bodies, Government of Karnataka, 
Bangalore 
Steffens, L. (1963), The Shame of the Cities, Hill & Wang Inc., New York 
Subramaniam, C. (1997), India is for Sale, UBS Publishers' Distributors Ltd., New 
Delhi 
Suleiman-Princeton, E.N. (1974), Politics, power and bureaucracy in France: The 
administrative elite, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 
Sundaram, P.S.A. (1994), 'Municipal finance in India', AIHDA-seminar on Futuristic 
Planning of Human Settlements for the 21st Century, 21-23 October, Kullu 
Suselo, H., J.L.Taylor and E.A.Wegelin (edit., 1995), Indonesia's Urban Infrastructure 
Development Experience: Critical Lessons of Good Practice, UNCHS, Nairobi 
Tandau, A.C. (1996), Policy Implementation in India: A Case Study, Vikas Publishing 
House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 
Taub, R.P. (1969), Bureaucrats under Stress, University of California Press, Los 
Angeles 
Taylor, P.J. (1993), Political Geography: World-economy, Nation-State and Locality, 
Longman Scientific and Technical Publications, Harlow, Essex 
Thakur, R. (1995), The Government and Politics of India, MacMillan Press, London 
Thapar, R. (1990), A History of India; Volume One, Penguin Books India, reprint, New 
Delhi 
Thimmaiah, G. (1993), Power Politics and Social Justice; Backward Castes in 
Karnataka, Sage Publications, New Delhi 
Times Research Foundation (1994), 'Democratic decentralization in the context of the 
Constitution (74th Amendment) Act, 1992', Issue paper for 25th Meeting of Central 
Council of Local Government and Urban Development, Government of India, Ministry 
of Urban Development, Calcutta 
Times Research Foundation (1996), State Housing Board Reform Study, HUDCO, 
Calcutta 
Town and Country Planning Organisation, Ministry of Works and Housing (1985), 
Integrated Development of Small and Medium Towns: In Retrospect and Prospect, 
Government of India, New Delhi 
Town and Country Planning Organisation, Ministry of Works and Housing (1979), 
IDSMT Guidelines, Government of India, New Delhi 
510 Urban Development in Karnataka 
Town and Country Planning Organisation (1994), Draft Revised IDSMT Guidelines, 
Government of India, Ministry of Urban Development, New Delhi 
UNCHS (1990), Financing Human Settlements, Development and Management in 
Developing Countries: A Comparative Overview of Case Studies, Nairobi 
UNCHS (Habitat)/Urban Management Group (1989), Overview of Issues and Strategic 
Options in Operations and Maintenance; Analysis and Synthesis, Revised Draft, 
UNDP/Urban Management Programme, May, Nairobi 
UNDP/World Bank/UNCHS (1992), Environmental Strategies for Cities: a Framework 
for Urban Environmental Management in Developing Countries, Working Draft, New 
York 
UNDP (1994), Human Development Report 1994, Oxford University Press, Delhi 
UNDP (1995), Human Development Report 1995, Oxford University Press, Delhi 
Ward, P.M. (edit., 1989), Corruption, Development and Inequality; Soft Touch or Hard 
Graft, Routledge, London/New York 
Wegelin, E.A. (1977), Urban low-income housing and development, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Amsterdam 
Weiner, M. (1989), The Indian Paradox; Essays in Indian Politics, Sage Publications, 
New Delhi 
Wijk, H.D. van, and W. Konijnenbelt (1984), Hoofdstukken van Administratief Recht, 
Fifth Edition, VUGA Uitgeverij BV, The Hague 
Willis, M. (1989), Bureaucracy; its Role in Third World Development, MacMillan 
Publishers, London 
Wilson, W. (1887), 'The study of administration', Political Science Quarterly, reprintedin 
R. J.Stillman II, Public administration: concepts and cases, 1976, pp. 269-281, Boston 
Wit, J.W. de (1991), Stedelijke Armoede in India, Landelijke Werkgroep India, Utrecht 
Wit, J.W. de (1996), Poverty, Policy and Politics in Madras Slums; Dynamics of 
Survival, Gender and Leadership, Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 
World Bank (1993), Housing: Enabling Markets to Work, With Technical Supplements, 
IBRD/World Bank, Washington 
World Bank (1989), India: Poverty, Employment and Social Services, A World Bank 
Country Study, World Bank, Washington 
World Bank (1995), India: Recent Economic Developments and Prospects, A World 
Bank Country Study, World Bank, Washington 
World Bank (1991), Urban Policy and Economic Development; An Agenda for the 
1990s, A World Bank Policy Paper, IBRD/World Bank, Washington 
World Bank (1994), World Development Report 1994; Infrastructure for Development, 
IBRD/World Bank, Oxford University Press, London 
References 511 
World Bank (1995), World Development Report J 995; Workers in an Integrating 
World, IBRD/World Bank, Oxford University Press, London 
Yagnendra, B.K. and H.A.Mengers (1996), Field Study Report Implementation of the 
Integrated Programme for Low-Cost Sanitation (and Liberation of Scavengers); 
Experiences from 5 case-study towns in Karnataka, Indian Human Settlements 
Programme, Bangalore 
— (1993), 'Economic survey on India 1992-93', The Economic Times, 26 February 
1993, Bangalore Edition, Bangalore 
— (1995), Economic survey of India 1994-95, The Economic Times, 21 January 1995, 
Bangalore Edition, Bangalore 
- (1994), 'Parties in no hurry to face civic polls', staff reporter, The Statesman, 30 
April 1994, New Delhi 
— (1995), 'The mouse roars back to life', Business World, 23 August 5 September 1995, 
Bombay 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
Inleiding 
Het stedelijk ontwikkelingsbeleid in India krijgt vorm in vijfjarenplannen 
van de nationale overheden en staatsoverheden, in beleidsdocumenten, in 
wetgeving, in circulaires, in projectrichtlijnen en in ambtelijke instructies. 
Bepalend voor het succes van dit 'beleid' is hoe de projecten worden 
uitgevoerd en hoe de wetgeving wordt gehandhaafd. Daarbij spelen vele 
partijen een rol: de nationale overheid in Delhi, de staatsoverheid in 
Bangalore, de instanties die dit beleid moeten uitvoeren, het ambtenaren-
apparaat, de gemeenten, maar ook de politici en de doelgroep. Het zal 
niemand verbazen dat het beleid met zijn goede bedoelingen is aangepast, 
bijgesteld en ook vervormd tegen de tijd dat het wordt uitgevoerd. 
Projecten blijken de doelgroep niet te bereiken, worden half afgemaakt, 
zijn van slechte kwaliteit en komen tot stilstand door gerechtelijke 
procedures. Soms blijken de gemeenten niet voldoende personeel te 
hebben voor het beheer of ontbreken de financiën. Het verschil tussen het 
omschreven en het gerealiseerde beleid is derhalve groot. Bovendien 
blijken de projecten maar een kleine bijdrage te leveren aan de stedelijke 
groei en dynamiek. Het lijkt zelfs of de overheid zo goed als geen greep 
heeft op de stedelijke ontwikkelingen, maar dat deze worden bepaald door 
andere maatschappelijke en autonome krachten. 
Opzet van het onderzoek 
Tijdens mijn verblijf in Karnataka in de jaren 1992-96 raakte ik gefasci-
neerd door deze transformatie. Andere onderzoekers hadden over het 
verschil tussen beleid en praktijk geschreven in de wetenschappelijke 
literatuur, maar er leek nog weinig diepgaand onderzoek te zijn gedaan 
naar de achterliggende factoren. Ook was onduidelijk in welke mate het 
beleid een bijdrage had geleverd aan de stedelijke ontwikkeling. De 
kernwoorden output (meetbaar resultaat) en outcome (doeltreffendheid) 
werden zo centrale begrippen in mijn onderzoek. Dit onderzoek startte in 
1994 met de volgende drie vragen: 
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Wat is het meetbare resultaat en de doeltreffendheid van het huisves-
tingsbeleid en het stedelijk ontwikkelingsbeleid in de deelstaat 
Karnataka? 
- Wat zijn de belangrijkste factoren die daarbij een rol hebben 
gespeeld? 
Wat is de bijdrage geweest van dit beleid aan de algehele stedelijke 
ontwikkeling? 
Het onderzoek richtte zich op een aantal factoren die verondersteld werden 
van belang te zijn. In de eerste plaats, de perceptie van de overheid van 
haar rol op het vlak van stedelijke ontwikkeling. De politieke geschiedenis 
van deze eeuw zou daarin inzicht kunnen bieden, met name de 
socialistische politiek die centraal stond in de ontwikkelingskoers die India 
in 1947 koos als onafhankelijke natie. Ten tweede, het beleid zoals dat was 
vastgelegd in vijfjarenplannen en andere documenten: welke betekenis 
kennen deze toe aan stedelijke ontwikkeling, welke benadering wordt 
daarbij gehanteerd en welke middelen worden beschikbaar gesteld om het 
beleid uit te voeren? Ten derde, het uitvoerende apparaat: welke instanties 
werden in het leven geroepen, welke bevoegdheden en middelen kregen zij 
en hoe gaven zij vorm aan het beleid? Ten vierde, de rol van het ambtelijk 
apparaat: welke belangen dienden de ambtenaren, wat was de rol van het 
topkader, met name die van de Indian Administrative Service, en wat was 
hun opstelling tegenover de politiek? Ten vijfde, de rol van de politiek op 
nationaal niveau, staats niveau en lokaal niveau: welke rol speelde zij in de 
uitvoering van het beleid, de toekenning van projectfondsen, het stellen 
van prioriteiten en de uitvoering van projecten? Ten zesde, wat was de rol 
van het beleid van andere departementen die ook actief zijn in de stedelijke 
omgeving, zoals die van industrie, handel en welzijn. Ten zevende, de rol 
van de gemeenten en de doelgroep, en ten slotte de rol van de lokale 
economie met zijn vele ondernemers, handelaren, huiseigenaren en 
anderen. Deze factoren vormden samen met het object van studie het 
conceptueel model (hoofdstuk 2). 
Uiteraard was een toespitsing noodzakelijk en daarom heeft dit 
onderzoek zich met name gericht op het beleid van het nationale ministerie 
van stedelijke ontwikkeling {Ministry of Urban Development) en het 
Staatsdepartement voor huisvesting en stedelijke ontwikkeling {Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development). Het resultaat en de doeltref-
fendheid van het beleid werden geanalyseerd aan de hand van de projecten 
die deze instanties hebben uitgevoerd in 172 gemeenten in Karnataka in de 
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periode 1980-94. Het gaat hierbij om sociale woningbouwprojecten van de 
Karnataka Housing Board (KHB) en de Karnataka Slum Clearance Board 
(KSCB), de gemengde woningbouwprojecten van de KHB, de 
drinkwaterprojecten van de Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board (KUWS&DB), het programma Integrated Development of Small 
and Medium Towns (IDSMT), het Nehru Rozgar Yojana (NRY) 
werkgelegenheidsprogramma, het Urban Basic Services for the Poor 
(UBSP) programma en het toilettenprogramma. De laatste vier zijn 
uitgevoerd door het Directorate of Municipal Administration (DMA) en 
genoten financiële ondersteuning van de centrale overheid. 
Het onderzoek bestond voor een belangrijk deel uit beleidsanalyse, 
projectevaluatie en aanvullend veldwerk. Met ongeveer 40 staatsambte-
naren werden gesprekken gevoerd over beleids- en uitvoeringskwesties. 
Om een analyse van de projecten en gemeenten mogelijk te maken werden 
drie indexen ontwikkeld: voor de ontwikkelingsstatus, de politieke 
affiliatie en de financiële situatie. Bovendien werden zeven gemeenten in 
Karnataka, waar dergelijke projecten zijn uitgevoerd, aan een uitgebreider 
onderzoek onderworpen. Het veldwerk bestond hier uit 115 interviews met 
uitvoerders van projecten, politici, journalisten en andere burgers, die een 
waardevolle mening zouden kunnen hebben over deze projecten, en uit 
536 gestructureerde interviews met begunstigden van de betreffende 
projecten. 
Het theoretisch kader 
Het onderzoeksterrein houdt het midden tussen bestuurskunde en urbane 
sociologie. Een inventarisatie van theorieën en concepten maakte het 
mogelijk een instrumentarium samen te stellen waarmee de bevindingen 
getoetst konden worden aan bestaande concepten en analyses vergelijkbaar 
gemaakt konden worden met ervaringen elders. Het is niet de intentie 
geweest om een theorievormende studie te verrichten. Naarmate de studie 
vorderde bleek steeds meer dat het onderzoeksonderwerp zich lastig laat 
vangen binnen één enkele theoretische benadering. De verwijzing naar 
bestaande theorieën en vergelijkingen met ander empirisch onderzoek is 
dan ook op een eclectische manier gebeurd. Niettemin reikten de twee 
genoemde disciplines voldoende instrumentarium aan om het onderzoek in 
een context te plaatsen. Rüland (1988) waarschuwt onderzoekers dat een 
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wettelijk-bestuurlijke benadering te beperkt is en dat deze andere 
dimensies te veel buiten beschouwing laat. Hij prefereert een penetrated 
system benadering, die zich richt op machtsverhoudingen en patronen van 
besluitvorming. Deze benadering heb ik inderdaad gevolgd en het 
bovengenoemde conceptueel model weerspiegelt deze keuze. 
Het resultaat van de huisvestingsprojecten en stedelijke ont-
wikkelingsprojecten in Karnataka 
Tussen 1980 en 1994 werden 287 huisvestingsprojecten en 335 stedelijke 
ontwikkelingsprojecten in Karnataka goedgekeurd en grotendeels 
uitgevoerd. Hiermee was een bedrag gemoeid van 21,8 miljard Indiase 
rupies (of 1.450 miljoen gulden). Negentig procent van dit bedrag kwam 
ten goede aan drinkwaterprojecten (48 procent) en huisvestingsprojecten 
(41 procent). Daarvan werden 70.000 huizen gebouwd, waardoor één op 
twintig huishoudens in de steden van Karnataka in principe een huis van 
de KHB of KSCB kon kopen. Dit aantal had aanmerkelijk hoger kunnen 
zijn als meer projecten waren afgerond. Ongeveer 500 rupies per hoofd 
van de bevolking werden uitgegeven aan drinkwaterprojecten in éénderde 
van de steden, met als resultaat dat daar nu ongeveer 75 liter water per dag 
per hoofd van bevolking kan worden geleverd (State Finance Commission, 
1996). In de andere steden is de aanvoer slechts 50 liter per dag. Andere 
door de centrale overheid ondersteunde programma's leverden een 
bijdrage aan de bouw en inrichting van markten en winkelcomplexen in 51 
steden en aan het genereren van gemeentelijke inkomsten (IDSMT), alsook 
aan het creëren van 14.000-34.000 mensjaren werkgelegenheid (NRY). 
Met deze laatste programma's werd 10-15 procent van de krottenwijk-
bewoners bereikt. Het toilettenprogramma verschafte latrines aan ten 
minste 10 procent van de bevolking in een vijftigtal steden. De 
kwantitatieve resultaten van deze programma's zijn al met al dus vrij 
opmerkelijk. 
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De doeltreffendheid van de huisvestingsprojecten en stedelijke 
ontwikkelingsproj ecten 
De doeltreffendheid van bovengenoemde projecten moet worden vastge-
steld aan de hand van de doelstellingen van deze programma's, alsook aan 
de hand van de algemene doelstellingen van de vijfjarenplannen en andere 
beleidsdocumenten. Het algemene doel van de huisvestingsprojecten is het 
huizentekort te verminderen en toegang tot grond en huisvesting te 
verschaffen aan lage inkomensgroepen die niet in staat zijn deze via de 
markt te verkrijgen. De stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten hebben diverse 
doelen, waaronder de verbetering van de netto drinkwatervoorziening, de 
verbetering van de woonomstandigheden in met name krottenwijken, het 
genereren van werkgelegenheid en inkomen voor de armsten, en het 
ombuigen van de migratiestromen naar de grote steden in de richting van 
de middelgrote steden in Karnataka. De overheid heeft voor de stedelijke 
ontwikkeling als geheel ten doel de armoede te verminderen en een 
bijdrage te leveren aan de evenwichtige ontwikkeling van de steden en hun 
economie. 
Terwijl de kwantitatieve resultaten van de projecten opmerkelijk 
mogen worden genoemd, is de doeltreffendheid van de inspanningen 
minder indrukwekkend. Tweederde van alle investeringen kwam terecht in 
de stad Bangalore, terwijl 10-20 procent van de investeringen naar een 
handjevol steden ging, zodat er nog maar weinig overbleef voor de andere 
urbane kernen. In 90 steden werd in de periode 1980-94 geen enkel 
huisvestingproject gerealiseerd en 25 steden bleven verstoken van 
stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten. Dit staat in contrast met het beleid van 
Karnataka om de stedelijke groei op meer evenwichtige wijze en verspreid 
te laten plaatsvinden. 
De respectabele productie van 70.000 huizen correspondeerde met 
slechts 4 procent van het officiële tekort aan huizen. Doordat de grootste 
woningproductie ook nog rondom de as Bangalore-Mysore plaatsvond, 
hebben tal van districten met grote tekorten weinig of geen projecten 
gehad. Als de keuze gekoppeld zou zijn geweest aan de tekorten en de 
mate van stedelijke groei, had men juist de steden die geen project hebben 
gehad moeten kiezen; zij groeiden namelijk veel harder dan de 
projectsteden. Als hiermee rekening was gehouden, had de 
doeltreffendheid van de huisvestingsprojecten aanmerkelijk groter kunnen 
zijn. Daar kwam nog bij dat intra- en interdepartementale coördinatie 
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ontbrak en dat de overheidsinstanties een duidelijke voorkeur hadden voor 
gemengde maar ook duurdere woningbouwprojecten en minder voorkeur 
voor sociale woningbouw. Deze sociale woningbouw werd in feite 
verwaarloosd, terwijl de projecten bovendien onvolledig en laat werden 
opgeleverd, de woningen van slechte kwaliteit bleken te zijn en 
basisvoorzieningen ontbraken. Ook werden op grote schaal onregel-
matigheden gerapporteerd. De woningen werden bovendien onbetaalbaar 
voor de doelgroep als gevolg van forse tijds- en kostenoverschrijdingen. 
Eenmaal bewoond bleek het terugbetalen van de leningen die op de huizen 
rustten niet van de grond te komen. Dit ondermijnde de financiële 
haalbaarheid en duurzaamheid van de projecten. De gemengde 
woningbouwprojecten liepen beter. In de zeven case-study steden werd een 
redelijke betalingsdiscipline geconstateerd. In alle onderzochte 
huisvestingsprojecten was de waardering van de bewoners positief en de 
meeste begunstigden vonden hun huis een duidelijke verbetering in 
vergelijking met de vorige woonplek. 
De gemengde woningbouwprojecten hebben ten doel verschillende 
typen huizen beschikbaar te stellen aan de diverse inkomensgroepen. 
Tijdens het veldwerk werd geconstateerd dat er een redelijke relatie bestaat 
tussen het inkomen van de huishoudens en het type woning dat zij 
bewonen. Vele bewoners blijken echter niet de oorspronkelijke eigenaar te 
zijn en verkoop en onderverhuur zijn algemene verschijnselen. Een en 
ander is in strijd met de regels van de Karnataka Housing Board, die 
verbieden dat huizen binnen tien jaar worden doorverkocht of onder-
verhuurd en daarmee willen voorkomen dat subsidies aan lage inkomens-
huishoudens uiteindelijk ten goede komen aan die met hogere inkomens. 
De situatie is ten dele een gevolg van onvoldoende controle op de naleving 
van de regels van de KHB. 
De analyse van de drinkwaterprojecten toonde aan dat er geen relatie 
bestaat tussen het geïnvesteerde bedrag per hoofd van de bevolking en de 
watervoorziening na het project. De officiële cijfers moeten bovendien met 
enige argwaan worden bezien, omdat de feitelijke situatie op het vlak van 
drinkwatervoorziening in meeste steden een heel ander beeld geeft. Met 
name in de steden van Noord-Karnataka worden de bewoners slechts om 
de andere dag een paar uur van water voorzien. Stroomuitval, achterstallig 
onderhoud, personeelsgebrek en lekkage zijn daarvan de oorzaken. De 
financiële haalbaarheid en de duurzaamheid van deze projecten blijken 
ernstig in gevaar te worden gebracht door de hoge kosten. De gemeenten 
zijn geheel niet in staat om de vereiste investeringsbijdrage te leveren of 
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om de middelen te genereren voor het onderhoud van de voorzieningen. 
Bovendien werden de werkelijke bouwkosten ruim tweemaal zo hoog 
tijdens de uitvoering, als gevolg van vertragingen en prijstijgingen van 
materialen en arbeid. 
Het IDSMT-programma is wellicht één van de betere programma's. 
De integrale benadering, het maatwerk en de flexibiliteit zijn de sterke 
kanten van de IDSMT. De gemeenten hebben een hoge waardering voor 
dit programma, omdat het hun concrete voordelen oplevert. De 
staatsoverheid droeg ook behoorlijk bij aan dit programma. De doelstel-
lingen werden echter geenszins bereikt: de steden met een IDSMT-
programma groeiden tussen 1981-91 even hard als de steden zonder dit 
programma. Het beleid tot afremming van de groei van bepaalde steden en 
het ombuigen van de migratiestromen kon in feite ook niet doeltreffend 
zijn, omdat maar liefst een vijftigtal steden werden geselecteerd, met als 
gevolg dat niet meer dan 52 rupies (drie gulden) per hoofd van de 
bevolking kon worden uitgegeven. Bovendien werden veel grotere 
projecten in Bangalore gepland en uitgevoerd, zoals het Mega-City project, 
waarin meer dan 200 rupies per hoofd zou worden uitgegeven. De 
tegenstelling tussen de stedelijke ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen en het 
investeringspatroon van de staatsoverheid is ook hier wederom opvallend. 
Het effect van het NRY-werkgelegenheidsprogramma is eveneens 
teleurstellend geweest, omdat de gegenereerde werkgelegenheid slechts 
0.1 procent bedraagt van de voor de periode 1989-94 berekende werk-
loosheid. Terwijl de gemeenten deden wat ze konden, was de rol van de 
KHB uitermate teleurstellend. Zij deed geen enkele moeite om een 
huisvestingscomponent te ontwikkelen. 
Het bonte UBSP-programma heeft op beperkte schaal de woonom-
geving van een aantal krottenwijkbewoners verbeterd en bijgedragen aan 
de opbouw van wijkorganisaties, met name onder vrouwen. Het veldwerk 
toonde aan dat de cijfers van de DMA in twijfel moeten worden getrokken, 
omdat wellicht een veel kleinere groep voordeel van dit programma heeft 
gehad. Het UBSP-programma had ten doel om de middelen en 
inspanningen van andere departementen samen te brengen en af te 
stemmen, maar dit is slechts op beperkte schaal gelukt. Deze andere 
departementen hadden weinig interesse en beschikten over onvoldoende 
personeel om aan het programma mee te werken. Zelfs binnen het 
Departement van Huisvesting en Stedelijke Ontwikkeling was beleids-
bundeling niet mogelijk. Participatie van de bevolking is een opmerkelijke 
component van dit programma. Er bleek echter een verschil in opvatting te 
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bestaan over de vraag waarom participatie zou moeten plaatsvinden. Het 
veldonderzoek toonde aan dat de programmamakers dachten aan wijk-
opbouw en bewonersorganisatie, de uitvoerders aan het op gang brengen 
van het programma en de bewoners aan een verplichting die noodzakelijk 
was om van de faciliteiten te kunnen profiteren. 
Het toilettenprogramma, tenslotte, heeft in Karnataka een trieste 
ervaring opgeleverd. Diverse eerdere en kleinere programma's op dit vlak 
waren redelijk succesvol, maar het grote Integrateci Programme for Low-
Cost Sanitation and Liberation of Scavengers ging ten onder door 
organisatorisch onvermogen en meer nog door de hebzucht en corruptie 
van een paar ambtenaren en politici. Met het project was ongeveer 310 
miljoen rupies gemoeid (18 miljoen gulden). De gang van zaken heeft 
geleid tot een gerechtelijke onderzoek en tot het in hechtenis nemen van 
een aantal ambtenaren, die ervan worden verdacht ten minste 20 miljoen 
rupies te hebben verduisterd. In de gemeenten zijn her en der latrines 
gebouwd die afwijken van het officiële ontwerp, ook nog van slechte 
kwaliteit zijn en nauwelijks worden gebruikt. Zij bewijzen slechts enkelen 
een dienst. De sociale component van het programma, het omscholen van 
de putjesscheppers (scavengers) en het vinden van ander passend werk, is 
volledig de mist ingegaan. Dankzij het falen van dit project is hun 
werkgelegenheid voorlopig gewaarborgd. 
Factoren die bepalend zijn geweest voor het resultaat en de doel-
treffendheid van het beleid 
Niet-gouvernementele actoren 
Het in deze studie gehanteerde conceptueel model maakt duidelijk dat 
meerdere factoren het verschil tussen beleid en uitvoering kunnen 
verklaren. De stedelijke ontwikkeling en huisvesting worden in de eerste 
plaats bepaald door niet-gouvernementele en kapitaalkrachtige actoren: de 
burgers, de industrieën, de bedrijven, de landeigenaren en de project-
ontwikkelaars. Het is bekend dat het nationale gespaarde vermogen in het 
fiscale jaar 1991-92, dat loopt van 1 april tot 31 maart van het volgende 
kalenderjaar, 1.500 miljard rupies was (Sundharam en Datt, 1995). Daar-
naast is er zwart geld in omloop dat geschat wordt op nog eens 3.000 
miljard rupies, ofwel 50 procent van het Bruto Nationaal Product (Gupta, 
520 Urban Development in Karnataka 
1992). Een groot deel hiervan wordt bestemd voor waardevaste uitgaven in 
de urbane sector: land en ander onroerend goed. De bijdrage die de staats-
overheid in Karnataka naar schatting aan diezelfde sector levert is gering: 
tussen 1 en 5 procent. Bovendien levert de overheid slechts een matige 
inspanning om de groei van de steden te controleren en minder nog om die 
ook te sturen. Een feit is ook dat het zwarte geld een ongunstig effect heeft 
op de prijsontwikkeling en de beschikbaarheid van land. De steden blijven 
dus op een ongecontroleerde en welhaast organische wijze groeien als 
gevolg van particuliere investeringen en het ontbreken van een krachtige 
regulering. Het ontbreken van die regulering is niet alleen een 
capaciteitsprobleem van de overheid, maar is soms ook politiek gestuurd, 
zoals we nog zullen zien. 
De rol van de overheid 
India kent een socialistische traditie en de overheid zou en moest daarom 
een centrale rol vervullen in alle sectoren van ontwikkeling. Gelijkheid, 
armoedebestrijding en economische ontwikkeling zijn sinds de onafhan-
kelijkheid in 1947 kernthema's van het beleid geweest. Terwijl grootse 
doelen werden geformuleerd, bleven de middelen echter beperkt en de 
instanties die het beleid moesten uitvoeren zwak. Het contrast tussen wat 
zou gebeuren en wat werkelijk gebeurde is immens gebleven. Er was, 
anders gezegd, een grote kloof tussen wat de centrale overheid voorschreef 
en wat de staatsoverheden deden, tussen wat de vijfjarenplannen 
bedoelden en wat de instellingen uitvoerden, tussen wat politici beloofden 
en wat ze in werkelijkheid deden, en tussen datgene wat de richtlijnen 
voorschreven en de handelwijze van de uitvoerenden. 
Het beleids- en planmatig overheidshandelen is ook wel omschreven 
als een (westerse) handelwijze, die buiten de culturele context van India 
zou vallen (Haque, 1996). Voorzichtigheid, conservatisme en angst voor 
een verstoring van de bestaande maatschappelijke en bestuurlijke 
verhoudingen hebben veranderingen in de weg gestaan. De bureaucratie 
van voor de onafhankelijkheid bestond uit een elitaire en uit de hogere 
kasten gerecruteerde groep ambtenaren. Net zoals de Moghuls, maakten 
ook de Britten gebruik van de bestaande maatschappelijke verhoudingen 
en brachten ze daarin geen verandering. Met de onafhankelijkheid wilde 
India af van het systeem waarbij sommige kasten door geboorte het recht 
hebben om te heersen en zeggenschap te hebben, en andere kasten om 
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onderdanig te zijn en te dienen. Het heeft echter vele jaren geduurd 
voordat ook laag-kastigen tot hogere ambtelijke functies werden toegelaten 
en nog steeds zijn de verhoudingen scheef. 
Er zijn in Karnataka daarnaast nog twee andere gemeenschappen die 
de politieke en bestuurlijke cultuur hebben bepaald: de vokkaligas en 
lingayats. Zij behoren tot de klasse van rurale en agrarische landeigenaren. 
Sinds de onafhankelijkheid hebben zij om de macht gestreden in de 
Congres-partij die domineerde tot het einde van de jaren zeventig. Dit 
leidde tot een politiek die vele jaren vooral gericht was op rurale 
ontwikkeling. De urbane problemen daarentegen werden verwaarloosd. 
Pas sinds het begin van de jaren tachtig is er bij de staatsoverheid serieuze 
aandacht voor deze problemen ontstaan. Ongeveer tegelijkertijd is de 
dominantie van de Congres-partij sterk afgenomen en heeft zij sindsdien 
twee andere partijen in de politieke arena moet dulden: de Janata- en de 
BJP-partij. Ook andere belangengroepen verschenen op het toneel. De 
verbrokkeling van de politieke macht ging zelfs zo ver dat binnen een 
enkele partij verschillende facties ontstonden, die soms tegenstrijdige 
belangen moeten behartigen. Van eenheid of partijdiscipline is geen sprake 
meer. Dit heeft geleid tot onstabiele regeringen met interne oppositie, 
uittredingen, partijrevoltes, etc. Deze politieke instabiliteit is een factor 
geweest die heeft bijgedragen aan het uitblijven van veranderingen. 
Liberalisatie, privatisering, bestuurlijke hervorming, decentralisatie en 
deregulering zijn tot nu toe blijven steken in het planstadium. 
De relatie tussen de centrale en staatsoverheid 
Woningbouw en stedelijke ontwikkeling zijn volgens de grondwet 
staatsaangelegenheden. Toch heeft de centrale overheid geprobeerd 
invloed uit te oefenen. Zij vond dat de staatsoverheden te weinig prioriteit 
gaven aan de urbane sector en ook niet adequaat reageerden op diverse 
verontrustende ontwikkelingen. In het uitschrijven van beleid was de 
centrale overheid echter niet bijzonder succesvol en sinds de jaren zeventig 
heeft zij daarom een ander instrument daaraan toegevoegd: door de 
centrale overheid gesponserde programma's. Er zijn geen staatsoverheden 
geweest die dat een inmenging in hun verantwoordelijkheid vonden; wel 
werd bezwaar gemaakt tegen de gedetailleerde wijze waarop de centrale 
overheid probeerde voor te schrijven hoe de programma's moesten worden 
uitgevoerd. Zij probeerde zelfs te regelen hoe de pamfletten voor de 
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burgers er uit moesten zien. Zij liet daarmee blijken niet bijster veel 
vertrouwen te hebben in de capaciteiten van de staatsoverheden en hun 
apparaat om de programma's goed uit te voeren. Bij een aantal 
programma's zijn deze details gehandhaafd, zoals bij het IDSMT en 
UBSP, maar in andere gevallen moest de centrale overheid terugkeren op 
haar schreden, zoals bij het NRY- en het toilettenprogramma. 
Een ander instrument van de centrale overheid vormden de 
financieringsvoorwaarden van de Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation Ltd. (HUDCO). Volgens deze voorwaarden moest een vast 
percentage van de projectfondsen ten goede komen aan de lage inko-
mensgroepen. Deze eis heeft inderdaad een distributief effect gehad op de 
vele huisvestingsprojecten in Karnataka. 
De invloed van de centrale overheid is desalniettemin beperkt 
gebleven, omdat 85 procent van de investeringen in de periode 1980-94 
van de staat kwam. Bovendien werden de centraal gesponsorde program-
ma's uitgevoerd door de kleinste en zwakste instanties. De urbane 
'krachtpatsers' waren andere instanties: de Bangalore Urban Development 
Authority, de Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, de Karnataka 
Housing Board en de Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage 
Board, 
Nationaal beleid en staatsbeleid voor huisvesting en stedelijke 
ontwikkeling 
De nationale vijfjarenplannen vormen het beleidskader voor de staats-
overheid. De analyses en concepten die werden gepresenteerd in nationale 
vijfjarenplannen waren veel verder uitgewerkt dan die in staatsvijfjaren-
plannen. De centrale overheid lanceerde verschillende voorstellen met 
betrekking tot de beleidsbenadering voor de urbane sector, het gebuik van 
aangepaste technologieën, de vorming van samenwerkingsverbanden, en 
het stimuleren van bevolkingsparticipatie en coördinatie tussen de 
verschillende actoren in de urbane sector. De documenten spraken zich 
ook uit over het gevoerde beleid, de tekortkomingen daarbij en de vraag 
hoe dit kon worden bijgesteld. Het tegenstrijdige in deze documenten is 
evenwel dat zij niet verder gaan dan een conceptueel niveau en geen 
poging doen om concrete richtlijnen of hervormingen aan te reiken. Ook 
worden er geen maatregelen in aangekondigd of fondsen ter beschikking 
gesteld. Het gevolg was dat de staatsplannen nauwelijks boodschap hadden 
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aan nationale beleidsideeën. Deze ideeën werden wel globaal 
overgenomen, maar de beleidsmakers voelden zich er weinig aan 
gehouden en trokken grotendeels hun eigen lijnen. 
De staatsdocumenten vertoonden weinig consistentie tussen eigen 
beleid, doelen, geplande actitiveiten of programma's en budgetten. Zelfs in 
het hoofdstuk over stedelijke ontwikkeling ontbraken verwijzingen naar 
secties als huisvesting en drinkwater. Deze secties werden door 
verschillende auteurs geschreven, blijkbaar zonder overleg en zonder 
eindredactie door het secretariaat voor huisvesting en stedelijke ontwik-
keling. De nadruk in deze documenten lag op wat en niet op het waarom 
en voor wie. De vijfjarenplannen van de staat zijn daardoor verworden tot 
documenten waarin niet zozeer het doel maar het middel centraal staat; ze 
zijn, met andere woorden, niet zozeer objective-driven, maar agency-
driven. 
Uit de hier voorliggende studie komt ook naar voren dat er weinig 
interesse bestond voor beleidsgericht overheidshandelen. De beleidstukken 
ter voorbereiding van het beleid voor staatshuisvesting en stedelijke 
ontwikkeling bleven ambtelijke stukken. Het vage beleidskader waarin de 
instanties werken illustreert ook dat er een desinteresse bestaat voor de 
beginselen van goed bestuur, zoals redelijkheid, billijkheid, voorspel-
baarheid (het vermijden van willekeur), rechtmatigheid, het nemen van 
politieke en bestuurlijke verantwoordelijkheid, en het kunnen afleggen van 
verantwoording daarover (Van Wijk en Konijnenbelt, 1984). 
Ruimtelijke ordening en de handhaving daarvan 
Als het beleid onvoldoende sturing geeft aan het stedelijke ontwikke-
lingsproces, dan is er altijd nog de uitgebreide wetgeving voor ruimtelijke 
ordening (Town and Country Planning Act, 1964). Ook bestaan er allerlei 
gemeentelijke verordeningen. De ruimtelijke ordening is ook in India 
gebaseerd op een ruimtelijk bestemmingsplan (master plan). Zo'n plan 
kent stedelijke functies toe aan gebieden: één gebied, één functie. Een 
dergelijk plan kent echter ook een aantal zwakheden. Het beperkt zich tot 
ruimtelijke functies zonder dat daarbij een economische of financiële 
analyse wordt gegeven voor de haalbaarheid. Verder zijn de 
bestemmingsplannen slecht verankerd in de wetgeving, zijn ze meer 
adviserend dan bindend en is het ambtelijk apparaat dat zorg moet dragen 
voor de naleving zwak of afwezig. Het draagvlak van een 
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bestemmingsplan is bovendien klein, omdat er onvoldoende publieke en 
politieke consultatie plaatsvindt. Deze zwakke ruimtelijke ordening wordt 
door het politieke bestel min of meer geduld en vormt een sterk argument 
voor de stelling dat ditzelfde bestel er belang bij zou hebben om een zekere 
mate van wanorde en niet-effectieve ruimtelijke ordening in stand te 
houden. 
De ruimtelijke ordening en de handhaving daarvan zijn nog verder 
uitgehold doordat twee belangrijke onteigeningswetten al decennia lang 
tegenhouden wat ze nu juist beogen: de aankoop van particulier land door 
de overheid voor het algemeen belang. 
De keuze van projecten voor huisvesting en stedelijke ontwikkeling 
In deze studie is geprobeerd te achterhalen hoe en waarom projecten 
werden gekozen. Naast beleidsrelevante factoren zijn ook andere factoren 
geanalyseerd. Uit de analyse bleek, zoals verwacht, dat bijna geen enkele 
beleidsrelevante factor een significante rol heeft gespeeld bij de keuze van 
projecten. Urbaan spreidingsbeleid, stedelijke groei, armoede, het aantal 
krottenwijken, de achterstand van de stedelijke ontwikkeling (gemeten met 
een ontwikkelingsindex), de financiële draagkracht van een gemeente, en 
de aanwezigheid van mogelijk ondersteunende investeringen door andere 
departementen waren nauwelijks van belang. De keuzes werden in feite 
bepaald door ad-hoc, puur departementale en persoonlijke besluit-
vormingsprocessen, die overeen lijken te komen met het garbage can 
model van Olsen (1976). Een evidente factor was politieke interventie. In 
tweederde van de ruim 600 projecten werd de keuze gemaakt op het 
moment dat het lokale lid van het staatsparlement {Member of Legislative 
Assembly) van dezelfde politieke partij was als de regering. In éénvierde 
van de gevallen bleek deze op het moment van keuze bovendien nog een 
ministersfunctie te hebben. De personen in kwestie hebben zonder twijfel 
hun invloed laten gelden. Het verband was vooral aantoonbaar bij de 
grotere projecten; die betreffende huisvesting, watervoorziening en de 
IDSMT. In de kleinere projecten (NRY, UBSP en het toilettenprogramma) 
was daar minder sprake van. 
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Verschillen tussen vraag en aanbod 
In een aantal programma's werd verschil tussen vraag en aanbod gecon-
stateerd. In geen enkel geval werd er onderzoek gedaan naar de vraag naar 
huisvesting en naar de financiële draagkracht van de woningzoekenden. De 
in de beleidsstukken opgenomen gegevens betreffende huisvestings-
tekorten werden gebaseerd op vuistregels en verjaarde cijfers. De 
inschrijvings- en toewijzingsprocedures waren voornamelijk afgestemd op 
de mogelijkheden van de middenklassen en geenszins toegesneden op de 
situatie van de economisch zwakkeren. Degenen die behoren tot de lage 
inkomensgroepen kunnen vaak geen goede identiteitspapieren overleggen, 
hebben een onregelmatig inkomen, beschikken niet over voldoende 
middelen om aanbetalingen te doen en zijn alleen in staat beetje bij beetje 
hun huis te verbeteren. De huisvestingsinstanties hebben hierop niet 
ingespeeld en zij deden ook geen moeite mogelijkheden daarvoor te 
ontwikkelen. 
In het latrineprogramma werd verondersteld dat degenen die alleen 
beschikten over een 'emmer-latrine' of in het geheel geen latrine hadden 
zonder meer zouden instemmen met het programma en dat zij daarvoor 
ook nog zouden willen betalen. Inventariserend onderzoek, inschrij-
vingsrondes en promotie-campagnes bleven achterwege, waardoor de 
bouw van de latrines begon zonder dat de bewoners of de gemeenten ervan 
afwisten. Toen het tot uitvoering kwam, bleken veel bewoners geen 
interesse te hebben en ook geen vertrouwen in het voor hen 'vreemde' 
twee-putten ontwerp. Ook hadden zij weinig vertrouwen in de kwaliteit 
van de voorziening, die zou worden geleverd door particuliere 
ondernemers die door de staatsoverheid waren uitgezocht. Er ontstond een 
Kafkaiaanse situatie: er werden latrines gebouwd die men niet wilde en 
men kon alleen toezien hoe het programma werd gerealiseerd. 
Ook in het IDSMT programma werden risico's genomen, doordat 
men naliet van te voren vast te stellen of er wel behoefte zou zijn aan de 
marktvoorzieningen en de winkelcentra voor de kostprijs die in het project 
was berekend. Het gevolg was dat de voorzieningen in verschillende 
steden ongebruikt bleven of onder de kostprijs werden verkocht of 
verhuurd. 
De technologiekeuze illustreert eveneens dat men onvoldoende 
rekening hield met de vraag. Een voorbeeld is de eerder genoemde twee-
putten latrine. De begunstigden hadden in feite veel liever een 
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conventionele spoelpot met de bekende septische tank gekregen in plaats 
van de water-besparende spoelpot gemaakt van glasfiber en de twee putten 
die wisselend gebruikt zouden moeten worden. De kostbare ontwerpen 
voor drinkwatersystemen van het Department of Urban Water Supply and 
Drainage kwamen de gemeenten duur te staan. Er werd niet gezocht naar 
goedkopere alternatieven, terwijl die in feite voorhanden zijn. Bovendien 
werd aangetoond dat er in een aantal gevallen politieke druk is uitgeoefend 
om de projecten zo kostbaar mogelijk te maken, daarbij uiteraard geen 
rekening houdend met degenen die daarvoor moesten betalen. 
De staatsorganen voor huisvesting en stedelijke ontwikkeling 
Deze studie heeft laten zien dat de staatsinstanties voor huisvesting en 
stedelijke ontwikkeling een opmerkelijke groei hebben doorgemaakt. Zij 
werden groot en financieel machtig. De KHB, de KUWS&DB en de KSCB 
lijken veel op het Departement van Openbare Werken. Dat is ook niet 
verwonderlijk, omdat de instanties geen eigen technische staf hebben maar 
deze beschikbaar wordt gesteld door dit departement. Deze staf heeft 
vooral oog voor het technisch ontwerp, de degelijkheid van de constructies 
en de inachtneming van de civiel-technische conventies, vastgelegd in de 
technische handleidingen van het departement. Bij de staf is weinig kennis 
en interesse aanwezig met betrekking tot oplossingen die goedkoop zijn en 
die toegesneden zijn op de financiële situatie van lage inkomensgroepen. 
Zij vonden de ontwerpen veelal te goedkoop en zowel de KHB als de 
KSCB hebben voortdurend geprobeerd de kostenplafonds voor sociale 
woningbouw te verhogen. Veelal met succes. Daarmee verloren deze 
boards hun missie uit het oog: sociale woningbouw voor lage 
inkomensgroepen. 
Het desinteresse van met name de KHB in sociale woningbouw 
heeft rampzalige gevolgen gehad. Uit de uitvoerige beschrijving van twee 
omvangrijke sociale woningbouwprogramma's bleek dat er geen 
betrokkenheid was van de doelgroep, de begunstigden verkeerd werden 
geselecteerd, de huizen bij oplevering van slechte kwaliteit waren, er bij de 
bouw geen toezicht was uitgeoefend en basisvoorzieningen op de lokaties 
ontbraken. Ook werden bij deze programma's diverse onregelmatigheden 
gerapporteerd: onderhandse aanbesteding, onjuiste voortgangs- en 
toeleveringsrapportage, onjuiste opleveringscertificaten en betaling van 
smeergelden aan locale politici en ambtenaren. Bovendien werden er 
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goede onderhandse zaken gedaan bij de aan- en verkoop van land voor 
deze projecten. 
De KHB, KSCB, KUWS&DB en de DMA lijden stuk voor stuk aan 
personeelsgebrek. Een ernstiger probleem is echter dat hun financiële en 
administratieve systeem uitermate zwak is. Er worden geen project-
rekeningen bijgehouden, er is geen controle op de liquiditeit, de inkomsten 
en uitgaven worden verkeerd geboekt, overboekingen worden slecht 
geadministreerd, de gelden van het ene project worden doorgesluisd naar 
het andere, men spant zich niet in om leningen terug te vorderen en in de 
meeste jaren zijn er geen accountantsrapporten gemaakt. Het gevolg is dat 
slechts 55-60% van de leningen voor huisvestingsprojecten wordt terug-
gevorderd. Op de drinkwaterprojecten moest de staatsoverheid ongeveer 
50 procent toeleggen. Met andere woorden, de staatsoverheid heeft in de 
periode 1980-94 onvrijwillig ongeveer 10 miljard rupies moeten uitgeven 
om de tekorten in deze sector(en) weg te werken. 
Dít alles gaat vanzelfsprekend ten koste van de begunstigden, de 
belastingbetalers en de gemeenten, die uiteindelijk voor de kosten moeten 
opdraaien. De tragiek is dat velen zich daarvan niet bewust zijn en zich 
passief opstellen. De gemeenten werden bovendien nauwelijks betrokken 
bij de beslissingen die voor hen vergaande gevolgen hadden. Slechts in het 
IDSMT- en het NRY-programma lag dit anders. 
De rol van de HUDCO is lange tijd positief geweest, omdat de 
financieringsvoorwaarden ervoor zorgden dat een deel van de investerin-
gen ten goede zouden komen aan de lage inkomensgroepen. Helaas hebben 
de toegenomen concurrentie met andere banken en de vergrote druk om 
financieel te presteren ertoe geleid dat HUDCO de voorwaarden minder 
stringent is gaan hanteren, zij meer projecten is gaan financieren die niet 
specifiek lage inkomensgroepen dienen, zij gemakkelijker aanvullende 
financiering is gaan verstrekken voor slecht lopende projecten en zij 
geleidelijk meer politieke inmenging is gaan toelaten en ook zelfs is gaan 
koesteren. 
De rol van de ambtenaren en de politiek 
Het topkader van de bureaucratie is opgeleid volgens Weberiaanse en 
westerse beginselen van openbaar bestuur. Tot aan de onafhankelijkheid 
had dit kader grote macht en rapporteerde het alleen aan de machthebbers. 
Sinds de onafhankelijkheid is de relatie met de politiek voor deze groep 
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van ambtenaren een nieuwe dimensie geworden. Deze relatie heeft geleid 
tot een voortdurend spanningsveld, wantrouwen en strijd om de macht. 
Terwijl het ambtenarenkorps een rationeel, planmatig en uitvoerings-
gericht beleid voorstond, hadden de politici een andere benadering. Zij 
wilden politiek scoren, dus dingen kunnen doen en laten zien op het 
moment dat en daar waar hen dat goed dunkte. Deze studie heeft laten zien 
dat de machtsstrijd tussen het ambtelijk apparaat en de politiek in het 
voordeel van de laatste is beslist. Het ambtelijk apparaat raakte verdeeld in 
een groep die de oude waarden wenste te handhaven en een groep die zich 
'coöperatief opstelde en daarmee vele voordelen verwierf. Het lange tijd 
beleidsgerichte en planmatige openbaar bestuur werd uiteindelijk 
omgevormd tot een sterk discretionair bestuur. Daarmee kwam een einde 
aan de scheiding der machten, de Trias Politica. Wat is overgebleven is een 
voor onafhankelijkheid strijdend wethandhavend apparaat. Maar ook 
daarbij zijn tekenen van politieke interventie. 
Het politieke toneel wordt nu beheerst door financieel sterke 
lobbies, met weinig electoraal verantwoordelijkheidsbesef. De partijen 
bestaan uit een amalgaam van fracties die deze of gene lobby steunen, 
zelfs dwars door de partijen heen. In de steden hebben projectontwikke-
laars, drankondernemingen, industrie- en zakenfamilies grote invloed. 
Daarnaast zijn er de agrarische, mijnbouw-, koffie- en theelobbies. Het is 
nogal vanzelfsprekend dat in een systeem waarin sponsoring van grote 
betekenis is, wederdiensten geleverd moeten worden die bestaan uit 
contracten, vergunningen en non-interventie. De verliezers in deze machts-
constellatie zijn de lage inkomensgroepen en de urbane middenklasse, bij 
wie de frustratie over het politiek bestel sterk is toegenomen. 
Het moge ook duidelijk zijn dat er voor vijfjarenplannen en andere 
beleidsdocumenten geen plaats kan zijn als gelden worden verhandeld 
voor contracten, projecten en vergunningen. Deze documenten vormen 
alleen maar een rem op het discretionaire bestuur, dat de politici nodig 
hebben om in het zadel te blijven. De vele uitspraken van hoge over-
heidsambtenaren hebben dit bevestigd. 
De rol en depositie van de gemeenten 
Terwijl de staatsinstanties groeiden, werden de meeste gemeenten 
verwaarloosd. Hun financiële positie ging per saldo achteruit, doordat zij 
bepaalde belastingen niet meer konden innen. Ook verzwakte hun positie 
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doordat diverse functies overgingen naar nieuw gevormde staats-
instellingen. Een feit is echter ook dat de gemeenten zich nogal passief 
opstelden, de burgerij apathisch bleef en hun politieke leiders middelmatig 
en kortzichtig waren. Het beoogde locale zelfbestuur heeft daardoor weinig 
vorm en inhoud gekregen. De centrale overheid realiseerde zich eind jaren 
tachtig dat het tij gekeerd moest worden en daarom zijn er inmiddels 
wettelijke maatregelen getroffen om meer bevoegdheden en middelen aan 
de gemeenten (terug) te geven. Toch zal er ook nog aanzienlijke politieke 
druk van de centrale overheid uitgeoefend moeten worden om de staats-
overheden zo ver te krijgen dat decentralisatie ook werkelijk plaatsvindt. 
De gemeentewetten moeten daartoe worden gewijzigd, de staatsgelden 
moeten worden herverdeeld en het toekenningssysteem gerationaliseerd 
(Report of the State Finance Commission for Urban Local Bodies, 1996; 
Mengers, 1997). 
Slotopmerkingen 
Het zou passend zijn om aan het eind van een omvangrijk onderzoek 
beleidsaanbevelingen te doen. Het is bovendien verleidelijk en ik zou 
bestuurders en beleidsmakers zelfs een dienst bewijzen door een lijst van 
suggesties te geven die het functioneren van overheidsdiensten zouden 
kunnen verbeteren en het beleid voor huisvesting en stedelijke 
ontwikkeling doeltreffender zouden maken. Toch is dit in deze studie niet 
gebeurd. De meeste deskundigen en ambtenaren zijn zichzelf terdege 
bewust van de veranderingen die nodig zijn. 
Er zijn twee zaken die ik hier in plaats daarvan onder de aandacht 
wil brengen: de achteruitgang van het politieke bestel en de corruptie. 
Beide vormen het zand in de machine van goed bestuur en beleidsmatige 
stedelijke ontwikkeling. De Principal Secretary van het department voor 
stedelijke ontwikkeling provoceerde in 1997 de deelnemers aan een 
seminar met een aantal vragen: 'Waarom heeft de stedelijke ontwikkeling 
zich niet zo voltrokken zoals we wilden? Wat is er mis met het beleid? 
Waar moeten we dit beleid aanpassen en ons bestuur verbeteren?'. Het was 
iedereen duidelijk dat hijzelf het antwoord beter kent dan de vergadering. 
De stilte die daarop volgde was veelbetekenend. Later interpreteerde hij 
die stilte als een teken van capitulatie, angst, morele zwakte en 
'intellectuele corruptie'. Waar hij op doelde is dat het in het vigerende 
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politieke bestel, waarin politieke willekeur en machtige lobbies belangrijke 
bestuurlijke beslissingen bepalen, niet mogelijk is rationeel, beleids- en 
planmatig te besturen. De meeste politici, bestuurders en ambtenaren zijn 
in de eerste plaats uit op de behartiging van persoonlijke belangen en op 
die van invloedrijke minderheden; zij houden weinig of geen rekening met 
de belangen van de lage inkomensgroepen en de stedelijke middenklasse. 
Het tweede aspect - de corruptie - is in deze studie nauwelijks 
expliciet aan de orde gekomen. Corruptie is echter overal en op alle 
niveaus aanwezig. Er zou dan ook een lange lijst vervaardigd kunnen 
worden van allerlei vormen van corruptie, inclusief waar en hoe zij 
plaatsvindt: van het krijgen van een contract tot het aanvragen van een 
telefoonaansluiting. De literatuur over corruptie in India en daarbuiten is 
omvangrijk. Wat essentieel is, is dat de corruptie een zichzelf versterkend 
en uitbreidend verschijnsel is. Steeds meer personen moeten eraan mee 
doen om haar effectief te maken en de voordelen ervan zijn inmiddels zo 
aantrekkelijk dat men de neiging heeft steeds verder te gaan. Op de lagere 
niveaus binnen een organisatie is dat ook niet verwonderlijk, omdat de 
salarissen sterk zijn achtergebleven bij de prijsontwikkelingen. Maar veel 
omvangrijkere inkomsten worden op hogere niveaus verkregen. En zodra 
de extra inkomsten deel gaan uit maken van een consumptiepatroon, is er 
geen weg meer terug. De auto, het huis in aanbouw, de bruiloft en de 
bruidschat worden dan geheel of gedeeltelijk op die manier gefinancierd. 
Corruptie, enerzijds, en efficiënte, goed geoliede en prestaties leverende 
overheidsdiensten, anderzijds, verdragen elkaar echter niet. Het één vraagt 
om zwakke, oncontroleerbare en niet inzichtelijke financiële en 
operationele systemen, het ander om gedetailleerde boekhoudingen en 
openbaarheid, alsook om vaste, controleerbare en inzichtelijke procedures. 
Pas wanneer de corruptie zal zijn teruggebracht tot een acceptabel niveau, 
zijn institutionele verbeteringen te verwezenlijken. 
Het laatste woord is helaas aan het electoraat, dat naar mijn mening 
uiteindelijk een einde zal moeten maken aan deze situatie. 'De oplossing is 
in handen van de mensen. Zij moeten wakker worden en zich verenigen 
om te vechten tegen de corruptie in het openbare leven. Niemand hoeft ze 
ook te leren hoe ze dat moeten doen', was het commentaar van M.N. Jois, 
een voormalig vrijheidsstrijder in Karnataka (Times of India, 3 August 
1997). 
Curriculum Vitae 
Harry Mengers was born in Doetinchem, the Netherlands, on 3 June 1956. 
He acquired his Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering in 1977 from the 
Technical College in Arnhem and worked for several years in Nepal and 
the Netherlands. In 1982, he started his study of Human Geography at the 
University of Nijmegen, specialising in the Human Geography of 
Developing Countries. He conducted field work in Guinea Bissau, West 
Africa, in 1986 on the basis of which he prepared his M.A. thesis. In 1987, 
he received his Master's Degree (Honours). Since then, Mr. Mengers has 
worked as an academic staff member with the Institute for Housing and 
Urban Development Studies (IHS) and has worked in several Asian and 
African countries. The IHS offers post-graduate and master degree courses 
for professionals from developing countries in the fields of urban 
environment, urban management and housing. The IHS has also 
established collaboration with sister institutes in developing countries. In 
this context, Mr. Mengers was posted in 1992 as Project Leader for a 
Decentralised Training Programme in Bangalore, India. There he worked 
closely with the Government of Karnataka, the Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation Ltd. (HUDCO) and the municipalities aiming to 
enhance their management capacity through training and research. It was 
this posting that was the start of his Ph.D. work on housing and urban 
development policies in the state of Karnataka. 

Stellingen 
behorende bij het proefschrift 
'Urban Development in the State Karnataka, India; 
Policies, Actors and Outcome' 
van Harry A. Mengers 
te verdedigen op 12 februari 1998 
des namiddags om 1.30 uur precies 
aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen 
Stellingen 
behorende bij het proefschrift 
'Urban Development in the State Karnataka, India; 
Policies, Actors and Outcome' 
van Harry A. Mengers 
te verdedigen op 12 februari 1998 
des namiddags om 1.30 uur precies 
aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen 
(nederlands) 
1. Het staatsbeleid voor huisvesting en stedelijke ontwikkeling in India dient 
om aan de eisen van de centrale overheid te voldoen maar toont weinig 
verband met de uitvoering van huisvestings- en stedelijke ontwikkelings-
programma's door diezelfde staatsoverheden. 
2. De doeltreffendheid van huisvestings- en stedelijke ontwikkelings-
programma's in de deelstaat Karnataka (India) kan beter verklaard 
worden door een analyse van de verwachte voordelen, die betrokken 
ambtenaren en politici denken te verkrijgen door de uitvoering van deze 
programma's, dan door het beleid van de verantwoordelijke Staats-
departementen. 
3. De ontwikkeling van de wetenschap zou gebaat zijn met de vervanging 
van het woord 'theorie' door het woord 'vertelling'. 
4. De gedragspatronen van chimpansees verschaffen een uiterst bniikbare 
analogie voor studies op het terrein van de urbane sociologie en 
politicologie. 
5. De oorzaak van het 'sanitatie' probleem in India is de ontkenning van het 
bestaan van menselijke uitwerpselen. 
6. Chaos is de ultieme structuur van complexiteit 
7. Het wetenschappelijk model is een teken van intellectuele luiheid. 
8. De Popperiaanse onderzoeksmethode (d.i. de falsificatie van theorieën) 
ondergraaft zichzelf door haar traagheid. 
9. Het gebniik van mobiele telefoons door mannen in openbare ruimten is 
een moderne vorm van territoriaal gedrag. 
10. Agressieve gevoelens van mannen jegens vrouwen zouden verminderen 
als borstvoeding aan zuigelingen van het mannelijk geslacht langer 
voortgezet zou kunnen worden. 
11. Sommige reclamemakers menen dat koopgedrag wordt gedreven door 
libido. 
12. Het gemopper van treinreizigers is niet veel meer dan het ventileren van 
alledaagse frustraties en heeft weinig te maken met de kwaliteit van de 
dienstverlening van de Nederlandse Spoorwegen. 


This book provides an overv iew of the housing and urban deveiopmen 
policies of the Government of Karnataka and a detailed analysis of the 
schemes employed to implement these policies between 1980-94 in 172 
municipal i t ies. The study shows that the output (in quanti tat ive terms) has 
been acceptable and, in some cases, even commendable . However, the 
outcome (with regard to the policy and programme objectives) has been 
far f rom satisfactory. 
Several factors are addressed that explain this situation. One major 
factor is that the policies wh ich were laid down in national and state five-
year plans and other government documents did not serve as a guide for 
the selection and implementat ion of government schemes. Once in 
implementat ion, the agencies responsible for the schemes demonstrated 
l itt le concern for cost-efficiency, good f inancial and project management, 
and loan recovery. 
Some of the lapses in proper implementat ion can be attr ibuted to 
the weaknesses of the implement ing state agencies. However, the author 
argues that w i th in the current weak polit ical system, both politicians and 
bureaucrats all ied to them seek to enlarge their control over the allocation 
of material favours and transfer of government funds. This control not only 
helps in sett l ing polit ical equations but also serves personal benefits. 
Combined w i th a g rowing degree of corrupt ion in the public sector, there 
are suff icient forces that constrain policy or objective-driven urban 
development , and, in addi t ion, planned, transparent and rational decision 
making. What was intended is, thus, a far cry f rom what can be found on 
the ground. The case-studies presented in this book provide revealing 
evidence of this. 
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